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Relations are guided by investment- uncertainty makes now key

The future of U.S.-Venezuela relations remains uncertain in the early days of Maduro The prospects for improved relations between the U S and Venezuela appear rather dim. Maduro's rhetoric directed at Washington has been notably tough and aggressive In the case of the U S and Venezuela, trade and direct investments will continue to guide the bilateral agenda Venezuela is living a defining moment

The future of U.S.-Venezuela relations remains uncertain The prospects for improved relations appear rather dim. Maduro's rhetoric has been notably tough trade and direct investments will continue to guide the bilateral agenda. Venezuela is living a defining moment.

Q: The future of U.S.-Venezuela relations remains uncertain in the early days of the Nicolás Maduro administration. Maduro has voiced a desire for "respectful relations" with the United States, though Washington has still not recognized his government. The United States has denied that it is considering sanctions against Venezuela, and Venezuelan authorities recently arrested a U.S. citizen on accusations of attempting to spark social unrest. The State Department has denied any efforts to destabilize the Venezuelan government. Will U.S.-Venezuela relations be better or worse under Maduro than they were under Hugo Chávez? What do Maduro's cabinet picks portend about the future of bilateral relations? Should businesses be more worried about political risk in Venezuela now than they were when Chávez was alive?¶ A: Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue: "The prospects for improved relations between the United States and Venezuela under the Maduro administration now appear rather dim. Maduro's rhetoric directed at Washington has been notably tough and aggressive, as he seeks to shore up support among the Chavista base. Arresting a U.S. citizen and accusing him of stirring up trouble in Venezuela is a vintage Chávez tactic, aimed at diverting attention from the country's myriad, fundamental problems. Lacking Chávez's political skills and common touch, Maduro is in a particularly shaky position, compounded by questions of legitimacy following the April 14 elections. To date, personnel picks and policy signals coming out of the administration have been confusing and mixed. Some in Maduro's team are hardliners, while others, such as Calixto Ortega--the recently appointed representative in Washington--are more open and moderate. Ortega, for example, was very active in the so-called Boston Group, an effort that sought to facilitate dialogue between Chavista and opposition lawmakers. As long as Maduro's political standing remains precarious, he will be severely constrained in his ability to pursue closer ties with the United States. There is no appetite or interest in Washington to adopt punitive measures and apply sanctions against Venezuela. In light of Maduro's confrontational rhetoric and actions--and disturbing incidents of violence--no one is calling for a rapprochement. Still, assuming that things begin to settle down, and given that other governments have already recognized Maduro, it would be surprising if Washington didn't eventually come around and deal with the practical reality."¶ A: Gustavo Roosen, chairman of the Advisory Board of Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) in Caracas: "The U.S. embargo on Cuba has helped the Castro brothers to hide the total failure of their economic system from their citizens and the world. First Chávez, and now Maduro, are the Castros' pupils and are following in their footsteps. They have randomly attacked the United States based on unsubstantiated evidence to justify the collapse of their socialist model. With now-limited resources, members of Maduro's cabinet are beginning to mention efficiency and productivity as the key to solving complex problems, such as the country's electricity failures. Unlike the fundamentalist views of former Finance Minister Jorge Giordani, Nelson Merentes maintained a positive relationship with the Venezuelan private banking sector during his time as central bank president. This attitude could be expanded to the rest of the economy. The United States has taken the wise step of delaying recognition of the election results until a full satisfactory audit is conducted. However, as the saying goes, countries have no friends, but only interests. In the case of the United States and Venezuela, trade and direct investments will continue to guide the bilateral agenda. Exchange restrictions and the recent devaluation could affect the long-term outlook of multinational companies toward Venezuela. In fact, the first-quarter earnings of several large U.S. companies were negatively affected as a result of the February devaluation of the bolivar. Venezuela is living a defining moment. The results of the April election suggest that under the guidance of UNASUR partners, public policy could move toward a model closer to that of Brazil."

<h4>Relations are guided by investment- uncertainty makes now key</h4><p><strong>Shifter and Roosen 5-1</strong>-13 [Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, Gustavo Roosen, chairman of the Advisory Board of Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) in Caracas, “What Does the Future Hold for U.S.-Venezuela Relations?” http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3297]</p><p>Q: <u><mark>The future of U.S.-Venezuela relations remains uncertain</mark> in the early days of</u> the Nicolás <u>Maduro</u> administration. Maduro has voiced a desire for "respectful relations" with the United States, though Washington has still not recognized his government. The United States has denied that it is considering sanctions against Venezuela, and Venezuelan authorities recently arrested a U.S. citizen on accusations of attempting to spark social unrest. The State Department has denied any efforts to destabilize the Venezuelan government. Will U.S.-Venezuela relations be better or worse under Maduro than they were under Hugo Chávez? What do Maduro's cabinet picks portend about the future of bilateral relations? Should businesses be more worried about political risk in Venezuela now than they were when Chávez was alive?¶ A: Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue: "<u><mark>The prospects for improved relations</mark> between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and Venezuela </u>under the Maduro administration now <u><mark>appear rather dim. Maduro's rhetoric</mark> directed at Washington <mark>has been notably tough</mark> and aggressive</u>, as he seeks to shore up support among the Chavista base. Arresting a U.S. citizen and accusing him of stirring up trouble in Venezuela is a vintage Chávez tactic, aimed at diverting attention from the country's myriad, fundamental problems. Lacking Chávez's political skills and common touch, Maduro is in a particularly shaky position, compounded by questions of legitimacy following the April 14 elections. To date, personnel picks and policy signals coming out of the administration have been confusing and mixed. Some in Maduro's team are hardliners, while others, such as Calixto Ortega--the recently appointed representative in Washington--are more open and moderate. Ortega, for example, was very active in the so-called Boston Group, an effort that sought to facilitate dialogue between Chavista and opposition lawmakers. As long as Maduro's political standing remains precarious, he will be severely constrained in his ability to pursue closer ties with the United States. There is no appetite or interest in Washington to adopt punitive measures and apply sanctions against Venezuela. In light of Maduro's confrontational rhetoric and actions--and disturbing incidents of violence--no one is calling for a rapprochement. Still, assuming that things begin to settle down, and given that other governments have already recognized Maduro, it would be surprising if Washington didn't eventually come around and deal with the practical reality."¶ A: Gustavo Roosen, chairman of the Advisory Board of Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) in Caracas: "The U.S. embargo on Cuba has helped the Castro brothers to hide the total failure of their economic system from their citizens and the world. First Chávez, and now Maduro, are the Castros' pupils and are following in their footsteps. They have randomly attacked the United States based on unsubstantiated evidence to justify the collapse of their socialist model. With now-limited resources, members of Maduro's cabinet are beginning to mention efficiency and productivity as the key to solving complex problems, such as the country's electricity failures. Unlike the fundamentalist views of former Finance Minister Jorge Giordani, Nelson Merentes maintained a positive relationship with the Venezuelan private banking sector during his time as central bank president. This attitude could be expanded to the rest of the economy. The United States has taken the wise step of delaying recognition of the election results until a full satisfactory audit is conducted. However, as the saying goes, countries have no friends, but only interests. <u>In the case of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and Venezuela, <mark>trade and direct investments will continue to guide the bilateral agenda</u>.</mark> Exchange restrictions and the recent devaluation could affect the long-term outlook of multinational companies toward Venezuela. In fact, the first-quarter earnings of several large U.S. companies were negatively affected as a result of the February devaluation of the bolivar. <u><mark>Venezuela is living a defining moment</u>.</mark> The results of the April election suggest that under the guidance of UNASUR partners, public policy could move toward a model closer to that of Brazil."</p>

Shifter and Roosen 5-1-13 [Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, Gustavo Roosen, chairman of the Advisory Board of Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) in Caracas, “What Does the Future Hold for U.S.-Venezuela Relations?” http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3297]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Shifter and Roosen 5-1-13 [Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, Gustavo Roosen, chairman of the Advisory Board of Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) in Caracas, “What Does the Future Hold for U.S.-Venezuela Relations?” http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3297] fulltext: Q: The future of U.S.-Venezuela relations remains uncertain in the early days of the Nicolás Maduro administration. Maduro has voiced a desire for "respectful relations" with the United States, though Washington has still not recognized his government. The United States has denied that it is considering sanctions against Venezuela, and Venezuelan authorities recently arrested a U.S. citizen on accusations of attempting to spark social unrest. The State Department has denied any efforts to destabilize the Venezuelan government. Will U.S.-Venezuela relations be better or worse under Maduro than they were under Hugo Chávez? What do Maduro's cabinet picks portend about the future of bilateral relations? Should businesses be more worried about political risk in Venezuela now than they were when Chávez was alive?¶ A: Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue: "The prospects for improved relations between the United States and Venezuela under the Maduro administration now appear rather dim. Maduro's rhetoric directed at Washington has been notably tough and aggressive, as he seeks to shore up support among the Chavista base. Arresting a U.S. citizen and accusing him of stirring up trouble in Venezuela is a vintage Chávez tactic, aimed at diverting attention from the country's myriad, fundamental problems. Lacking Chávez's political skills and common touch, Maduro is in a particularly shaky position, compounded by questions of legitimacy following the April 14 elections. To date, personnel picks and policy signals coming out of the administration have been confusing and mixed. Some in Maduro's team are hardliners, while others, such as Calixto Ortega--the recently appointed representative in Washington--are more open and moderate. Ortega, for example, was very active in the so-called Boston Group, an effort that sought to facilitate dialogue between Chavista and opposition lawmakers. As long as Maduro's political standing remains precarious, he will be severely constrained in his ability to pursue closer ties with the United States. There is no appetite or interest in Washington to adopt punitive measures and apply sanctions against Venezuela. In light of Maduro's confrontational rhetoric and actions--and disturbing incidents of violence--no one is calling for a rapprochement. Still, assuming that things begin to settle down, and given that other governments have already recognized Maduro, it would be surprising if Washington didn't eventually come around and deal with the practical reality."¶ A: Gustavo Roosen, chairman of the Advisory Board of Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) in Caracas: "The U.S. embargo on Cuba has helped the Castro brothers to hide the total failure of their economic system from their citizens and the world. First Chávez, and now Maduro, are the Castros' pupils and are following in their footsteps. They have randomly attacked the United States based on unsubstantiated evidence to justify the collapse of their socialist model. With now-limited resources, members of Maduro's cabinet are beginning to mention efficiency and productivity as the key to solving complex problems, such as the country's electricity failures. Unlike the fundamentalist views of former Finance Minister Jorge Giordani, Nelson Merentes maintained a positive relationship with the Venezuelan private banking sector during his time as central bank president. This attitude could be expanded to the rest of the economy. The United States has taken the wise step of delaying recognition of the election results until a full satisfactory audit is conducted. However, as the saying goes, countries have no friends, but only interests. In the case of the United States and Venezuela, trade and direct investments will continue to guide the bilateral agenda. Exchange restrictions and the recent devaluation could affect the long-term outlook of multinational companies toward Venezuela. In fact, the first-quarter earnings of several large U.S. companies were negatively affected as a result of the February devaluation of the bolivar. Venezuela is living a defining moment. The results of the April election suggest that under the guidance of UNASUR partners, public policy could move toward a model closer to that of Brazil." [/INST] <h4>Relations are guided by investment- uncertainty makes now key</h4><p><strong>Shifter and Roosen 5-1</strong>-13 [Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, Gustavo Roosen, chairman of the Advisory Board of Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) in Caracas, “What Does the Future Hold for U.S.-Venezuela Relations?” http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3297]</p><p>Q: <u><mark>The future of U.S.-Venezuela relations remains uncertain</mark> in the early days of</u> the Nicolás <u>Maduro</u> administration. Maduro has voiced a desire for "respectful relations" with the United States, though Washington has still not recognized his government. The United States has denied that it is considering sanctions against Venezuela, and Venezuelan authorities recently arrested a U.S. citizen on accusations of attempting to spark social unrest. The State Department has denied any efforts to destabilize the Venezuelan government. Will U.S.-Venezuela relations be better or worse under Maduro than they were under Hugo Chávez? What do Maduro's cabinet picks portend about the future of bilateral relations? Should businesses be more worried about political risk in Venezuela now than they were when Chávez was alive?¶ A: Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue: "<u><mark>The prospects for improved relations</mark> between the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and Venezuela </u>under the Maduro administration now <u><mark>appear rather dim. Maduro's rhetoric</mark> directed at Washington <mark>has been notably tough</mark> and aggressive</u>, as he seeks to shore up support among the Chavista base. Arresting a U.S. citizen and accusing him of stirring up trouble in Venezuela is a vintage Chávez tactic, aimed at diverting attention from the country's myriad, fundamental problems. Lacking Chávez's political skills and common touch, Maduro is in a particularly shaky position, compounded by questions of legitimacy following the April 14 elections. To date, personnel picks and policy signals coming out of the administration have been confusing and mixed. Some in Maduro's team are hardliners, while others, such as Calixto Ortega--the recently appointed representative in Washington--are more open and moderate. Ortega, for example, was very active in the so-called Boston Group, an effort that sought to facilitate dialogue between Chavista and opposition lawmakers. As long as Maduro's political standing remains precarious, he will be severely constrained in his ability to pursue closer ties with the United States. There is no appetite or interest in Washington to adopt punitive measures and apply sanctions against Venezuela. In light of Maduro's confrontational rhetoric and actions--and disturbing incidents of violence--no one is calling for a rapprochement. Still, assuming that things begin to settle down, and given that other governments have already recognized Maduro, it would be surprising if Washington didn't eventually come around and deal with the practical reality."¶ A: Gustavo Roosen, chairman of the Advisory Board of Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración (IESA) in Caracas: "The U.S. embargo on Cuba has helped the Castro brothers to hide the total failure of their economic system from their citizens and the world. First Chávez, and now Maduro, are the Castros' pupils and are following in their footsteps. They have randomly attacked the United States based on unsubstantiated evidence to justify the collapse of their socialist model. With now-limited resources, members of Maduro's cabinet are beginning to mention efficiency and productivity as the key to solving complex problems, such as the country's electricity failures. Unlike the fundamentalist views of former Finance Minister Jorge Giordani, Nelson Merentes maintained a positive relationship with the Venezuelan private banking sector during his time as central bank president. This attitude could be expanded to the rest of the economy. The United States has taken the wise step of delaying recognition of the election results until a full satisfactory audit is conducted. However, as the saying goes, countries have no friends, but only interests. <u>In the case of the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>and Venezuela, <mark>trade and direct investments will continue to guide the bilateral agenda</u>.</mark> Exchange restrictions and the recent devaluation could affect the long-term outlook of multinational companies toward Venezuela. In fact, the first-quarter earnings of several large U.S. companies were negatively affected as a result of the February devaluation of the bolivar. <u><mark>Venezuela is living a defining moment</u>.</mark> The results of the April election suggest that under the guidance of UNASUR partners, public policy could move toward a model closer to that of Brazil."</p> </s>

(__) State Department shifting focus to North Korea now.

) Senior U.S. officials is going to try and take the focus on North Korea in a different direction toward diplomacy, as part of an administration-wide effort to calm tensions with North Korea. Now Nuland is going to send the message “this is time for diplomacy” and urge North Korea to stop threats and get back on the peace train, Nuland is going to be setting up the fact Kerry is in Asia next week and will be talking about “finding a diplomatic way forward

(“Sources: State Department will shift North Korea focus to diplomacy” April 4th, 2013 CNN Foreign Affairs Reporter Elise Labott http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/04/sources-state-department-will-shift-north-korea-focus-to-diplomacy/) Senior U.S. officials tell CNN that at the State Department briefing Thursday, spokeswoman Victoria Nuland is going to try and take the focus on North Korea in a different direction toward diplomacy, as part of an administration-wide effort to calm tensions with North Korea. The U.S. has been saying its military actions have all been defensive in nature and focused on the U.S. protecting its allies and its homeland. Now Nuland is going to send the message “this is time for diplomacy” and urge North Korea to stop threats and get back on the peace train, one official said. Nuland is going to be setting up the fact Kerry is in Asia next week and will be talking about “finding a diplomatic way forward,” the official said.

<h4>(__) State Department shifting focus to North Korea now. </h4><p><strong>Labott</strong>, CNN Foreign Affairs Reporter, <strong>2013</p><p></strong>(“Sources: State Department will shift North Korea focus to diplomacy” April 4th, 2013 CNN Foreign Affairs Reporter Elise Labott </p><p>http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/04/sources-state-department-will-shift-north-korea-focus-to-diplomacy/<u><strong>)</p><p>Senior U.S. officials </u></strong>tell CNN that at the State Department briefing Thursday, spokeswoman Victoria Nuland <u><strong>is going to try and take the focus on North Korea in a different direction toward diplomacy, as part of an administration-wide effort to calm tensions with North Korea.</p><p></u></strong>The U.S. has been saying its military actions have all been defensive in nature and focused on the U.S. protecting its allies and its homeland. <u><strong>Now Nuland is going to send the message “this is time for diplomacy” and urge North Korea to stop threats and get back on the peace train,</u></strong> one official said.</p><p><u><strong>Nuland is going to be setting up the fact Kerry is in Asia next week and will be talking about “finding a diplomatic way forward</u></strong>,” the official said.</p>

Labott, CNN Foreign Affairs Reporter, 2013

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Labott, CNN Foreign Affairs Reporter, 2013 fulltext: (“Sources: State Department will shift North Korea focus to diplomacy” April 4th, 2013 CNN Foreign Affairs Reporter Elise Labott http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/04/sources-state-department-will-shift-north-korea-focus-to-diplomacy/) Senior U.S. officials tell CNN that at the State Department briefing Thursday, spokeswoman Victoria Nuland is going to try and take the focus on North Korea in a different direction toward diplomacy, as part of an administration-wide effort to calm tensions with North Korea. The U.S. has been saying its military actions have all been defensive in nature and focused on the U.S. protecting its allies and its homeland. Now Nuland is going to send the message “this is time for diplomacy” and urge North Korea to stop threats and get back on the peace train, one official said. Nuland is going to be setting up the fact Kerry is in Asia next week and will be talking about “finding a diplomatic way forward,” the official said. [/INST] <h4>(__) State Department shifting focus to North Korea now. </h4><p><strong>Labott</strong>, CNN Foreign Affairs Reporter, <strong>2013</p><p></strong>(“Sources: State Department will shift North Korea focus to diplomacy” April 4th, 2013 CNN Foreign Affairs Reporter Elise Labott </p><p>http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/04/sources-state-department-will-shift-north-korea-focus-to-diplomacy/<u><strong>)</p><p>Senior U.S. officials </u></strong>tell CNN that at the State Department briefing Thursday, spokeswoman Victoria Nuland <u><strong>is going to try and take the focus on North Korea in a different direction toward diplomacy, as part of an administration-wide effort to calm tensions with North Korea.</p><p></u></strong>The U.S. has been saying its military actions have all been defensive in nature and focused on the U.S. protecting its allies and its homeland. <u><strong>Now Nuland is going to send the message “this is time for diplomacy” and urge North Korea to stop threats and get back on the peace train,</u></strong> one official said.</p><p><u><strong>Nuland is going to be setting up the fact Kerry is in Asia next week and will be talking about “finding a diplomatic way forward</u></strong>,” the official said.</p> </s>

Skolkovo key to global science cooperation

the Skolkovo center is being built at a very high rate Skolkovo will turn into a big settlement of scientists with living accommodation, streets, schools – and, of course, all kinds of scientific centers and laboratories The five priority branches in which the Skolkovo scientists will work are biomedicine, IT, space technologies, energy-saving technologies and nuclear technologies About 400 companies have already expressed a wish to take part in the Skolkovo project Such giants as the US Intel, Cisco and Boeing, the Finnish Nokia and the Dutch Phillips will invest in Skolkovo Skolkovo is an international project, not only a Russian one it is one of the most rapidly developing projects in Russia

Skolkovo is being built at a very high rate.” Skolkovo will turn into a big settlement of scientists with all centers and laboratories The five priority branches are biomedicine, IT, space energy and nuclear Such giants as the US Intel, Cisco and Boeing, will invest in Skolkovo Skolkovo is an international project

The centre of innovative technologies, which is currently being built in Skolkovo, a place near Moscow, will most likely host the summit of the G8 in 2014.President Dmitry Medvedev has ordered the Russian government to start preparations for this summit.The G8 is a non-official forum which unites the world’s most economically advanced democratic powers. Two years from now, Russia will be the chairing country in this forum. The Russian government believes that it will be logical to hold this summit in Skolkovo, this ‘town of scientists’. President Medvedev, who was the main initiator of creating a center of innovate technologies in Skolkovo, fully supports this idea.“It will be a good chance to show Russia’s latest achievements in science to the world,” Mr. Medvedev says. “I hope that the construction of the Skolkovo center will be over before the start of the summit. I can confirm that it is being built at a very high rate.”The decision to create a center of innovative technologies in Skolkovo was taken in the spring of 2010. It is planned that Skolkovo will turn into a big settlement of scientists with living accommodation, streets, schools – and, of course, all kinds of scientific centers and laboratories.The five priority branches in which the Skolkovo scientists will work are biomedicine, IT, space technologies, energy-saving technologies and nuclear technologies.About 400 companies have already expressed a wish to take part in the Skolkovo project. Such giants as the US Intel, Cisco and Boeing, the Finnish Nokia and the Dutch Phillips have already signed relevant documents that they will invest in the Skolkovo projects. In total, their investments will make many billions of dollars. Besides, a university of innovative technologies will be opened in Skolkovo. About 2,000 students will study there. The lectures will be read by the world’s leading professors. Vice President of the Skolkovo Foundation Seda Pumyanskaya says: “Skolkovo is an international project, not only a Russian one. At present, it is one of the most rapidly developing projects in Russia. I am glad that the G8 summit will be held in Skolkovo – it will be a good chance to show the world what Russia is capable of.”The last time that Russia hosted a summit of the G8 was in 2006. That time, the summit took place in Strelnya, a place near St. Petersburg.

<h4>Skolkovo key to global science cooperation</h4><p><strong><mark>RUSEM ’12</strong></mark> (Embassy of the Russian Federation to the UK. “Skolkovo – Russia’s ‘scientific capital’ - to host G8 summit”. May 4, 2012. http://www.rusemblon.org/foreignpolicy/3)</p><p>The centre of innovative technologies, which is currently being built in Skolkovo, a place near Moscow, will most likely host the summit of the G8 in 2014.President Dmitry Medvedev has ordered the Russian government to start preparations for this summit.The G8 is a non-official forum which unites the world’s most economically advanced democratic powers. Two years from now, Russia will be the chairing country in this forum. The Russian government believes that it will be logical to hold this summit in Skolkovo, this ‘town of scientists’. President Medvedev, who was the main initiator of creating a center of innovate technologies in Skolkovo, fully supports this idea.“It will be a good chance to show Russia’s latest achievements in science to the world,” Mr. Medvedev says. “I hope that the construction of <u>the <mark>Skolkovo</mark> center</u> will be over before the start of the summit. I can confirm that it <u><mark>is being built at a very high rate</u>.”</mark>The decision to create a center of innovative technologies in Skolkovo was taken in the spring of 2010. It is planned that <u><mark>Skolkovo will turn into a <strong>big settlement of scientists</strong> with</mark> living accommodation, streets, schools – and, of course, <mark>all</mark> kinds of scientific <mark>centers and laboratories</u></mark>.<u><mark>The five priority branches</mark> in which the Skolkovo scientists will work <mark>are biomedicine, IT, space</mark> technologies, <mark>energy</mark>-saving technologies <mark>and nuclear</mark> technologies</u>.<u>About 400 companies have already expressed a wish to take part in the Skolkovo project</u>. <u><mark>Such giants as the US Intel, Cisco and Boeing,</mark> the Finnish Nokia and the Dutch Phillips</u> have already signed relevant documents that they <u><mark>will invest in</u></mark> the <u><mark>Skolkovo</u></mark> projects. In total, their investments will make many billions of dollars. Besides, a university of innovative technologies will be opened in Skolkovo. About 2,000 students will study there. The lectures will be read by the world’s leading professors. Vice President of the Skolkovo Foundation Seda Pumyanskaya says:</p><p>“<u><mark>Skolkovo is an international project</mark>, not only a Russian one</u>. At present, <u>it is one of the most rapidly developing projects in Russia</u>. I am glad that the G8 summit will be held in Skolkovo – it will be a good chance to show the world what Russia is capable of.”The last time that Russia hosted a summit of the G8 was in 2006. That time, the summit took place in Strelnya, a place near St. Petersburg.</p>

RUSEM ’12 (Embassy of the Russian Federation to the UK. “Skolkovo – Russia’s ‘scientific capital’ - to host G8 summit”. May 4, 2012. http://www.rusemblon.org/foreignpolicy/3)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: RUSEM ’12 (Embassy of the Russian Federation to the UK. “Skolkovo – Russia’s ‘scientific capital’ - to host G8 summit”. May 4, 2012. http://www.rusemblon.org/foreignpolicy/3) fulltext: The centre of innovative technologies, which is currently being built in Skolkovo, a place near Moscow, will most likely host the summit of the G8 in 2014.President Dmitry Medvedev has ordered the Russian government to start preparations for this summit.The G8 is a non-official forum which unites the world’s most economically advanced democratic powers. Two years from now, Russia will be the chairing country in this forum. The Russian government believes that it will be logical to hold this summit in Skolkovo, this ‘town of scientists’. President Medvedev, who was the main initiator of creating a center of innovate technologies in Skolkovo, fully supports this idea.“It will be a good chance to show Russia’s latest achievements in science to the world,” Mr. Medvedev says. “I hope that the construction of the Skolkovo center will be over before the start of the summit. I can confirm that it is being built at a very high rate.”The decision to create a center of innovative technologies in Skolkovo was taken in the spring of 2010. It is planned that Skolkovo will turn into a big settlement of scientists with living accommodation, streets, schools – and, of course, all kinds of scientific centers and laboratories.The five priority branches in which the Skolkovo scientists will work are biomedicine, IT, space technologies, energy-saving technologies and nuclear technologies.About 400 companies have already expressed a wish to take part in the Skolkovo project. Such giants as the US Intel, Cisco and Boeing, the Finnish Nokia and the Dutch Phillips have already signed relevant documents that they will invest in the Skolkovo projects. In total, their investments will make many billions of dollars. Besides, a university of innovative technologies will be opened in Skolkovo. About 2,000 students will study there. The lectures will be read by the world’s leading professors. Vice President of the Skolkovo Foundation Seda Pumyanskaya says: “Skolkovo is an international project, not only a Russian one. At present, it is one of the most rapidly developing projects in Russia. I am glad that the G8 summit will be held in Skolkovo – it will be a good chance to show the world what Russia is capable of.”The last time that Russia hosted a summit of the G8 was in 2006. That time, the summit took place in Strelnya, a place near St. Petersburg. [/INST] <h4>Skolkovo key to global science cooperation</h4><p><strong><mark>RUSEM ’12</strong></mark> (Embassy of the Russian Federation to the UK. “Skolkovo – Russia’s ‘scientific capital’ - to host G8 summit”. May 4, 2012. http://www.rusemblon.org/foreignpolicy/3)</p><p>The centre of innovative technologies, which is currently being built in Skolkovo, a place near Moscow, will most likely host the summit of the G8 in 2014.President Dmitry Medvedev has ordered the Russian government to start preparations for this summit.The G8 is a non-official forum which unites the world’s most economically advanced democratic powers. Two years from now, Russia will be the chairing country in this forum. The Russian government believes that it will be logical to hold this summit in Skolkovo, this ‘town of scientists’. President Medvedev, who was the main initiator of creating a center of innovate technologies in Skolkovo, fully supports this idea.“It will be a good chance to show Russia’s latest achievements in science to the world,” Mr. Medvedev says. “I hope that the construction of <u>the <mark>Skolkovo</mark> center</u> will be over before the start of the summit. I can confirm that it <u><mark>is being built at a very high rate</u>.”</mark>The decision to create a center of innovative technologies in Skolkovo was taken in the spring of 2010. It is planned that <u><mark>Skolkovo will turn into a <strong>big settlement of scientists</strong> with</mark> living accommodation, streets, schools – and, of course, <mark>all</mark> kinds of scientific <mark>centers and laboratories</u></mark>.<u><mark>The five priority branches</mark> in which the Skolkovo scientists will work <mark>are biomedicine, IT, space</mark> technologies, <mark>energy</mark>-saving technologies <mark>and nuclear</mark> technologies</u>.<u>About 400 companies have already expressed a wish to take part in the Skolkovo project</u>. <u><mark>Such giants as the US Intel, Cisco and Boeing,</mark> the Finnish Nokia and the Dutch Phillips</u> have already signed relevant documents that they <u><mark>will invest in</u></mark> the <u><mark>Skolkovo</u></mark> projects. In total, their investments will make many billions of dollars. Besides, a university of innovative technologies will be opened in Skolkovo. About 2,000 students will study there. The lectures will be read by the world’s leading professors. Vice President of the Skolkovo Foundation Seda Pumyanskaya says:</p><p>“<u><mark>Skolkovo is an international project</mark>, not only a Russian one</u>. At present, <u>it is one of the most rapidly developing projects in Russia</u>. I am glad that the G8 summit will be held in Skolkovo – it will be a good chance to show the world what Russia is capable of.”The last time that Russia hosted a summit of the G8 was in 2006. That time, the summit took place in Strelnya, a place near St. Petersburg.</p> </s>

New investment restores positive relations

there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan relations to get back on track. An important aspect of this could be engagement on critical bilateral issues on trade, investment issues, and other commercial matters Congress is likely to maintain its strong oversight

there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan ¶ relations to get back on track. An important aspect of this could be engagement on critical bilateral issues on trade, investment issues, and other commercial matters

In the aftermath of the presidential election, there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan ¶ relations to get back on track. An important aspect of this could be restoring ambassadors in order to augment engagement on critical bilateral issues, not only on anti-drug, terrorism, and ¶ democracy concerns, but on trade, investment issues, and other commercial matters. ¶ With Chávez’s death and an upcoming presidential election, the 113th Congress is likely to maintain its strong oversight on the status of human rights and democracy in Venezuela as well as ¶ drug trafficking and terrorism concerns, including the extent of Venezuela’s relations with Iran.

<h4>New investment restores positive relations</h4><p><strong>Sullivan 4-9</strong>-13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf]</p><p>In the aftermath of the presidential election, <u><mark>there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan </u>¶<u> relations to get back on track. An important aspect of this could be</u> </mark>restoring ambassadors in order to augment <u><mark>engagement on critical bilateral issues</u></mark>, not only on anti-drug, terrorism, and ¶ democracy concerns, but <u><mark>on trade, investment issues, and other commercial matters</u></mark>. ¶ With Chávez’s death and an upcoming presidential election, the 113th <u>Congress is likely to maintain its strong oversight</u> on the status of human rights and democracy in Venezuela as well as ¶ drug trafficking and terrorism concerns, including the extent of Venezuela’s relations with Iran. </p>

Sullivan 4-9-13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Sullivan 4-9-13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf] fulltext: In the aftermath of the presidential election, there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan ¶ relations to get back on track. An important aspect of this could be restoring ambassadors in order to augment engagement on critical bilateral issues, not only on anti-drug, terrorism, and ¶ democracy concerns, but on trade, investment issues, and other commercial matters. ¶ With Chávez’s death and an upcoming presidential election, the 113th Congress is likely to maintain its strong oversight on the status of human rights and democracy in Venezuela as well as ¶ drug trafficking and terrorism concerns, including the extent of Venezuela’s relations with Iran. [/INST] <h4>New investment restores positive relations</h4><p><strong>Sullivan 4-9</strong>-13 [Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “Hugo Chávez’s Death: Implications for Venezuela and U.S. Relations,” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42989.pdf]</p><p>In the aftermath of the presidential election, <u><mark>there could be an opportunity for U.S.-Venezuelan </u>¶<u> relations to get back on track. An important aspect of this could be</u> </mark>restoring ambassadors in order to augment <u><mark>engagement on critical bilateral issues</u></mark>, not only on anti-drug, terrorism, and ¶ democracy concerns, but <u><mark>on trade, investment issues, and other commercial matters</u></mark>. ¶ With Chávez’s death and an upcoming presidential election, the 113th <u>Congress is likely to maintain its strong oversight</u> on the status of human rights and democracy in Venezuela as well as ¶ drug trafficking and terrorism concerns, including the extent of Venezuela’s relations with Iran. </p> </s>

(__) State department is focusing on global health diplomacy.

) the State Department is trying integrate the U.S. government’s international health aid efforts and help governments in developing countries create sustainable healthcare funding and care models. “There has been a convergence of a number of experiences, facts and understandings that have come together to convince, I think, a broader portion of the world community that we have learned how to take programs from a pilot to scale,” said Goosby, who helped develop care models for AIDS and HIV at San Francisco General Hospital in the 1980s before going on to oversee the Department of Health and Human Services AIDS programs. While poverty, political upheaval and related problems of terrorism remain as prime challenges to the U.S. multi-institution collaboration, planning and financial management has the potential to help developing countries craft programs around their needs. the U.S. and other governments are working with the World Bank to help countries with growing mining industries avoid the so-called resource curse and set aside perhaps three to five percent of government mining tax revenues for healthcare The huge diplomatic tool chest is to try to elevate the discussions with countries There’s also a renewed focus on public-private partnerships to both sustain and advance health programs Global health diplomacy “is a reflection of the conscious of the American people

(“State Department renews focus on global health diplomacy” February 28, 2013 | Anthony Brino, Associate Editor http://www.govhealthit.com/news/state-department-renews-focus-health-diplomacy) As the federal government works to reform America’s beleaguered health system, the State Department’s new Office of Global Health Diplomacy is trying integrate the U.S. government’s international health aid efforts and help governments in developing countries create sustainable healthcare funding and care models. “We really are at a remarkable moment,” Eric Goosby, MD, U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and recently named head of the Office of Global Health Diplomacy, said at a Kaiser Family Foundation forum. “There has been a convergence of a number of experiences, facts and understandings that have come together to convince, I think, a broader portion of the world community that we have learned how to take programs from a pilot to scale,” said Goosby, who helped develop care models for AIDS and HIV at San Francisco General Hospital in the 1980s before going on to oversee the Department of Health and Human Services AIDS programs. While poverty, political upheaval and related problems of terrorism remain as prime challenges to the U.S. and other industrialized countries providing sustainable healthcare aid, Goosby said, multi-institution collaboration, planning and financial management has the potential to help developing countries craft programs around their needs. [See also: HIE 2.0 closer than it might appear] For instance, he said, the U.S. and other governments are working with the World Bank to help countries with growing mining industries avoid the so-called resource curse and set aside perhaps three to five percent of government mining tax revenues for healthcare, as Botswana has done. In addition to on-the-ground aid — such as malaria, AIDS and maternal and children’s healthcare programs — Goosby said the emerging global health diplomacy paradigm model needs also to focus on technical cooperation and assistance, supporting the expansion of government health ministries and helping them design plans that meet their populations’ needs. “The huge diplomatic tool chest is to try to elevate the discussions with countries,” he said. There’s also a renewed focus on public-private partnerships to both sustain and advance health programs. “If we identify the profit interest with companies, they work better and deliver. If we don’t we find that after a year or two, it fades out.” Global health diplomacy “is a reflection of the conscious of the American people,” Goosby said. “We’ve really been given an opportunity to supply those scaled operations, allowing us to apply the science...and really move public health.” Indeed, global health development is being seen more and more as integral to U.S. international trade and security interests. “What exactly does maternal health, or immunizations, or the fight against HIV and AIDS have to do with foreign policy?" former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in 2010. "Well, my answer is everything.”

<h4>(__) State department is focusing on global health diplomacy.</h4><p><strong>Brino</strong>, Associate Editor, <strong>2013</p><p></strong>(“State Department renews focus on global health diplomacy” February 28, 2013 | Anthony Brino, Associate Editor http://www.govhealthit.com/news/state-department-renews-focus-health-diplomacy<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>As the federal government works to reform America’s beleaguered health system, <u><strong>the State Department</u></strong>’s new Office of Global Health Diplomacy <u><strong>is trying integrate the U.S. government’s international health aid efforts and help governments in developing countries create sustainable healthcare funding and care models.</p><p></u></strong>“We really are at a remarkable moment,” Eric Goosby, MD, U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and recently named head of the Office of Global Health Diplomacy, said at a Kaiser Family Foundation forum.</p><p><u><strong>“There has been a convergence of a number of experiences, facts and understandings that have come together to convince, I think, a broader portion of the world community that we have learned how to take programs from a pilot to scale,” said Goosby, who helped develop care models for AIDS and HIV at San Francisco General Hospital in the 1980s before going on to oversee the Department of Health and Human Services AIDS programs.</p><p>While poverty, political upheaval and related problems of terrorism remain as prime challenges to the U.S.</u></strong> and other industrialized countries providing sustainable healthcare aid, Goosby said, <u><strong>multi-institution collaboration, planning and financial management has the potential to help developing countries craft programs around their needs.</p><p></u></strong>[See also: HIE 2.0 closer than it might appear]</p><p>For instance, he said, <u><strong>the U.S. and other governments are working with the World Bank to help countries with growing mining industries avoid the so-called resource curse and set aside perhaps three to five percent of government mining tax revenues for healthcare</u></strong>, as Botswana has done.</p><p>In addition to on-the-ground aid — such as malaria, AIDS and maternal and children’s healthcare programs — Goosby said the emerging global health diplomacy paradigm model needs also to focus on technical cooperation and assistance, supporting the expansion of government health ministries and helping them design plans that meet their populations’ needs.</p><p>“<u><strong>The huge diplomatic tool chest is to try to elevate the discussions with countries</u></strong>,” he said. <u><strong>There’s also a renewed focus on public-private partnerships to both sustain and advance health programs</u></strong>. “If we identify the profit interest with companies, they work better and deliver. If we don’t we find that after a year or two, it fades out.”</p><p><u><strong>Global health diplomacy “is a reflection of the conscious of the American people</u></strong>,” Goosby said. “We’ve really been given an opportunity to supply those scaled operations, allowing us to apply the science...and really move public health.”</p><p>Indeed, global health development is being seen more and more as integral to U.S. international trade and security interests.</p><p>“What exactly does maternal health, or immunizations, or the fight against HIV and AIDS have to do with foreign policy?" former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in 2010<strong>. "Well, my answer is everything.” </p></strong>

Brino, Associate Editor, 2013

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Brino, Associate Editor, 2013 fulltext: (“State Department renews focus on global health diplomacy” February 28, 2013 | Anthony Brino, Associate Editor http://www.govhealthit.com/news/state-department-renews-focus-health-diplomacy) As the federal government works to reform America’s beleaguered health system, the State Department’s new Office of Global Health Diplomacy is trying integrate the U.S. government’s international health aid efforts and help governments in developing countries create sustainable healthcare funding and care models. “We really are at a remarkable moment,” Eric Goosby, MD, U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and recently named head of the Office of Global Health Diplomacy, said at a Kaiser Family Foundation forum. “There has been a convergence of a number of experiences, facts and understandings that have come together to convince, I think, a broader portion of the world community that we have learned how to take programs from a pilot to scale,” said Goosby, who helped develop care models for AIDS and HIV at San Francisco General Hospital in the 1980s before going on to oversee the Department of Health and Human Services AIDS programs. While poverty, political upheaval and related problems of terrorism remain as prime challenges to the U.S. and other industrialized countries providing sustainable healthcare aid, Goosby said, multi-institution collaboration, planning and financial management has the potential to help developing countries craft programs around their needs. [See also: HIE 2.0 closer than it might appear] For instance, he said, the U.S. and other governments are working with the World Bank to help countries with growing mining industries avoid the so-called resource curse and set aside perhaps three to five percent of government mining tax revenues for healthcare, as Botswana has done. In addition to on-the-ground aid — such as malaria, AIDS and maternal and children’s healthcare programs — Goosby said the emerging global health diplomacy paradigm model needs also to focus on technical cooperation and assistance, supporting the expansion of government health ministries and helping them design plans that meet their populations’ needs. “The huge diplomatic tool chest is to try to elevate the discussions with countries,” he said. There’s also a renewed focus on public-private partnerships to both sustain and advance health programs. “If we identify the profit interest with companies, they work better and deliver. If we don’t we find that after a year or two, it fades out.” Global health diplomacy “is a reflection of the conscious of the American people,” Goosby said. “We’ve really been given an opportunity to supply those scaled operations, allowing us to apply the science...and really move public health.” Indeed, global health development is being seen more and more as integral to U.S. international trade and security interests. “What exactly does maternal health, or immunizations, or the fight against HIV and AIDS have to do with foreign policy?" former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in 2010. "Well, my answer is everything.” [/INST] <h4>(__) State department is focusing on global health diplomacy.</h4><p><strong>Brino</strong>, Associate Editor, <strong>2013</p><p></strong>(“State Department renews focus on global health diplomacy” February 28, 2013 | Anthony Brino, Associate Editor http://www.govhealthit.com/news/state-department-renews-focus-health-diplomacy<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>As the federal government works to reform America’s beleaguered health system, <u><strong>the State Department</u></strong>’s new Office of Global Health Diplomacy <u><strong>is trying integrate the U.S. government’s international health aid efforts and help governments in developing countries create sustainable healthcare funding and care models.</p><p></u></strong>“We really are at a remarkable moment,” Eric Goosby, MD, U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator and recently named head of the Office of Global Health Diplomacy, said at a Kaiser Family Foundation forum.</p><p><u><strong>“There has been a convergence of a number of experiences, facts and understandings that have come together to convince, I think, a broader portion of the world community that we have learned how to take programs from a pilot to scale,” said Goosby, who helped develop care models for AIDS and HIV at San Francisco General Hospital in the 1980s before going on to oversee the Department of Health and Human Services AIDS programs.</p><p>While poverty, political upheaval and related problems of terrorism remain as prime challenges to the U.S.</u></strong> and other industrialized countries providing sustainable healthcare aid, Goosby said, <u><strong>multi-institution collaboration, planning and financial management has the potential to help developing countries craft programs around their needs.</p><p></u></strong>[See also: HIE 2.0 closer than it might appear]</p><p>For instance, he said, <u><strong>the U.S. and other governments are working with the World Bank to help countries with growing mining industries avoid the so-called resource curse and set aside perhaps three to five percent of government mining tax revenues for healthcare</u></strong>, as Botswana has done.</p><p>In addition to on-the-ground aid — such as malaria, AIDS and maternal and children’s healthcare programs — Goosby said the emerging global health diplomacy paradigm model needs also to focus on technical cooperation and assistance, supporting the expansion of government health ministries and helping them design plans that meet their populations’ needs.</p><p>“<u><strong>The huge diplomatic tool chest is to try to elevate the discussions with countries</u></strong>,” he said. <u><strong>There’s also a renewed focus on public-private partnerships to both sustain and advance health programs</u></strong>. “If we identify the profit interest with companies, they work better and deliver. If we don’t we find that after a year or two, it fades out.”</p><p><u><strong>Global health diplomacy “is a reflection of the conscious of the American people</u></strong>,” Goosby said. “We’ve really been given an opportunity to supply those scaled operations, allowing us to apply the science...and really move public health.”</p><p>Indeed, global health development is being seen more and more as integral to U.S. international trade and security interests.</p><p>“What exactly does maternal health, or immunizations, or the fight against HIV and AIDS have to do with foreign policy?" former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in 2010<strong>. "Well, my answer is everything.” </p></strong> </s>

Key to solve global conflict and multiple extinction scenarios

Technological exchange is an important platform for countries looking to create better connections with the publics of other nations, and to establish and strengthen relationships With multiple scientific challenges like sustainability, pandemics, climate change, environmental disasters and overpopulation faced by the world today, technological exchanges are effective platforms for states and scientists to cooperate and share knowledge, expertise and resources this can promote economic and social progress, and contribute to peace and security. Such exchanges can also be a means for developed countries to boost their soft power and international image with developing nations Technological exchanges can also enable countries to overcome a negative image in parts of the world While America’s international image, for example, has faced a sharp decline since 9/11, its expertise in science and technology has always been held in high regard Science diplomacy can function as a tool for conflict prevention and be understood as fostering cooperation between the scientific communities of hostile countries Cooperation in the field of scientific research can help bridge the gap between the countries by creating a forum of mutual support and common interests science diplomacy for conflict prevention can also be understood as the use of science and technology to enhance global or regional security Solving regional problems and advancing peoples’ well-being though technology by providing them with access to water, clean energy, food, and information can prevent the rise of conflicts

With multiple challenges like pandemics, climate change, environmental disasters technological exchanges are for states and scientists to cooperate Science diplomacy can be understood as fostering cooperation between hostile countries by creating mutual support science diplomacy can enhance global security Solving regional problems though water energy, food can prevent conflicts

Technological exchange is an important platform for countries looking to create better connections with the publics of other nations, and to establish and strengthen relationships. Technological exchanges can be particularly effective between developed and developing nations. With multiple scientific challenges like sustainability, pandemics, climate change, environmental disasters and overpopulation faced by the world today, technological exchanges are effective platforms for states and scientists to cooperate and share knowledge, expertise and resources. In turn, this can promote economic and social progress, and contribute to peace and security. Such exchanges can also be a means for developed countries to boost their soft power and international image with developing nations. This form of exchange diplomacy is enhanced by the fact that science diplomacy as a whole is better funded than cultural diplomacy, especially since it has the capacity to deliver tangible results in a shorter period of time. There are many avenues in which technological exchange can take place. One primary way is through education. On July 25, 2011, the U.S. government announced that it was committing $15 million towards a new five-year Fulbright Indonesia Research, Science, and Technology Program – or FIRST Program – which would support American and Indonesian students in the study, teaching and research of science and technology. Next, technological exchange can also take place in the traditional sense of the word, where delegations travel to each other’s countries to share ideas on science, innovation and technology. The U.S. has several such exchanges with India, with the government playing a key role in setting the stage for businesses, scientists, laboratories and institutions in both countries to collaborate with each other. These strategic public-private exchanges will not only develop India’s infrastructure and research capabilities, they offer a possible route for countering China’s rise by allying the United States with one of Beijing’s main rivals. Conferences are another form of technological exchange. The France-Israel Foundation, established in 2005, has brought together scientists from both countries at a yearly conference, with the objectives of shaping the respective images of France and Israel and cultivating deeper ties in science, as well as culture, economy and the media. The scientists are funded by the European Research Council, an independent organization which funds research in the European Union. This example also further attests to the role that multilateral institutions can play as instruments of soft power. Technological exchanges can also enable countries to overcome a negative image in parts of the world. While America’s international image, for example, has faced a sharp decline since 9/11, its expertise in science and technology has always been held in high regard. Science is not as value-laden as culture or ideology and thus it can function as a more meaningful platform to build cooperation and understanding of different countries. At the same time, it receives better funding than culture as it has a more direct impact given the wide array of scientific issues common to countries around the world. The U.S. has used science diplomacy to reach out to Muslim countries, no doubt to repair strained relations following its unpopularity in the aftermath of 9/11. In 2009, the U.S. announced the appointment of three Science and Technology Envoys to Muslim communities around the world to make connections with local scientists there. With U.S. scientists and engineers included in the process, the envoys will establish partnerships with multilateral institutions, non-governmental organizations and private sector partners to work towards key scientific challenges. For developing countries that share similar problems, technological exchanges can facilitate efforts towards solutions. India and South Africa, for example, have common HIV strains, and have launched a joint research project backed by the requisite infrastructure and talent. With industrialized countries showing little interest in this area, developing countries can take the lead by carrying out technological exchanges of their own, boosted by their shared experiences. One common thread running through technological exchanges is their focus on less-controversial issues. Nuclear power, for example, is rarely, if ever, on the agenda. Rather, topics like the environment, health and agriculture regularly feature in such exchanges, possibly since these do not stray into the political realm in which case countries would be more wary and skeptical, making it harder for public diplomacy to succeed. Another limitation of technological exchanges is that aside from academic ones, they typically exclude large swaths of the population. Scientists, researchers, and institutions are included alongside governments, but this comprises a small group and does not have the depth of outreach at which public diplomacy aims. Conducting technological exchanges on common scientific issues and challenges of key concern to countries across the globe, governments are in a better position to improve their country’s image and influence in the eyes of their target audience. With science diplomacy delivering more direct and tangible results, funding in most cases is not as critical a problem as it is with its cultural counterpart as governments are more than willing to step in. Although there are many various platforms for which technological exchanges can take place, countries prefer to stick to non-controversial topics that are less likely to offend. Yet, the effectiveness of such technological exchanges as a tool for public diplomacy is ambiguous as it reaches out to only a small proportion of a population. Conflict Prevention Summarized by Molly Krasnodebska Science diplomacy can function as a tool for conflict prevention and be understood as fostering cooperation between the scientific communities of hostile countries. Cooperation in the field of scientific research can help bridge the gap between the countries by creating a forum of mutual support and common interests. In recent years, there have been numerous examples of scientific cooperation between countries that otherwise have no official diplomatic relations. One such example is the "inter-Korean cooperation" in the chemistry, biotech and nano-science arenas, which was first proposed in March 2010. Science diplomacy between the two Koreas is also exemplified by the foundation of the first privately funded university in communist North Korea, the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology by Dr. Kim Chin-Kyung, a former war prisoner in North Korea. "Educating people is a way to share what they love, and share their values," said the South Korean in an interview. Another example is the earthquake research cooperation between China and Taiwan initiated in January 2010. Chen Cheng-hung, vice chairman of the National Science Council in Taipei calls the initiative the “biggest scientific cooperation program between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits so far.” The United States launched a science diplomacy campaign toward Iran. The two countries, which have had no formal relations since 1980, have re-launched their ‘broken dialogue” though science. In the summer of 2009, the American Association for the Advancement of Science established a new Center for Science Diplomacy in Iran. According to Miller-McCune, this “scientist-to scientist exchange” is more effective that governmental public diplomacy initiatives. The two countries instead of trying to “influence each other’s behavior…will learn something in the process.” In addition, science diplomacy for conflict prevention can also be understood as the use of science and technology to enhance global or regional security. Solving regional problems and advancing peoples’ well-being though technology by providing them with access to water, clean energy, food, and information can prevent the rise of conflicts.

<h4>Key to solve global conflict and multiple extinction scenarios</h4><p><strong><mark>CHAN ‘12</strong></mark> – Candidate, Master of Public Diplomacy, USC (Chan, Rachel. “SCIENCE DIPLOMACY”. January 10, 2012. http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/media_monitor_reports_detail/science_diplomacy/)</p><p><u>Technological exchange is an important platform for countries looking to create better connections with the publics of other nations, and to establish and strengthen relationships</u>. Technological exchanges can be particularly effective between developed and developing nations. <u><mark>With multiple </mark>scientific <mark>challenges like</mark> sustainability, <strong><mark>pandemics, climate change, environmental disasters</strong></mark> and overpopulation faced by the world today, <mark>technological exchanges are</mark> effective platforms <mark>for states and scientists</mark> <mark>to cooperate</mark> and share knowledge, expertise and resources</u>. In turn, <u>this can promote economic and social progress, and contribute to peace and security.</u> <u>Such exchanges can also be a means for developed countries to boost their soft power and international image with developing nations</u>. This form of exchange diplomacy is enhanced by the fact that science diplomacy as a whole is better funded than cultural diplomacy, especially since it has the capacity to deliver tangible results in a shorter period of time. There are many avenues in which technological exchange can take place. One primary way is through education. On July 25, 2011, the U.S. government announced that it was committing $15 million towards a new five-year Fulbright Indonesia Research, Science, and Technology Program – or FIRST Program – which would support American and Indonesian students in the study, teaching and research of science and technology. Next, technological exchange can also take place in the traditional sense of the word, where delegations travel to each other’s countries to share ideas on science, innovation and technology. The U.S. has several such exchanges with India, with the government playing a key role in setting the stage for businesses, scientists, laboratories and institutions in both countries to collaborate with each other. These strategic public-private exchanges will not only develop India’s infrastructure and research capabilities, they offer a possible route for countering China’s rise by allying the United States with one of Beijing’s main rivals. Conferences are another form of technological exchange. The France-Israel Foundation, established in 2005, has brought together scientists from both countries at a yearly conference, with the objectives of shaping the respective images of France and Israel and cultivating deeper ties in science, as well as culture, economy and the media. The scientists are funded by the European Research Council, an independent organization which funds research in the European Union. This example also further attests to the role that multilateral institutions can play as instruments of soft power. <u>Technological exchanges can also enable countries to overcome a negative image in parts of the world</u>. <u>While America’s international image, for example, has faced a sharp decline since 9/11, its expertise in science and technology has always been held in high regard</u>. Science is not as value-laden as culture or ideology and thus it can function as a more meaningful platform to build cooperation and understanding of different countries. At the same time, it receives better funding than culture as it has a more direct impact given the wide array of scientific issues common to countries around the world. The U.S. has used science diplomacy to reach out to Muslim countries, no doubt to repair strained relations following its unpopularity in the aftermath of 9/11. In 2009, the U.S. announced the appointment of three Science and Technology Envoys to Muslim communities around the world to make connections with local scientists there. With U.S. scientists and engineers included in the process, the envoys will establish partnerships with multilateral institutions, non-governmental organizations and private sector partners to work towards key scientific challenges. For developing countries that share similar problems, technological exchanges can facilitate efforts towards solutions. India and South Africa, for example, have common HIV strains, and have launched a joint research project backed by the requisite infrastructure and talent. With industrialized countries showing little interest in this area, developing countries can take the lead by carrying out technological exchanges of their own, boosted by their shared experiences. One common thread running through technological exchanges is their focus on less-controversial issues. Nuclear power, for example, is rarely, if ever, on the agenda. Rather, topics like the environment, health and agriculture regularly feature in such exchanges, possibly since these do not stray into the political realm in which case countries would be more wary and skeptical, making it harder for public diplomacy to succeed. Another limitation of technological exchanges is that aside from academic ones, they typically exclude large swaths of the population. Scientists, researchers, and institutions are included alongside governments, but this comprises a small group and does not have the depth of outreach at which public diplomacy aims. Conducting technological exchanges on common scientific issues and challenges of key concern to countries across the globe, governments are in a better position to improve their country’s image and influence in the eyes of their target audience. With science diplomacy delivering more direct and tangible results, funding in most cases is not as critical a problem as it is with its cultural counterpart as governments are more than willing to step in. Although there are many various platforms for which technological exchanges can take place, countries prefer to stick to non-controversial topics that are less likely to offend. Yet, the effectiveness of such technological exchanges as a tool for public diplomacy is ambiguous as it reaches out to only a small proportion of a population. Conflict Prevention Summarized by Molly Krasnodebska <u><mark>Science diplomacy can</mark> function as a tool for conflict prevention and <mark>be understood as fostering cooperation between</mark> the scientific communities of <mark>hostile countries</u></mark>. <u>Cooperation in the field of scientific research can help bridge the gap between the countries <mark>by creating</mark> a forum of <mark>mutual support</mark> and common interests</u>. In recent years, there have been numerous examples of scientific cooperation between countries that otherwise have no official diplomatic relations. One such example is the "inter-Korean cooperation" in the chemistry, biotech and nano-science arenas, which was first proposed in March 2010. Science diplomacy between the two Koreas is also exemplified by the foundation of the first privately funded university in communist North Korea, the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology by Dr. Kim Chin-Kyung, a former war prisoner in North Korea. "Educating people is a way to share what they love, and share their values," said the South Korean in an interview. Another example is the earthquake research cooperation between China and Taiwan initiated in January 2010. Chen Cheng-hung, vice chairman of the National Science Council in Taipei calls the initiative the “biggest scientific cooperation program between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits so far.” The United States launched a science diplomacy campaign toward Iran. The two countries, which have had no formal relations since 1980, have re-launched their ‘broken dialogue” though science. In the summer of 2009, the American Association for the Advancement of Science established a new Center for Science Diplomacy in Iran. According to Miller-McCune, this “scientist-to scientist exchange” is more effective that governmental public diplomacy initiatives. The two countries instead of trying to “influence each other’s behavior…will learn something in the process.” In addition, <u><mark>science diplomacy</mark> for conflict prevention <mark>can</mark> also be understood as the use of science and technology to <mark>enhance</mark> <strong><mark>global</strong></mark> or regional <strong><mark>security</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Solving regional problems</strong></mark> and advancing peoples’ well-being <strong><mark>though</strong></mark> technology by providing them with access to <strong><mark>water</strong></mark>, clean <strong><mark>energy, food</mark>,</strong> and information <strong><mark>can prevent</strong></mark> the rise of <strong><mark>conflicts</u></strong></mark>. </p>

CHAN ‘12 – Candidate, Master of Public Diplomacy, USC (Chan, Rachel. “SCIENCE DIPLOMACY”. January 10, 2012. http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/media_monitor_reports_detail/science_diplomacy/)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: CHAN ‘12 – Candidate, Master of Public Diplomacy, USC (Chan, Rachel. “SCIENCE DIPLOMACY”. January 10, 2012. http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/media_monitor_reports_detail/science_diplomacy/) fulltext: Technological exchange is an important platform for countries looking to create better connections with the publics of other nations, and to establish and strengthen relationships. Technological exchanges can be particularly effective between developed and developing nations. With multiple scientific challenges like sustainability, pandemics, climate change, environmental disasters and overpopulation faced by the world today, technological exchanges are effective platforms for states and scientists to cooperate and share knowledge, expertise and resources. In turn, this can promote economic and social progress, and contribute to peace and security. Such exchanges can also be a means for developed countries to boost their soft power and international image with developing nations. This form of exchange diplomacy is enhanced by the fact that science diplomacy as a whole is better funded than cultural diplomacy, especially since it has the capacity to deliver tangible results in a shorter period of time. There are many avenues in which technological exchange can take place. One primary way is through education. On July 25, 2011, the U.S. government announced that it was committing $15 million towards a new five-year Fulbright Indonesia Research, Science, and Technology Program – or FIRST Program – which would support American and Indonesian students in the study, teaching and research of science and technology. Next, technological exchange can also take place in the traditional sense of the word, where delegations travel to each other’s countries to share ideas on science, innovation and technology. The U.S. has several such exchanges with India, with the government playing a key role in setting the stage for businesses, scientists, laboratories and institutions in both countries to collaborate with each other. These strategic public-private exchanges will not only develop India’s infrastructure and research capabilities, they offer a possible route for countering China’s rise by allying the United States with one of Beijing’s main rivals. Conferences are another form of technological exchange. The France-Israel Foundation, established in 2005, has brought together scientists from both countries at a yearly conference, with the objectives of shaping the respective images of France and Israel and cultivating deeper ties in science, as well as culture, economy and the media. The scientists are funded by the European Research Council, an independent organization which funds research in the European Union. This example also further attests to the role that multilateral institutions can play as instruments of soft power. Technological exchanges can also enable countries to overcome a negative image in parts of the world. While America’s international image, for example, has faced a sharp decline since 9/11, its expertise in science and technology has always been held in high regard. Science is not as value-laden as culture or ideology and thus it can function as a more meaningful platform to build cooperation and understanding of different countries. At the same time, it receives better funding than culture as it has a more direct impact given the wide array of scientific issues common to countries around the world. The U.S. has used science diplomacy to reach out to Muslim countries, no doubt to repair strained relations following its unpopularity in the aftermath of 9/11. In 2009, the U.S. announced the appointment of three Science and Technology Envoys to Muslim communities around the world to make connections with local scientists there. With U.S. scientists and engineers included in the process, the envoys will establish partnerships with multilateral institutions, non-governmental organizations and private sector partners to work towards key scientific challenges. For developing countries that share similar problems, technological exchanges can facilitate efforts towards solutions. India and South Africa, for example, have common HIV strains, and have launched a joint research project backed by the requisite infrastructure and talent. With industrialized countries showing little interest in this area, developing countries can take the lead by carrying out technological exchanges of their own, boosted by their shared experiences. One common thread running through technological exchanges is their focus on less-controversial issues. Nuclear power, for example, is rarely, if ever, on the agenda. Rather, topics like the environment, health and agriculture regularly feature in such exchanges, possibly since these do not stray into the political realm in which case countries would be more wary and skeptical, making it harder for public diplomacy to succeed. Another limitation of technological exchanges is that aside from academic ones, they typically exclude large swaths of the population. Scientists, researchers, and institutions are included alongside governments, but this comprises a small group and does not have the depth of outreach at which public diplomacy aims. Conducting technological exchanges on common scientific issues and challenges of key concern to countries across the globe, governments are in a better position to improve their country’s image and influence in the eyes of their target audience. With science diplomacy delivering more direct and tangible results, funding in most cases is not as critical a problem as it is with its cultural counterpart as governments are more than willing to step in. Although there are many various platforms for which technological exchanges can take place, countries prefer to stick to non-controversial topics that are less likely to offend. Yet, the effectiveness of such technological exchanges as a tool for public diplomacy is ambiguous as it reaches out to only a small proportion of a population. Conflict Prevention Summarized by Molly Krasnodebska Science diplomacy can function as a tool for conflict prevention and be understood as fostering cooperation between the scientific communities of hostile countries. Cooperation in the field of scientific research can help bridge the gap between the countries by creating a forum of mutual support and common interests. In recent years, there have been numerous examples of scientific cooperation between countries that otherwise have no official diplomatic relations. One such example is the "inter-Korean cooperation" in the chemistry, biotech and nano-science arenas, which was first proposed in March 2010. Science diplomacy between the two Koreas is also exemplified by the foundation of the first privately funded university in communist North Korea, the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology by Dr. Kim Chin-Kyung, a former war prisoner in North Korea. "Educating people is a way to share what they love, and share their values," said the South Korean in an interview. Another example is the earthquake research cooperation between China and Taiwan initiated in January 2010. Chen Cheng-hung, vice chairman of the National Science Council in Taipei calls the initiative the “biggest scientific cooperation program between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits so far.” The United States launched a science diplomacy campaign toward Iran. The two countries, which have had no formal relations since 1980, have re-launched their ‘broken dialogue” though science. In the summer of 2009, the American Association for the Advancement of Science established a new Center for Science Diplomacy in Iran. According to Miller-McCune, this “scientist-to scientist exchange” is more effective that governmental public diplomacy initiatives. The two countries instead of trying to “influence each other’s behavior…will learn something in the process.” In addition, science diplomacy for conflict prevention can also be understood as the use of science and technology to enhance global or regional security. Solving regional problems and advancing peoples’ well-being though technology by providing them with access to water, clean energy, food, and information can prevent the rise of conflicts. [/INST] <h4>Key to solve global conflict and multiple extinction scenarios</h4><p><strong><mark>CHAN ‘12</strong></mark> – Candidate, Master of Public Diplomacy, USC (Chan, Rachel. “SCIENCE DIPLOMACY”. January 10, 2012. http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/media_monitor_reports_detail/science_diplomacy/)</p><p><u>Technological exchange is an important platform for countries looking to create better connections with the publics of other nations, and to establish and strengthen relationships</u>. Technological exchanges can be particularly effective between developed and developing nations. <u><mark>With multiple </mark>scientific <mark>challenges like</mark> sustainability, <strong><mark>pandemics, climate change, environmental disasters</strong></mark> and overpopulation faced by the world today, <mark>technological exchanges are</mark> effective platforms <mark>for states and scientists</mark> <mark>to cooperate</mark> and share knowledge, expertise and resources</u>. In turn, <u>this can promote economic and social progress, and contribute to peace and security.</u> <u>Such exchanges can also be a means for developed countries to boost their soft power and international image with developing nations</u>. This form of exchange diplomacy is enhanced by the fact that science diplomacy as a whole is better funded than cultural diplomacy, especially since it has the capacity to deliver tangible results in a shorter period of time. There are many avenues in which technological exchange can take place. One primary way is through education. On July 25, 2011, the U.S. government announced that it was committing $15 million towards a new five-year Fulbright Indonesia Research, Science, and Technology Program – or FIRST Program – which would support American and Indonesian students in the study, teaching and research of science and technology. Next, technological exchange can also take place in the traditional sense of the word, where delegations travel to each other’s countries to share ideas on science, innovation and technology. The U.S. has several such exchanges with India, with the government playing a key role in setting the stage for businesses, scientists, laboratories and institutions in both countries to collaborate with each other. These strategic public-private exchanges will not only develop India’s infrastructure and research capabilities, they offer a possible route for countering China’s rise by allying the United States with one of Beijing’s main rivals. Conferences are another form of technological exchange. The France-Israel Foundation, established in 2005, has brought together scientists from both countries at a yearly conference, with the objectives of shaping the respective images of France and Israel and cultivating deeper ties in science, as well as culture, economy and the media. The scientists are funded by the European Research Council, an independent organization which funds research in the European Union. This example also further attests to the role that multilateral institutions can play as instruments of soft power. <u>Technological exchanges can also enable countries to overcome a negative image in parts of the world</u>. <u>While America’s international image, for example, has faced a sharp decline since 9/11, its expertise in science and technology has always been held in high regard</u>. Science is not as value-laden as culture or ideology and thus it can function as a more meaningful platform to build cooperation and understanding of different countries. At the same time, it receives better funding than culture as it has a more direct impact given the wide array of scientific issues common to countries around the world. The U.S. has used science diplomacy to reach out to Muslim countries, no doubt to repair strained relations following its unpopularity in the aftermath of 9/11. In 2009, the U.S. announced the appointment of three Science and Technology Envoys to Muslim communities around the world to make connections with local scientists there. With U.S. scientists and engineers included in the process, the envoys will establish partnerships with multilateral institutions, non-governmental organizations and private sector partners to work towards key scientific challenges. For developing countries that share similar problems, technological exchanges can facilitate efforts towards solutions. India and South Africa, for example, have common HIV strains, and have launched a joint research project backed by the requisite infrastructure and talent. With industrialized countries showing little interest in this area, developing countries can take the lead by carrying out technological exchanges of their own, boosted by their shared experiences. One common thread running through technological exchanges is their focus on less-controversial issues. Nuclear power, for example, is rarely, if ever, on the agenda. Rather, topics like the environment, health and agriculture regularly feature in such exchanges, possibly since these do not stray into the political realm in which case countries would be more wary and skeptical, making it harder for public diplomacy to succeed. Another limitation of technological exchanges is that aside from academic ones, they typically exclude large swaths of the population. Scientists, researchers, and institutions are included alongside governments, but this comprises a small group and does not have the depth of outreach at which public diplomacy aims. Conducting technological exchanges on common scientific issues and challenges of key concern to countries across the globe, governments are in a better position to improve their country’s image and influence in the eyes of their target audience. With science diplomacy delivering more direct and tangible results, funding in most cases is not as critical a problem as it is with its cultural counterpart as governments are more than willing to step in. Although there are many various platforms for which technological exchanges can take place, countries prefer to stick to non-controversial topics that are less likely to offend. Yet, the effectiveness of such technological exchanges as a tool for public diplomacy is ambiguous as it reaches out to only a small proportion of a population. Conflict Prevention Summarized by Molly Krasnodebska <u><mark>Science diplomacy can</mark> function as a tool for conflict prevention and <mark>be understood as fostering cooperation between</mark> the scientific communities of <mark>hostile countries</u></mark>. <u>Cooperation in the field of scientific research can help bridge the gap between the countries <mark>by creating</mark> a forum of <mark>mutual support</mark> and common interests</u>. In recent years, there have been numerous examples of scientific cooperation between countries that otherwise have no official diplomatic relations. One such example is the "inter-Korean cooperation" in the chemistry, biotech and nano-science arenas, which was first proposed in March 2010. Science diplomacy between the two Koreas is also exemplified by the foundation of the first privately funded university in communist North Korea, the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology by Dr. Kim Chin-Kyung, a former war prisoner in North Korea. "Educating people is a way to share what they love, and share their values," said the South Korean in an interview. Another example is the earthquake research cooperation between China and Taiwan initiated in January 2010. Chen Cheng-hung, vice chairman of the National Science Council in Taipei calls the initiative the “biggest scientific cooperation program between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits so far.” The United States launched a science diplomacy campaign toward Iran. The two countries, which have had no formal relations since 1980, have re-launched their ‘broken dialogue” though science. In the summer of 2009, the American Association for the Advancement of Science established a new Center for Science Diplomacy in Iran. According to Miller-McCune, this “scientist-to scientist exchange” is more effective that governmental public diplomacy initiatives. The two countries instead of trying to “influence each other’s behavior…will learn something in the process.” In addition, <u><mark>science diplomacy</mark> for conflict prevention <mark>can</mark> also be understood as the use of science and technology to <mark>enhance</mark> <strong><mark>global</strong></mark> or regional <strong><mark>security</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Solving regional problems</strong></mark> and advancing peoples’ well-being <strong><mark>though</strong></mark> technology by providing them with access to <strong><mark>water</strong></mark>, clean <strong><mark>energy, food</mark>,</strong> and information <strong><mark>can prevent</strong></mark> the rise of <strong><mark>conflicts</u></strong></mark>. </p> </s>

Relations are struggling, but the plan is a breakthrough- Maduro will cave

Venezuela and the U.S. are making tentative moves to improve relations Improving relations could be a long, hard slog The embassy has been without a top envoy since Venezuela refused to accept another proposed U.S. envoy in 2010, leading the U.S. to revoke the visa of Venezuela's ambassador the deterioration of Chávez's health had slowed progress Both sides remain deeply suspicious of the other Maduro's pragmatism and his several years of experience on the international stage as the government's foreign minister could make him more willing to open diplomatic channels It will be very difficult, but Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit With Venezuela's oil production in decline successors may be more willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Chávez, who expanded state control over parts of the oil sector

Venezuela and the U.S. are making tentative moves to improve relations Improving relations could be hard Both sides remain deeply suspicious Maduro's pragmatism and his several years of experience on the international stage as the government's foreign minister could make him more willing to open diplomatic channels Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit With Venezuela's oil production in decline successors may be more willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Chávez

Venezuela and the U.S. are making tentative moves to improve relations even as Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez struggles to recover from an unknown type of cancer at a Cuban hospital.¶ Officials say the détente began in late November, when Roberta Jacobson, the U.S.'s top diplomat for Latin America, telephoned Venezuela's Vice President Nicolás Maduro, the Chávez-designated heir. Both sides discussed areas of mutual interest, according to U.S. officials.¶ "We have for some time made it clear that we were willing and open to trying to improve our ties with Venezuela," State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said at a news briefing this week.¶ Improving relations between the U.S. and the country with the world's biggest oil reserves could be a long, hard slog. Mr. Chávez has led a motley crew of like-minded Latin American leaders, and has cultivated close ties with U.S. foes like Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.¶ Mr. Chávez famously called President George W. Bush a "devil" on the floor of the United Nations before the assembled leaders in 2006. Two years later, he tossed the U.S. ambassador to Caracas, Patrick Duddy, out of the country. The embassy has been without a top envoy since Venezuela refused to accept another proposed U.S. envoy in 2010, leading the U.S. to revoke the visa of Venezuela's ambassador in Washington, Bernardo Álvarez.¶ Mr. Chávez has also gone after President Barack Obama, once calling him an "ignoramus," after Mr. Obama criticized Mr. Chávez's alleged links to Colombian guerrillas.¶ But both sides have cautiously reached out to each other since then. During their talk in November, Mr. Maduro was interested in the possibility of exchanging ambassadors again, U.S. officials say. Mr. Maduro said this month that the contacts had been made "with the authorization" of Mr. Chávez.¶ For its part, the U.S. prefers to move slowly. Before restoring ambassadors, it would like to see Venezuelan instances of cooperation, U.S. officials say. They say they would like to beef up the number of antidrug agents in the country as a first step.¶ "It is just going to take two to tango," Ms. Nuland said.¶ Other areas the U.S. would like to see progress on are counterterrorism cooperation and in resolving commercial disputes involving U.S. companies in Venezuela, some of which have been nationalized, and many of which sometimes have difficulty getting dollars from Venezuela's government to pay for needed imports and repatriate profits.¶ Since the initial contact, Venezuelan diplomats and U.S. officials have continued the dialogue in Washington. But the deterioration of Mr. Chávez's health had slowed progress, U.S. officials say. Few expect Mr. Chávez to recover from his illness.¶ Both sides remain deeply suspicious of the other. Many Republicans in Congress are opposed to trying to forge a new relationship with the Venezuelan government. On the Venezuelan side, Mr. Maduro or any other potential successor to Mr. Chávez is likely to try to claim the populist's revolutionary mantle and mimic his anti-U.S. rhetoric.¶ But Mr. Maduro's pragmatism and his several years of experience on the international stage as the government's foreign minister could make him more willing to open diplomatic channels privately, say experts and observers.¶ "It will be very slow, very difficult, but I think Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the subjects of drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector. With Venezuela's oil production in decline, giving the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, successors may be more willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Mr. Chávez, who expanded state control over parts of the oil sector.

<h4>Relations are struggling, but the plan is a breakthrough- Maduro will cave</h4><p><strong>Cordoba and Munoz 1-11</strong>-13 [Jose and Sara, Wall Street Journal, “Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html]</p><p><u><mark>Venezuela and the U.S. are making tentative moves to improve relations</u></mark> even as Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez struggles to recover from an unknown type of cancer at a Cuban hospital.¶ Officials say the détente began in late November, when Roberta Jacobson, the U.S.'s top diplomat for Latin America, telephoned Venezuela's Vice President Nicolás Maduro, the Chávez-designated heir. Both sides discussed areas of mutual interest, according to U.S. officials.¶ "We have for some time made it clear that we were willing and open to trying to improve our ties with Venezuela," State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said at a news briefing this week.¶ <u><mark>Improving relations</u></mark> between the U.S. and the country with the world's biggest oil reserves <u><mark>could be</mark> a long, <mark>hard </mark>slog</u>. Mr. Chávez has led a motley crew of like-minded Latin American leaders, and has cultivated close ties with U.S. foes like Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.¶ Mr. Chávez famously called President George W. Bush a "devil" on the floor of the United Nations before the assembled leaders in 2006. Two years later, he tossed the U.S. ambassador to Caracas, Patrick Duddy, out of the country. <u>The embassy has been without a top envoy since Venezuela refused to accept another proposed U.S. envoy in 2010, leading the U.S. to revoke the visa of Venezuela's ambassador </u>in Washington, Bernardo Álvarez.¶ Mr. Chávez has also gone after President Barack Obama, once calling him an "ignoramus," after Mr. Obama criticized Mr. Chávez's alleged links to Colombian guerrillas.¶ But both sides have cautiously reached out to each other since then. During their talk in November, Mr. Maduro was interested in the possibility of exchanging ambassadors again, U.S. officials say. Mr. Maduro said this month that the contacts had been made "with the authorization" of Mr. Chávez.¶ For its part, the U.S. prefers to move slowly. Before restoring ambassadors, it would like to see Venezuelan instances of cooperation, U.S. officials say. They say they would like to beef up the number of antidrug agents in the country as a first step.¶ "It is just going to take two to tango," Ms. Nuland said.¶ Other areas the U.S. would like to see progress on are counterterrorism cooperation and in resolving commercial disputes involving U.S. companies in Venezuela, some of which have been nationalized, and many of which sometimes have difficulty getting dollars from Venezuela's government to pay for needed imports and repatriate profits.¶ Since the initial contact, Venezuelan diplomats and U.S. officials have continued the dialogue in Washington. But <u>the deterioration of</u> Mr. <u>Chávez's health had slowed progress</u>, U.S. officials say. Few expect Mr. Chávez to recover from his illness.¶ <u><mark>Both sides remain deeply suspicious</mark> of the other</u>. Many Republicans in Congress are opposed to trying to forge a new relationship with the Venezuelan government. On the Venezuelan side, Mr. Maduro or any other potential successor to Mr. Chávez is likely to try to claim the populist's revolutionary mantle and mimic his anti-U.S. rhetoric.¶ But Mr. <u><mark>Maduro's pragmatism and his several years of experience on the international stage as the government's foreign minister could make him more willing to open diplomatic channels</u></mark> privately, say experts and observers.¶ "<u>It will be</u> very slow, <u>very difficult, but</u> I think <u><mark>Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit</u></mark>," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the subjects of drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector. <u><mark>With Venezuela's oil production in decline</u></mark>, giving the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, <u><mark>successors may be more willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under</u></mark> Mr. <u><mark>Chávez</mark>, who expanded state control over parts of the oil sector</u>.</p>

Cordoba and Munoz 1-11-13 [Jose and Sara, Wall Street Journal, “Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Cordoba and Munoz 1-11-13 [Jose and Sara, Wall Street Journal, “Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html] fulltext: Venezuela and the U.S. are making tentative moves to improve relations even as Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez struggles to recover from an unknown type of cancer at a Cuban hospital.¶ Officials say the détente began in late November, when Roberta Jacobson, the U.S.'s top diplomat for Latin America, telephoned Venezuela's Vice President Nicolás Maduro, the Chávez-designated heir. Both sides discussed areas of mutual interest, according to U.S. officials.¶ "We have for some time made it clear that we were willing and open to trying to improve our ties with Venezuela," State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said at a news briefing this week.¶ Improving relations between the U.S. and the country with the world's biggest oil reserves could be a long, hard slog. Mr. Chávez has led a motley crew of like-minded Latin American leaders, and has cultivated close ties with U.S. foes like Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.¶ Mr. Chávez famously called President George W. Bush a "devil" on the floor of the United Nations before the assembled leaders in 2006. Two years later, he tossed the U.S. ambassador to Caracas, Patrick Duddy, out of the country. The embassy has been without a top envoy since Venezuela refused to accept another proposed U.S. envoy in 2010, leading the U.S. to revoke the visa of Venezuela's ambassador in Washington, Bernardo Álvarez.¶ Mr. Chávez has also gone after President Barack Obama, once calling him an "ignoramus," after Mr. Obama criticized Mr. Chávez's alleged links to Colombian guerrillas.¶ But both sides have cautiously reached out to each other since then. During their talk in November, Mr. Maduro was interested in the possibility of exchanging ambassadors again, U.S. officials say. Mr. Maduro said this month that the contacts had been made "with the authorization" of Mr. Chávez.¶ For its part, the U.S. prefers to move slowly. Before restoring ambassadors, it would like to see Venezuelan instances of cooperation, U.S. officials say. They say they would like to beef up the number of antidrug agents in the country as a first step.¶ "It is just going to take two to tango," Ms. Nuland said.¶ Other areas the U.S. would like to see progress on are counterterrorism cooperation and in resolving commercial disputes involving U.S. companies in Venezuela, some of which have been nationalized, and many of which sometimes have difficulty getting dollars from Venezuela's government to pay for needed imports and repatriate profits.¶ Since the initial contact, Venezuelan diplomats and U.S. officials have continued the dialogue in Washington. But the deterioration of Mr. Chávez's health had slowed progress, U.S. officials say. Few expect Mr. Chávez to recover from his illness.¶ Both sides remain deeply suspicious of the other. Many Republicans in Congress are opposed to trying to forge a new relationship with the Venezuelan government. On the Venezuelan side, Mr. Maduro or any other potential successor to Mr. Chávez is likely to try to claim the populist's revolutionary mantle and mimic his anti-U.S. rhetoric.¶ But Mr. Maduro's pragmatism and his several years of experience on the international stage as the government's foreign minister could make him more willing to open diplomatic channels privately, say experts and observers.¶ "It will be very slow, very difficult, but I think Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the subjects of drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector. With Venezuela's oil production in decline, giving the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, successors may be more willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Mr. Chávez, who expanded state control over parts of the oil sector. [/INST] <h4>Relations are struggling, but the plan is a breakthrough- Maduro will cave</h4><p><strong>Cordoba and Munoz 1-11</strong>-13 [Jose and Sara, Wall Street Journal, “Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html]</p><p><u><mark>Venezuela and the U.S. are making tentative moves to improve relations</u></mark> even as Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez struggles to recover from an unknown type of cancer at a Cuban hospital.¶ Officials say the détente began in late November, when Roberta Jacobson, the U.S.'s top diplomat for Latin America, telephoned Venezuela's Vice President Nicolás Maduro, the Chávez-designated heir. Both sides discussed areas of mutual interest, according to U.S. officials.¶ "We have for some time made it clear that we were willing and open to trying to improve our ties with Venezuela," State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said at a news briefing this week.¶ <u><mark>Improving relations</u></mark> between the U.S. and the country with the world's biggest oil reserves <u><mark>could be</mark> a long, <mark>hard </mark>slog</u>. Mr. Chávez has led a motley crew of like-minded Latin American leaders, and has cultivated close ties with U.S. foes like Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.¶ Mr. Chávez famously called President George W. Bush a "devil" on the floor of the United Nations before the assembled leaders in 2006. Two years later, he tossed the U.S. ambassador to Caracas, Patrick Duddy, out of the country. <u>The embassy has been without a top envoy since Venezuela refused to accept another proposed U.S. envoy in 2010, leading the U.S. to revoke the visa of Venezuela's ambassador </u>in Washington, Bernardo Álvarez.¶ Mr. Chávez has also gone after President Barack Obama, once calling him an "ignoramus," after Mr. Obama criticized Mr. Chávez's alleged links to Colombian guerrillas.¶ But both sides have cautiously reached out to each other since then. During their talk in November, Mr. Maduro was interested in the possibility of exchanging ambassadors again, U.S. officials say. Mr. Maduro said this month that the contacts had been made "with the authorization" of Mr. Chávez.¶ For its part, the U.S. prefers to move slowly. Before restoring ambassadors, it would like to see Venezuelan instances of cooperation, U.S. officials say. They say they would like to beef up the number of antidrug agents in the country as a first step.¶ "It is just going to take two to tango," Ms. Nuland said.¶ Other areas the U.S. would like to see progress on are counterterrorism cooperation and in resolving commercial disputes involving U.S. companies in Venezuela, some of which have been nationalized, and many of which sometimes have difficulty getting dollars from Venezuela's government to pay for needed imports and repatriate profits.¶ Since the initial contact, Venezuelan diplomats and U.S. officials have continued the dialogue in Washington. But <u>the deterioration of</u> Mr. <u>Chávez's health had slowed progress</u>, U.S. officials say. Few expect Mr. Chávez to recover from his illness.¶ <u><mark>Both sides remain deeply suspicious</mark> of the other</u>. Many Republicans in Congress are opposed to trying to forge a new relationship with the Venezuelan government. On the Venezuelan side, Mr. Maduro or any other potential successor to Mr. Chávez is likely to try to claim the populist's revolutionary mantle and mimic his anti-U.S. rhetoric.¶ But Mr. <u><mark>Maduro's pragmatism and his several years of experience on the international stage as the government's foreign minister could make him more willing to open diplomatic channels</u></mark> privately, say experts and observers.¶ "<u>It will be</u> very slow, <u>very difficult, but</u> I think <u><mark>Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit</u></mark>," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the subjects of drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could come from the private sector. <u><mark>With Venezuela's oil production in decline</u></mark>, giving the government less power to spend its way out of a likely recession, <u><mark>successors may be more willing to reopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under</u></mark> Mr. <u><mark>Chávez</mark>, who expanded state control over parts of the oil sector</u>.</p> </s>

Reverse causal link – decreased oil means S&P would destroy Russia’s growth

S and P warned it may cut Russia’s debt rating in case of a drop in the price of oil because of its “huge impact” on the economy a $10 decline in the global price of oil would lead to a 1.4-percent of g d p drop in government revenues This high oil price supports the government’s expenditure levels for now spending pressures, resulting for example from an aging population or to implement a significant part of the spending promises made during the presidential election campaign, will likely fuel the need for rising revenues a drop in the price of oil to $60 would see Russia’s long-term debt rating drop three notches from its current level of BBB to the second-lowest investment grade issued Russia remained particularly susceptible to a continuing economic slowdown Such a drop would “affect Russia particularly severely,” credit analyst Kai Stukenbrock wrote

S and P warned it may cut Russia’s rating in case of a drop in the price of oil a $10 decline in price would lead to a 1.4-percent of g d p drop high price supports expenditure levels for now a drop to $60 would see Russia’s rating drop three notches to the second-lowest grade Russia remained particularly susceptible

Standard and Poor’s warned Monday it may cut Russia’s debt rating in case of a drop in the price of oil because of its “huge impact” on the economy and president-elect Vladimir Putin’s campaign promises. The global ratings agency said a $10 decline in the global price of oil would lead to a 1.4-percent of gross domestic product drop in government revenues. It estimated that Russia would need an average oil price of $120 per barrel this year to keep the budget balanced − slightly above the $117 figure given by the government. Settlement prices for Urals grade oil futures the government uses as a reference hovered around $125 on Monday. “This high oil price supports the government’s expenditure levels for now, S&P said. “However, spending pressures, resulting for example from an aging population or to implement a significant part of the spending promises made during the presidential election campaign, will likely fuel the need for rising revenues.” It said that a drop in the price of oil to $60 would see Russia’s long-term debt rating drop three notches from its current level of BBB to the second-lowest investment grade issued by the New York-based firm. S&P warned that Russia remained particularly susceptible to a continuing economic slowdown in China and its impact on global energy consumption and prices. Such a drop would “affect Russia particularly severely,” credit analyst Kai Stukenbrock wrote in the report.

<h4>Reverse causal link – decreased oil means S&P would destroy Russia’s growth</h4><p><strong><mark>REUTERS ’12</strong></mark> (Reuters. “Standard and Poor’s warns Russia on oil price risks”. March 26, 2012. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/26/203282.html)</p><p><u><mark>S</u></mark>tandard <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>P</u></mark>oor’s <u><mark>warned</u></mark> Monday <u><mark>it may cut Russia’s</mark> debt <mark>rating in case of a drop in the price of oil</mark> because of its “huge impact” on the economy </u>and president-elect Vladimir Putin’s campaign promises.</p><p>The global ratings agency said <u><mark>a $10 decline in</mark> the global <mark>price</mark> of oil <mark>would lead to a 1.4-percent of g</u></mark>ross <u><mark>d</u></mark>omestic <u><mark>p</u></mark>roduct <u><mark>drop</mark> in government revenues</u>.</p><p>It estimated that Russia would need an average oil price of $120 per barrel this year to keep the budget balanced − slightly above the $117 figure given by the government.</p><p>Settlement prices for Urals grade oil futures the government uses as a reference hovered around $125 on Monday.</p><p>“<u>This <mark>high</mark> oil <mark>price supports</mark> the government’s <mark>expenditure levels for now</u></mark>, S&P said.</p><p>“However, <u>spending pressures, resulting for example from an aging population or to implement a significant part of the spending promises made during the presidential election campaign, will likely fuel the need for rising revenues</u>.”</p><p>It said that <u><mark>a drop</mark> in the price of oil <mark>to $60 would see Russia’s</mark> long-term debt <strong><mark>rating drop three notches</strong></mark> from its current level of BBB <strong><mark>to the second-lowest</strong></mark> investment <strong><mark>grade</strong></mark> <strong>issued</u></strong> by the New York-based firm.</p><p>S&P warned that <u><strong><mark>Russia remained particularly susceptible</strong></mark> to a continuing economic slowdown</u> in China and its impact on global energy consumption and prices.</p><p><u>Such a drop would “affect Russia particularly severely,” credit analyst Kai Stukenbrock wrote</u> in the report.</p>

REUTERS ’12 (Reuters. “Standard and Poor’s warns Russia on oil price risks”. March 26, 2012. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/26/203282.html)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: REUTERS ’12 (Reuters. “Standard and Poor’s warns Russia on oil price risks”. March 26, 2012. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/26/203282.html) fulltext: Standard and Poor’s warned Monday it may cut Russia’s debt rating in case of a drop in the price of oil because of its “huge impact” on the economy and president-elect Vladimir Putin’s campaign promises. The global ratings agency said a $10 decline in the global price of oil would lead to a 1.4-percent of gross domestic product drop in government revenues. It estimated that Russia would need an average oil price of $120 per barrel this year to keep the budget balanced − slightly above the $117 figure given by the government. Settlement prices for Urals grade oil futures the government uses as a reference hovered around $125 on Monday. “This high oil price supports the government’s expenditure levels for now, S&P said. “However, spending pressures, resulting for example from an aging population or to implement a significant part of the spending promises made during the presidential election campaign, will likely fuel the need for rising revenues.” It said that a drop in the price of oil to $60 would see Russia’s long-term debt rating drop three notches from its current level of BBB to the second-lowest investment grade issued by the New York-based firm. S&P warned that Russia remained particularly susceptible to a continuing economic slowdown in China and its impact on global energy consumption and prices. Such a drop would “affect Russia particularly severely,” credit analyst Kai Stukenbrock wrote in the report. [/INST] <h4>Reverse causal link – decreased oil means S&P would destroy Russia’s growth</h4><p><strong><mark>REUTERS ’12</strong></mark> (Reuters. “Standard and Poor’s warns Russia on oil price risks”. March 26, 2012. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/26/203282.html)</p><p><u><mark>S</u></mark>tandard <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><mark>P</u></mark>oor’s <u><mark>warned</u></mark> Monday <u><mark>it may cut Russia’s</mark> debt <mark>rating in case of a drop in the price of oil</mark> because of its “huge impact” on the economy </u>and president-elect Vladimir Putin’s campaign promises.</p><p>The global ratings agency said <u><mark>a $10 decline in</mark> the global <mark>price</mark> of oil <mark>would lead to a 1.4-percent of g</u></mark>ross <u><mark>d</u></mark>omestic <u><mark>p</u></mark>roduct <u><mark>drop</mark> in government revenues</u>.</p><p>It estimated that Russia would need an average oil price of $120 per barrel this year to keep the budget balanced − slightly above the $117 figure given by the government.</p><p>Settlement prices for Urals grade oil futures the government uses as a reference hovered around $125 on Monday.</p><p>“<u>This <mark>high</mark> oil <mark>price supports</mark> the government’s <mark>expenditure levels for now</u></mark>, S&P said.</p><p>“However, <u>spending pressures, resulting for example from an aging population or to implement a significant part of the spending promises made during the presidential election campaign, will likely fuel the need for rising revenues</u>.”</p><p>It said that <u><mark>a drop</mark> in the price of oil <mark>to $60 would see Russia’s</mark> long-term debt <strong><mark>rating drop three notches</strong></mark> from its current level of BBB <strong><mark>to the second-lowest</strong></mark> investment <strong><mark>grade</strong></mark> <strong>issued</u></strong> by the New York-based firm.</p><p>S&P warned that <u><strong><mark>Russia remained particularly susceptible</strong></mark> to a continuing economic slowdown</u> in China and its impact on global energy consumption and prices.</p><p><u>Such a drop would “affect Russia particularly severely,” credit analyst Kai Stukenbrock wrote</u> in the report.</p> </s>

(__) Kerry’s main concern is public safety in his new position

New Secretary of State John Kerry reported for duty Monday, acknowledging that as Hillary Rodham Clinton's successor he has "big heels to fill" and promising to protect U.S. foreign service workers from terrorist attacks overseas ."¶ Kerry told his new agency's employees that he and President Barack Obama needed their help to make America safer and the world more prosperous and peaceful Kerry said the protection of American diplomats would be a top priority.¶ "I guarantee you that beginning this morning when I report for duty upstairs, everything I do will be focused on the security and safety of our people

WASHINGTON -- New Secretary of State John Kerry reported for duty Monday, acknowledging that as Hillary Rodham Clinton's successor he has "big heels to fill" and promising to protect U.S. foreign service workers from terrorist attacks overseas.¶ On his first day at the office in his new job, the former senator and 2004 Democratic presidential candidate was greeted with loud cheers by employees of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development.¶ As the first man in the post in eight years, Kerry referred to his two most recent predecessors, Clinton and Condoleezza Rice, by asking in jest: "Can a man actually run the State Department?"¶ "I don't know," he answered. "As the saying goes, I have big heels to fill."¶ Kerry told his new agency's employees that he and President Barack Obama needed their help to make America safer and the world more prosperous and peaceful.¶ And after noting the deaths of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans in the Sept. 11, 2012, terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya, Kerry said the protection of American diplomats would be a top priority.¶ "I guarantee you that beginning this morning when I report for duty upstairs, everything I do will be focused on the security and safety of our people," he said.

<h4><strong>(__) Kerry’s main concern is public safety in his new position </h4><p>Huffington Post 2013</p><p></strong>[Huffington Post Politics, “John Kerry Addresses State Department Colleagues Monday”, 5/15/2013, <u>http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/john-kerry-state-department_n_2614538.html</u>]</p><p>WASHINGTON -- <u><strong>New Secretary of State John Kerry reported for duty Monday, acknowledging that as Hillary Rodham Clinton's successor he has "big heels to fill" and promising to protect U.S. foreign service workers from terrorist attacks overseas</u></strong>.¶ On his first day at the office in his new job, the former senator and 2004 Democratic presidential candidate was greeted with loud cheers by employees of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development.¶ As the first man in the post in eight years, Kerry referred to his two most recent predecessors, Clinton and Condoleezza Rice, by asking in jest: "Can a man actually run the State Department?"¶ "I don't know," he answered. "As the saying goes, I have big heels to fill<u><strong>."¶ Kerry told his new agency's employees that he and President Barack Obama needed their help to make America safer and the world more prosperous and peaceful</u></strong>.¶ And after noting the deaths of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans in the Sept. 11, 2012, terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya, <u><strong>Kerry said the protection of American diplomats would be a top priority.¶ "I guarantee you that beginning this morning when I report for duty upstairs, everything I do will be focused on the security and safety of our people</u></strong>," he said. </p>

Huffington Post 2013 [Huffington Post Politics, “John Kerry Addresses State Department Colleagues Monday”, 5/15/2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/john-kerry-state-department_n_2614538.html]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Huffington Post 2013 [Huffington Post Politics, “John Kerry Addresses State Department Colleagues Monday”, 5/15/2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/john-kerry-state-department_n_2614538.html] fulltext: WASHINGTON -- New Secretary of State John Kerry reported for duty Monday, acknowledging that as Hillary Rodham Clinton's successor he has "big heels to fill" and promising to protect U.S. foreign service workers from terrorist attacks overseas.¶ On his first day at the office in his new job, the former senator and 2004 Democratic presidential candidate was greeted with loud cheers by employees of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development.¶ As the first man in the post in eight years, Kerry referred to his two most recent predecessors, Clinton and Condoleezza Rice, by asking in jest: "Can a man actually run the State Department?"¶ "I don't know," he answered. "As the saying goes, I have big heels to fill."¶ Kerry told his new agency's employees that he and President Barack Obama needed their help to make America safer and the world more prosperous and peaceful.¶ And after noting the deaths of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans in the Sept. 11, 2012, terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya, Kerry said the protection of American diplomats would be a top priority.¶ "I guarantee you that beginning this morning when I report for duty upstairs, everything I do will be focused on the security and safety of our people," he said. [/INST] <h4><strong>(__) Kerry’s main concern is public safety in his new position </h4><p>Huffington Post 2013</p><p></strong>[Huffington Post Politics, “John Kerry Addresses State Department Colleagues Monday”, 5/15/2013, <u>http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/john-kerry-state-department_n_2614538.html</u>]</p><p>WASHINGTON -- <u><strong>New Secretary of State John Kerry reported for duty Monday, acknowledging that as Hillary Rodham Clinton's successor he has "big heels to fill" and promising to protect U.S. foreign service workers from terrorist attacks overseas</u></strong>.¶ On his first day at the office in his new job, the former senator and 2004 Democratic presidential candidate was greeted with loud cheers by employees of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development.¶ As the first man in the post in eight years, Kerry referred to his two most recent predecessors, Clinton and Condoleezza Rice, by asking in jest: "Can a man actually run the State Department?"¶ "I don't know," he answered. "As the saying goes, I have big heels to fill<u><strong>."¶ Kerry told his new agency's employees that he and President Barack Obama needed their help to make America safer and the world more prosperous and peaceful</u></strong>.¶ And after noting the deaths of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans in the Sept. 11, 2012, terrorist attack in Benghazi, Libya, <u><strong>Kerry said the protection of American diplomats would be a top priority.¶ "I guarantee you that beginning this morning when I report for duty upstairs, everything I do will be focused on the security and safety of our people</u></strong>," he said. </p> </s>

Oil is key to the alliance, but our policy is uncertain

As far as Venezuela-US relations are concerned, the future points to certain possibilities diplomatic ties between the two countries are yet to normalize. The degree of progress will depend on the diplomatic game the two countries play Since oil plays a key role in both countries' economic and political policies, it will help prevent bilateral relations from worsening the US could review its policy toward Venezuela The security of Venezuela's oil exports and the US' oil imports are interdependent

As far as Venezuela-US relations are concerned, the future points to certain possibilities diplomatic ties between the two countries are yet to normalize progress will depend on the diplomatic game the two countries play Since oil plays a key role in both countries' economic and political policies, it will help prevent bilateral relations from worsening the US could review its policy toward Venezuela

As far as Venezuela-US relations are concerned, the future points to certain possibilities. The tense relations between Caracas and Washington are likely to ease, even though diplomatic ties between the two countries are yet to normalize. The degree of progress will depend on the diplomatic game the two countries play and their domestic political demands. But owing to Venezuela's political and economic stability, and oil security, the new government may ease its anti-US stance, drawing a similar response from Washington.¶ Since oil plays a key role in both countries' economic and political policies, it will help prevent bilateral relations from worsening. Plus, the US could review its policy toward Venezuela with an eye on its overall interest in Latin America. But if for any reason the US bans oil imports from Venezuela, the latter's economy could get into trouble. The US' geopolitical and strategic interests in Latin America, however, demand that Venezuela continue to enjoy its political, economic and social stability.¶ The security of Venezuela's oil exports and the US' oil imports are, to a certain degree, interdependent. Venezuela is still the third largest source of crude oil for the US. The US remains Venezuela's largest trading partner and has invested about $12 billion in Venezuela, while Venezuela has an investment of about $4 billion in the US. The US is also Venezuela's largest source of trade surplus and has a decisive influence on Venezuela's international balance of payment and foreign exchange reserve accumulation.

<h4>Oil is key to the alliance, but our policy is uncertain</h4><p><strong>Hongbo 3-12</strong>-13 [Sun, associate professor with the Institute of Latin American Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Chavez legacy will live on in Latin America,” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-03/12/content_16300175.htm]</p><p><u><mark>As far as Venezuela-US relations are concerned, the future points to certain possibilities</u></mark>. The tense relations between Caracas and Washington are likely to ease, even though <u><mark>diplomatic ties between the two countries are yet to normalize</mark>. The degree of <mark>progress will depend on the diplomatic game the two countries play</u></mark> and their domestic political demands. But owing to Venezuela's political and economic stability, and oil security, the new government may ease its anti-US stance, drawing a similar response from Washington.¶ <u><mark>Since oil plays a key role in both countries' economic and political policies, it will help prevent bilateral relations from worsening</u></mark>. Plus, <u><mark>the US could review its policy toward Venezuela</u></mark> with an eye on its overall interest in Latin America. But if for any reason the US bans oil imports from Venezuela, the latter's economy could get into trouble. The US' geopolitical and strategic interests in Latin America, however, demand that Venezuela continue to enjoy its political, economic and social stability.¶ <u>The security of Venezuela's oil exports and the US' oil imports are</u>, to a certain degree, <u>interdependent</u>. Venezuela is still the third largest source of crude oil for the US. The US remains Venezuela's largest trading partner and has invested about $12 billion in Venezuela, while Venezuela has an investment of about $4 billion in the US. The US is also Venezuela's largest source of trade surplus and has a decisive influence on Venezuela's international balance of payment and foreign exchange reserve accumulation.</p>

Hongbo 3-12-13 [Sun, associate professor with the Institute of Latin American Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Chavez legacy will live on in Latin America,” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-03/12/content_16300175.htm]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Hongbo 3-12-13 [Sun, associate professor with the Institute of Latin American Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Chavez legacy will live on in Latin America,” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-03/12/content_16300175.htm] fulltext: As far as Venezuela-US relations are concerned, the future points to certain possibilities. The tense relations between Caracas and Washington are likely to ease, even though diplomatic ties between the two countries are yet to normalize. The degree of progress will depend on the diplomatic game the two countries play and their domestic political demands. But owing to Venezuela's political and economic stability, and oil security, the new government may ease its anti-US stance, drawing a similar response from Washington.¶ Since oil plays a key role in both countries' economic and political policies, it will help prevent bilateral relations from worsening. Plus, the US could review its policy toward Venezuela with an eye on its overall interest in Latin America. But if for any reason the US bans oil imports from Venezuela, the latter's economy could get into trouble. The US' geopolitical and strategic interests in Latin America, however, demand that Venezuela continue to enjoy its political, economic and social stability.¶ The security of Venezuela's oil exports and the US' oil imports are, to a certain degree, interdependent. Venezuela is still the third largest source of crude oil for the US. The US remains Venezuela's largest trading partner and has invested about $12 billion in Venezuela, while Venezuela has an investment of about $4 billion in the US. The US is also Venezuela's largest source of trade surplus and has a decisive influence on Venezuela's international balance of payment and foreign exchange reserve accumulation. [/INST] <h4>Oil is key to the alliance, but our policy is uncertain</h4><p><strong>Hongbo 3-12</strong>-13 [Sun, associate professor with the Institute of Latin American Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Chavez legacy will live on in Latin America,” http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-03/12/content_16300175.htm]</p><p><u><mark>As far as Venezuela-US relations are concerned, the future points to certain possibilities</u></mark>. The tense relations between Caracas and Washington are likely to ease, even though <u><mark>diplomatic ties between the two countries are yet to normalize</mark>. The degree of <mark>progress will depend on the diplomatic game the two countries play</u></mark> and their domestic political demands. But owing to Venezuela's political and economic stability, and oil security, the new government may ease its anti-US stance, drawing a similar response from Washington.¶ <u><mark>Since oil plays a key role in both countries' economic and political policies, it will help prevent bilateral relations from worsening</u></mark>. Plus, <u><mark>the US could review its policy toward Venezuela</u></mark> with an eye on its overall interest in Latin America. But if for any reason the US bans oil imports from Venezuela, the latter's economy could get into trouble. The US' geopolitical and strategic interests in Latin America, however, demand that Venezuela continue to enjoy its political, economic and social stability.¶ <u>The security of Venezuela's oil exports and the US' oil imports are</u>, to a certain degree, <u>interdependent</u>. Venezuela is still the third largest source of crude oil for the US. The US remains Venezuela's largest trading partner and has invested about $12 billion in Venezuela, while Venezuela has an investment of about $4 billion in the US. The US is also Venezuela's largest source of trade surplus and has a decisive influence on Venezuela's international balance of payment and foreign exchange reserve accumulation.</p> </s>

Skolkovo is key to Russia’s economy and broader relations with the U.S.

Russia has been largely dependent on technology imports in recent years as its own industry remains heavily focused on energy and metals as a result of this trip, we start full-fledged relations that will lead to establishing powerful cooperation The Obama administration was enthusiastic about Medvedev’s technology initiative and sees it as the palpable outcome of a year of hard work to reset a relationship that had gone adrift during the Bush administration. Obama saw Medvedev’s high-tech push as “something that will unleash growth for Russia” and increase opportunity for US exports and jobs.

Russia has been dependent on technology imports as a result of this trip, we start full-fledged relations that will lead powerful cooperation Obama was enthusiastic about Medvedev’s technology initiative to reset a relationship

Medvedev took with him a pledge from Schwarzenegger to put together a technology trade mission to Moscow to help with the Skolkovo project. Russia has been largely dependent on technology imports in recent years as its own industry remains heavily focused on energy and metals since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. “I would like that, as a result of this trip, we start full-fledged relations that will lead to establishing powerful cooperation,” Medvedev said. Google Inc chief executive Eric Schmidt had already agreed to join the Skolkovo board before the Medvedev visit, Bloomberg reported. Vekselberg said Cisco would also join the Skolkovo efforts, according to the financial news agency. The Obama administration was enthusiastic about Medvedev’s technology initiative and sees it as the palpable outcome of a year of hard work to reset a relationship that had gone adrift during the Bush administration. Obama saw Medvedev’s high-tech push as “something that will unleash growth for Russia” and increase opportunity for US exports and jobs.

<h4>Skolkovo is key to Russia’s economy and broader relations with the U.S.</h4><p><strong>New Europe ’10</strong> (“Medvedev seeks US help to steer Russia into a new economic age,” http://www.neurope.eu/articles/101633.php<u>)</p><p></u>Medvedev took with him a pledge from Schwarzenegger to put together a technology trade mission to Moscow to help with the Skolkovo project. <u><mark>Russia has been</mark> largely <mark>dependent on technology imports</mark> in recent years as its own industry remains heavily focused on energy and metals</u> since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. “I would like that, <u><strong><mark>as a result of this trip, we start full-fledged relations that will lead</mark> </strong>to establishing <strong><mark>powerful cooperation</u></strong></mark>,” Medvedev said. Google Inc chief executive Eric Schmidt had already agreed to join the Skolkovo board before the Medvedev visit, Bloomberg reported. Vekselberg said Cisco would also join the Skolkovo efforts, according to the financial news agency. <u>The <mark>Obama</mark> administration <mark>was enthusiastic about Medvedev’s technology initiative</mark> and sees it as the palpable outcome of a year of hard work <mark>to reset a relationship</mark> that had gone adrift during the Bush administration. Obama saw Medvedev’s high-tech push as “something that will unleash growth for Russia” and increase opportunity for US exports and jobs.</p></u>

New Europe ’10 (“Medvedev seeks US help to steer Russia into a new economic age,” http://www.neurope.eu/articles/101633.php)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: New Europe ’10 (“Medvedev seeks US help to steer Russia into a new economic age,” http://www.neurope.eu/articles/101633.php) fulltext: Medvedev took with him a pledge from Schwarzenegger to put together a technology trade mission to Moscow to help with the Skolkovo project. Russia has been largely dependent on technology imports in recent years as its own industry remains heavily focused on energy and metals since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. “I would like that, as a result of this trip, we start full-fledged relations that will lead to establishing powerful cooperation,” Medvedev said. Google Inc chief executive Eric Schmidt had already agreed to join the Skolkovo board before the Medvedev visit, Bloomberg reported. Vekselberg said Cisco would also join the Skolkovo efforts, according to the financial news agency. The Obama administration was enthusiastic about Medvedev’s technology initiative and sees it as the palpable outcome of a year of hard work to reset a relationship that had gone adrift during the Bush administration. Obama saw Medvedev’s high-tech push as “something that will unleash growth for Russia” and increase opportunity for US exports and jobs. [/INST] <h4>Skolkovo is key to Russia’s economy and broader relations with the U.S.</h4><p><strong>New Europe ’10</strong> (“Medvedev seeks US help to steer Russia into a new economic age,” http://www.neurope.eu/articles/101633.php<u>)</p><p></u>Medvedev took with him a pledge from Schwarzenegger to put together a technology trade mission to Moscow to help with the Skolkovo project. <u><mark>Russia has been</mark> largely <mark>dependent on technology imports</mark> in recent years as its own industry remains heavily focused on energy and metals</u> since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. “I would like that, <u><strong><mark>as a result of this trip, we start full-fledged relations that will lead</mark> </strong>to establishing <strong><mark>powerful cooperation</u></strong></mark>,” Medvedev said. Google Inc chief executive Eric Schmidt had already agreed to join the Skolkovo board before the Medvedev visit, Bloomberg reported. Vekselberg said Cisco would also join the Skolkovo efforts, according to the financial news agency. <u>The <mark>Obama</mark> administration <mark>was enthusiastic about Medvedev’s technology initiative</mark> and sees it as the palpable outcome of a year of hard work <mark>to reset a relationship</mark> that had gone adrift during the Bush administration. Obama saw Medvedev’s high-tech push as “something that will unleash growth for Russia” and increase opportunity for US exports and jobs.</p></u> </s>

(__) Lifting the Cuban embargo would increase US diplomatic capital

What the U S does need, urgently, is diplomatic capital. Free of charge, our Cuba embargo has given Castro an enemy straight from Central Casting with which to justify their regimes. The embargo also alienates people throughout Latin America the embargo is the disproportionate wrath of the Americas' Goliath toward a country that dared to defy it. Ratcheting down the embargo, would echo positively around the world.

What the United States does need, and urgently, is diplomatic capital. Free of charge, our Cuba embargo has given Castro and his protege, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, an enemy straight from Central Casting with which to justify their regimes. The embargo also alienates people throughout Latin America, including many who risked their lives fighting for democracy in their own countries. For many, the embargo is the disproportionate wrath of the Americas' Goliath toward a country that dared to defy it. Ratcheting down the embargo, and the assumptions about it, would echo positively around the world. Venezuela, though, might be the most immediate logjam to unstick. President Chavez wants nothing more than an old-time Cold War enmity with the United States. The drama therein provides him with material for countless speeches, and endless distractions as he mines at democratic institutions. Imagine how his rhetoric and policies might be retooled if Cuba and the United States suddenly began cooperating on counterterrorism, counter-narcotics and technical exchange projects.

<h4>(__) Lifting the Cuban embargo would increase US diplomatic capital</h4><p><strong>Houston Chronicle 07</strong> </p><p>(8-17-07 “Peacemaking for profit: U.S. shouldn't wait to ratchet down Cuba embargo”) http://uscubanormalization.blogspot.com/2007/08/houston-chronicle-editorial.html</p><p><u><strong>What the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>does need, </u></strong>and <u><strong>urgently, is diplomatic capital. Free of charge, our Cuba embargo has given Castro</u></strong> and his protege, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, <u><strong>an enemy straight from Central Casting with which to justify their regimes. The embargo also alienates people throughout Latin America</u></strong>, including many who risked their lives fighting for democracy in their own countries. For many, <u><strong>the embargo is the disproportionate wrath of the Americas' Goliath toward a country that dared to defy it. Ratcheting down the embargo,</u></strong> and the assumptions about it, <u><strong>would echo positively around the world.</u></strong> Venezuela, though, might be the most immediate logjam to unstick. President Chavez wants nothing more than an old-time Cold War enmity with the United States. The drama therein provides him with material for countless speeches, and endless distractions as he mines at democratic institutions. Imagine how his rhetoric and policies might be retooled if Cuba and the United States suddenly began cooperating on counterterrorism, counter-narcotics and technical exchange projects.</p>

Houston Chronicle 07 (8-17-07 “Peacemaking for profit: U.S. shouldn't wait to ratchet down Cuba embargo”) http://uscubanormalization.blogspot.com/2007/08/houston-chronicle-editorial.html

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Houston Chronicle 07 (8-17-07 “Peacemaking for profit: U.S. shouldn't wait to ratchet down Cuba embargo”) http://uscubanormalization.blogspot.com/2007/08/houston-chronicle-editorial.html fulltext: What the United States does need, and urgently, is diplomatic capital. Free of charge, our Cuba embargo has given Castro and his protege, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, an enemy straight from Central Casting with which to justify their regimes. The embargo also alienates people throughout Latin America, including many who risked their lives fighting for democracy in their own countries. For many, the embargo is the disproportionate wrath of the Americas' Goliath toward a country that dared to defy it. Ratcheting down the embargo, and the assumptions about it, would echo positively around the world. Venezuela, though, might be the most immediate logjam to unstick. President Chavez wants nothing more than an old-time Cold War enmity with the United States. The drama therein provides him with material for countless speeches, and endless distractions as he mines at democratic institutions. Imagine how his rhetoric and policies might be retooled if Cuba and the United States suddenly began cooperating on counterterrorism, counter-narcotics and technical exchange projects. [/INST] <h4>(__) Lifting the Cuban embargo would increase US diplomatic capital</h4><p><strong>Houston Chronicle 07</strong> </p><p>(8-17-07 “Peacemaking for profit: U.S. shouldn't wait to ratchet down Cuba embargo”) http://uscubanormalization.blogspot.com/2007/08/houston-chronicle-editorial.html</p><p><u><strong>What the U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>does need, </u></strong>and <u><strong>urgently, is diplomatic capital. Free of charge, our Cuba embargo has given Castro</u></strong> and his protege, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, <u><strong>an enemy straight from Central Casting with which to justify their regimes. The embargo also alienates people throughout Latin America</u></strong>, including many who risked their lives fighting for democracy in their own countries. For many, <u><strong>the embargo is the disproportionate wrath of the Americas' Goliath toward a country that dared to defy it. Ratcheting down the embargo,</u></strong> and the assumptions about it, <u><strong>would echo positively around the world.</u></strong> Venezuela, though, might be the most immediate logjam to unstick. President Chavez wants nothing more than an old-time Cold War enmity with the United States. The drama therein provides him with material for countless speeches, and endless distractions as he mines at democratic institutions. Imagine how his rhetoric and policies might be retooled if Cuba and the United States suddenly began cooperating on counterterrorism, counter-narcotics and technical exchange projects.</p> </s>

US economic engagement counteracts Iranian influence in Latin America

Iran’s forays into Latin America are the product of an aggressive diplomacy geared towards alleviating the pressure of Western-led sanctions weakness of Iran’s alliance network is brought about by engagement and pressure from the US. To prevent Iran from strengthening its bonds with peripheral powers policymakers in Washington should Engage with peripheral countries in countries of strategic interest it is beneficial to engage Iranian commitments have a tendency to eventually collapse under their own weight US aid and commercial interests provide strong incentives for peripheral nations to hesitate from full cooperation with the IRI

Iran’s forays into Latin America are the product of an aggressive ¶ diplomacy geared towards alleviating the pressure of Western-led sanctions weakness of Iran’s alliance ¶ network is brought about by engagement and pressure from the US. To prevent Iran from strengthening its bonds with ¶ peripheral powers policymakers in Washington should Engage with peripheral countries in countries of strategic interest it is ¶ beneficial to engage US aid and commercial interests provide strong incentives for peripheral nations to hesitate from full cooperation with ¶ the IRI

Iran’s forays into Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere are the product of an aggressive ¶ diplomacy geared towards alleviating the pressure of Western-led sanctions and more generally ¶ combating the present international order, which Tehran views as hostile to its interests. At ¶ present, Iran’s relationships with individual peripheral powers are not strong enough to achieve ¶ its goals, and thus not of critical concern to the US. The present weakness of Iran’s alliance ¶ network is brought about by divisions within Iran and its targeted partners, but also by sustained ¶ engagement and pressure from the US. To prevent Iran from strengthening its bonds with ¶ peripheral powers policymakers in Washington should consider the following three broad ¶ strategies:¶  Engage with peripheral countries, but do not meddle. Some analysts have criticized the US for ignoring the ¶ periphery (especially Latin America) and thus allowing Iran to gain a foothold. As Iran’s ambitious and ¶ geographically unbounded strategy in seeking partners and “allies” demonstrates, the US cannot afford to ¶ completely ignore any region of the globe. That being said, in countries of limited strategic interest it is ¶ beneficial to engage without overreaching, especially when considering that Iranian commitments have a ¶ tendency to eventually collapse under their own weight (e.g. Senegal’s Seniran Auto). US aid and commercial interests provide strong incentives for peripheral nations to hesitate from full cooperation with ¶ the IRI.

<h4>US economic engagement counteracts Iranian influence in Latin America</h4><p><strong>Fite ’12</strong> [Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” April 4, <u>http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf</u>]</p><p><u><mark>Iran’s forays into Latin America</u></mark>, Africa, and elsewhere <u><mark>are the product of an aggressive </u>¶<u> diplomacy geared towards alleviating the pressure of Western-led sanctions</u> </mark>and more generally ¶ combating the present international order, which Tehran views as hostile to its interests. At ¶ present, Iran’s relationships with individual peripheral powers are not strong enough to achieve ¶ its goals, and thus not of critical concern to the US. The present <u><mark>weakness of Iran’s alliance </u>¶<u> network is brought about by</u> </mark>divisions within Iran and its targeted partners, but also by sustained ¶ <u><mark>engagement and pressure from the US. To prevent Iran from strengthening its bonds</u> <u>with </u>¶<u> peripheral powers policymakers in Washington should</u> </mark>consider the following three broad ¶ strategies:¶  <u><mark>Engage with peripheral countries</u></mark>, but do not meddle. Some analysts have criticized the US for ignoring the ¶ periphery (especially Latin America) and thus allowing Iran to gain a foothold. As Iran’s ambitious and ¶ geographically unbounded strategy in seeking partners and “allies” demonstrates, the US cannot afford to ¶ completely ignore any region of the globe. That being said, <u><mark>in countries of</u></mark> limited <u><mark>strategic interest it is </u>¶<u> beneficial to engage</u> </mark>without overreaching, especially when considering that <u>Iranian commitments have a </u>¶<u> tendency to eventually collapse under their own weight</u> (e.g. Senegal’s Seniran Auto). <u><mark>US aid and commercial interests provide strong incentives for peripheral nations to hesitate from full cooperation with </u>¶<u> the IRI</u></mark>.</p>

Fite ’12 [Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” April 4, http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Fite ’12 [Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” April 4, http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf] fulltext: Iran’s forays into Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere are the product of an aggressive ¶ diplomacy geared towards alleviating the pressure of Western-led sanctions and more generally ¶ combating the present international order, which Tehran views as hostile to its interests. At ¶ present, Iran’s relationships with individual peripheral powers are not strong enough to achieve ¶ its goals, and thus not of critical concern to the US. The present weakness of Iran’s alliance ¶ network is brought about by divisions within Iran and its targeted partners, but also by sustained ¶ engagement and pressure from the US. To prevent Iran from strengthening its bonds with ¶ peripheral powers policymakers in Washington should consider the following three broad ¶ strategies:¶  Engage with peripheral countries, but do not meddle. Some analysts have criticized the US for ignoring the ¶ periphery (especially Latin America) and thus allowing Iran to gain a foothold. As Iran’s ambitious and ¶ geographically unbounded strategy in seeking partners and “allies” demonstrates, the US cannot afford to ¶ completely ignore any region of the globe. That being said, in countries of limited strategic interest it is ¶ beneficial to engage without overreaching, especially when considering that Iranian commitments have a ¶ tendency to eventually collapse under their own weight (e.g. Senegal’s Seniran Auto). US aid and commercial interests provide strong incentives for peripheral nations to hesitate from full cooperation with ¶ the IRI. [/INST] <h4>US economic engagement counteracts Iranian influence in Latin America</h4><p><strong>Fite ’12</strong> [Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” April 4, <u>http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf</u>]</p><p><u><mark>Iran’s forays into Latin America</u></mark>, Africa, and elsewhere <u><mark>are the product of an aggressive </u>¶<u> diplomacy geared towards alleviating the pressure of Western-led sanctions</u> </mark>and more generally ¶ combating the present international order, which Tehran views as hostile to its interests. At ¶ present, Iran’s relationships with individual peripheral powers are not strong enough to achieve ¶ its goals, and thus not of critical concern to the US. The present <u><mark>weakness of Iran’s alliance </u>¶<u> network is brought about by</u> </mark>divisions within Iran and its targeted partners, but also by sustained ¶ <u><mark>engagement and pressure from the US. To prevent Iran from strengthening its bonds</u> <u>with </u>¶<u> peripheral powers policymakers in Washington should</u> </mark>consider the following three broad ¶ strategies:¶  <u><mark>Engage with peripheral countries</u></mark>, but do not meddle. Some analysts have criticized the US for ignoring the ¶ periphery (especially Latin America) and thus allowing Iran to gain a foothold. As Iran’s ambitious and ¶ geographically unbounded strategy in seeking partners and “allies” demonstrates, the US cannot afford to ¶ completely ignore any region of the globe. That being said, <u><mark>in countries of</u></mark> limited <u><mark>strategic interest it is </u>¶<u> beneficial to engage</u> </mark>without overreaching, especially when considering that <u>Iranian commitments have a </u>¶<u> tendency to eventually collapse under their own weight</u> (e.g. Senegal’s Seniran Auto). <u><mark>US aid and commercial interests provide strong incentives for peripheral nations to hesitate from full cooperation with </u>¶<u> the IRI</u></mark>.</p> </s>

(__) Diplomatic capital is not being invested in the peace process now

Obama kept a distance from the Middle East peace process because neither Israelis nor Palestinians were ready to take hard steps needed for a durable peace. Cognizant that the region has long been a graveyard of U.S. diplomats’ dreams Obama decided to preserve his diplomatic capital until circumstances indicated that there was a real chance of success. That moment is not yet here.

In truth, Mr. Obama’s commitment to the defense of Israel has not wavered. His overtures to the Islamic world reflected a desire to undo the damage done by the Bush administration’s global war on terror. He kept a distance from the Middle East peace process — although he created a special envoy to the negotiations — because neither Israelis nor Palestinians were ready to take hard steps needed for a durable peace. Cognizant that the region has long been a graveyard of U.S. diplomats’ dreams, Mr. Obama decided to preserve his diplomatic capital until circumstances indicated that there was a real chance of success. That moment is not yet here. But dynamics in the region, along with his re-election, demanded that he refocus on the Middle East, and a visit was overdue. The trip had several objectives. Mr. Obama had to win the confidence of the Israeli people, and assure them — and others — of the strength of their relationship with the U.S. At the same time, he had to make the case for the Palestinians without suggesting that there is a zero-sum relationship between the two.

<h4>(__) Diplomatic capital is not being invested in the peace process now</h4><p><strong>The Japan Times 13</strong> </p><p>(4-3-13, “Symbols, substance in the Mideast” Editorial) http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/04/03/editorials/symbols-substance-in-the-mideast/#.UcswTPmsiSo</p><p>In truth, Mr. <u><strong>Obama</u></strong>’s commitment to the defense of Israel has not wavered. His overtures to the Islamic world reflected a desire to undo the damage done by the Bush administration’s global war on terror. He <u><strong>kept a distance from the Middle East peace process</u></strong> — although he created a special envoy to the negotiations — <u><strong>because neither Israelis nor Palestinians were ready to take hard steps needed for a durable peace. Cognizant that the region has long been a graveyard of U.S. diplomats’ dreams</u></strong>, Mr. <u><strong>Obama decided to preserve his diplomatic capital until circumstances indicated that there was a real chance of success. That moment is not yet here.</u></strong> But dynamics in the region, along with his re-election, demanded that he refocus on the Middle East, and a visit was overdue. The trip had several objectives. Mr. Obama had to win the confidence of the Israeli people, and assure them — and others — of the strength of their relationship with the U.S. At the same time, he had to make the case for the Palestinians without suggesting that there is a zero-sum relationship between the two.</p>

The Japan Times 13 (4-3-13, “Symbols, substance in the Mideast” Editorial) http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/04/03/editorials/symbols-substance-in-the-mideast/#.UcswTPmsiSo

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: The Japan Times 13 (4-3-13, “Symbols, substance in the Mideast” Editorial) http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/04/03/editorials/symbols-substance-in-the-mideast/#.UcswTPmsiSo fulltext: In truth, Mr. Obama’s commitment to the defense of Israel has not wavered. His overtures to the Islamic world reflected a desire to undo the damage done by the Bush administration’s global war on terror. He kept a distance from the Middle East peace process — although he created a special envoy to the negotiations — because neither Israelis nor Palestinians were ready to take hard steps needed for a durable peace. Cognizant that the region has long been a graveyard of U.S. diplomats’ dreams, Mr. Obama decided to preserve his diplomatic capital until circumstances indicated that there was a real chance of success. That moment is not yet here. But dynamics in the region, along with his re-election, demanded that he refocus on the Middle East, and a visit was overdue. The trip had several objectives. Mr. Obama had to win the confidence of the Israeli people, and assure them — and others — of the strength of their relationship with the U.S. At the same time, he had to make the case for the Palestinians without suggesting that there is a zero-sum relationship between the two. [/INST] <h4>(__) Diplomatic capital is not being invested in the peace process now</h4><p><strong>The Japan Times 13</strong> </p><p>(4-3-13, “Symbols, substance in the Mideast” Editorial) http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/04/03/editorials/symbols-substance-in-the-mideast/#.UcswTPmsiSo</p><p>In truth, Mr. <u><strong>Obama</u></strong>’s commitment to the defense of Israel has not wavered. His overtures to the Islamic world reflected a desire to undo the damage done by the Bush administration’s global war on terror. He <u><strong>kept a distance from the Middle East peace process</u></strong> — although he created a special envoy to the negotiations — <u><strong>because neither Israelis nor Palestinians were ready to take hard steps needed for a durable peace. Cognizant that the region has long been a graveyard of U.S. diplomats’ dreams</u></strong>, Mr. <u><strong>Obama decided to preserve his diplomatic capital until circumstances indicated that there was a real chance of success. That moment is not yet here.</u></strong> But dynamics in the region, along with his re-election, demanded that he refocus on the Middle East, and a visit was overdue. The trip had several objectives. Mr. Obama had to win the confidence of the Israeli people, and assure them — and others — of the strength of their relationship with the U.S. At the same time, he had to make the case for the Palestinians without suggesting that there is a zero-sum relationship between the two.</p> </s>

Nuclear war

Russia matters a great deal Putin’s decision to return makes it critical for Washington to manage relations Russia is a player whose choices affect vital interests First, Russia can erase the U S in 30 minutes Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war Second, Russia is most consequential in preventing nuclear terrorism Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing prolif Russian choices are the difference between failure and success Fourth, Russian support in sharing intel and cooperating in operations remains essential to combat transnational terrorist groups Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to Afghanistan Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system A Moscow closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power Eighth, Russia provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy Ninth, Russia’s brainpower Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what Russia intent on frustrating U.S. could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. resolutions

Russia matters Putin’s decision to return makes i critical for Washington to manage its relationship Russia can erase the U S in 30 minutes Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war Russia is most consequential in preventing nuclear terrorism Russia plays an essential role in preventing prolif Russian support remains essential to the combat terrorist groups potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what Russia intent on frustrating U.S could do

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order. Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy. Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin. Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions.

<h4>Nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Allison 11</strong>. (10-31 -- Graham, Director – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School, and Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, “10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters”, Politico, 2011, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6)</p><p>That central point is that <u><mark>Russia matters</mark> a great deal</u> to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir <u><mark>Putin’s decision to return</u></mark> next year as president <u><mark>makes i</mark>t</u> all the more <u><mark>critical for Washington to manage</u></mark> <mark>its <u>relations</u>hip</mark> with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, <u>Russia is a player whose choices affect</u> our <u>vital interests</u> in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. <u>First, <mark>Russia</u></mark> remains the only nation that <u><mark>can erase the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates from the map <u><mark>in 30 minutes</u></mark>. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, <u><mark>Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war</u></mark>. <u>Second, <mark>Russia is</u></mark> our <u><mark>most consequential</u></mark> partner <u><mark>in preventing nuclear terrorism</u></mark>. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. <u>Third, <mark>Russia plays an essential role in preventing</u></mark> the <u><mark>prolif</u></mark>eration of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, <u>Russian choices</u> to sell or withhold sensitive technologies <u>are the difference between failure and</u> the possibility of <u>success</u>. <u>Fourth, <mark>Russian support </mark>in sharing intel</u>ligence <u>and cooperating in operations <mark>remains essential to</u> the</mark> U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and <u><mark>combat</u></mark> other <u>transnational <mark>terrorist groups</u></mark>. <u>Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to</u> 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in <u>Afghanistan</u>. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. <u>Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer</u>. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. <u>Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system</u>. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. <u>A Moscow</u> more <u>closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power</u> to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order. <u>Eighth, Russia</u> is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory <u>provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy</u>. <u>Ninth, Russia’s brainpower</u> is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin. <u>Tenth, Russia’s <mark>potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what</u></mark> a <u><mark>Russia</u></mark>n president <u><mark>intent on frustrating U.S</mark>.</u> international objectives <u><mark>could do</mark> — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling</u> S-300 air defense <u>missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N.</u> Security Council <u>resolutions</u>.</p>

Allison 11. (10-31 -- Graham, Director – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School, and Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, “10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters”, Politico, 2011, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Allison 11. (10-31 -- Graham, Director – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School, and Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, “10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters”, Politico, 2011, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6) fulltext: That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order. Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy. Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin. Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions. [/INST] <h4>Nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Allison 11</strong>. (10-31 -- Graham, Director – Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School, and Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, “10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters”, Politico, 2011, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6)</p><p>That central point is that <u><mark>Russia matters</mark> a great deal</u> to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir <u><mark>Putin’s decision to return</u></mark> next year as president <u><mark>makes i</mark>t</u> all the more <u><mark>critical for Washington to manage</u></mark> <mark>its <u>relations</u>hip</mark> with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, <u>Russia is a player whose choices affect</u> our <u>vital interests</u> in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. <u>First, <mark>Russia</u></mark> remains the only nation that <u><mark>can erase the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates from the map <u><mark>in 30 minutes</u></mark>. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, <u><mark>Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war</u></mark>. <u>Second, <mark>Russia is</u></mark> our <u><mark>most consequential</u></mark> partner <u><mark>in preventing nuclear terrorism</u></mark>. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. <u>Third, <mark>Russia plays an essential role in preventing</u></mark> the <u><mark>prolif</u></mark>eration of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, <u>Russian choices</u> to sell or withhold sensitive technologies <u>are the difference between failure and</u> the possibility of <u>success</u>. <u>Fourth, <mark>Russian support </mark>in sharing intel</u>ligence <u>and cooperating in operations <mark>remains essential to</u> the</mark> U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and <u><mark>combat</u></mark> other <u>transnational <mark>terrorist groups</u></mark>. <u>Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to</u> 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in <u>Afghanistan</u>. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. <u>Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer</u>. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. <u>Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system</u>. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. <u>A Moscow</u> more <u>closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power</u> to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order. <u>Eighth, Russia</u> is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory <u>provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy</u>. <u>Ninth, Russia’s brainpower</u> is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin. <u>Tenth, Russia’s <mark>potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what</u></mark> a <u><mark>Russia</u></mark>n president <u><mark>intent on frustrating U.S</mark>.</u> international objectives <u><mark>could do</mark> — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling</u> S-300 air defense <u>missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N.</u> Security Council <u>resolutions</u>.</p> </s>

Iran is competing with the US for influence in Venezuela

In Latin America, Iran mobilizes historically rooted anti-American sentiment with economic incentives to draw states into its “post-Western” camp impoverished countries are drawn to Iran as a source of desperately needed investment and antipathy towards the US Iran has dramatically increased its diplomatic missions to states critical of the US like Venezuela

In Latin America, Iran mobilizes historically rooted anti-American sentiment with economic incentives to draw states into its “post-Western” camp impoverished countries are drawn to Iran as a source of desperately needed investment and antipathy towards the US Iran has dramatically increased its diplomatic missions to states critical of the ¶ US like Venezuela

In Latin America, Iran mobilizes historically rooted anti-American sentiment in combination ¶ with economic incentives to draw states into its “post-Western” camp. Economically ¶ impoverished countries are drawn to Iran as a source of desperately needed investment and ¶ mutual antipathy towards the US provides rhetorical packaging for bilateral agreements. In the past decade Iran has dramatically increased its diplomatic missions to states critical of the ¶ US like Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador, but also to non-aligned states like Argentina ¶ and Brazil. Iran currently maintains 11 embassies and 17 cultural centers in Latin America. In ¶ addition to existing embassies in Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, in recent ¶ years, Iran has opened embassies in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Columbia, Chile, and ¶ Uruguay.¶ 2¶ The Islamic Republic’s diplomatic missions have resulted in lively rhetoric and ¶ impressive promises of cooperation, but they have not yet yielded strategic results that have a ¶ significant effect on greater US-Iranian competition.

<h4>Iran is competing with the US for influence in Venezuela</h4><p><strong>Fite ’12</strong> [Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” April 4, <u>http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf</u>]</p><p><u><mark>In Latin America, Iran mobilizes historically rooted anti-American sentiment</u> </mark>in combination ¶ <u><mark>with economic incentives to draw states into its “post-Western” camp</u></mark>. Economically ¶ <u><mark>impoverished countries are drawn to Iran as a source of desperately needed investment and</u> </mark>¶ mutual <u><mark>antipathy towards the US</u> </mark>provides rhetorical packaging for bilateral agreements. In the past decade <u><mark>Iran has dramatically increased its diplomatic missions to states critical of the</u> ¶ <u>US like Venezuela</u></mark>, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador, but also to non-aligned states like Argentina ¶ and Brazil. Iran currently maintains 11 embassies and 17 cultural centers in Latin America. In ¶ addition to existing embassies in Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, in recent ¶ years, Iran has opened embassies in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Columbia, Chile, and ¶ Uruguay.¶ 2¶ The Islamic Republic’s diplomatic missions have resulted in lively rhetoric and ¶ impressive promises of cooperation, but they have not yet yielded strategic results that have a ¶ significant effect on greater US-Iranian competition. </p>

Fite ’12 [Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” April 4, http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Fite ’12 [Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” April 4, http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf] fulltext: In Latin America, Iran mobilizes historically rooted anti-American sentiment in combination ¶ with economic incentives to draw states into its “post-Western” camp. Economically ¶ impoverished countries are drawn to Iran as a source of desperately needed investment and ¶ mutual antipathy towards the US provides rhetorical packaging for bilateral agreements. In the past decade Iran has dramatically increased its diplomatic missions to states critical of the ¶ US like Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador, but also to non-aligned states like Argentina ¶ and Brazil. Iran currently maintains 11 embassies and 17 cultural centers in Latin America. In ¶ addition to existing embassies in Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, in recent ¶ years, Iran has opened embassies in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Columbia, Chile, and ¶ Uruguay.¶ 2¶ The Islamic Republic’s diplomatic missions have resulted in lively rhetoric and ¶ impressive promises of cooperation, but they have not yet yielded strategic results that have a ¶ significant effect on greater US-Iranian competition. [/INST] <h4>Iran is competing with the US for influence in Venezuela</h4><p><strong>Fite ’12</strong> [Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” April 4, <u>http://csis.org/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf</u>]</p><p><u><mark>In Latin America, Iran mobilizes historically rooted anti-American sentiment</u> </mark>in combination ¶ <u><mark>with economic incentives to draw states into its “post-Western” camp</u></mark>. Economically ¶ <u><mark>impoverished countries are drawn to Iran as a source of desperately needed investment and</u> </mark>¶ mutual <u><mark>antipathy towards the US</u> </mark>provides rhetorical packaging for bilateral agreements. In the past decade <u><mark>Iran has dramatically increased its diplomatic missions to states critical of the</u> ¶ <u>US like Venezuela</u></mark>, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador, but also to non-aligned states like Argentina ¶ and Brazil. Iran currently maintains 11 embassies and 17 cultural centers in Latin America. In ¶ addition to existing embassies in Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, in recent ¶ years, Iran has opened embassies in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Columbia, Chile, and ¶ Uruguay.¶ 2¶ The Islamic Republic’s diplomatic missions have resulted in lively rhetoric and ¶ impressive promises of cooperation, but they have not yet yielded strategic results that have a ¶ significant effect on greater US-Iranian competition. </p> </s>

(__) Diplomatic capital doesn’t trade off – the state department can collaborate and hire more people to avoid any tradeoff.

To improve U.S diplomacy efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of State • develop a strategy collaborate with the private sector designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs sections to reduce the administrative burden; • strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages; and • program adequate time for training

(Government Accountability Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges: GAO-03-951.”, 4 September 2003, GAO-03-951, EBSCO) To improve the planning, coordination, execution, and assessment of U.S. public diplomacy efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of State • develop and widely disseminate throughout the department a strategy that considers the techniques of private sector public relations firms in integrating all of State’s public diplomacy efforts and directing them toward achieving common and measurable objectives; • consider ways to collaborate with the private sector to employ best practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target audiences, including expanded use of opinion research and better use of existing research; • designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs sections to reduce the administrative burden; • strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages; and • program adequate time for public diplomacy training into State’s assignment process.

<h4>(__) Diplomatic capital doesn’t trade off – the state department can collaborate and hire more people to avoid any tradeoff.</h4><p><u><strong>GAO, </strong>Government Accountability Office,<strong> 2003</u></strong> </p><p>(Government Accountability Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges: GAO-03-951.”, 4 September 2003, GAO-03-951, EBSCO)</p><p><u><strong>To improve</u></strong> the planning, coordination, execution, and assessment of <u>U.S</u>. public <u><strong>diplomacy efforts, we recommend that the</u></strong> <u><strong>Secretary of State • develop</u></strong> and widely disseminate throughout the department <u><strong>a strategy</u></strong> that considers the techniques of private sector public relations firms in integrating all of State’s public diplomacy efforts and directing them toward achieving common and measurable objectives; • consider ways to <u><strong>collaborate with the private sector</u></strong> to employ best practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target audiences, including expanded use of opinion research and better use of existing research; • <u><strong>designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs sections to reduce the administrative burden; • strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages; and • program adequate time for</u></strong> public diplomacy <u><strong>training</u></strong> into State’s assignment process.</p>

GAO, Government Accountability Office, 2003

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: GAO, Government Accountability Office, 2003 fulltext: (Government Accountability Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges: GAO-03-951.”, 4 September 2003, GAO-03-951, EBSCO) To improve the planning, coordination, execution, and assessment of U.S. public diplomacy efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of State • develop and widely disseminate throughout the department a strategy that considers the techniques of private sector public relations firms in integrating all of State’s public diplomacy efforts and directing them toward achieving common and measurable objectives; • consider ways to collaborate with the private sector to employ best practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target audiences, including expanded use of opinion research and better use of existing research; • designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs sections to reduce the administrative burden; • strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages; and • program adequate time for public diplomacy training into State’s assignment process. [/INST] <h4>(__) Diplomatic capital doesn’t trade off – the state department can collaborate and hire more people to avoid any tradeoff.</h4><p><u><strong>GAO, </strong>Government Accountability Office,<strong> 2003</u></strong> </p><p>(Government Accountability Office, “U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges: GAO-03-951.”, 4 September 2003, GAO-03-951, EBSCO)</p><p><u><strong>To improve</u></strong> the planning, coordination, execution, and assessment of <u>U.S</u>. public <u><strong>diplomacy efforts, we recommend that the</u></strong> <u><strong>Secretary of State • develop</u></strong> and widely disseminate throughout the department <u><strong>a strategy</u></strong> that considers the techniques of private sector public relations firms in integrating all of State’s public diplomacy efforts and directing them toward achieving common and measurable objectives; • consider ways to <u><strong>collaborate with the private sector</u></strong> to employ best practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target audiences, including expanded use of opinion research and better use of existing research; • <u><strong>designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs sections to reduce the administrative burden; • strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign languages; and • program adequate time for</u></strong> public diplomacy <u><strong>training</u></strong> into State’s assignment process.</p> </s>

[insert no impact e.g. ]

<h4>[insert no impact e.g. ] </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>[insert no impact e.g. ] </h4> </s>

Plan: The United States federal government should repeal the embargo against Cuba

<h4>Plan: The United States federal government should repeal the embargo against Cuba</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>Plan: The United States federal government should repeal the embargo against Cuba</h4> </s>

(__) Peace Process will fail – Arab Spring

attempts to revive Palestinian-Israeli talks now will be doomed to fail especially amid the Arab Spring and general instability in the region Israel evidently couldn’t care less about getting on the track of peace and has no motive to hold territorial talks now. As for Palestine its rival factions Fatah and Hamas have announced a plan to form a unity government and hold elections but they are still split which doesn’t add to the peace process”. if Syria falls into chaos and the extremists from across the Arab world gain a foothold there , Israel and Palestine have more pressing issues than rivalry right now the entire Middle East should be viewed through the prism of the Syrian conflict which threatens to set the whole region ablaze The Arab Spring has once triggered an irreversible escalation of violence and there is no way back

With all eyes on Syria, the world has somewhat forgotten about the Middle East while experts claim that Syria is indispensable to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The Middle East is a small and tangled world so Syria really matters for Israel and Palestine. Even the smallest moves in the Syrian conflict may trigger drastic changes between Israel and Palestine. Irina Zvyagelskaya, senior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of Russian Academy of Science, commented on the situation. “I think any attempts to revive Palestinian-Israeli talks now will be doomed to fail especially amid the Arab Spring and general instability in the region. Israel evidently couldn’t care less about getting on the track of peace and has no motive to hold territorial talks now. As for Palestine, it is at least trying, its rival factions Fatah and Hamas have announced a plan to form a unity government and hold elections but they are still split which doesn’t add to the peace process”. Even though ties between Israel and Syria are tense, Assad is the best leader as far as Israel in concerned, an Israeli intelligence source told The Times, saying the following. “Better the devil we know, than the demons we can only imagine if Syria falls into chaos and the extremists from across the Arab world gain a foothold there”. What he meant were Islamists that are now prevailing among Syria’s opposition. Therefore, Israel and Palestine have more pressing issues than rivalry right now. Dmitry Maryasis, senior researcher with the Department of Israeli Studies of the Oriental Studies Institute says: “Syria was an active supporter of Hamas funding it and supplying it with arms, so if Assad quits, Hamas will loose its shells supplied via Iran. At the same time the Syrian opposition has plenty of Al-Qaeda-linked Islamists and if they grab the helm, this will mean a danger for Fatah which is a national not a religions party. Now the entire Middle East should be viewed through the prism of the Syrian conflict which threatens to set the whole region ablaze. Thus, all global efforts should be focused on Syria and not on boosting the Palestine-Israeli peaceful process. The Arab Spring has once triggered an irreversible escalation of violence and there is no way back.

<h4> (__) Peace Process will fail – Arab Spring</h4><p><strong>Duz</strong>, reporter for the Voice of Russia Radio, <strong>2013</strong> </p><p>(“Syria: a key to Middle East peace” Sergey Duz, reporter for The Voice of Russia Radio. 22 May, 2013 http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_05_22/Syria-a-key-to-Mid-East-peace/)</p><p>With all eyes on Syria, the world has somewhat forgotten about the Middle East while experts claim that Syria is indispensable to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The Middle East is a small and tangled world so Syria really matters for Israel and Palestine. Even the smallest moves in the Syrian conflict may trigger drastic changes between Israel and Palestine.</p><p>Irina Zvyagelskaya, senior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of Russian Academy of Science, commented on the situation.</p><p>“I think any <u><strong>attempts to revive Palestinian-Israeli talks now will be doomed to fail especially amid the Arab Spring and general instability in the region</u></strong>. <u><strong>Israel evidently couldn’t care less about getting on the track of peace and has no motive to hold territorial talks now. As for Palestine</u></strong>, it is at least trying, <u><strong>its rival factions Fatah and Hamas have announced a plan to form a unity government and hold elections but they are still split which doesn’t add to the peace process”.</p><p></u></strong>Even though ties between Israel and Syria are tense, Assad is the best leader as far as Israel in concerned, an Israeli intelligence source told The Times, saying the following.</p><p>“Better the devil we know, than the demons we can only imagine <u><strong>if Syria falls into chaos and the extremists from across the Arab world gain a foothold there</u></strong>”. What he meant were Islamists that are now prevailing among Syria’s opposition.</p><p>Therefore<u><strong>, Israel and Palestine have more pressing issues than rivalry right now</u></strong>.</p><p>Dmitry Maryasis, senior researcher with the Department of Israeli Studies of the Oriental Studies Institute says: “Syria was an active supporter of Hamas funding it and supplying it with arms, so if Assad quits, Hamas will loose its shells supplied via Iran. At the same time the Syrian opposition has plenty of Al-Qaeda-linked Islamists and if they grab the helm, this will mean a danger for Fatah which is a national not a religions party.</p><p>Now <u><strong>the entire Middle East should be viewed through the prism of the Syrian conflict which threatens to set the whole region ablaze</u></strong>. Thus, all global efforts should be focused on Syria and not on boosting the Palestine-Israeli peaceful process.</p><p> <u><strong>The Arab Spring has once triggered an irreversible escalation of violence and there is no way back</u></strong>. </p>

Duz, reporter for the Voice of Russia Radio, 2013 (“Syria: a key to Middle East peace” Sergey Duz, reporter for The Voice of Russia Radio. 22 May, 2013 http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_05_22/Syria-a-key-to-Mid-East-peace/)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Duz, reporter for the Voice of Russia Radio, 2013 (“Syria: a key to Middle East peace” Sergey Duz, reporter for The Voice of Russia Radio. 22 May, 2013 http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_05_22/Syria-a-key-to-Mid-East-peace/) fulltext: With all eyes on Syria, the world has somewhat forgotten about the Middle East while experts claim that Syria is indispensable to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The Middle East is a small and tangled world so Syria really matters for Israel and Palestine. Even the smallest moves in the Syrian conflict may trigger drastic changes between Israel and Palestine. Irina Zvyagelskaya, senior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of Russian Academy of Science, commented on the situation. “I think any attempts to revive Palestinian-Israeli talks now will be doomed to fail especially amid the Arab Spring and general instability in the region. Israel evidently couldn’t care less about getting on the track of peace and has no motive to hold territorial talks now. As for Palestine, it is at least trying, its rival factions Fatah and Hamas have announced a plan to form a unity government and hold elections but they are still split which doesn’t add to the peace process”. Even though ties between Israel and Syria are tense, Assad is the best leader as far as Israel in concerned, an Israeli intelligence source told The Times, saying the following. “Better the devil we know, than the demons we can only imagine if Syria falls into chaos and the extremists from across the Arab world gain a foothold there”. What he meant were Islamists that are now prevailing among Syria’s opposition. Therefore, Israel and Palestine have more pressing issues than rivalry right now. Dmitry Maryasis, senior researcher with the Department of Israeli Studies of the Oriental Studies Institute says: “Syria was an active supporter of Hamas funding it and supplying it with arms, so if Assad quits, Hamas will loose its shells supplied via Iran. At the same time the Syrian opposition has plenty of Al-Qaeda-linked Islamists and if they grab the helm, this will mean a danger for Fatah which is a national not a religions party. Now the entire Middle East should be viewed through the prism of the Syrian conflict which threatens to set the whole region ablaze. Thus, all global efforts should be focused on Syria and not on boosting the Palestine-Israeli peaceful process. The Arab Spring has once triggered an irreversible escalation of violence and there is no way back. [/INST] <h4> (__) Peace Process will fail – Arab Spring</h4><p><strong>Duz</strong>, reporter for the Voice of Russia Radio, <strong>2013</strong> </p><p>(“Syria: a key to Middle East peace” Sergey Duz, reporter for The Voice of Russia Radio. 22 May, 2013 http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_05_22/Syria-a-key-to-Mid-East-peace/)</p><p>With all eyes on Syria, the world has somewhat forgotten about the Middle East while experts claim that Syria is indispensable to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The Middle East is a small and tangled world so Syria really matters for Israel and Palestine. Even the smallest moves in the Syrian conflict may trigger drastic changes between Israel and Palestine.</p><p>Irina Zvyagelskaya, senior researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of Russian Academy of Science, commented on the situation.</p><p>“I think any <u><strong>attempts to revive Palestinian-Israeli talks now will be doomed to fail especially amid the Arab Spring and general instability in the region</u></strong>. <u><strong>Israel evidently couldn’t care less about getting on the track of peace and has no motive to hold territorial talks now. As for Palestine</u></strong>, it is at least trying, <u><strong>its rival factions Fatah and Hamas have announced a plan to form a unity government and hold elections but they are still split which doesn’t add to the peace process”.</p><p></u></strong>Even though ties between Israel and Syria are tense, Assad is the best leader as far as Israel in concerned, an Israeli intelligence source told The Times, saying the following.</p><p>“Better the devil we know, than the demons we can only imagine <u><strong>if Syria falls into chaos and the extremists from across the Arab world gain a foothold there</u></strong>”. What he meant were Islamists that are now prevailing among Syria’s opposition.</p><p>Therefore<u><strong>, Israel and Palestine have more pressing issues than rivalry right now</u></strong>.</p><p>Dmitry Maryasis, senior researcher with the Department of Israeli Studies of the Oriental Studies Institute says: “Syria was an active supporter of Hamas funding it and supplying it with arms, so if Assad quits, Hamas will loose its shells supplied via Iran. At the same time the Syrian opposition has plenty of Al-Qaeda-linked Islamists and if they grab the helm, this will mean a danger for Fatah which is a national not a religions party.</p><p>Now <u><strong>the entire Middle East should be viewed through the prism of the Syrian conflict which threatens to set the whole region ablaze</u></strong>. Thus, all global efforts should be focused on Syria and not on boosting the Palestine-Israeli peaceful process.</p><p> <u><strong>The Arab Spring has once triggered an irreversible escalation of violence and there is no way back</u></strong>. </p> </s>

US-Iran influence is zero-sum- new economic engagement exposes their fragility

US competition with Iran has become the equivalent of a game of three-dimensional chess Iran pursues cooperation in Latin America creating a coalition of anti-Western states capable of influencing its competition with the United States Tehran casts a wide net and intends to frustrate American influence over Iran and throughout the developing world. US ability to push back against Iran’s attempts to widen its network is strongest in countries that benefit from US aid, trade Tehran’s web is fragile and possibly illusory It remains to be seen if Tehran can make good on the development commitments it has made to potential partners or if its bonds with peripheral states can be institutionalized

Iran pursues cooperation in Latin America, creating a coalition of anti-Western states Tehran casts a wide net and intends to frustrate American influence over Iran and throughout the developing world.¶ US ability to push back against Iran’s attempts to widen its network is strongest in countries that benefit from US aid, trade Tehran’s web is fragile and possibly illusory It remains to be seen if Tehran can make good on the development commitments it has made to potential partners or if its bonds with peripheral states can be institutionalized

US competition with Iran has become the equivalent of a game of three-dimensional chess, but a game where each side can modify at least some of the rules with each move. It is also a game that has been going on for some three decades. It is clear that it is also a game that is unlikely to be ended by better dialog and mutual understanding, and that Iran’s version of “democracy” is unlikely to change the way it is played in the foreseeable future.¶ The Burke Chair at CSIS is preparing a detailed analysis of the history and character of this competition as part of a project supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation. This has led to the preparation of a new draft report entitled Peripheral Competition Involving Latin America and Africa, which is now available on the CSIS web site at: http://csis.org/files/publication/120314_Iran_Chapter_XII_Peripheral_States.pdf¶ This report shows that Iran pursues cooperation with states on the geographic and strategic periphery of the competition between the US and Iran in order to create a network of diplomatic and economic relationships or “partners” who can lessen the blow of international sanctions and generally oppose Western attempts to constrict its ambitions. These peripheral “partners,” located mainly in Africa and Latin America, also serve as alternative markets for Iranian oil, provide diplomatic cover for Iran’s nuclear efforts, and aid Iran’s acquisition of goods proscribed by international sanctions.¶ Tehran’s strategy pragmatically subordinates concerns for ideological and religious homogeneity to the goal of creating a coalition of non- or anti-Western states capable of influencing its competition with the United States. The states involved are drawn to Iran by both promises of economic help—particularly in the energy sector—and by Iranian appeals to commonly oppose the Western international system.¶ The Islamic Republic also portrays its present isolation by the US and Europe as a continuation of Western imperialism, and draws on its credentials as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement to elicit support from the disparate states throughout Africa and the Americas that have preexisting grievances with the Western order and its leading states.¶ According to Iranian leaders, the IRI’s competition with the US and its allies is not a just a contest between states, but a clash of worldviews. The US represents an exploitative status quo, and Iran offers the promise of an alternative order geared toward promoting the sovereignty and interests of developing nations. Speaking to an audience in Nigeria in 2010, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for a decisive break with the present Western-dominated system:¶ We have to develop a proper cooperation among the developing nations in order to wriggle ourselves from the domination of the western powers. And this effort is going on among the independent developing nations today. We have to establish a collective effort with a view to create a new international independent economic system that should be on the basis of justice.¶ Though many of the countries Iran seeks to cooperate with are militarily and economically weak, Tehran casts a wide net in trying to build an array of partners to counterbalance what it sees as Western dominance of the global order. Iran seeks to be the hub of a non-Western bloc, and intends to frustrate American influence over Iran and throughout the developing world.¶ US ability to push back against Iran’s attempts to widen its network of such countries is strongest in countries that benefit from US aid, trade, or that lack a significant basis for ideological disagreement with US practices. While Iran’s overtures to peripheral states have the potential to weaken US attempts to contain and isolate Iran, Tehran’s web is fragile and possibly illusory.¶ It remains to be seen if Tehran can make good on the development commitments it has made to potential partners or if its bonds with peripheral states can be institutionalized beyond a personal relationship between heads of state. Iran’s plan to restructure the international system in opposition to the Western-led model remains the vision of a few fringe governments and does not appear likely to spread.

<h4>US-Iran influence is zero-sum- new economic engagement exposes their fragility</h4><p><strong>Fite ’12</strong> [Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” March 12, <u>http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic-competition-impact-latin-america-africa-and-peripheral-states</u>]</p><p><u>US competition with Iran has become the equivalent of a game of three-dimensional chess</u>, but a game where each side can modify at least some of the rules with each move. It is also a game that has been going on for some three decades. It is clear that it is also a game that is unlikely to be ended by better dialog and mutual understanding, and that Iran’s version of “democracy” is unlikely to change the way it is played in the foreseeable future.¶ The Burke Chair at CSIS is preparing a detailed analysis of the history and character of this competition as part of a project supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation. This has led to the preparation of a new draft report entitled Peripheral Competition Involving Latin America and Africa, which is now available on the CSIS web site at: http://csis.org/files/publication/120314_Iran_Chapter_XII_Peripheral_States.pdf¶ This report shows that <u><mark>Iran pursues cooperation</u></mark> with states on the geographic and strategic periphery of the competition between the US and Iran in order to create a network of diplomatic and economic relationships or “partners” who can lessen the blow of international sanctions and generally oppose Western attempts to constrict its ambitions. These peripheral “partners,” located mainly <u><mark>in</u></mark> Africa and <u><mark>Latin America</u>,</mark> also serve as alternative markets for Iranian oil, provide diplomatic cover for Iran’s nuclear efforts, and aid Iran’s acquisition of goods proscribed by international sanctions.¶ Tehran’s strategy pragmatically subordinates concerns for ideological and religious homogeneity to the goal of <u><mark>creating a coalition of</u></mark> non- or <u><mark>anti-Western states</mark> capable of influencing its competition with the United States</u>. The states involved are drawn to Iran by both promises of economic help—particularly in the energy sector—and by Iranian appeals to commonly oppose the Western international system.¶ The Islamic Republic also portrays its present isolation by the US and Europe as a continuation of Western imperialism, and draws on its credentials as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement to elicit support from the disparate states throughout Africa and the Americas that have preexisting grievances with the Western order and its leading states.¶ According to Iranian leaders, the IRI’s competition with the US and its allies is not a just a contest between states, but a clash of worldviews. The US represents an exploitative status quo, and Iran offers the promise of an alternative order geared toward promoting the sovereignty and interests of developing nations. Speaking to an audience in Nigeria in 2010, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for a decisive break with the present Western-dominated system:¶ We have to develop a proper cooperation among the developing nations in order to wriggle ourselves from the domination of the western powers. And this effort is going on among the independent developing nations today. We have to establish a collective effort with a view to create a new international independent economic system that should be on the basis of justice.¶ Though many of the countries Iran seeks to cooperate with are militarily and economically weak, <u><mark>Tehran casts a wide net </u></mark>in trying to build an array of partners to counterbalance what it sees as Western dominance of the global order. Iran seeks to be the hub of a non-Western bloc, <u><mark>and intends to frustrate American influence over Iran and throughout the developing world.</u>¶<u> US ability to push back against Iran’s attempts to widen its network</u> </mark>of such countries <u><mark>is strongest in countries that benefit from US</u> <u>aid, trade</u></mark>, or that lack a significant basis for ideological disagreement with US practices. While Iran’s overtures to peripheral states have the potential to weaken US attempts to contain and isolate Iran, <u><mark>Tehran’s web is fragile and possibly illusory</u></mark>.¶ <u><mark>It remains to be seen if Tehran can make good on the development commitments it has made to potential partners or if its bonds with peripheral states can be institutionalized</u></mark> beyond a personal relationship between heads of state. Iran’s plan to restructure the international system in opposition to the Western-led model remains the vision of a few fringe governments and does not appear likely to spread.</p>

Fite ’12 [Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” March 12, http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic-competition-impact-latin-america-africa-and-peripheral-states]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Fite ’12 [Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” March 12, http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic-competition-impact-latin-america-africa-and-peripheral-states] fulltext: US competition with Iran has become the equivalent of a game of three-dimensional chess, but a game where each side can modify at least some of the rules with each move. It is also a game that has been going on for some three decades. It is clear that it is also a game that is unlikely to be ended by better dialog and mutual understanding, and that Iran’s version of “democracy” is unlikely to change the way it is played in the foreseeable future.¶ The Burke Chair at CSIS is preparing a detailed analysis of the history and character of this competition as part of a project supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation. This has led to the preparation of a new draft report entitled Peripheral Competition Involving Latin America and Africa, which is now available on the CSIS web site at: http://csis.org/files/publication/120314_Iran_Chapter_XII_Peripheral_States.pdf¶ This report shows that Iran pursues cooperation with states on the geographic and strategic periphery of the competition between the US and Iran in order to create a network of diplomatic and economic relationships or “partners” who can lessen the blow of international sanctions and generally oppose Western attempts to constrict its ambitions. These peripheral “partners,” located mainly in Africa and Latin America, also serve as alternative markets for Iranian oil, provide diplomatic cover for Iran’s nuclear efforts, and aid Iran’s acquisition of goods proscribed by international sanctions.¶ Tehran’s strategy pragmatically subordinates concerns for ideological and religious homogeneity to the goal of creating a coalition of non- or anti-Western states capable of influencing its competition with the United States. The states involved are drawn to Iran by both promises of economic help—particularly in the energy sector—and by Iranian appeals to commonly oppose the Western international system.¶ The Islamic Republic also portrays its present isolation by the US and Europe as a continuation of Western imperialism, and draws on its credentials as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement to elicit support from the disparate states throughout Africa and the Americas that have preexisting grievances with the Western order and its leading states.¶ According to Iranian leaders, the IRI’s competition with the US and its allies is not a just a contest between states, but a clash of worldviews. The US represents an exploitative status quo, and Iran offers the promise of an alternative order geared toward promoting the sovereignty and interests of developing nations. Speaking to an audience in Nigeria in 2010, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for a decisive break with the present Western-dominated system:¶ We have to develop a proper cooperation among the developing nations in order to wriggle ourselves from the domination of the western powers. And this effort is going on among the independent developing nations today. We have to establish a collective effort with a view to create a new international independent economic system that should be on the basis of justice.¶ Though many of the countries Iran seeks to cooperate with are militarily and economically weak, Tehran casts a wide net in trying to build an array of partners to counterbalance what it sees as Western dominance of the global order. Iran seeks to be the hub of a non-Western bloc, and intends to frustrate American influence over Iran and throughout the developing world.¶ US ability to push back against Iran’s attempts to widen its network of such countries is strongest in countries that benefit from US aid, trade, or that lack a significant basis for ideological disagreement with US practices. While Iran’s overtures to peripheral states have the potential to weaken US attempts to contain and isolate Iran, Tehran’s web is fragile and possibly illusory.¶ It remains to be seen if Tehran can make good on the development commitments it has made to potential partners or if its bonds with peripheral states can be institutionalized beyond a personal relationship between heads of state. Iran’s plan to restructure the international system in opposition to the Western-led model remains the vision of a few fringe governments and does not appear likely to spread. [/INST] <h4>US-Iran influence is zero-sum- new economic engagement exposes their fragility</h4><p><strong>Fite ’12</strong> [Brandon, Burke Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of Latin America, Africa and Peripheral States,” March 12, <u>http://csis.org/publication/us-and-iranian-strategic-competition-impact-latin-america-africa-and-peripheral-states</u>]</p><p><u>US competition with Iran has become the equivalent of a game of three-dimensional chess</u>, but a game where each side can modify at least some of the rules with each move. It is also a game that has been going on for some three decades. It is clear that it is also a game that is unlikely to be ended by better dialog and mutual understanding, and that Iran’s version of “democracy” is unlikely to change the way it is played in the foreseeable future.¶ The Burke Chair at CSIS is preparing a detailed analysis of the history and character of this competition as part of a project supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation. This has led to the preparation of a new draft report entitled Peripheral Competition Involving Latin America and Africa, which is now available on the CSIS web site at: http://csis.org/files/publication/120314_Iran_Chapter_XII_Peripheral_States.pdf¶ This report shows that <u><mark>Iran pursues cooperation</u></mark> with states on the geographic and strategic periphery of the competition between the US and Iran in order to create a network of diplomatic and economic relationships or “partners” who can lessen the blow of international sanctions and generally oppose Western attempts to constrict its ambitions. These peripheral “partners,” located mainly <u><mark>in</u></mark> Africa and <u><mark>Latin America</u>,</mark> also serve as alternative markets for Iranian oil, provide diplomatic cover for Iran’s nuclear efforts, and aid Iran’s acquisition of goods proscribed by international sanctions.¶ Tehran’s strategy pragmatically subordinates concerns for ideological and religious homogeneity to the goal of <u><mark>creating a coalition of</u></mark> non- or <u><mark>anti-Western states</mark> capable of influencing its competition with the United States</u>. The states involved are drawn to Iran by both promises of economic help—particularly in the energy sector—and by Iranian appeals to commonly oppose the Western international system.¶ The Islamic Republic also portrays its present isolation by the US and Europe as a continuation of Western imperialism, and draws on its credentials as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement to elicit support from the disparate states throughout Africa and the Americas that have preexisting grievances with the Western order and its leading states.¶ According to Iranian leaders, the IRI’s competition with the US and its allies is not a just a contest between states, but a clash of worldviews. The US represents an exploitative status quo, and Iran offers the promise of an alternative order geared toward promoting the sovereignty and interests of developing nations. Speaking to an audience in Nigeria in 2010, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called for a decisive break with the present Western-dominated system:¶ We have to develop a proper cooperation among the developing nations in order to wriggle ourselves from the domination of the western powers. And this effort is going on among the independent developing nations today. We have to establish a collective effort with a view to create a new international independent economic system that should be on the basis of justice.¶ Though many of the countries Iran seeks to cooperate with are militarily and economically weak, <u><mark>Tehran casts a wide net </u></mark>in trying to build an array of partners to counterbalance what it sees as Western dominance of the global order. Iran seeks to be the hub of a non-Western bloc, <u><mark>and intends to frustrate American influence over Iran and throughout the developing world.</u>¶<u> US ability to push back against Iran’s attempts to widen its network</u> </mark>of such countries <u><mark>is strongest in countries that benefit from US</u> <u>aid, trade</u></mark>, or that lack a significant basis for ideological disagreement with US practices. While Iran’s overtures to peripheral states have the potential to weaken US attempts to contain and isolate Iran, <u><mark>Tehran’s web is fragile and possibly illusory</u></mark>.¶ <u><mark>It remains to be seen if Tehran can make good on the development commitments it has made to potential partners or if its bonds with peripheral states can be institutionalized</u></mark> beyond a personal relationship between heads of state. Iran’s plan to restructure the international system in opposition to the Western-led model remains the vision of a few fringe governments and does not appear likely to spread.</p> </s>

-----No impact: Consensus of new economic research and scholarship

The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy has become deeply rooted in the American psyche, But a growing body of economic research suggests that this is wrong. The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in the oil supply than previously assumed, according to studies. Scholars have found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls.

oil shocks has become deeply rooted in the American psyche a growing body of economic research suggests that this is wrong The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in Scholars have found the worldwide market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick compensating shortfalls

Economists have a term for this disruption: an oil shock. The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy has become deeply rooted in the American psyche, and in turn the United States has made ensuring the smooth flow of crude from the Middle East a central tenet of its foreign policy. Oil security is one of the primary reasons America has a long-term military presence in the region. Even aside from the Iraq and Afghan wars, we have equipment and forces positioned in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar; the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is permanently stationed in Bahrain. But a growing body of economic research suggests that this conventional view of oil shocks is wrong. The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in the oil supply than previously assumed, according to these studies. Scholars examining the recent history of oil disruptions have found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls. Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973.

<h4>-----No impact: Consensus of new economic research and scholarship</h4><p><strong>KAHN 2011 </strong>(Jeremy Kahn, journalist, “Crude Reality,” February 13, 2011, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/?page=full, )</p><p>Economists have a term for this disruption: an oil shock. <u>The idea that such <mark>oil shocks</mark> will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy <mark>has become <strong>deeply rooted in the American psyche</strong></mark>,</u> and in turn the United States has made ensuring the smooth flow of crude from the Middle East a central tenet of its foreign policy. Oil security is one of the primary reasons America has a long-term military presence in the region. Even aside from the Iraq and Afghan wars, we have equipment and forces positioned in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar; the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is permanently stationed in Bahrain. <u>But <mark>a growing body of economic research suggests that this</u></mark> conventional view of oil shocks <u><mark>is wrong</mark>. <mark>The US economy is <strong>far less susceptible</strong> to interruptions in</mark> the oil supply than previously assumed, according to</u> these <u>studies. <mark>Scholars</u></mark> examining the recent history of oil disruptions <u><mark>have found the worldwide</mark> oil <mark>market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick</mark> at <mark>compensating</mark> for <mark>shortfalls</mark>.</u> Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973.</p>

KAHN 2011 (Jeremy Kahn, journalist, “Crude Reality,” February 13, 2011, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/?page=full, )

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: KAHN 2011 (Jeremy Kahn, journalist, “Crude Reality,” February 13, 2011, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/?page=full, ) fulltext: Economists have a term for this disruption: an oil shock. The idea that such oil shocks will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy has become deeply rooted in the American psyche, and in turn the United States has made ensuring the smooth flow of crude from the Middle East a central tenet of its foreign policy. Oil security is one of the primary reasons America has a long-term military presence in the region. Even aside from the Iraq and Afghan wars, we have equipment and forces positioned in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar; the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is permanently stationed in Bahrain. But a growing body of economic research suggests that this conventional view of oil shocks is wrong. The US economy is far less susceptible to interruptions in the oil supply than previously assumed, according to these studies. Scholars examining the recent history of oil disruptions have found the worldwide oil market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick at compensating for shortfalls. Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973. [/INST] <h4>-----No impact: Consensus of new economic research and scholarship</h4><p><strong>KAHN 2011 </strong>(Jeremy Kahn, journalist, “Crude Reality,” February 13, 2011, http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2011/02/13/crude_reality/?page=full, )</p><p>Economists have a term for this disruption: an oil shock. <u>The idea that such <mark>oil shocks</mark> will inevitably wreak havoc on the US economy <mark>has become <strong>deeply rooted in the American psyche</strong></mark>,</u> and in turn the United States has made ensuring the smooth flow of crude from the Middle East a central tenet of its foreign policy. Oil security is one of the primary reasons America has a long-term military presence in the region. Even aside from the Iraq and Afghan wars, we have equipment and forces positioned in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar; the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is permanently stationed in Bahrain. <u>But <mark>a growing body of economic research suggests that this</u></mark> conventional view of oil shocks <u><mark>is wrong</mark>. <mark>The US economy is <strong>far less susceptible</strong> to interruptions in</mark> the oil supply than previously assumed, according to</u> these <u>studies. <mark>Scholars</u></mark> examining the recent history of oil disruptions <u><mark>have found the worldwide</mark> oil <mark>market to be remarkably adaptable and surprisingly quick</mark> at <mark>compensating</mark> for <mark>shortfalls</mark>.</u> Economists have found that much of the damage once attributed to oil shocks can more persuasively be laid at the feet of bad government policies. The US economy, meanwhile, has become less dependent on Persian Gulf oil and less sensitive to changes in crude prices overall than it was in 1973.</p> </s>

[A.] The plan solves it is necessary to lift the embargo in its entirety

While the executive branch can continue ¶ to chip away at these longstanding restrictions, the law requires that Congress will ¶ ultimately need to pass legislation to repeal the embargo. Under existing law, established by the Helms-Burton Act, the embargo cannot be ¶ lifted until the Cuban people democratically elect a new government lifting the embargo will ultimately require that ¶ Congress pass and the President sign into law legislation to repeal both the ¶ Torricelli Act and the Helms-Burton Act Congress will need to take further action to see that the embargo is lifted in ¶ its entirety.

Although the Obama administration took the largely symbolic step of extending ¶ the embargo for another year under the Trading with the Enemy Act last year, the ¶ President did relax some longstanding restrictions by taking action to make it easier ¶ for Cuban-Americans to visit and send remittances to family members in Cuba.The ¶ administration also recently hinted at plans to reduce travel restrictions for academic, ¶ cultural, and religious groups later this year.12 While the executive branch can continue ¶ to chip away at these longstanding restrictions, the law requires that Congress will ¶ ultimately need to pass legislation to repeal the embargo. Under existing law, established by the Helms-Burton Act, the embargo cannot be ¶ lifted until the Cuban people democratically elect a new government and the ¶ transition government is in place. While President Obama could take an initial step by ¶ refusing to issue the annual extension of Cuba’s “national emergency” status under ¶ the Trading with the Enemy Act,13 lifting the embargo will ultimately require that ¶ Congress pass and the President sign into law legislation to repeal both the ¶ Torricelli Act and the Helms-Burton Act. Passing HR 4645 would be a positive first ¶ step, but Congress will need to take further action to see that the embargo is lifted in ¶ its entirety.

<h4>[A.] The plan solves it is <strong>necessary to lift the embargo in its entirety </h4><p>Johnson et al, 2010</p><p></strong>[Andy Johnson, Director, National Security Program, Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor, National Security Program, Kristina Lilac, National Security Program, Third Way Memo: End the Embargo of Cuba, 9-16-10, http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo_-_End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf<u><strong>] /Wyo-MB</p><p></u></strong>Although the Obama administration took the largely symbolic step of extending ¶ the embargo for another year under the Trading with the Enemy Act last year, the ¶ President did relax some longstanding restrictions by taking action to make it easier ¶ for Cuban-Americans to visit and send remittances to family members in Cuba.The ¶ administration also recently hinted at plans to reduce travel restrictions for academic, ¶ cultural, and religious groups later this year.12 <u><strong>While the executive branch can continue ¶ to chip away at these longstanding restrictions, the law requires that Congress will ¶ ultimately need to pass legislation to repeal the embargo. Under existing law, established by the Helms-Burton Act, the embargo cannot be ¶ lifted until the Cuban people democratically elect a new government</u></strong> and the ¶ transition government is in place. While President Obama could take an initial step by ¶ refusing to issue the annual extension of Cuba’s “national emergency” status under ¶ the Trading with the Enemy Act,13 <u><strong>lifting the embargo will ultimately require that ¶ Congress pass and the President sign into law legislation to repeal both the ¶ Torricelli Act and the Helms-Burton Act</u></strong>. Passing HR 4645 would be a positive first ¶ step, but <u><strong>Congress will need to take further action to see that the embargo is lifted in ¶ its entirety.</p></u></strong>

Johnson et al, 2010 [Andy Johnson, Director, National Security Program, Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor, National Security Program, Kristina Lilac, National Security Program, Third Way Memo: End the Embargo of Cuba, 9-16-10, http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo_-_End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf] /Wyo-MB

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Johnson et al, 2010 [Andy Johnson, Director, National Security Program, Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor, National Security Program, Kristina Lilac, National Security Program, Third Way Memo: End the Embargo of Cuba, 9-16-10, http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo_-_End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf] /Wyo-MB fulltext: Although the Obama administration took the largely symbolic step of extending ¶ the embargo for another year under the Trading with the Enemy Act last year, the ¶ President did relax some longstanding restrictions by taking action to make it easier ¶ for Cuban-Americans to visit and send remittances to family members in Cuba.The ¶ administration also recently hinted at plans to reduce travel restrictions for academic, ¶ cultural, and religious groups later this year.12 While the executive branch can continue ¶ to chip away at these longstanding restrictions, the law requires that Congress will ¶ ultimately need to pass legislation to repeal the embargo. Under existing law, established by the Helms-Burton Act, the embargo cannot be ¶ lifted until the Cuban people democratically elect a new government and the ¶ transition government is in place. While President Obama could take an initial step by ¶ refusing to issue the annual extension of Cuba’s “national emergency” status under ¶ the Trading with the Enemy Act,13 lifting the embargo will ultimately require that ¶ Congress pass and the President sign into law legislation to repeal both the ¶ Torricelli Act and the Helms-Burton Act. Passing HR 4645 would be a positive first ¶ step, but Congress will need to take further action to see that the embargo is lifted in ¶ its entirety. [/INST] <h4>[A.] The plan solves it is <strong>necessary to lift the embargo in its entirety </h4><p>Johnson et al, 2010</p><p></strong>[Andy Johnson, Director, National Security Program, Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor, National Security Program, Kristina Lilac, National Security Program, Third Way Memo: End the Embargo of Cuba, 9-16-10, http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo_-_End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf<u><strong>] /Wyo-MB</p><p></u></strong>Although the Obama administration took the largely symbolic step of extending ¶ the embargo for another year under the Trading with the Enemy Act last year, the ¶ President did relax some longstanding restrictions by taking action to make it easier ¶ for Cuban-Americans to visit and send remittances to family members in Cuba.The ¶ administration also recently hinted at plans to reduce travel restrictions for academic, ¶ cultural, and religious groups later this year.12 <u><strong>While the executive branch can continue ¶ to chip away at these longstanding restrictions, the law requires that Congress will ¶ ultimately need to pass legislation to repeal the embargo. Under existing law, established by the Helms-Burton Act, the embargo cannot be ¶ lifted until the Cuban people democratically elect a new government</u></strong> and the ¶ transition government is in place. While President Obama could take an initial step by ¶ refusing to issue the annual extension of Cuba’s “national emergency” status under ¶ the Trading with the Enemy Act,13 <u><strong>lifting the embargo will ultimately require that ¶ Congress pass and the President sign into law legislation to repeal both the ¶ Torricelli Act and the Helms-Burton Act</u></strong>. Passing HR 4645 would be a positive first ¶ step, but <u><strong>Congress will need to take further action to see that the embargo is lifted in ¶ its entirety.</p></u></strong> </s>

Venezuela is the lynchpin of Iran’s Latin American influence

Iran’s broadening presence in Latin America is promoted by the unwavering relationship between Chávez and Ahmadinejad As the dominant oil provider in the region, Venezuela connects Latin American countries, including Ecuador and Nicaragua, to Iran and facilitates their collaboration Iran’s diplomatic expansion into countries such as Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia reflect Ahmadinejad’s intentions to bolster political support amid international condemnation and sanctions in forums such as the Security Council and European Union

Iran’s ¶ broadening presence in Latin America is promoted by the unwavering ¶ relationship between Chávez and Ahmadinejad As the dominant ¶ oil provider in the region, Venezuela connects Latin American countries, including Ecuador and Nicaragua, to Iran and facilitates their collaboration Iran’s diplomatic expansion into countries such as ¶ Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia reflect Ahmadinejad’s intentions to ¶ bolster political support amid international condemnation and sanctions ¶ in forums such as the Security Council and European Union

Douglas Farah, president of IBI Consultants and a Senior Fellow ¶ at the International Assessment and Strategy Center asserts that Iran’s ¶ broadening presence in Latin America is promoted by the unwavering ¶ relationship between Hugo Chávez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, necessitated by Iran’s search for international political support, and fortified ¶ by anti-imperialist attitudes toward the United States. As the dominant ¶ oil provider in the region, Venezuela connects Latin American countries, including Ecuador and Nicaragua, to Iran and facilitates their collaboration. Moreover, Iran’s diplomatic expansion into countries such as ¶ Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia reflect Ahmadinejad’s intentions to ¶ bolster political support amid international condemnation and sanctions ¶ in forums such as the Security Council and European Union. Farah clarifies that Iran’s relationship with Latin America is primarily political, not ¶ economic, given that most Latin American trade with the United States ¶ vastly outweighs commerce with Iran. Finally, mutual antagonism toward the United States unites Iran and some Latin American countries. ¶ The existence of a common enemy and the recognition that the United ¶ States has largely excluded Latin America from its post 9/11 agenda has ¶ forged their partnership and has created an opening for Iran to fill.

<h4>Venezuela is the lynchpin of Iran’s Latin American influence</h4><p><strong>Stubits ‘09</strong> [Adam Stubits is program associate for the Wilson Center’s Latin ¶ American Program. He received his B.A. in Political Science and M.P.A ¶ with an emphasis in international organizations from The American ¶ University. His research interests include citizen security in Latin ¶ America, informal international organizations and the role of public administration in development. Prior to coming to the Wilson Center, ¶ he was a special assistant for International Accounts with the Corporate ¶ Executive Board and before that a Development Officer with Partners ¶ of the Americas, “Iran In Latin America: Threat or ‘axis of annoyance’?” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran_in_LA.pdf]</p><p>Douglas Farah, president of IBI Consultants and a Senior Fellow ¶ at the International Assessment and Strategy Center asserts that <u><mark>Iran’s </u>¶<u> broadening presence in Latin America is promoted by the unwavering </u>¶<u> relationship between</u> </mark>Hugo <u><mark>Chávez and</u> </mark>Mahmoud <u><mark>Ahmadinejad</u></mark>, necessitated by Iran’s search for international political support, and fortified ¶ by anti-imperialist attitudes toward the United States. <u><mark>As the dominant </u>¶<u> oil provider in the region, Venezuela connects Latin American countries, including Ecuador and Nicaragua, to Iran and facilitates their collaboration</u></mark>. Moreover, <u><mark>Iran’s diplomatic expansion into countries such as </u>¶<u> Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia reflect Ahmadinejad’s intentions to </u>¶<u> bolster political support amid international condemnation and sanctions </u>¶<u> in forums such as the Security Council and European Union</u></mark>. Farah clarifies that Iran’s relationship with Latin America is primarily political, not ¶ economic, given that most Latin American trade with the United States ¶ vastly outweighs commerce with Iran. Finally, mutual antagonism toward the United States unites Iran and some Latin American countries. ¶ The existence of a common enemy and the recognition that the United ¶ States has largely excluded Latin America from its post 9/11 agenda has ¶ forged their partnership and has created an opening for Iran to fill.</p>

Stubits ‘09 [Adam Stubits is program associate for the Wilson Center’s Latin ¶ American Program. He received his B.A. in Political Science and M.P.A ¶ with an emphasis in international organizations from The American ¶ University. His research interests include citizen security in Latin ¶ America, informal international organizations and the role of public administration in development. Prior to coming to the Wilson Center, ¶ he was a special assistant for International Accounts with the Corporate ¶ Executive Board and before that a Development Officer with Partners ¶ of the Americas, “Iran In Latin America: Threat or ‘axis of annoyance’?” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran_in_LA.pdf]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Stubits ‘09 [Adam Stubits is program associate for the Wilson Center’s Latin ¶ American Program. He received his B.A. in Political Science and M.P.A ¶ with an emphasis in international organizations from The American ¶ University. His research interests include citizen security in Latin ¶ America, informal international organizations and the role of public administration in development. Prior to coming to the Wilson Center, ¶ he was a special assistant for International Accounts with the Corporate ¶ Executive Board and before that a Development Officer with Partners ¶ of the Americas, “Iran In Latin America: Threat or ‘axis of annoyance’?” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran_in_LA.pdf] fulltext: Douglas Farah, president of IBI Consultants and a Senior Fellow ¶ at the International Assessment and Strategy Center asserts that Iran’s ¶ broadening presence in Latin America is promoted by the unwavering ¶ relationship between Hugo Chávez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, necessitated by Iran’s search for international political support, and fortified ¶ by anti-imperialist attitudes toward the United States. As the dominant ¶ oil provider in the region, Venezuela connects Latin American countries, including Ecuador and Nicaragua, to Iran and facilitates their collaboration. Moreover, Iran’s diplomatic expansion into countries such as ¶ Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia reflect Ahmadinejad’s intentions to ¶ bolster political support amid international condemnation and sanctions ¶ in forums such as the Security Council and European Union. Farah clarifies that Iran’s relationship with Latin America is primarily political, not ¶ economic, given that most Latin American trade with the United States ¶ vastly outweighs commerce with Iran. Finally, mutual antagonism toward the United States unites Iran and some Latin American countries. ¶ The existence of a common enemy and the recognition that the United ¶ States has largely excluded Latin America from its post 9/11 agenda has ¶ forged their partnership and has created an opening for Iran to fill. [/INST] <h4>Venezuela is the lynchpin of Iran’s Latin American influence</h4><p><strong>Stubits ‘09</strong> [Adam Stubits is program associate for the Wilson Center’s Latin ¶ American Program. He received his B.A. in Political Science and M.P.A ¶ with an emphasis in international organizations from The American ¶ University. His research interests include citizen security in Latin ¶ America, informal international organizations and the role of public administration in development. Prior to coming to the Wilson Center, ¶ he was a special assistant for International Accounts with the Corporate ¶ Executive Board and before that a Development Officer with Partners ¶ of the Americas, “Iran In Latin America: Threat or ‘axis of annoyance’?” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran_in_LA.pdf]</p><p>Douglas Farah, president of IBI Consultants and a Senior Fellow ¶ at the International Assessment and Strategy Center asserts that <u><mark>Iran’s </u>¶<u> broadening presence in Latin America is promoted by the unwavering </u>¶<u> relationship between</u> </mark>Hugo <u><mark>Chávez and</u> </mark>Mahmoud <u><mark>Ahmadinejad</u></mark>, necessitated by Iran’s search for international political support, and fortified ¶ by anti-imperialist attitudes toward the United States. <u><mark>As the dominant </u>¶<u> oil provider in the region, Venezuela connects Latin American countries, including Ecuador and Nicaragua, to Iran and facilitates their collaboration</u></mark>. Moreover, <u><mark>Iran’s diplomatic expansion into countries such as </u>¶<u> Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia reflect Ahmadinejad’s intentions to </u>¶<u> bolster political support amid international condemnation and sanctions </u>¶<u> in forums such as the Security Council and European Union</u></mark>. Farah clarifies that Iran’s relationship with Latin America is primarily political, not ¶ economic, given that most Latin American trade with the United States ¶ vastly outweighs commerce with Iran. Finally, mutual antagonism toward the United States unites Iran and some Latin American countries. ¶ The existence of a common enemy and the recognition that the United ¶ States has largely excluded Latin America from its post 9/11 agenda has ¶ forged their partnership and has created an opening for Iran to fill.</p> </s>

(__) Talks doomed to fail now without settlement agreement over the West Bank.

Israeli plans to declare legal four illegal West Bank settler outposts Netanyahu is unwilling to declare another settlement building freeze and maintains that direct peace talks should resume without conditions. A Palestinian Authority source told Palestinian newspaper negotiations were unlikely to resume, since Mr Kerry failed to persuade Mr Netanyahu to cease settlement construction or agree that the 1967 border between Israel and the West Bank will serve as a basis for negotiations for a future Palestinian state.

(“John Kerry reaches out in effort to restart Middle East Peace Talks” Mark Weiss, reporter. May 23, 2013 http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/john-kerry-reaches-out-in-effort-to-restart-middle-east-peace-talks-1.1404621) Last week Mr Kerry telephoned Mr Netanyahu to voice US displeasure over Israeli plans to declare legal four illegal West Bank settler outposts. However, Mr Netanyahu is unwilling to declare another settlement building freeze and maintains that direct peace talks should resume without conditions. A Palestinian Authority source told Palestinian newspaper al-Ayyam negotiations were unlikely to resume, since Mr Kerry failed to persuade Mr Netanyahu to cease settlement construction or agree that the 1967 border between Israel and the West Bank will serve as a basis for negotiations for a future Palestinian state.

<h4>(__) Talks doomed to fail now without settlement agreement over the West Bank. </h4><p><strong>Weiss</strong>, Reporter for the Irish Times, <strong>2013</strong> </p><p>(“John Kerry reaches out in effort to restart Middle East Peace Talks” Mark Weiss, reporter. May 23, 2013</p><p>http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/john-kerry-reaches-out-in-effort-to-restart-middle-east-peace-talks-1.1404621)</p><p>Last week Mr Kerry telephoned Mr Netanyahu to voice US displeasure over <u><strong>Israeli plans to declare legal four illegal West Bank settler outposts</u></strong>.</p><p>However, Mr <u><strong>Netanyahu is unwilling to declare another settlement building freeze and maintains that direct peace talks should resume without conditions.</p><p>A Palestinian Authority source told Palestinian newspaper </u></strong>al-Ayyam <u><strong>negotiations were unlikely to resume, since Mr Kerry failed to persuade Mr Netanyahu to cease settlement construction or agree that the 1967 border between Israel and the West Bank will serve as a basis for negotiations for a future Palestinian state.</p></u></strong>

Weiss, Reporter for the Irish Times, 2013

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Weiss, Reporter for the Irish Times, 2013 fulltext: (“John Kerry reaches out in effort to restart Middle East Peace Talks” Mark Weiss, reporter. May 23, 2013 http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/john-kerry-reaches-out-in-effort-to-restart-middle-east-peace-talks-1.1404621) Last week Mr Kerry telephoned Mr Netanyahu to voice US displeasure over Israeli plans to declare legal four illegal West Bank settler outposts. However, Mr Netanyahu is unwilling to declare another settlement building freeze and maintains that direct peace talks should resume without conditions. A Palestinian Authority source told Palestinian newspaper al-Ayyam negotiations were unlikely to resume, since Mr Kerry failed to persuade Mr Netanyahu to cease settlement construction or agree that the 1967 border between Israel and the West Bank will serve as a basis for negotiations for a future Palestinian state. [/INST] <h4>(__) Talks doomed to fail now without settlement agreement over the West Bank. </h4><p><strong>Weiss</strong>, Reporter for the Irish Times, <strong>2013</strong> </p><p>(“John Kerry reaches out in effort to restart Middle East Peace Talks” Mark Weiss, reporter. May 23, 2013</p><p>http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/john-kerry-reaches-out-in-effort-to-restart-middle-east-peace-talks-1.1404621)</p><p>Last week Mr Kerry telephoned Mr Netanyahu to voice US displeasure over <u><strong>Israeli plans to declare legal four illegal West Bank settler outposts</u></strong>.</p><p>However, Mr <u><strong>Netanyahu is unwilling to declare another settlement building freeze and maintains that direct peace talks should resume without conditions.</p><p>A Palestinian Authority source told Palestinian newspaper </u></strong>al-Ayyam <u><strong>negotiations were unlikely to resume, since Mr Kerry failed to persuade Mr Netanyahu to cease settlement construction or agree that the 1967 border between Israel and the West Bank will serve as a basis for negotiations for a future Palestinian state.</p></u></strong> </s>

[insert non-unique e.g.]

<h4>[insert non-unique e.g.] </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>[insert non-unique e.g.] </h4> </s>

First uniqueness- US-Cuba ties down now and Chinese influence is expanding

US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard the continent has arguably never been so united and independent US attention to Latin America has waned in recent Latin American leaders urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway. China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US

(Shlomo, former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace, Project Syndicate, “Is the US Losing Latin America?,” June 5, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami) /wyo-mm MADRID – It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard”; on the contrary, the continent has arguably never been so united and independent. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America – and elsewhere as well. It is true that US attention to Latin America has waned in recent years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his “global war on terror.” His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, Latin American leaders felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It is also true that Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway. China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US. India is showing keen interest in the region’s energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela.

<h4><strong>First uniqueness- US-Cuba ties down now and Chinese influence is expanding</h4><p>Ben-Ami 13</p><p></strong>(Shlomo, former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace, Project Syndicate, “Is the US Losing Latin America?,” June 5, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami) /wyo-mm</p><p>MADRID – It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: <u><strong>US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard</u></strong>”; on the contrary, <u><strong>the continent has arguably never been so united and independent</u></strong>. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America – and elsewhere as well. It is true that <u><strong>US attention to Latin America has waned in recent</u></strong> years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his “global war on terror.” His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, <u><strong>Latin American leaders </u></strong>felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They <u><strong>urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent</u></strong>, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It is also true that <u><strong>Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway.</u></strong> <u><strong>China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US</u></strong>. India is showing keen interest in the region’s energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela.</p>

Ben-Ami 13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ben-Ami 13 fulltext: (Shlomo, former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace, Project Syndicate, “Is the US Losing Latin America?,” June 5, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami) /wyo-mm MADRID – It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard”; on the contrary, the continent has arguably never been so united and independent. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America – and elsewhere as well. It is true that US attention to Latin America has waned in recent years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his “global war on terror.” His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, Latin American leaders felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It is also true that Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway. China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US. India is showing keen interest in the region’s energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela. [/INST] <h4><strong>First uniqueness- US-Cuba ties down now and Chinese influence is expanding</h4><p>Ben-Ami 13</p><p></strong>(Shlomo, former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace, Project Syndicate, “Is the US Losing Latin America?,” June 5, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami) /wyo-mm</p><p>MADRID – It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: <u><strong>US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard</u></strong>”; on the contrary, <u><strong>the continent has arguably never been so united and independent</u></strong>. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America – and elsewhere as well. It is true that <u><strong>US attention to Latin America has waned in recent</u></strong> years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his “global war on terror.” His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, <u><strong>Latin American leaders </u></strong>felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They <u><strong>urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent</u></strong>, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It is also true that <u><strong>Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway.</u></strong> <u><strong>China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US</u></strong>. India is showing keen interest in the region’s energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela.</p> </s>

[B.] Lifting the embargo solves trade relations, serves to normalize relations with Cuba, and boosts the US image with allies and Latin American powers

The U.S. needs to adopt a new approach to Cuba that is not based on sanctions, passivity, and waiting. The U.S. government should instead take a more pragmatic approach when trying to encourage change in Cuba, especially with the opportunity created by the change in leadership of both countries and with the recent reforms announced by Raul Castro which will over time eliminate the state’s information monopoly The opportunities involved in gradually loosening trade restrictions with Cuba and promoting cooperation on issues of mutual benefit far outweigh the risks. Benefits for the U.S. in reducing financing restrictions and travel restrictions with Cuba include the following: 1) U.S. agribusinesses will benefit from substantial revenue increases derived from a more significant share of food exports to Cuba, from reduced transportation costs and delays caused by travel restrictions, and from the elimination of cumbersome payment requirements; 2) the U.S. government will benefit from additional tax revenues on the increase in sales; 3) funds wasted on attempts to de-legitimize the Castro regime, estimated to be in excess of $35 million annually, instead can be used for more productive purposes expenses of enforcing financing restrictions will be reduced and redirected to a more practical use, such as investigating terrorist networks abroad; and improved foreign relations with some of the U.S.’s most important allies including the European Union and OAS partners will result from the reform measures Relaxing U.S. trade restrictions will not result in an immediate thaw in relations with Cuba. The Cuban government’s response may be slow, as Raul Castro will need to factor in the changes in U.S. policy into the larger equation of Cuban recovery and economic reform. Moving from a policy of isolation to one of investment and engagement will send a different message to Cuba and sets the stage for fruitful trade possibilities and for normalizing relations between the two countries the United States will be sending a signal to other Latin America about its willingness to view the world in cooperative terms. A policy based on sanctions and regime change is out of touch with the times, and is inconsistent and flawed in its intent and application. The trade embargo imposed on Cuba reflects bad economics, bad business, bad national security strategy, and bad global politics, and warrants a gradual revamping through revised regulations and, ultimately, Congressional action

[Chelsea, Barnard College, Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a Broken Policy, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf] /Wyo-MB This proposal sets forth multiple reasons for the failure of the U.S. policy of ¶ economic sanctions to promote democracy in Cuba, but I will now focus on the ¶ costs and benefits of a gradual modification of the current policy. The U.S. needs ¶ to adopt a new approach to Cuba that is not based on sanctions, passivity, and ¶ waiting. The U.S. government should instead take a more pragmatic approach¶ when trying to encourage change in Cuba, especially with the opportunity created ¶ by the change in leadership of both countries and with the recent reforms ¶ announced by Raul Castro which will over time eliminate the state’s information ¶ monopoly. The opportunities involved in gradually loosening trade restrictions ¶ with Cuba and promoting cooperation on issues of mutual benefit far outweigh the ¶ risks. Benefits for the U.S. in reducing financing restrictions and travel restrictions ¶ with Cuba include the following: 1) U.S. agribusinesses will benefit from ¶ substantial revenue increases derived from a more significant share of food exports ¶ to Cuba, from reduced transportation costs and delays caused by travel restrictions, ¶ and from the elimination of cumbersome payment requirements; 2) the U.S. ¶ government will benefit from additional tax revenues on the increase in sales; 3) ¶ funds wasted on attempts to de-legitimize the Castro regime, such as Radio and TV ¶ Marti, estimated to be in excess of $35 million annually, instead can be used for ¶ more productive purposes, such as academic and cultural exchanges; 4) the U.S. ¶ Treasury’s administrative expenses of enforcing complex financing restrictions and ¶ investigating illegal U.S. investments and travel to Cuba will be reduced and ¶ redirected to a more practical use, such as investigating terrorist networks abroad; ¶ and 5) improved foreign relations with some of the U.S.’s most important allies ¶ including the European Union and OAS partners will result from the reform ¶ measures (Sweig). Offsetting these benefits are the costs of enforcement of ¶ increased trade activities and travel with Cuba as well as the reality that these ¶ measures will not force the collapse of Cuban communism or result in a rapid ¶ transition to a democratic government. ¶ The probability of implementing these changes within the next six months ¶ seems likely. The political strength of the farm lobby has eclipsed the power of ¶ Florida’s Cuban-American community, which did not play a significant role in the ¶ election of President Obama. Because all of these reform measures, with the ¶ exception of lifting the travel ban, can be adopted through administrative action ¶ rather than Congressional or executive action,1¶ a political showdown would not be ¶ necessary to accomplish these measures. ¶ VI. Conclusion ¶ Relaxing U.S. trade restrictions will not result in an immediate thaw in ¶ relations with Cuba. The Cuban government’s response may be slow, as Raul ¶ Castro will need to factor in the changes in U.S. policy into the larger equation of ¶ Cuban recovery and economic reform. Moving from a policy of isolation to one of ¶ investment and engagement will send a different message to Cuba and sets the stage ¶ for fruitful trade possibilities and for normalizing relations between the two ¶ countries. In addition, the United States will be sending a signal to other Latin ¶ America about its willingness to view the world in cooperative terms. ¶ The current U.S. policy toward Cuba has been driven by history, without¶ taking into account political and economic interests of both countries. A policy ¶ ¶ based on sanctions and regime change is out of touch with the times, and is ¶ ¶ inconsistent and flawed in its intent and application. The trade embargo imposed on ¶ ¶ Cuba reflects bad economics, bad business, bad national security strategy, and bad ¶ ¶ global politics, and warrants a gradual revamping through revised regulations and, ¶ ¶ ultimately, Congressional action.

<h4>[B.] <strong>Lifting the embargo solves trade relations, serves to normalize relations with Cuba, and boosts the US image with allies and Latin American powers</h4><p>Zimmerman, 2010</p><p></strong>[Chelsea, Barnard College, Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a Broken Policy, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf] /Wyo-MB</p><p>This proposal sets forth multiple reasons for the failure of the U.S. policy of ¶ economic sanctions to promote democracy in Cuba, but I will now focus on the ¶ costs and benefits of a gradual modification of the current policy. <u><strong>The U.S. needs </u></strong>¶<u><strong> to adopt a new approach to Cuba that is not based on sanctions, passivity, and </u></strong>¶<u><strong> waiting. The U.S. government should instead take a more pragmatic approach</u></strong>¶<u><strong> when trying to encourage change in Cuba, especially with the opportunity created </u></strong>¶<u><strong> by the change in leadership of both countries and with the recent reforms </u></strong>¶<u><strong> announced by Raul Castro which will over time eliminate the state’s information </u></strong>¶<u><strong> monopoly</u></strong>. <u><strong>The opportunities involved in gradually loosening trade restrictions </u></strong>¶<u><strong> with Cuba and promoting cooperation on issues of mutual benefit far outweigh the </u></strong>¶<u><strong> risks. Benefits for the U.S. in reducing financing restrictions and travel restrictions </u></strong>¶<u><strong> with Cuba include the following: 1) U.S. agribusinesses will benefit from </u></strong>¶<u><strong> substantial revenue increases derived from a more significant share of food exports </u></strong>¶<u><strong> to Cuba, from reduced transportation costs and delays caused by travel restrictions, </u></strong>¶<u><strong> and from the elimination of cumbersome payment requirements; 2) the U.S. </u></strong>¶<u><strong> government will benefit from additional tax revenues on the increase in sales; 3) </u></strong>¶<u><strong> funds wasted on attempts to de-legitimize the Castro regime,</u></strong> such as Radio and TV ¶ Marti, <u><strong>estimated to be in excess of $35 million annually, instead can be used for </u></strong>¶<u><strong> more productive purposes</u></strong>, such as academic and cultural exchanges; 4) the U.S. ¶ Treasury’s administrative <u><strong>expenses</u></strong> <u><strong>of enforcing</u></strong> complex <u><strong>financing restrictions</u></strong> and ¶ investigating illegal U.S. investments and travel to Cuba <u><strong>will be reduced and </u></strong>¶<u><strong> redirected to a more practical use, such as investigating terrorist networks abroad; </u></strong>¶<u><strong> and</u></strong> 5) <u><strong>improved foreign relations with some of the U.S.’s most important allies </u></strong>¶<u><strong> including the European Union and OAS partners will result from the reform </u></strong>¶<u><strong> measures</u></strong> (Sweig). Offsetting these benefits are the costs of enforcement of ¶ increased trade activities and travel with Cuba as well as the reality that these ¶ measures will not force the collapse of Cuban communism or result in a rapid ¶ transition to a democratic government. ¶ The probability of implementing these changes within the next six months ¶ seems likely. The political strength of the farm lobby has eclipsed the power of ¶ Florida’s Cuban-American community, which did not play a significant role in the ¶ election of President Obama. Because all of these reform measures, with the ¶ exception of lifting the travel ban, can be adopted through administrative action ¶ rather than Congressional or executive action,1¶ a political showdown would not be ¶ necessary to accomplish these measures. ¶ VI. Conclusion ¶ <u><strong>Relaxing U.S. trade restrictions will not result in an immediate thaw in </u></strong>¶<u><strong> relations with Cuba. The Cuban government’s response may be slow, as Raul </u></strong>¶<u><strong> Castro will need to factor in the changes in U.S. policy into the larger equation of </u></strong>¶<u><strong> Cuban recovery and economic reform. Moving from a policy of isolation to one of </u></strong>¶<u><strong> investment and engagement will send a different message to Cuba and sets the stage </u></strong>¶<u><strong> for fruitful trade possibilities and for normalizing relations between the two </u></strong>¶<u><strong> countries</u></strong>. In addition, <u><strong>the United States will be sending a signal to other Latin </u></strong>¶<u><strong> America about its willingness to view the world in cooperative terms.</u></strong> ¶ The current U.S. policy toward Cuba has been driven by history, without¶ taking into account political and economic interests of both countries. <u><strong>A policy </u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶<u><strong> based on sanctions and regime change is out of touch with the times, and is </u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶<u><strong> inconsistent and flawed in its intent and application. The trade embargo imposed on </u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶<u><strong> Cuba reflects bad economics, bad business, bad national security strategy, and bad </u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶<u><strong> global politics, and warrants a gradual revamping through revised regulations and, </u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶<u><strong> ultimately, Congressional action</u></strong>.</p>

Zimmerman, 2010

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Zimmerman, 2010 fulltext: [Chelsea, Barnard College, Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a Broken Policy, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf] /Wyo-MB This proposal sets forth multiple reasons for the failure of the U.S. policy of ¶ economic sanctions to promote democracy in Cuba, but I will now focus on the ¶ costs and benefits of a gradual modification of the current policy. The U.S. needs ¶ to adopt a new approach to Cuba that is not based on sanctions, passivity, and ¶ waiting. The U.S. government should instead take a more pragmatic approach¶ when trying to encourage change in Cuba, especially with the opportunity created ¶ by the change in leadership of both countries and with the recent reforms ¶ announced by Raul Castro which will over time eliminate the state’s information ¶ monopoly. The opportunities involved in gradually loosening trade restrictions ¶ with Cuba and promoting cooperation on issues of mutual benefit far outweigh the ¶ risks. Benefits for the U.S. in reducing financing restrictions and travel restrictions ¶ with Cuba include the following: 1) U.S. agribusinesses will benefit from ¶ substantial revenue increases derived from a more significant share of food exports ¶ to Cuba, from reduced transportation costs and delays caused by travel restrictions, ¶ and from the elimination of cumbersome payment requirements; 2) the U.S. ¶ government will benefit from additional tax revenues on the increase in sales; 3) ¶ funds wasted on attempts to de-legitimize the Castro regime, such as Radio and TV ¶ Marti, estimated to be in excess of $35 million annually, instead can be used for ¶ more productive purposes, such as academic and cultural exchanges; 4) the U.S. ¶ Treasury’s administrative expenses of enforcing complex financing restrictions and ¶ investigating illegal U.S. investments and travel to Cuba will be reduced and ¶ redirected to a more practical use, such as investigating terrorist networks abroad; ¶ and 5) improved foreign relations with some of the U.S.’s most important allies ¶ including the European Union and OAS partners will result from the reform ¶ measures (Sweig). Offsetting these benefits are the costs of enforcement of ¶ increased trade activities and travel with Cuba as well as the reality that these ¶ measures will not force the collapse of Cuban communism or result in a rapid ¶ transition to a democratic government. ¶ The probability of implementing these changes within the next six months ¶ seems likely. The political strength of the farm lobby has eclipsed the power of ¶ Florida’s Cuban-American community, which did not play a significant role in the ¶ election of President Obama. Because all of these reform measures, with the ¶ exception of lifting the travel ban, can be adopted through administrative action ¶ rather than Congressional or executive action,1¶ a political showdown would not be ¶ necessary to accomplish these measures. ¶ VI. Conclusion ¶ Relaxing U.S. trade restrictions will not result in an immediate thaw in ¶ relations with Cuba. The Cuban government’s response may be slow, as Raul ¶ Castro will need to factor in the changes in U.S. policy into the larger equation of ¶ Cuban recovery and economic reform. Moving from a policy of isolation to one of ¶ investment and engagement will send a different message to Cuba and sets the stage ¶ for fruitful trade possibilities and for normalizing relations between the two ¶ countries. In addition, the United States will be sending a signal to other Latin ¶ America about its willingness to view the world in cooperative terms. ¶ The current U.S. policy toward Cuba has been driven by history, without¶ taking into account political and economic interests of both countries. A policy ¶ ¶ based on sanctions and regime change is out of touch with the times, and is ¶ ¶ inconsistent and flawed in its intent and application. The trade embargo imposed on ¶ ¶ Cuba reflects bad economics, bad business, bad national security strategy, and bad ¶ ¶ global politics, and warrants a gradual revamping through revised regulations and, ¶ ¶ ultimately, Congressional action. [/INST] <h4>[B.] <strong>Lifting the embargo solves trade relations, serves to normalize relations with Cuba, and boosts the US image with allies and Latin American powers</h4><p>Zimmerman, 2010</p><p></strong>[Chelsea, Barnard College, Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a Broken Policy, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf] /Wyo-MB</p><p>This proposal sets forth multiple reasons for the failure of the U.S. policy of ¶ economic sanctions to promote democracy in Cuba, but I will now focus on the ¶ costs and benefits of a gradual modification of the current policy. <u><strong>The U.S. needs </u></strong>¶<u><strong> to adopt a new approach to Cuba that is not based on sanctions, passivity, and </u></strong>¶<u><strong> waiting. The U.S. government should instead take a more pragmatic approach</u></strong>¶<u><strong> when trying to encourage change in Cuba, especially with the opportunity created </u></strong>¶<u><strong> by the change in leadership of both countries and with the recent reforms </u></strong>¶<u><strong> announced by Raul Castro which will over time eliminate the state’s information </u></strong>¶<u><strong> monopoly</u></strong>. <u><strong>The opportunities involved in gradually loosening trade restrictions </u></strong>¶<u><strong> with Cuba and promoting cooperation on issues of mutual benefit far outweigh the </u></strong>¶<u><strong> risks. Benefits for the U.S. in reducing financing restrictions and travel restrictions </u></strong>¶<u><strong> with Cuba include the following: 1) U.S. agribusinesses will benefit from </u></strong>¶<u><strong> substantial revenue increases derived from a more significant share of food exports </u></strong>¶<u><strong> to Cuba, from reduced transportation costs and delays caused by travel restrictions, </u></strong>¶<u><strong> and from the elimination of cumbersome payment requirements; 2) the U.S. </u></strong>¶<u><strong> government will benefit from additional tax revenues on the increase in sales; 3) </u></strong>¶<u><strong> funds wasted on attempts to de-legitimize the Castro regime,</u></strong> such as Radio and TV ¶ Marti, <u><strong>estimated to be in excess of $35 million annually, instead can be used for </u></strong>¶<u><strong> more productive purposes</u></strong>, such as academic and cultural exchanges; 4) the U.S. ¶ Treasury’s administrative <u><strong>expenses</u></strong> <u><strong>of enforcing</u></strong> complex <u><strong>financing restrictions</u></strong> and ¶ investigating illegal U.S. investments and travel to Cuba <u><strong>will be reduced and </u></strong>¶<u><strong> redirected to a more practical use, such as investigating terrorist networks abroad; </u></strong>¶<u><strong> and</u></strong> 5) <u><strong>improved foreign relations with some of the U.S.’s most important allies </u></strong>¶<u><strong> including the European Union and OAS partners will result from the reform </u></strong>¶<u><strong> measures</u></strong> (Sweig). Offsetting these benefits are the costs of enforcement of ¶ increased trade activities and travel with Cuba as well as the reality that these ¶ measures will not force the collapse of Cuban communism or result in a rapid ¶ transition to a democratic government. ¶ The probability of implementing these changes within the next six months ¶ seems likely. The political strength of the farm lobby has eclipsed the power of ¶ Florida’s Cuban-American community, which did not play a significant role in the ¶ election of President Obama. Because all of these reform measures, with the ¶ exception of lifting the travel ban, can be adopted through administrative action ¶ rather than Congressional or executive action,1¶ a political showdown would not be ¶ necessary to accomplish these measures. ¶ VI. Conclusion ¶ <u><strong>Relaxing U.S. trade restrictions will not result in an immediate thaw in </u></strong>¶<u><strong> relations with Cuba. The Cuban government’s response may be slow, as Raul </u></strong>¶<u><strong> Castro will need to factor in the changes in U.S. policy into the larger equation of </u></strong>¶<u><strong> Cuban recovery and economic reform. Moving from a policy of isolation to one of </u></strong>¶<u><strong> investment and engagement will send a different message to Cuba and sets the stage </u></strong>¶<u><strong> for fruitful trade possibilities and for normalizing relations between the two </u></strong>¶<u><strong> countries</u></strong>. In addition, <u><strong>the United States will be sending a signal to other Latin </u></strong>¶<u><strong> America about its willingness to view the world in cooperative terms.</u></strong> ¶ The current U.S. policy toward Cuba has been driven by history, without¶ taking into account political and economic interests of both countries. <u><strong>A policy </u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶<u><strong> based on sanctions and regime change is out of touch with the times, and is </u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶<u><strong> inconsistent and flawed in its intent and application. The trade embargo imposed on </u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶<u><strong> Cuba reflects bad economics, bad business, bad national security strategy, and bad </u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶<u><strong> global politics, and warrants a gradual revamping through revised regulations and, </u></strong>¶<u><strong> </u></strong>¶<u><strong> ultimately, Congressional action</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Venezuela is central to Iran’s Latin American influence

The primary reason for Iran’s increasing presence and influence in Latin America is based on its growing ideological and economic relationship with Venezuela both regimes share a mutual enmity of what they perceive as the imperialist agenda of the United States the two countries have partnered

The primary reason for Iran’s increasing presence and influence in Latin America is based on its ¶ growing ideological and economic relationship with Venezuela both ¶ regimes share a mutual enmity of what they perceive as the imperialist agenda of the United ¶ States the two countries have partnered

The primary reason for Iran’s increasing presence and influence in Latin America is based on its ¶ growing ideological and economic relationship with Venezuela. Ideologically speaking, both ¶ regimes share a mutual enmity of what they perceive as the imperialist agenda of the United ¶ States.44 Economically speaking, the two countries have partnered together in an attempt to ¶ survive and thrive despite being ostracized in varying degrees from the official economy and its ¶ financial and trade systems.45

<h4>Venezuela is central to Iran’s Latin American influence</h4><p><strong>McCaul ’12</strong> [Michael, U.S. Representative for Texas's 10th congressional district, former Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Former Chief of Counterterrorism and National Security for Texas's branch of the US Attorney's office, “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” November, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf] </p><p><u><mark>The primary reason for Iran’s increasing presence and influence in Latin America is based on its </u>¶<u> growing ideological and economic relationship with Venezuela</u></mark>. Ideologically speaking, <u><mark>both </u>¶<u> regimes share a mutual enmity of what they perceive as the imperialist agenda of the United </u>¶<u> States</u></mark>.44 Economically speaking, <u><mark>the two countries have partnered</u> </mark>together in an attempt to ¶ survive and thrive despite being ostracized in varying degrees from the official economy and its ¶ financial and trade systems.45</p>

McCaul ’12 [Michael, U.S. Representative for Texas's 10th congressional district, former Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Former Chief of Counterterrorism and National Security for Texas's branch of the US Attorney's office, “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” November, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: McCaul ’12 [Michael, U.S. Representative for Texas's 10th congressional district, former Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Former Chief of Counterterrorism and National Security for Texas's branch of the US Attorney's office, “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” November, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf] fulltext: The primary reason for Iran’s increasing presence and influence in Latin America is based on its ¶ growing ideological and economic relationship with Venezuela. Ideologically speaking, both ¶ regimes share a mutual enmity of what they perceive as the imperialist agenda of the United ¶ States.44 Economically speaking, the two countries have partnered together in an attempt to ¶ survive and thrive despite being ostracized in varying degrees from the official economy and its ¶ financial and trade systems.45 [/INST] <h4>Venezuela is central to Iran’s Latin American influence</h4><p><strong>McCaul ’12</strong> [Michael, U.S. Representative for Texas's 10th congressional district, former Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Former Chief of Counterterrorism and National Security for Texas's branch of the US Attorney's office, “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” November, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf] </p><p><u><mark>The primary reason for Iran’s increasing presence and influence in Latin America is based on its </u>¶<u> growing ideological and economic relationship with Venezuela</u></mark>. Ideologically speaking, <u><mark>both </u>¶<u> regimes share a mutual enmity of what they perceive as the imperialist agenda of the United </u>¶<u> States</u></mark>.44 Economically speaking, <u><mark>the two countries have partnered</u> </mark>together in an attempt to ¶ survive and thrive despite being ostracized in varying degrees from the official economy and its ¶ financial and trade systems.45</p> </s>

(__) The Middle East Peace Process inherently fails at establishing peace and only fosters more violent conflict

<h4>(__) The Middle East Peace Process inherently fails at establishing peace and only fosters more violent conflict</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>(__) The Middle East Peace Process inherently fails at establishing peace and only fosters more violent conflict</h4> </s>

-----Non-Unique: Oil prices will always stay high even without OPEC – production costs

Bernstein’s energy analysts have looked at the upstream costs for the 50 biggest listed oil producers and found that — surprise, surprise — “the era of cheap oil is over While we see near term downside to oil prices on weaker demand growth, the longer term outlook for higher oil prices continues to be supported by the rising costs of production Bernstein analyst Neil Beveridge and colleagues note, the cost of producing marginal barrels of oil plays a big role in determining oil prices While OPEC plays a key role through production quotas it is the marginal cost of non-OPEC production which sets the oil price.

analysts looked at costs for the 50 biggest producers and found the era of cheap oil is over While we see near term downside on weaker demand longer term outlook continues by rising costs analyst Beveridge and colleagues note, the cost of producing marginal barrels plays a big role in determining prices While OPEC plays a key role through production quotas the marginal cost of non-OPEC production sets the oil price

Bernstein’s energy analysts have looked at the upstream costs for the 50 biggest listed oil producers and found that — surprise, surprise — “the era of cheap oil is over”: Tracking data from the 50 largest listed oil and gas producing companies globally (ex FSU) indicates that cash, production and unit costs in 2011 grew at a rate significantly faster than the 10 year average. Last year production costs increased 26% y-o-y, while the unit cost of production increased by 21% y-o-y to US$35.88/bbl. This is significantly higher than the longer term cost growth rates, highlighting continued cost pressures faced by the E&P industry as the incremental barrel continues to become more expensive to produce. The marginal cost of the 50 largest oil and gas producers globally increased to US$92/bbl in 2011, an increase of 11% y-o-y and in-line with historical average CAGR growth. Assuming another double digit increase this year, marginal costs for the 50 largest oil and gas producers could reach close to US$100/bbl. While we see near term downside to oil prices on weaker demand growth, the longer term outlook for higher oil prices continues to be supported by the rising costs of production. This is important because, as Bernstein analyst Neil Beveridge and colleagues note, the cost of producing marginal barrels of oil plays a big role in determining oil prices. We’d add that the expectations of said costs also play a big role, but that’s another story… and anyway, the Bernstein team argue their point pretty strongly with this chart: Also, this research obviously only covers non-Opec producers, and it mostly excludes Russia too. Given Saudi Arabia’s role as the “swing producer”, how are the ex-Opec, ex-Former Soviet Union marginal oil production costs so correlated to Brent prices? Bernstein argues that it’s because they are, basically, more costly: While OPEC plays a key role in influencing price through production quotas, in the long run we believe that it is the marginal cost of non-OPEC production which sets the oil price. As global demand has surged over the past decade the marginal cost of production and oil prices have increased, as the industry has venture to increasingly higher cost (smaller, deeper fields) and more marginal regions (deep water, high arctic) to produce the incremental barrel of oil.

<h4>-----Non-Unique: Oil prices will always stay high even without OPEC – production costs</h4><p><strong><mark>MACKENZIE ’12</strong></mark> - Editor, FT Energy Source at Financial Times (Kate, “Marginal oil production costs are heading towards $100/barrel”. May 2. http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2012/05/02/983171/marginal-oil-production-costs-are-heading-towards-100barrel/)</p><p><u>Bernstein’s energy <mark>analysts</mark> have <mark>looked at</mark> the upstream <mark>costs for the 50 biggest</mark> listed oil <mark>producers and</mark> <mark>found</mark> that — surprise, surprise — “<mark>the era of cheap oil is over</u></mark>”: Tracking data from the 50 largest listed oil and gas producing companies globally (ex FSU) indicates that cash, production and unit costs in 2011 grew at a rate significantly faster than the 10 year average. Last year production costs increased 26% y-o-y, while the unit cost of production increased by 21% y-o-y to US$35.88/bbl. This is significantly higher than the longer term cost growth rates, highlighting continued cost pressures faced by the E&P industry as the incremental barrel continues to become more expensive to produce. The marginal cost of the 50 largest oil and gas producers globally increased to US$92/bbl in 2011, an increase of 11% y-o-y and in-line with historical average CAGR growth. Assuming another double digit increase this year, marginal costs for the 50 largest oil and gas producers could reach close to US$100/bbl. <u><mark>While we see near term downside</mark> to oil prices <mark>on weaker demand</mark> growth, the <mark>longer term outlook</mark> for higher oil prices <mark>continues</mark> to be supported <mark>by </mark>the <mark>rising costs</mark> of production</u>. This is important because, as <u>Bernstein <strong><mark>analyst</strong></mark> Neil <strong><mark>Beveridge and colleagues note, the cost of producing marginal barrels</strong></mark> of oil <strong><mark>plays</strong> <strong>a</strong> <strong>big role in determining</strong></mark> oil <strong><mark>prices</u></strong></mark>. We’d add that the expectations of said costs also play a big role, but that’s another story… and anyway, the Bernstein team argue their point pretty strongly with this chart: Also, this research obviously only covers non-Opec producers, and it mostly excludes Russia too. Given Saudi Arabia’s role as the “swing producer”, how are the ex-Opec, ex-Former Soviet Union marginal oil production costs so correlated to Brent prices? Bernstein argues that it’s because they are, basically, more costly: <u><mark>While OPEC plays a key role </u></mark>in influencing price<u> <mark>through production quotas</u></mark>, in the long run we believe that <u>it is <mark>the marginal cost of non-OPEC production</mark> which <strong><mark>sets the oil price</strong></mark>.</u> As global demand has surged over the past decade the marginal cost of production and oil prices have increased, as the industry has venture to increasingly higher cost (smaller, deeper fields) and more marginal regions (deep water, high arctic) to produce the incremental barrel of oil.</p>

MACKENZIE ’12 - Editor, FT Energy Source at Financial Times (Kate, “Marginal oil production costs are heading towards $100/barrel”. May 2. http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2012/05/02/983171/marginal-oil-production-costs-are-heading-towards-100barrel/)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: MACKENZIE ’12 - Editor, FT Energy Source at Financial Times (Kate, “Marginal oil production costs are heading towards $100/barrel”. May 2. http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2012/05/02/983171/marginal-oil-production-costs-are-heading-towards-100barrel/) fulltext: Bernstein’s energy analysts have looked at the upstream costs for the 50 biggest listed oil producers and found that — surprise, surprise — “the era of cheap oil is over”: Tracking data from the 50 largest listed oil and gas producing companies globally (ex FSU) indicates that cash, production and unit costs in 2011 grew at a rate significantly faster than the 10 year average. Last year production costs increased 26% y-o-y, while the unit cost of production increased by 21% y-o-y to US$35.88/bbl. This is significantly higher than the longer term cost growth rates, highlighting continued cost pressures faced by the E&P industry as the incremental barrel continues to become more expensive to produce. The marginal cost of the 50 largest oil and gas producers globally increased to US$92/bbl in 2011, an increase of 11% y-o-y and in-line with historical average CAGR growth. Assuming another double digit increase this year, marginal costs for the 50 largest oil and gas producers could reach close to US$100/bbl. While we see near term downside to oil prices on weaker demand growth, the longer term outlook for higher oil prices continues to be supported by the rising costs of production. This is important because, as Bernstein analyst Neil Beveridge and colleagues note, the cost of producing marginal barrels of oil plays a big role in determining oil prices. We’d add that the expectations of said costs also play a big role, but that’s another story… and anyway, the Bernstein team argue their point pretty strongly with this chart: Also, this research obviously only covers non-Opec producers, and it mostly excludes Russia too. Given Saudi Arabia’s role as the “swing producer”, how are the ex-Opec, ex-Former Soviet Union marginal oil production costs so correlated to Brent prices? Bernstein argues that it’s because they are, basically, more costly: While OPEC plays a key role in influencing price through production quotas, in the long run we believe that it is the marginal cost of non-OPEC production which sets the oil price. As global demand has surged over the past decade the marginal cost of production and oil prices have increased, as the industry has venture to increasingly higher cost (smaller, deeper fields) and more marginal regions (deep water, high arctic) to produce the incremental barrel of oil. [/INST] <h4>-----Non-Unique: Oil prices will always stay high even without OPEC – production costs</h4><p><strong><mark>MACKENZIE ’12</strong></mark> - Editor, FT Energy Source at Financial Times (Kate, “Marginal oil production costs are heading towards $100/barrel”. May 2. http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2012/05/02/983171/marginal-oil-production-costs-are-heading-towards-100barrel/)</p><p><u>Bernstein’s energy <mark>analysts</mark> have <mark>looked at</mark> the upstream <mark>costs for the 50 biggest</mark> listed oil <mark>producers and</mark> <mark>found</mark> that — surprise, surprise — “<mark>the era of cheap oil is over</u></mark>”: Tracking data from the 50 largest listed oil and gas producing companies globally (ex FSU) indicates that cash, production and unit costs in 2011 grew at a rate significantly faster than the 10 year average. Last year production costs increased 26% y-o-y, while the unit cost of production increased by 21% y-o-y to US$35.88/bbl. This is significantly higher than the longer term cost growth rates, highlighting continued cost pressures faced by the E&P industry as the incremental barrel continues to become more expensive to produce. The marginal cost of the 50 largest oil and gas producers globally increased to US$92/bbl in 2011, an increase of 11% y-o-y and in-line with historical average CAGR growth. Assuming another double digit increase this year, marginal costs for the 50 largest oil and gas producers could reach close to US$100/bbl. <u><mark>While we see near term downside</mark> to oil prices <mark>on weaker demand</mark> growth, the <mark>longer term outlook</mark> for higher oil prices <mark>continues</mark> to be supported <mark>by </mark>the <mark>rising costs</mark> of production</u>. This is important because, as <u>Bernstein <strong><mark>analyst</strong></mark> Neil <strong><mark>Beveridge and colleagues note, the cost of producing marginal barrels</strong></mark> of oil <strong><mark>plays</strong> <strong>a</strong> <strong>big role in determining</strong></mark> oil <strong><mark>prices</u></strong></mark>. We’d add that the expectations of said costs also play a big role, but that’s another story… and anyway, the Bernstein team argue their point pretty strongly with this chart: Also, this research obviously only covers non-Opec producers, and it mostly excludes Russia too. Given Saudi Arabia’s role as the “swing producer”, how are the ex-Opec, ex-Former Soviet Union marginal oil production costs so correlated to Brent prices? Bernstein argues that it’s because they are, basically, more costly: <u><mark>While OPEC plays a key role </u></mark>in influencing price<u> <mark>through production quotas</u></mark>, in the long run we believe that <u>it is <mark>the marginal cost of non-OPEC production</mark> which <strong><mark>sets the oil price</strong></mark>.</u> As global demand has surged over the past decade the marginal cost of production and oil prices have increased, as the industry has venture to increasingly higher cost (smaller, deeper fields) and more marginal regions (deep water, high arctic) to produce the incremental barrel of oil.</p> </s>

Second, link- US engagement in Cuba undermines Chinese influence and crowds them out-

Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region bilateral trade increased to $1.83 billion in 2010 it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba

(James, Nolan Chart, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped,” June 29, 2011, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html) /wyo-mm) Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral trade increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba.

<h4><strong>Second, link- US engagement in Cuba undermines Chinese influence and crowds them out-</h4><p>Luko 11</p><p></strong>(James, Nolan Chart, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped,” June 29, 2011, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html) /wyo-mm)</p><p><u><strong>Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region</u></strong>, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, <u><strong>bilateral trade increased</u></strong> from $440 million in 2001 <u><strong>to $1.83 billion in 2010</u></strong>. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, <u><strong>it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan</u></strong>. <u><strong>Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources</u></strong>. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] <u><strong>The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba</u></strong>.</p>

Luko 11

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Luko 11 fulltext: (James, Nolan Chart, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped,” June 29, 2011, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html) /wyo-mm) Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral trade increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba. [/INST] <h4><strong>Second, link- US engagement in Cuba undermines Chinese influence and crowds them out-</h4><p>Luko 11</p><p></strong>(James, Nolan Chart, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped,” June 29, 2011, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html) /wyo-mm)</p><p><u><strong>Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region</u></strong>, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, <u><strong>bilateral trade increased</u></strong> from $440 million in 2001 <u><strong>to $1.83 billion in 2010</u></strong>. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, <u><strong>it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan</u></strong>. <u><strong>Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources</u></strong>. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] <u><strong>The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba</u></strong>.</p> </s>

[A.] US economic growth is tepid now, despite signs of recovery the economy has a long way to go, expansion of trading partners is key to growth

] /Wyo-MB The International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Friday lowered its forecast of U.S. economic growth to 2. 7 percent next year, 0.3 percentage point lower than its April prediction against the backdrop of the government spending cuts The U.S. economic growth is expected to slow to 1.9 percent this year owing to an excessively rapid pace of fiscal deficit reduction "The U.S. recovery has remained tepid over the past year, but underlying fundamentals have been gradually improving Despite these headwinds, the nature of the recovery appears to be changing The U.S. economic recovery is "gaining ground and becoming more durable," and the housing market and labor market are doing better, supported by the U.S. But the economy still has "way to go" before returning to full strength, Lagarde told reporters As the legacy of the financial crisis wanes further, private domestic demand in the world's largest economy is expected to continue recovering, but weak growth in a number of trading partners is projected to weigh on U.S. export growth, according to the statement.

[Staff, IMF: US economy to grow 2.7 percent in 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-06/15/content_16624533.htm] /Wyo-MB WASHINGTON - The International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Friday lowered its forecast of U.S. economic growth to 2. 7 percent next year, 0.3 percentage point lower than its April prediction against the backdrop of the government spending cuts.¶ The scaling down in the forecasted economic growth rate was largely due to the ongoing automatic budget cuts across the federal governmental departments, also known as sequester, which will be affecting economic recovery next year, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde said at a press conference Friday.¶ The U.S. economic growth is expected to slow to 1.9 percent this year owing to an excessively rapid pace of fiscal deficit reduction, the same as its April prediction, the IMF said in a concluding statement after an annual review of U.S. economic and financial situations.¶ "The U.S. recovery has remained tepid over the past year, but underlying fundamentals have been gradually improving." The modest growth rate of 2.2 percent last year reflected legacy effects from the financial crisis, fiscal deficit reduction, a weak external environment and temporary effects of extreme weather-related events, noted the statement.¶ Despite these headwinds, the nature of the recovery appears to be changing. In particular, home prices and house construction activity have rebounded, along with strengthening of household balance sheets and improvement of labor market conditions, and corporate profitability and balance sheets remain strong, especially for large firms, said the Washington-based global lender.¶ The U.S. economic recovery is "gaining ground and becoming more durable," and the housing market and labor market are doing better, supported by the U.S. Federal Reserve's easy monetary policy. But the economy still has "way to go" before returning to full strength, Lagarde told reporters.¶ The ongoing sequester is a major risk for U.S. economic growth. Another fiscal worry is doing too little further down the road on fiscal consolidation after having done too much in the short term, she stressed.¶ The IMF suggested the United States should repeal the sequester and adopt a more balanced and gradual pace of fiscal consolidation in the short term.¶ The sequester was included in the August 2011 debt-ceiling package to force lawmakers to come up with a long-term deficit reduction plan. After the failure to produce such a plan in November 2011, a total of more than 1 trillion U.S. dollars cuts over a decade were triggered starting this year, or about 109 billion dollars per year.¶ The Fed's quantitative easing (QE) monetary measures have been "extremely useful" in bolstering economic growth and should continue. The IMF predicted the Fed to maintain its current asset purchase program until the end of this year and that the Fed should carefully manage its QE exit plan to avoid disrupting the markets, Lagarde noted.¶ As the legacy of the financial crisis wanes further, private domestic demand in the world's largest economy is expected to continue recovering, but weak growth in a number of trading partners is projected to weigh on U.S. export growth, according to the statement.

<h4>[A.] <strong>US economic growth is tepid now, despite signs of recovery the economy has a long way to go, expansion of trading partners is key to growth</h4><p>China Daily, 6-15-13</p><p></strong>[Staff, IMF: US economy to grow 2.7 percent in 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-06/15/content_16624533.htm<u><strong>] /Wyo-MB</p><p></u></strong>WASHINGTON - <u><strong>The International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Friday lowered its forecast of U.S. economic growth to 2. 7 percent next year, 0.3 percentage point lower than its April prediction against the backdrop of the government spending cuts</u></strong>.¶ The scaling down in the forecasted economic growth rate was largely due to the ongoing automatic budget cuts across the federal governmental departments, also known as sequester, which will be affecting economic recovery next year, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde said at a press conference Friday.¶ <u><strong>The U.S. economic growth is expected to slow to 1.9 percent this year owing to an excessively rapid pace of fiscal deficit reduction</u></strong>, the same as its April prediction, the IMF said in a concluding statement after an annual review of U.S. economic and financial situations.¶ <u><strong>"The U.S. recovery has remained tepid over the past year, but underlying fundamentals have been gradually improving</u></strong>." The modest growth rate of 2.2 percent last year reflected legacy effects from the financial crisis, fiscal deficit reduction, a weak external environment and temporary effects of extreme weather-related events, noted the statement.¶ <u><strong>Despite these headwinds, the nature of the recovery appears to be changing</u></strong>. In particular, home prices and house construction activity have rebounded, along with strengthening of household balance sheets and improvement of labor market conditions, and corporate profitability and balance sheets remain strong, especially for large firms, said the Washington-based global lender.¶ <u><strong>The U.S. economic recovery is "gaining ground and becoming more durable," and the housing market and labor market are doing better, supported by the U.S.</u></strong> Federal Reserve's easy monetary policy. <u><strong>But the economy still has "way to go" before returning to full strength, Lagarde told reporters</u></strong>.¶ The ongoing sequester is a major risk for U.S. economic growth. Another fiscal worry is doing too little further down the road on fiscal consolidation after having done too much in the short term, she stressed.¶ The IMF suggested the United States should repeal the sequester and adopt a more balanced and gradual pace of fiscal consolidation in the short term.¶ The sequester was included in the August 2011 debt-ceiling package to force lawmakers to come up with a long-term deficit reduction plan. After the failure to produce such a plan in November 2011, a total of more than 1 trillion U.S. dollars cuts over a decade were triggered starting this year, or about 109 billion dollars per year.¶ The Fed's quantitative easing (QE) monetary measures have been "extremely useful" in bolstering economic growth and should continue. The IMF predicted the Fed to maintain its current asset purchase program until the end of this year and that the Fed should carefully manage its QE exit plan to avoid disrupting the markets, Lagarde noted.¶ <u><strong>As the legacy of the financial crisis wanes further, private domestic demand in the world's largest economy is expected to continue recovering, but weak growth in a number of trading partners is projected to weigh on U.S. export growth, according to the statement.</p></u></strong>

China Daily, 6-15-13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: China Daily, 6-15-13 fulltext: [Staff, IMF: US economy to grow 2.7 percent in 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-06/15/content_16624533.htm] /Wyo-MB WASHINGTON - The International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Friday lowered its forecast of U.S. economic growth to 2. 7 percent next year, 0.3 percentage point lower than its April prediction against the backdrop of the government spending cuts.¶ The scaling down in the forecasted economic growth rate was largely due to the ongoing automatic budget cuts across the federal governmental departments, also known as sequester, which will be affecting economic recovery next year, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde said at a press conference Friday.¶ The U.S. economic growth is expected to slow to 1.9 percent this year owing to an excessively rapid pace of fiscal deficit reduction, the same as its April prediction, the IMF said in a concluding statement after an annual review of U.S. economic and financial situations.¶ "The U.S. recovery has remained tepid over the past year, but underlying fundamentals have been gradually improving." The modest growth rate of 2.2 percent last year reflected legacy effects from the financial crisis, fiscal deficit reduction, a weak external environment and temporary effects of extreme weather-related events, noted the statement.¶ Despite these headwinds, the nature of the recovery appears to be changing. In particular, home prices and house construction activity have rebounded, along with strengthening of household balance sheets and improvement of labor market conditions, and corporate profitability and balance sheets remain strong, especially for large firms, said the Washington-based global lender.¶ The U.S. economic recovery is "gaining ground and becoming more durable," and the housing market and labor market are doing better, supported by the U.S. Federal Reserve's easy monetary policy. But the economy still has "way to go" before returning to full strength, Lagarde told reporters.¶ The ongoing sequester is a major risk for U.S. economic growth. Another fiscal worry is doing too little further down the road on fiscal consolidation after having done too much in the short term, she stressed.¶ The IMF suggested the United States should repeal the sequester and adopt a more balanced and gradual pace of fiscal consolidation in the short term.¶ The sequester was included in the August 2011 debt-ceiling package to force lawmakers to come up with a long-term deficit reduction plan. After the failure to produce such a plan in November 2011, a total of more than 1 trillion U.S. dollars cuts over a decade were triggered starting this year, or about 109 billion dollars per year.¶ The Fed's quantitative easing (QE) monetary measures have been "extremely useful" in bolstering economic growth and should continue. The IMF predicted the Fed to maintain its current asset purchase program until the end of this year and that the Fed should carefully manage its QE exit plan to avoid disrupting the markets, Lagarde noted.¶ As the legacy of the financial crisis wanes further, private domestic demand in the world's largest economy is expected to continue recovering, but weak growth in a number of trading partners is projected to weigh on U.S. export growth, according to the statement. [/INST] <h4>[A.] <strong>US economic growth is tepid now, despite signs of recovery the economy has a long way to go, expansion of trading partners is key to growth</h4><p>China Daily, 6-15-13</p><p></strong>[Staff, IMF: US economy to grow 2.7 percent in 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-06/15/content_16624533.htm<u><strong>] /Wyo-MB</p><p></u></strong>WASHINGTON - <u><strong>The International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Friday lowered its forecast of U.S. economic growth to 2. 7 percent next year, 0.3 percentage point lower than its April prediction against the backdrop of the government spending cuts</u></strong>.¶ The scaling down in the forecasted economic growth rate was largely due to the ongoing automatic budget cuts across the federal governmental departments, also known as sequester, which will be affecting economic recovery next year, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde said at a press conference Friday.¶ <u><strong>The U.S. economic growth is expected to slow to 1.9 percent this year owing to an excessively rapid pace of fiscal deficit reduction</u></strong>, the same as its April prediction, the IMF said in a concluding statement after an annual review of U.S. economic and financial situations.¶ <u><strong>"The U.S. recovery has remained tepid over the past year, but underlying fundamentals have been gradually improving</u></strong>." The modest growth rate of 2.2 percent last year reflected legacy effects from the financial crisis, fiscal deficit reduction, a weak external environment and temporary effects of extreme weather-related events, noted the statement.¶ <u><strong>Despite these headwinds, the nature of the recovery appears to be changing</u></strong>. In particular, home prices and house construction activity have rebounded, along with strengthening of household balance sheets and improvement of labor market conditions, and corporate profitability and balance sheets remain strong, especially for large firms, said the Washington-based global lender.¶ <u><strong>The U.S. economic recovery is "gaining ground and becoming more durable," and the housing market and labor market are doing better, supported by the U.S.</u></strong> Federal Reserve's easy monetary policy. <u><strong>But the economy still has "way to go" before returning to full strength, Lagarde told reporters</u></strong>.¶ The ongoing sequester is a major risk for U.S. economic growth. Another fiscal worry is doing too little further down the road on fiscal consolidation after having done too much in the short term, she stressed.¶ The IMF suggested the United States should repeal the sequester and adopt a more balanced and gradual pace of fiscal consolidation in the short term.¶ The sequester was included in the August 2011 debt-ceiling package to force lawmakers to come up with a long-term deficit reduction plan. After the failure to produce such a plan in November 2011, a total of more than 1 trillion U.S. dollars cuts over a decade were triggered starting this year, or about 109 billion dollars per year.¶ The Fed's quantitative easing (QE) monetary measures have been "extremely useful" in bolstering economic growth and should continue. The IMF predicted the Fed to maintain its current asset purchase program until the end of this year and that the Fed should carefully manage its QE exit plan to avoid disrupting the markets, Lagarde noted.¶ <u><strong>As the legacy of the financial crisis wanes further, private domestic demand in the world's largest economy is expected to continue recovering, but weak growth in a number of trading partners is projected to weigh on U.S. export growth, according to the statement.</p></u></strong> </s>

Oil is the key area of Iran’s influence lead in Venezuela

Both Iran and Venezuela are rentier states that use oil revenue as an instrument to gain political influence and to contain their enemies’ breadth of influence Their recent bilateral partnership is based on the political affinities between Chávez and Ahmedinejad, who consider themselves as part of an alliance of energy-rich “rogue states” against the U S

Both Iran and Venezuela are rentier states that use oil revenue as an instrument to gain political influence and to contain their enemies’ breadth of influence Their recent bilateral partnership is based on the political¶ affinities between Chávez and Ahmedinejad, who consider themselves as part of an alliance of energy-rich “rogue states” against the U S

Both Iran and Venezuela are rentier states that use oil revenue as an instrument to gain political influence and to contain their enemies’ breadth of influence. Combined, they represent 8¶ percent of global oil production. Their recent bilateral partnership is based on the political¶ affinities between Presidents Chávez and Ahmedinejad, who consider themselves as part of an alliance of energy-rich “rogue states” against the United States.

<h4>Oil is the key area of Iran’s influence lead in Venezuela</h4><p><strong>Gratius and Fürtig ’09</strong> [Susanne Gratius, Senior researcher, Peace, Security & Human Rights Programme, FRIDE, Henner Fürtig, Reseacher, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, ““Iran and Venezuela: Bilateral alliance and global power projections,” online]</p><p><u><mark>Both Iran and Venezuela are rentier states that use oil revenue as an instrument to gain political influence and to contain their enemies’ breadth of influence</u></mark>. Combined, they represent 8¶ percent of global oil production. <u><mark>Their recent bilateral partnership is based on the political</u>¶<u> affinities between</u></mark> Presidents <u><mark>Chávez and Ahmedinejad, who consider themselves as part of an alliance of energy-rich “rogue states” against the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates.</p>

Gratius and Fürtig ’09 [Susanne Gratius, Senior researcher, Peace, Security & Human Rights Programme, FRIDE, Henner Fürtig, Reseacher, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, ““Iran and Venezuela: Bilateral alliance and global power projections,” online]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Gratius and Fürtig ’09 [Susanne Gratius, Senior researcher, Peace, Security & Human Rights Programme, FRIDE, Henner Fürtig, Reseacher, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, ““Iran and Venezuela: Bilateral alliance and global power projections,” online] fulltext: Both Iran and Venezuela are rentier states that use oil revenue as an instrument to gain political influence and to contain their enemies’ breadth of influence. Combined, they represent 8¶ percent of global oil production. Their recent bilateral partnership is based on the political¶ affinities between Presidents Chávez and Ahmedinejad, who consider themselves as part of an alliance of energy-rich “rogue states” against the United States. [/INST] <h4>Oil is the key area of Iran’s influence lead in Venezuela</h4><p><strong>Gratius and Fürtig ’09</strong> [Susanne Gratius, Senior researcher, Peace, Security & Human Rights Programme, FRIDE, Henner Fürtig, Reseacher, German Institute of Global and Area Studies, ““Iran and Venezuela: Bilateral alliance and global power projections,” online]</p><p><u><mark>Both Iran and Venezuela are rentier states that use oil revenue as an instrument to gain political influence and to contain their enemies’ breadth of influence</u></mark>. Combined, they represent 8¶ percent of global oil production. <u><mark>Their recent bilateral partnership is based on the political</u>¶<u> affinities between</u></mark> Presidents <u><mark>Chávez and Ahmedinejad, who consider themselves as part of an alliance of energy-rich “rogue states” against the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates.</p> </s>

(__) Alt causes to instability; Taliban gaining ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan

<h4>(__) Alt causes to instability; Taliban gaining ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>(__) Alt causes to instability; Taliban gaining ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan </h4> </s>

[insert no-link e.g. ]

<h4>[insert no-link e.g. ] </h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>[insert no-link e.g. ] </h4> </s>

That kills US-Chinese cooperation which is key to solve every global impact-

Until now Obama’s China policy has been mainly a hedge against China’s rise Washington intends to try to stunt China’s growth and contain it the way that America sought to halt the spread of Soviet power during the cold hedging without a sincere attempt to open up a dialogue risks feeding China’s resentment and transforming competition into conflict. Cooperation between America and China is crucial for the future of the world America and China are the world’s two biggest economies, two largest trading nations and two worst polluters There is no way to rebalance the global economy, slow climate change, manage the trouble kicked up by rogue states and keep the peace in Asia unless Washington and Beijing work together in as many areas as possible

Until now, Mr. Obama’s China policy has been mainly a hedge against China’s rise. The administration’s “pivot” to Asia — the shift of attention and resources from other regions — has convinced many in Beijing that Washington intends to try to stunt China’s growth and contain it the way that America sought to halt the spread of Soviet power during the cold war. Hedging should be part of America’s strategy. But hedging without a sincere attempt to open up a dialogue risks feeding China’s resentment and transforming competition into conflict. Cooperation between America and China is crucial for the future of both countries and the world, and the current policy of damage control isn’t enough. America and China are the world’s two biggest economies, two largest trading nations and two worst polluters. America is the world’s largest debtor, China its biggest foreign creditor. There is no way to rebalance the global economy, slow climate change, manage the trouble kicked up by rogue states and keep the peace in Asia unless Washington and Beijing work together in as many areas as possible. THE first step will be for Mr. Obama and his representatives to stop trying to negotiate with the China they want to see and engage China as it is.

<h4>That kills US-Chinese cooperation which is key to solve every global impact-<strong> </h4><p>Bremmer and Huntsman 13</p><p></strong>(Ian and Jon, Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, Huntsman was governor of Utah from 2005 to 2009 and the United States ambassador to China from 2009 to 2011, New York Times, “How to Play Well With China,” June 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/opinion/sunday/how-to-play-well-with-china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) /wyo-mm</p><p><u><strong>Until now</u></strong>, Mr. <u><strong>Obama’s China policy has been mainly a hedge against China’s rise</u></strong>. The administration’s “pivot” to Asia — the shift of attention and resources from other regions — has convinced many in Beijing that <u><strong>Washington intends to try to stunt China’s growth and contain it the way that America sought to halt the spread of Soviet power during the cold</u></strong> war. Hedging should be part of America’s strategy. But <u><strong>hedging without a sincere attempt to open up a dialogue risks feeding China’s resentment and transforming competition into conflict. Cooperation between America and China is crucial for the future of</u></strong> both countries and <u><strong>the world</u></strong>, and the current policy of damage control isn’t enough. <u><strong>America and China are the world’s two biggest economies, two largest trading nations and two worst polluters</u></strong>. America is the world’s largest debtor, China its biggest foreign creditor. <u><strong>There is no way to rebalance the global economy, slow climate change, manage the trouble kicked up by rogue states and keep the peace in Asia unless Washington and Beijing work together in as many areas as possible</u></strong>. THE first step will be for Mr. Obama and his representatives to stop trying to negotiate with the China they want to see and engage China as it is.</p>

Bremmer and Huntsman 13 (Ian and Jon, Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, Huntsman was governor of Utah from 2005 to 2009 and the United States ambassador to China from 2009 to 2011, New York Times, “How to Play Well With China,” June 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/opinion/sunday/how-to-play-well-with-china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) /wyo-mm

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Bremmer and Huntsman 13 (Ian and Jon, Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, Huntsman was governor of Utah from 2005 to 2009 and the United States ambassador to China from 2009 to 2011, New York Times, “How to Play Well With China,” June 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/opinion/sunday/how-to-play-well-with-china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) /wyo-mm fulltext: Until now, Mr. Obama’s China policy has been mainly a hedge against China’s rise. The administration’s “pivot” to Asia — the shift of attention and resources from other regions — has convinced many in Beijing that Washington intends to try to stunt China’s growth and contain it the way that America sought to halt the spread of Soviet power during the cold war. Hedging should be part of America’s strategy. But hedging without a sincere attempt to open up a dialogue risks feeding China’s resentment and transforming competition into conflict. Cooperation between America and China is crucial for the future of both countries and the world, and the current policy of damage control isn’t enough. America and China are the world’s two biggest economies, two largest trading nations and two worst polluters. America is the world’s largest debtor, China its biggest foreign creditor. There is no way to rebalance the global economy, slow climate change, manage the trouble kicked up by rogue states and keep the peace in Asia unless Washington and Beijing work together in as many areas as possible. THE first step will be for Mr. Obama and his representatives to stop trying to negotiate with the China they want to see and engage China as it is. [/INST] <h4>That kills US-Chinese cooperation which is key to solve every global impact-<strong> </h4><p>Bremmer and Huntsman 13</p><p></strong>(Ian and Jon, Bremmer is president of Eurasia Group, Huntsman was governor of Utah from 2005 to 2009 and the United States ambassador to China from 2009 to 2011, New York Times, “How to Play Well With China,” June 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/opinion/sunday/how-to-play-well-with-china.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0) /wyo-mm</p><p><u><strong>Until now</u></strong>, Mr. <u><strong>Obama’s China policy has been mainly a hedge against China’s rise</u></strong>. The administration’s “pivot” to Asia — the shift of attention and resources from other regions — has convinced many in Beijing that <u><strong>Washington intends to try to stunt China’s growth and contain it the way that America sought to halt the spread of Soviet power during the cold</u></strong> war. Hedging should be part of America’s strategy. But <u><strong>hedging without a sincere attempt to open up a dialogue risks feeding China’s resentment and transforming competition into conflict. Cooperation between America and China is crucial for the future of</u></strong> both countries and <u><strong>the world</u></strong>, and the current policy of damage control isn’t enough. <u><strong>America and China are the world’s two biggest economies, two largest trading nations and two worst polluters</u></strong>. America is the world’s largest debtor, China its biggest foreign creditor. <u><strong>There is no way to rebalance the global economy, slow climate change, manage the trouble kicked up by rogue states and keep the peace in Asia unless Washington and Beijing work together in as many areas as possible</u></strong>. THE first step will be for Mr. Obama and his representatives to stop trying to negotiate with the China they want to see and engage China as it is.</p> </s>

[B.] The status quo enforcement of the embargo drains the US economy

, the U.S. spends massive amounts of money trying to keep illicit Cuban goods out of the United States. At least 10 different agencies are responsible for enforcing different provisions of the embargo, and the U.S. government devotes hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of man hours to administering the embargo each year. More than 70 percent of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control inspections each year are centered on rooting out smuggled Cuban goods even though the agency administers more than 20 other trade bans Government resources could be better spent on the enforcement of other sanctions estimates of the sanctions’ annual cost to the U.S. economy range from $1.2 to $3.6 billion, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Restrictions on trade disproportionately affect U.S. small businesses who lack the transportation and financial infrastructure to skirt the embargo. These restrictions translate into real reductions in income and employment

Despite this progress, the U.S. spends massive amounts of money trying to keep illicit Cuban goods out of the United States. At least 10 different agencies are responsible for enforcing different provisions of the embargo, and according to the Government Accountability Office, the U.S. government devotes hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of man hours to administering the embargo each year.¶ At the Miami International Airport, visitors arriving from a Cuban airport are seven times more likely to be stopped and subjected to further customs inspections than are visitors from other countries. More than 70 percent of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control inspections each year are centered on rooting out smuggled Cuban goods even though the agency administers more than 20 other trade bans. Government resources could be better spent on the enforcement of other sanctions, such as illicit drug trade from Columbia, rather than the search for contraband cigars and rum.¶ Yet, estimates of the sanctions’ annual cost to the U.S. economy range from $1.2 to $3.6 billion, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Restrictions on trade disproportionately affect U.S. small businesses who lack the transportation and financial infrastructure to skirt the embargo. These restrictions translate into real reductions in income and employment for Americans in states like Florida, where the unemployment rate currently stands at 8.1 percent.

<h4>[B.] T<strong>he status quo enforcement of the embargo drains the US economy</h4><p>Hanson, Batten, and Ealey, 2013</p><p></strong>[Daniel, Dayne, and Harrison, Daniel Hanson is an economics researcher at the American Enterprise Institute. Dayne Batten is affiliated with the University of North Carolina Department of Public Policy. Harrison Ealey is a financial analyst, It's Time For The U.S. To End Its Senseless Embargo Of Cuba, 1-16-13, http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/] /Wyo-MB</p><p>Despite this progress<u><strong>, the U.S. spends massive amounts of money trying to keep illicit Cuban goods out of the United States. At least 10 different agencies are responsible for enforcing different provisions of the embargo, and</u></strong> according to the Government Accountability Office, <u><strong>the U.S. government devotes hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of man hours to administering the embargo each year.</u></strong>¶ At the Miami International Airport, visitors arriving from a Cuban airport are seven times more likely to be stopped and subjected to further customs inspections than are visitors from other countries. <u><strong>More than 70 percent of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control inspections each year are centered on rooting out smuggled Cuban goods even though the agency administers more than 20 other trade bans</u></strong>. <u><strong>Government resources could be better spent on the enforcement of other sanctions</u></strong>, such as illicit drug trade from Columbia, rather than the search for contraband cigars and rum.¶ Yet, <u><strong>estimates of the sanctions’ annual cost to the U.S. economy range from $1.2 to $3.6 billion, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Restrictions on trade disproportionately affect U.S. small businesses who lack the transportation and financial infrastructure to skirt the embargo. These restrictions translate into real reductions in income and employment</u></strong> for Americans in states like Florida, where the unemployment rate currently stands at 8.1 percent.</p>

Hanson, Batten, and Ealey, 2013 [Daniel, Dayne, and Harrison, Daniel Hanson is an economics researcher at the American Enterprise Institute. Dayne Batten is affiliated with the University of North Carolina Department of Public Policy. Harrison Ealey is a financial analyst, It's Time For The U.S. To End Its Senseless Embargo Of Cuba, 1-16-13, http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/] /Wyo-MB

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Hanson, Batten, and Ealey, 2013 [Daniel, Dayne, and Harrison, Daniel Hanson is an economics researcher at the American Enterprise Institute. Dayne Batten is affiliated with the University of North Carolina Department of Public Policy. Harrison Ealey is a financial analyst, It's Time For The U.S. To End Its Senseless Embargo Of Cuba, 1-16-13, http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/] /Wyo-MB fulltext: Despite this progress, the U.S. spends massive amounts of money trying to keep illicit Cuban goods out of the United States. At least 10 different agencies are responsible for enforcing different provisions of the embargo, and according to the Government Accountability Office, the U.S. government devotes hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of man hours to administering the embargo each year.¶ At the Miami International Airport, visitors arriving from a Cuban airport are seven times more likely to be stopped and subjected to further customs inspections than are visitors from other countries. More than 70 percent of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control inspections each year are centered on rooting out smuggled Cuban goods even though the agency administers more than 20 other trade bans. Government resources could be better spent on the enforcement of other sanctions, such as illicit drug trade from Columbia, rather than the search for contraband cigars and rum.¶ Yet, estimates of the sanctions’ annual cost to the U.S. economy range from $1.2 to $3.6 billion, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Restrictions on trade disproportionately affect U.S. small businesses who lack the transportation and financial infrastructure to skirt the embargo. These restrictions translate into real reductions in income and employment for Americans in states like Florida, where the unemployment rate currently stands at 8.1 percent. [/INST] <h4>[B.] T<strong>he status quo enforcement of the embargo drains the US economy</h4><p>Hanson, Batten, and Ealey, 2013</p><p></strong>[Daniel, Dayne, and Harrison, Daniel Hanson is an economics researcher at the American Enterprise Institute. Dayne Batten is affiliated with the University of North Carolina Department of Public Policy. Harrison Ealey is a financial analyst, It's Time For The U.S. To End Its Senseless Embargo Of Cuba, 1-16-13, http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/] /Wyo-MB</p><p>Despite this progress<u><strong>, the U.S. spends massive amounts of money trying to keep illicit Cuban goods out of the United States. At least 10 different agencies are responsible for enforcing different provisions of the embargo, and</u></strong> according to the Government Accountability Office, <u><strong>the U.S. government devotes hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of man hours to administering the embargo each year.</u></strong>¶ At the Miami International Airport, visitors arriving from a Cuban airport are seven times more likely to be stopped and subjected to further customs inspections than are visitors from other countries. <u><strong>More than 70 percent of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control inspections each year are centered on rooting out smuggled Cuban goods even though the agency administers more than 20 other trade bans</u></strong>. <u><strong>Government resources could be better spent on the enforcement of other sanctions</u></strong>, such as illicit drug trade from Columbia, rather than the search for contraband cigars and rum.¶ Yet, <u><strong>estimates of the sanctions’ annual cost to the U.S. economy range from $1.2 to $3.6 billion, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Restrictions on trade disproportionately affect U.S. small businesses who lack the transportation and financial infrastructure to skirt the embargo. These restrictions translate into real reductions in income and employment</u></strong> for Americans in states like Florida, where the unemployment rate currently stands at 8.1 percent.</p> </s>

US-Iran war goes nuclear

the advent of a “nuclear-armed Iran” means the failure of one form of U.S. deterrence strategy in postulating a nuclear-armed Iran, we must accept up front that U.S. credibility had suffered a serious blow Of particular concern is nuclear-backed “adventurism,” defined here as more risk-acceptant Iranian challenges to regional and global order than currently exist. Examples include heightened levels of: politicalmilitary-economic intimidation, support for terrorism and insurgency, clashes with U.S. naval forces in the Gulf, and the proliferation of WMD At the end is direct combat with U.S. forces and Iranian nuclear use, most likely arising from conflict escalation

the advent of a “nuclear-armed Iran” means the ¶ failure of one form of U.S. deterrence strategy in postulating a nuclear-armed Iran, we must accept up front ¶ that U.S. credibility had suffered a ¶ serious blow Of particular concern is nuclear-backed “adventurism,” defined ¶ here as more risk-acceptant Iranian challenges to regional and global order ¶ than currently exist. Examples include heightened levels of: politicalmilitary-economic intimidation, support for terrorism and insurgency, ¶ clashes with U.S. naval forces in the Gulf, and the proliferation of WMD At the end is direct combat with U.S. forces and Iranian ¶ nuclear use, most likely arising from conflict escalation

By definition, the advent of a “nuclear-armed Iran” means the ¶ failure of one form of U.S. deterrence strategy — the deterrence of ¶ proliferation. Both the Obama administration and its predecessor publicly ¶ committed the United States to keeping Tehran from acquiring nuclear ¶ weapons. So in postulating a nuclear-armed Iran, we must accept up front ¶ that U.S. credibility – a key component of deterrence – had suffered a ¶ serious blow, one that will generally make it harder subsequently to deter ¶ various threats from the Islamic Republic.¶ Of particular concern is nuclear-backed “adventurism,” defined ¶ here as more risk-acceptant Iranian challenges to regional and global order ¶ than currently exist. Examples include heightened levels of: politicalmilitary-economic intimidation, support for terrorism and insurgency, ¶ clashes with U.S. naval forces in the Gulf, and the proliferation of ¶ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to others. At the end of this ¶ spectrum is the potential for direct combat with U.S. forces and Iranian ¶ nuclear use, most likely arising from conflict escalation.

<h4>US-Iran war goes nuclear</h4><p><strong>Giles ‘11</strong> [Gregory, Assistant Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation and Manager of its Weapons Proliferation Analysis Division, “Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Iran from Adventurism and Nuclear Use,” May, http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/book/chapter5.pdf]</p><p>By definition, <u><mark>the advent of a “nuclear-armed Iran” means the </u>¶<u> failure of one form of U.S. deterrence strategy </u></mark>— the deterrence of ¶ proliferation. Both the Obama administration and its predecessor publicly ¶ committed the United States to keeping Tehran from acquiring nuclear ¶ weapons. So <u><mark>in postulating a nuclear-armed Iran, we must accept up front </u>¶<u> that U.S. credibility </u></mark>– a key component of deterrence – <u><mark>had suffered a </u>¶<u> serious blow</u></mark>, one that will generally make it harder subsequently to deter ¶ various threats from the Islamic Republic.¶ <u><mark>Of particular concern is nuclear-backed “adventurism,” defined </u>¶<u> here as more risk-acceptant Iranian challenges to regional and global order </u>¶<u> than currently exist. Examples include heightened levels of: politicalmilitary-economic intimidation, support for terrorism and insurgency, </u>¶<u> clashes with U.S. naval forces in the Gulf, and the proliferation of </u></mark>¶ weapons of mass destruction (<u><mark>WMD</u></mark>) to others. <u><mark>At the end </u></mark>of this ¶ spectrum <u><mark>is </u></mark>the potential for <u><mark>direct combat with U.S. forces and Iranian </u>¶<u> nuclear use, most likely arising from conflict escalation</u></mark>.</p>

Giles ‘11 [Gregory, Assistant Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation and Manager of its Weapons Proliferation Analysis Division, “Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Iran from Adventurism and Nuclear Use,” May, http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/book/chapter5.pdf]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Giles ‘11 [Gregory, Assistant Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation and Manager of its Weapons Proliferation Analysis Division, “Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Iran from Adventurism and Nuclear Use,” May, http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/book/chapter5.pdf] fulltext: By definition, the advent of a “nuclear-armed Iran” means the ¶ failure of one form of U.S. deterrence strategy — the deterrence of ¶ proliferation. Both the Obama administration and its predecessor publicly ¶ committed the United States to keeping Tehran from acquiring nuclear ¶ weapons. So in postulating a nuclear-armed Iran, we must accept up front ¶ that U.S. credibility – a key component of deterrence – had suffered a ¶ serious blow, one that will generally make it harder subsequently to deter ¶ various threats from the Islamic Republic.¶ Of particular concern is nuclear-backed “adventurism,” defined ¶ here as more risk-acceptant Iranian challenges to regional and global order ¶ than currently exist. Examples include heightened levels of: politicalmilitary-economic intimidation, support for terrorism and insurgency, ¶ clashes with U.S. naval forces in the Gulf, and the proliferation of ¶ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to others. At the end of this ¶ spectrum is the potential for direct combat with U.S. forces and Iranian ¶ nuclear use, most likely arising from conflict escalation. [/INST] <h4>US-Iran war goes nuclear</h4><p><strong>Giles ‘11</strong> [Gregory, Assistant Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation and Manager of its Weapons Proliferation Analysis Division, “Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Iran from Adventurism and Nuclear Use,” May, http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/book/chapter5.pdf]</p><p>By definition, <u><mark>the advent of a “nuclear-armed Iran” means the </u>¶<u> failure of one form of U.S. deterrence strategy </u></mark>— the deterrence of ¶ proliferation. Both the Obama administration and its predecessor publicly ¶ committed the United States to keeping Tehran from acquiring nuclear ¶ weapons. So <u><mark>in postulating a nuclear-armed Iran, we must accept up front </u>¶<u> that U.S. credibility </u></mark>– a key component of deterrence – <u><mark>had suffered a </u>¶<u> serious blow</u></mark>, one that will generally make it harder subsequently to deter ¶ various threats from the Islamic Republic.¶ <u><mark>Of particular concern is nuclear-backed “adventurism,” defined </u>¶<u> here as more risk-acceptant Iranian challenges to regional and global order </u>¶<u> than currently exist. Examples include heightened levels of: politicalmilitary-economic intimidation, support for terrorism and insurgency, </u>¶<u> clashes with U.S. naval forces in the Gulf, and the proliferation of </u></mark>¶ weapons of mass destruction (<u><mark>WMD</u></mark>) to others. <u><mark>At the end </u></mark>of this ¶ spectrum <u><mark>is </u></mark>the potential for <u><mark>direct combat with U.S. forces and Iranian </u>¶<u> nuclear use, most likely arising from conflict escalation</u></mark>.</p> </s>

(__) Kerry may get the negotiations started, but peace talks won’t be successful

None of the four scholars could understand Kerry’s emphasis on the conflict Kerry would have an easier time convincing Greenpeace to dine on whale steak and spotted owl than brokering peace between Israel and Palestinians Rubin resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Brown at the Carnegie Endowment finds Kerry’s decision to focus on the Israeli-Palestinian peace “baffling.” “He may get formal negotiations started if he’s lucky. I can’t see him getting any farther,” Brown said of Kerry’s prospects for success.

None of the four scholars who responded to Daily Caller inquiries could understand Kerry’s emphasis on the conflict, and some were outright dismissive of the idea that he could broker any sort of solution. “Kerry would have an easier time convincing Greenpeace to dine on whale steak and spotted owl than in brokering peace between Israel and Palestinians,” Michael Rubin, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, told TheDC. What’s more, Rubin said, with all the fires flaring around the world, it makes little sense that Kerry would devote so much time to a problem that isn’t currently in a position to be resolved. “Egypt is imploding, and Turkey is going south fast. Antagonism between Europe and America is at an all-time high. China is bullying U.S. allies in southeast Asia. And what is Kerry doing? Off tilting at windmills,” he said. Nathan Brown, a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for National Peace, told TheDC he finds Kerry’s decision to focus on the Israeli-Palestinian peace “baffling.” “He may get formal negotiations started if he’s lucky. I can’t see him getting any farther,” Brown said of Kerry’s prospects for success.

<h4>(__) <strong>Kerry may get the negotiations started, but peace talks won’t be successful </h4><p>Daily Caller 7/4 </p><p><u>[Daily Caller, News paper quoting qualified people, “Middle East experts find Kerry focus on Israeli-Palestinian peace ‘baffling’”, 11:46 PM 07/04/2013, http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/04/middle-east-experts-find-kerry-focus-on-israeli-palestinian-peace-baffling/#ixzz2YHteE5Iv, \\wyo-bb]</p><p>None of the four scholars</u></strong> who responded to Daily Caller inquiries <u><strong>could understand Kerry’s emphasis</u></strong> <u><strong>on the conflict</u></strong>, and some were outright dismissive of the idea that he could broker any sort of solution. “<u><strong>Kerry would have an easier time convincing Greenpeace to dine on whale steak and spotted owl than</u></strong> in <u><strong>brokering peace between Israel and Palestinians</u></strong>,” Michael <u><strong>Rubin</u></strong>, <u><strong>resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute,</u></strong> told TheDC. What’s more, Rubin said, with all the fires flaring around the world, it makes little sense that Kerry would devote so much time to a problem that isn’t currently in a position to be resolved. “Egypt is imploding, and Turkey is going south fast. Antagonism between Europe and America is at an all-time high. China is bullying U.S. allies in southeast Asia. And what is Kerry doing? Off tilting at windmills,” he said. Nathan <u><strong>Brown</u></strong>, a nonresident senior associate <u><strong>at the Carnegie Endowment</u></strong> for National Peace, told TheDC he <u><strong>finds</u></strong> <u><strong>Kerry’s decision to focus on the Israeli-Palestinian peace “baffling.” “He may get formal negotiations started if he’s lucky. I can’t see him getting any farther,” Brown said of Kerry’s prospects for success.</p></u></strong>

Daily Caller 7/4 [Daily Caller, News paper quoting qualified people, “Middle East experts find Kerry focus on Israeli-Palestinian peace ‘baffling’”, 11:46 PM 07/04/2013, http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/04/middle-east-experts-find-kerry-focus-on-israeli-palestinian-peace-baffling/#ixzz2YHteE5Iv, \\wyo-bb]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Daily Caller 7/4 [Daily Caller, News paper quoting qualified people, “Middle East experts find Kerry focus on Israeli-Palestinian peace ‘baffling’”, 11:46 PM 07/04/2013, http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/04/middle-east-experts-find-kerry-focus-on-israeli-palestinian-peace-baffling/#ixzz2YHteE5Iv, \\wyo-bb] fulltext: None of the four scholars who responded to Daily Caller inquiries could understand Kerry’s emphasis on the conflict, and some were outright dismissive of the idea that he could broker any sort of solution. “Kerry would have an easier time convincing Greenpeace to dine on whale steak and spotted owl than in brokering peace between Israel and Palestinians,” Michael Rubin, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, told TheDC. What’s more, Rubin said, with all the fires flaring around the world, it makes little sense that Kerry would devote so much time to a problem that isn’t currently in a position to be resolved. “Egypt is imploding, and Turkey is going south fast. Antagonism between Europe and America is at an all-time high. China is bullying U.S. allies in southeast Asia. And what is Kerry doing? Off tilting at windmills,” he said. Nathan Brown, a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for National Peace, told TheDC he finds Kerry’s decision to focus on the Israeli-Palestinian peace “baffling.” “He may get formal negotiations started if he’s lucky. I can’t see him getting any farther,” Brown said of Kerry’s prospects for success. [/INST] <h4>(__) <strong>Kerry may get the negotiations started, but peace talks won’t be successful </h4><p>Daily Caller 7/4 </p><p><u>[Daily Caller, News paper quoting qualified people, “Middle East experts find Kerry focus on Israeli-Palestinian peace ‘baffling’”, 11:46 PM 07/04/2013, http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/04/middle-east-experts-find-kerry-focus-on-israeli-palestinian-peace-baffling/#ixzz2YHteE5Iv, \\wyo-bb]</p><p>None of the four scholars</u></strong> who responded to Daily Caller inquiries <u><strong>could understand Kerry’s emphasis</u></strong> <u><strong>on the conflict</u></strong>, and some were outright dismissive of the idea that he could broker any sort of solution. “<u><strong>Kerry would have an easier time convincing Greenpeace to dine on whale steak and spotted owl than</u></strong> in <u><strong>brokering peace between Israel and Palestinians</u></strong>,” Michael <u><strong>Rubin</u></strong>, <u><strong>resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute,</u></strong> told TheDC. What’s more, Rubin said, with all the fires flaring around the world, it makes little sense that Kerry would devote so much time to a problem that isn’t currently in a position to be resolved. “Egypt is imploding, and Turkey is going south fast. Antagonism between Europe and America is at an all-time high. China is bullying U.S. allies in southeast Asia. And what is Kerry doing? Off tilting at windmills,” he said. Nathan <u><strong>Brown</u></strong>, a nonresident senior associate <u><strong>at the Carnegie Endowment</u></strong> for National Peace, told TheDC he <u><strong>finds</u></strong> <u><strong>Kerry’s decision to focus on the Israeli-Palestinian peace “baffling.” “He may get formal negotiations started if he’s lucky. I can’t see him getting any farther,” Brown said of Kerry’s prospects for success.</p></u></strong> </s>

-----No-Link: Demand on ME oil decreasing now – domestic production

the capital of energy will likely have shifted back to the Western Hemisphere, where it was prior to the ascendancy of Middle Eastern megasuppliers such as Saudi Arabia the Americas are home to plentiful hydrocarbons since the early 2000s shale gas production in the United States has skyrocketed from virtually nothing to 15 to 20 percent of the U.S. natural gas supply in less than a decade onshore oil production in the United is about to stage an unexpected comeback analysts are predicting production of as much as 1.5 million barrels a day in the next few years from resources beneath the Great Plains and Texas alone -- the equivalent of 8 percent of current U.S. oil consumption Rising recovery rates from old wells could also stem previous declines Similar gains are to be had in Canadian oil sands, where petroleum is extracted from tarry sediment in open pits The petropower of Iran, Russia, and Venezuela has faltered on the back of plentiful American natural gas supply A surplus of resources in the Americas is sending other foreign suppliers scrambling to line up buyers in Europe and Asia, making it more difficult for such exporters to assert themselves via heavy-handed energy "diplomacy

the capital of energy will have shifted back to the Western Hemisphere the Americas are home to plentiful hydrocarbons shale production has skyrocketed onshore production is about to comeback analysts are predicting production 8 percent of current consumption The petropower of Iran, Russia, and Venezuela has faltered on plentiful American natural gas surplus is sending foreign suppliers scrambling to Europe and Asia, making it more difficult for exporters to assert themselves

By the 2020s, the capital of energy will likely have shifted back to the Western Hemisphere, where it was prior to the ascendancy of Middle Eastern megasuppliers such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the 1960s. The reasons for this shift are partly technological and partly political. Geologists have long known that the Americas are home to plentiful hydrocarbons trapped in hard-to-reach offshore deposits, on-land shale rock, oil sands, and heavy oil formations. The U.S. endowment of unconventional oil is more than 2 trillion barrels, with another 2.4 trillion in Canada and 2 trillion-plus in South America -- compared with conventional Middle Eastern and North African oil resources of 1.2 trillion. The problem was always how to unlock them economically. But since the early 2000s, the energy industry has largely solved that problem. With the help of horizontal drilling and other innovations, shale gas production in the United States has skyrocketed from virtually nothing to 15 to 20 percent of the U.S. natural gas supply in less than a decade. By 2040, it could account for more than half of it. This tremendous change in volume has turned the conversation in the U.S. natural gas industry on its head; where Americans once fretted about meeting the country's natural gas needs, they now worry about finding potential buyers for the country's surplus. Meanwhile, onshore oil production in the United States, condemned to predictions of inexorable decline by analysts for two decades, is about to stage an unexpected comeback. Oil production from shale rock, a technically complex process of squeezing hydrocarbons from sedimentary deposits, is just beginning. But analysts are predicting production of as much as 1.5 million barrels a day in the next few years from resources beneath the Great Plains and Texas alone -- the equivalent of 8 percent of current U.S. oil consumption. The development raises the question of what else the U.S. energy industry might accomplish if prices remain high and technology continues to advance. Rising recovery rates from old wells, for example, could also stem previous declines. On top of all this, analysts expect an additional 1 to 2 million barrels a day from the Gulf of Mexico now that drilling is resuming. Peak oil? Not anytime soon. The picture elsewhere in the Americas is similarly promising. Brazil is believed to have the capacity to pump 2 million barrels a day from "pre-salt" deepwater resources, deposits of crude found more than a mile below the surface of the Atlantic Ocean that until the last couple of years were technologically inaccessible. Similar gains are to be had in Canadian oil sands, where petroleum is extracted from tarry sediment in open pits. And production of perhaps 3 million to 7 million barrels a day more is possible if U.S. in situ heavy oil, or kerogen, can be produced commercially, a process that involves heating rock to allow the oil contained within it to be pumped out in a liquid form. There is no question that such developments face environmental hurdles. But industry is starting to see that it must find ways to get over them, investing in nontoxic drilling fluids, less-invasive hydraulic-fracturing techniques, and new water-recycling processes, among other technologies, in hopes of shrinking the environmental impact of drilling. And like the U.S. oil industry, oil-thirsty China has also recognized the energy potential of the Americas, investing billions in Canada, the United States, and Latin America. The revolution-swept Middle East and North Africa, meanwhile, will soon be facing up to an inconvenient truth about their own fossil-fuel legacy: Changes of government in the region have historically led to long and steep declines in oil production. Libya's oil output has never recovered to the 3.5 million barrels a day it was producing when Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi overthrew King Idris in 1969; instead it has been stuck at under 2 million barrels a day for three decades and is now close to zero. Iran produced more than 6 million barrels a day in the times of the shah, but saw oil production fall precipitously below 2 million barrels a day in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It failed to recover significantly during the 1980s and has only crept back to 4 million in recent years. Iraq's production has also suffered during its many years of turmoil and now sits at 2.7 million barrels a day, lower than the 3.5 million it produced before Saddam Hussein came to power. The Arab Spring stands to complicate matters even further: A 1979-style disruption in Middle Eastern oil exports is hardly out of the question, nor are work stoppages or strikes by oil workers caught up in the region's political zeitgeist. All in all, upwards of 21 million barrels a day of Arab oil production are at stake -- about a quarter of global demand. The boom in the Americas, meanwhile, should be food for thought for the Middle East's remaining autocrats: It means they may not be able to count on ever-rising oil prices to calm restive populations. This hydrocarbon-driven reordering of geopolitics is already taking place. The petropower of Iran, Russia, and Venezuela has faltered on the back of plentiful American natural gas supply: A surplus of resources in the Americas is sending other foreign suppliers scrambling to line up buyers in Europe and Asia, making it more difficult for such exporters to assert themselves via heavy-handed energy "diplomacy." The U.S. energy industry may also be able to provide the technical assistance necessary for Europe and China to tap unconventional resources of their own, scuttling their need to kowtow to Moscow or the Persian Gulf. So watch this space: America may be back in the energy leadership saddle again.

<h4>-----No-Link: Demand on ME oil decreasing now – domestic production</h4><p><strong><mark>MYERS ’11</strong></mark> - director of the Baker Institute Energy Forum at Rice University (Jaffe, Amy Myers. “The Americas, Not the Middle East, Will Be the World Capital of Energy”. October, 2011. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_americas_not_the_middle_east_will_be_the_world_capital_of_energy)</p><p>By the 2020s, <u><mark>the capital of energy will</mark> likely <mark>have shifted back to the Western Hemisphere</mark>, where it was prior to the ascendancy of Middle Eastern megasuppliers such as Saudi Arabia</u> and Kuwait in the 1960s. The reasons for this shift are partly technological and partly political. Geologists have long known that <u><strong><mark>the Americas are home to plentiful hydrocarbons</strong></mark> </u>trapped in hard-to-reach offshore deposits, on-land shale rock, oil sands, and heavy oil formations. The U.S. endowment of unconventional oil is more than 2 trillion barrels, with another 2.4 trillion in Canada and 2 trillion-plus in South America -- compared with conventional Middle Eastern and North African oil resources of 1.2 trillion. The problem was always how to unlock them economically. But <u>since the early 2000s</u>, the energy industry has largely solved that problem. With the help of horizontal drilling and other innovations, <u><mark>shale </mark>gas <mark>production</mark> in the United States <mark>has skyrocketed</mark> from virtually nothing to 15 to 20 percent of the U.S. natural gas supply in less than a decade</u>. By 2040, it could account for more than half of it. This tremendous change in volume has turned the conversation in the U.S. natural gas industry on its head; where Americans once fretted about meeting the country's natural gas needs, they now worry about finding potential buyers for the country's surplus. Meanwhile, <u><mark>onshore</mark> oil <mark>production</mark> in the United</u> States, condemned to predictions of inexorable decline by analysts for two decades, <u><mark>is about to</mark> stage an unexpected <mark>comeback</u></mark>. Oil production from shale rock, a technically complex process of squeezing hydrocarbons from sedimentary deposits, is just beginning. But <u><strong><mark>analysts are predicting production</strong></mark> of as much as 1.5 million barrels a day in the next few years from resources beneath the Great Plains and Texas alone -- the equivalent of <strong><mark>8 percent of</mark> <mark>current</mark> </strong>U.S. oil <strong><mark>consumption</u></strong></mark>. The development raises the question of what else the U.S. energy industry might accomplish if prices remain high and technology continues to advance. <u>Rising recovery rates from old wells</u>, for example, <u>could also stem previous declines</u>. On top of all this, analysts expect an additional 1 to 2 million barrels a day from the Gulf of Mexico now that drilling is resuming. Peak oil? Not anytime soon. The picture elsewhere in the Americas is similarly promising. Brazil is believed to have the capacity to pump 2 million barrels a day from "pre-salt" deepwater resources, deposits of crude found more than a mile below the surface of the Atlantic Ocean that until the last couple of years were technologically inaccessible. <u>Similar gains are to be had in Canadian oil sands, where petroleum is extracted from tarry sediment in open pits</u>. And production of perhaps 3 million to 7 million barrels a day more is possible if U.S. in situ heavy oil, or kerogen, can be produced commercially, a process that involves heating rock to allow the oil contained within it to be pumped out in a liquid form. There is no question that such developments face environmental hurdles. But industry is starting to see that it must find ways to get over them, investing in nontoxic drilling fluids, less-invasive hydraulic-fracturing techniques, and new water-recycling processes, among other technologies, in hopes of shrinking the environmental impact of drilling. And like the U.S. oil industry, oil-thirsty China has also recognized the energy potential of the Americas, investing billions in Canada, the United States, and Latin America. The revolution-swept Middle East and North Africa, meanwhile, will soon be facing up to an inconvenient truth about their own fossil-fuel legacy: Changes of government in the region have historically led to long and steep declines in oil production. Libya's oil output has never recovered to the 3.5 million barrels a day it was producing when Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi overthrew King Idris in 1969; instead it has been stuck at under 2 million barrels a day for three decades and is now close to zero. Iran produced more than 6 million barrels a day in the times of the shah, but saw oil production fall precipitously below 2 million barrels a day in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It failed to recover significantly during the 1980s and has only crept back to 4 million in recent years. Iraq's production has also suffered during its many years of turmoil and now sits at 2.7 million barrels a day, lower than the 3.5 million it produced before Saddam Hussein came to power. The Arab Spring stands to complicate matters even further: A 1979-style disruption in Middle Eastern oil exports is hardly out of the question, nor are work stoppages or strikes by oil workers caught up in the region's political zeitgeist. All in all, upwards of 21 million barrels a day of Arab oil production are at stake -- about a quarter of global demand. The boom in the Americas, meanwhile, should be food for thought for the Middle East's remaining autocrats: It means they may not be able to count on ever-rising oil prices to calm restive populations. This hydrocarbon-driven reordering of geopolitics is already taking place. <u><mark>The petropower of Iran, Russia, and Venezuela has</mark> <mark>faltered on</mark> the back of <mark>plentiful American natural gas</mark> supply</u>: <u>A <mark>surplus</mark> of resources in the Americas <mark>is sending</mark> other <mark>foreign suppliers scrambling to</mark> line up buyers in <mark>Europe and Asia, making it more difficult for</mark> such <mark>exporters to assert themselves</mark> via heavy-handed energy "diplomacy</u>." The U.S. energy industry may also be able to provide the technical assistance necessary for Europe and China to tap unconventional resources of their own, scuttling their need to kowtow to Moscow or the Persian Gulf. So watch this space: America may be back in the energy leadership saddle again. </p>

MYERS ’11 - director of the Baker Institute Energy Forum at Rice University (Jaffe, Amy Myers. “The Americas, Not the Middle East, Will Be the World Capital of Energy”. October, 2011. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_americas_not_the_middle_east_will_be_the_world_capital_of_energy)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: MYERS ’11 - director of the Baker Institute Energy Forum at Rice University (Jaffe, Amy Myers. “The Americas, Not the Middle East, Will Be the World Capital of Energy”. October, 2011. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_americas_not_the_middle_east_will_be_the_world_capital_of_energy) fulltext: By the 2020s, the capital of energy will likely have shifted back to the Western Hemisphere, where it was prior to the ascendancy of Middle Eastern megasuppliers such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the 1960s. The reasons for this shift are partly technological and partly political. Geologists have long known that the Americas are home to plentiful hydrocarbons trapped in hard-to-reach offshore deposits, on-land shale rock, oil sands, and heavy oil formations. The U.S. endowment of unconventional oil is more than 2 trillion barrels, with another 2.4 trillion in Canada and 2 trillion-plus in South America -- compared with conventional Middle Eastern and North African oil resources of 1.2 trillion. The problem was always how to unlock them economically. But since the early 2000s, the energy industry has largely solved that problem. With the help of horizontal drilling and other innovations, shale gas production in the United States has skyrocketed from virtually nothing to 15 to 20 percent of the U.S. natural gas supply in less than a decade. By 2040, it could account for more than half of it. This tremendous change in volume has turned the conversation in the U.S. natural gas industry on its head; where Americans once fretted about meeting the country's natural gas needs, they now worry about finding potential buyers for the country's surplus. Meanwhile, onshore oil production in the United States, condemned to predictions of inexorable decline by analysts for two decades, is about to stage an unexpected comeback. Oil production from shale rock, a technically complex process of squeezing hydrocarbons from sedimentary deposits, is just beginning. But analysts are predicting production of as much as 1.5 million barrels a day in the next few years from resources beneath the Great Plains and Texas alone -- the equivalent of 8 percent of current U.S. oil consumption. The development raises the question of what else the U.S. energy industry might accomplish if prices remain high and technology continues to advance. Rising recovery rates from old wells, for example, could also stem previous declines. On top of all this, analysts expect an additional 1 to 2 million barrels a day from the Gulf of Mexico now that drilling is resuming. Peak oil? Not anytime soon. The picture elsewhere in the Americas is similarly promising. Brazil is believed to have the capacity to pump 2 million barrels a day from "pre-salt" deepwater resources, deposits of crude found more than a mile below the surface of the Atlantic Ocean that until the last couple of years were technologically inaccessible. Similar gains are to be had in Canadian oil sands, where petroleum is extracted from tarry sediment in open pits. And production of perhaps 3 million to 7 million barrels a day more is possible if U.S. in situ heavy oil, or kerogen, can be produced commercially, a process that involves heating rock to allow the oil contained within it to be pumped out in a liquid form. There is no question that such developments face environmental hurdles. But industry is starting to see that it must find ways to get over them, investing in nontoxic drilling fluids, less-invasive hydraulic-fracturing techniques, and new water-recycling processes, among other technologies, in hopes of shrinking the environmental impact of drilling. And like the U.S. oil industry, oil-thirsty China has also recognized the energy potential of the Americas, investing billions in Canada, the United States, and Latin America. The revolution-swept Middle East and North Africa, meanwhile, will soon be facing up to an inconvenient truth about their own fossil-fuel legacy: Changes of government in the region have historically led to long and steep declines in oil production. Libya's oil output has never recovered to the 3.5 million barrels a day it was producing when Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi overthrew King Idris in 1969; instead it has been stuck at under 2 million barrels a day for three decades and is now close to zero. Iran produced more than 6 million barrels a day in the times of the shah, but saw oil production fall precipitously below 2 million barrels a day in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It failed to recover significantly during the 1980s and has only crept back to 4 million in recent years. Iraq's production has also suffered during its many years of turmoil and now sits at 2.7 million barrels a day, lower than the 3.5 million it produced before Saddam Hussein came to power. The Arab Spring stands to complicate matters even further: A 1979-style disruption in Middle Eastern oil exports is hardly out of the question, nor are work stoppages or strikes by oil workers caught up in the region's political zeitgeist. All in all, upwards of 21 million barrels a day of Arab oil production are at stake -- about a quarter of global demand. The boom in the Americas, meanwhile, should be food for thought for the Middle East's remaining autocrats: It means they may not be able to count on ever-rising oil prices to calm restive populations. This hydrocarbon-driven reordering of geopolitics is already taking place. The petropower of Iran, Russia, and Venezuela has faltered on the back of plentiful American natural gas supply: A surplus of resources in the Americas is sending other foreign suppliers scrambling to line up buyers in Europe and Asia, making it more difficult for such exporters to assert themselves via heavy-handed energy "diplomacy." The U.S. energy industry may also be able to provide the technical assistance necessary for Europe and China to tap unconventional resources of their own, scuttling their need to kowtow to Moscow or the Persian Gulf. So watch this space: America may be back in the energy leadership saddle again. [/INST] <h4>-----No-Link: Demand on ME oil decreasing now – domestic production</h4><p><strong><mark>MYERS ’11</strong></mark> - director of the Baker Institute Energy Forum at Rice University (Jaffe, Amy Myers. “The Americas, Not the Middle East, Will Be the World Capital of Energy”. October, 2011. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/the_americas_not_the_middle_east_will_be_the_world_capital_of_energy)</p><p>By the 2020s, <u><mark>the capital of energy will</mark> likely <mark>have shifted back to the Western Hemisphere</mark>, where it was prior to the ascendancy of Middle Eastern megasuppliers such as Saudi Arabia</u> and Kuwait in the 1960s. The reasons for this shift are partly technological and partly political. Geologists have long known that <u><strong><mark>the Americas are home to plentiful hydrocarbons</strong></mark> </u>trapped in hard-to-reach offshore deposits, on-land shale rock, oil sands, and heavy oil formations. The U.S. endowment of unconventional oil is more than 2 trillion barrels, with another 2.4 trillion in Canada and 2 trillion-plus in South America -- compared with conventional Middle Eastern and North African oil resources of 1.2 trillion. The problem was always how to unlock them economically. But <u>since the early 2000s</u>, the energy industry has largely solved that problem. With the help of horizontal drilling and other innovations, <u><mark>shale </mark>gas <mark>production</mark> in the United States <mark>has skyrocketed</mark> from virtually nothing to 15 to 20 percent of the U.S. natural gas supply in less than a decade</u>. By 2040, it could account for more than half of it. This tremendous change in volume has turned the conversation in the U.S. natural gas industry on its head; where Americans once fretted about meeting the country's natural gas needs, they now worry about finding potential buyers for the country's surplus. Meanwhile, <u><mark>onshore</mark> oil <mark>production</mark> in the United</u> States, condemned to predictions of inexorable decline by analysts for two decades, <u><mark>is about to</mark> stage an unexpected <mark>comeback</u></mark>. Oil production from shale rock, a technically complex process of squeezing hydrocarbons from sedimentary deposits, is just beginning. But <u><strong><mark>analysts are predicting production</strong></mark> of as much as 1.5 million barrels a day in the next few years from resources beneath the Great Plains and Texas alone -- the equivalent of <strong><mark>8 percent of</mark> <mark>current</mark> </strong>U.S. oil <strong><mark>consumption</u></strong></mark>. The development raises the question of what else the U.S. energy industry might accomplish if prices remain high and technology continues to advance. <u>Rising recovery rates from old wells</u>, for example, <u>could also stem previous declines</u>. On top of all this, analysts expect an additional 1 to 2 million barrels a day from the Gulf of Mexico now that drilling is resuming. Peak oil? Not anytime soon. The picture elsewhere in the Americas is similarly promising. Brazil is believed to have the capacity to pump 2 million barrels a day from "pre-salt" deepwater resources, deposits of crude found more than a mile below the surface of the Atlantic Ocean that until the last couple of years were technologically inaccessible. <u>Similar gains are to be had in Canadian oil sands, where petroleum is extracted from tarry sediment in open pits</u>. And production of perhaps 3 million to 7 million barrels a day more is possible if U.S. in situ heavy oil, or kerogen, can be produced commercially, a process that involves heating rock to allow the oil contained within it to be pumped out in a liquid form. There is no question that such developments face environmental hurdles. But industry is starting to see that it must find ways to get over them, investing in nontoxic drilling fluids, less-invasive hydraulic-fracturing techniques, and new water-recycling processes, among other technologies, in hopes of shrinking the environmental impact of drilling. And like the U.S. oil industry, oil-thirsty China has also recognized the energy potential of the Americas, investing billions in Canada, the United States, and Latin America. The revolution-swept Middle East and North Africa, meanwhile, will soon be facing up to an inconvenient truth about their own fossil-fuel legacy: Changes of government in the region have historically led to long and steep declines in oil production. Libya's oil output has never recovered to the 3.5 million barrels a day it was producing when Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi overthrew King Idris in 1969; instead it has been stuck at under 2 million barrels a day for three decades and is now close to zero. Iran produced more than 6 million barrels a day in the times of the shah, but saw oil production fall precipitously below 2 million barrels a day in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It failed to recover significantly during the 1980s and has only crept back to 4 million in recent years. Iraq's production has also suffered during its many years of turmoil and now sits at 2.7 million barrels a day, lower than the 3.5 million it produced before Saddam Hussein came to power. The Arab Spring stands to complicate matters even further: A 1979-style disruption in Middle Eastern oil exports is hardly out of the question, nor are work stoppages or strikes by oil workers caught up in the region's political zeitgeist. All in all, upwards of 21 million barrels a day of Arab oil production are at stake -- about a quarter of global demand. The boom in the Americas, meanwhile, should be food for thought for the Middle East's remaining autocrats: It means they may not be able to count on ever-rising oil prices to calm restive populations. This hydrocarbon-driven reordering of geopolitics is already taking place. <u><mark>The petropower of Iran, Russia, and Venezuela has</mark> <mark>faltered on</mark> the back of <mark>plentiful American natural gas</mark> supply</u>: <u>A <mark>surplus</mark> of resources in the Americas <mark>is sending</mark> other <mark>foreign suppliers scrambling to</mark> line up buyers in <mark>Europe and Asia, making it more difficult for</mark> such <mark>exporters to assert themselves</mark> via heavy-handed energy "diplomacy</u>." The U.S. energy industry may also be able to provide the technical assistance necessary for Europe and China to tap unconventional resources of their own, scuttling their need to kowtow to Moscow or the Persian Gulf. So watch this space: America may be back in the energy leadership saddle again. </p> </s>

A. Uniqueness: CIR will pass house now - differences can be reconciled

all involved are optimistic that the time is ripe to make big changes to the nation’s immigration laws For Republicans, their loss when Latino and Asians backed Obama resonates as evidence that they must confront immigration The politics of self-deportation are behind us Every corner of the Republican Party is understanding there has to be an earned pathway to citizenship floor action could start in the Senate in May, lawmakers i in the House sounded optimistic that they, too, would have a deal soon that could be reconciled with the Senate agreement

the time is ripe Republicans loss when Latino and Asians backed Obama resonates as evidence Every corner of the Republican Party is understanding there has to be citizenship lawmakers involved in the House sounded optimistic that they would have a deal that could be reconciled with the Senate agreement

But overall, all involved are optimistic that the time is ripe to make the biggest changes to the nation’s immigration laws in more than a quarter-century. For many Republicans, their loss in the November presidential election, when Latino and Asians voters backed Obama in big numbers, resonates as evidence that they must confront the immigration issue.¶ “The politics of self-deportation are behind us,” said Graham, referring to GOP candidate Mitt Romney’s suggestion in the presidential campaign. “It was an impractical solution. Quite frankly, it’s offensive. Every corner of the Republican Party, from libertarians to the (Republican National Committee), House Republicans and the rank-and-file Republican Party member, is now understanding there has to be an earned pathway to citizenship.”¶ After consideration by the Judiciary Committee, floor action could start in the Senate in May, Schumer said.¶ Meanwhile two lawmakers involved in writing a bipartisan immigration bill in the House, Reps. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill., and Mario Diaz-Balart, R-Fla., sounded optimistic that they, too, would have a deal soon that could be reconciled with the Senate agreement.

<h4>A. Uniqueness: CIR will pass house now - differences can be reconciled </h4><p>The <strong>Associated Press</strong>. 4/8/<strong>13</p><p></strong>But overall, <u><strong>all involved are optimistic that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>the time is ripe</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to make</u></strong> the <u><strong>big</u></strong>gest <u><strong>changes to the nation’s immigration laws</u></strong> in more than a quarter-century. <u><strong>For</u></strong> many <u><strong><mark>Republicans</mark>, their <mark>loss</u></strong></mark> in the November presidential election, <u><strong><mark>when Latino and Asians</u></strong></mark> voters <u><strong><mark>backed Obama</u></strong></mark> in big numbers, <u><strong><mark>resonates as evidence</mark> that they must confront</u></strong> the <u><strong>immigration</u></strong> issue.¶ “<u><strong>The politics of self-deportation are behind us</u></strong>,” said Graham, referring to GOP candidate Mitt Romney’s suggestion in the presidential campaign. “It was an impractical solution. Quite frankly, it’s offensive. <u><strong><mark>Every corner of the Republican Party</u></strong></mark>, from libertarians to the (Republican National Committee), House Republicans and the rank-and-file Republican Party member, <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong></mark> now <u><strong><mark>understanding there has to be</mark> an earned pathway to <mark>citizenship</u></strong></mark>.”¶ After consideration by the Judiciary Committee, <u><strong>floor action could start in the Senate in May,</u></strong> Schumer said.¶ Meanwhile two <u><strong><mark>lawmakers i</u></strong>nvolved</mark> in writing a bipartisan immigration bill <u><strong><mark>in the House</u></strong></mark>, Reps. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill., and Mario Diaz-Balart, R-Fla., <u><strong><mark>sounded optimistic that they</mark>, too, <mark>would have a deal</mark> soon</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>that could be reconciled with the Senate agreement</u></strong></mark>.</p>

The Associated Press. 4/8/13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: The Associated Press. 4/8/13 fulltext: But overall, all involved are optimistic that the time is ripe to make the biggest changes to the nation’s immigration laws in more than a quarter-century. For many Republicans, their loss in the November presidential election, when Latino and Asians voters backed Obama in big numbers, resonates as evidence that they must confront the immigration issue.¶ “The politics of self-deportation are behind us,” said Graham, referring to GOP candidate Mitt Romney’s suggestion in the presidential campaign. “It was an impractical solution. Quite frankly, it’s offensive. Every corner of the Republican Party, from libertarians to the (Republican National Committee), House Republicans and the rank-and-file Republican Party member, is now understanding there has to be an earned pathway to citizenship.”¶ After consideration by the Judiciary Committee, floor action could start in the Senate in May, Schumer said.¶ Meanwhile two lawmakers involved in writing a bipartisan immigration bill in the House, Reps. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill., and Mario Diaz-Balart, R-Fla., sounded optimistic that they, too, would have a deal soon that could be reconciled with the Senate agreement. [/INST] <h4>A. Uniqueness: CIR will pass house now - differences can be reconciled </h4><p>The <strong>Associated Press</strong>. 4/8/<strong>13</p><p></strong>But overall, <u><strong>all involved are optimistic that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>the time is ripe</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>to make</u></strong> the <u><strong>big</u></strong>gest <u><strong>changes to the nation’s immigration laws</u></strong> in more than a quarter-century. <u><strong>For</u></strong> many <u><strong><mark>Republicans</mark>, their <mark>loss</u></strong></mark> in the November presidential election, <u><strong><mark>when Latino and Asians</u></strong></mark> voters <u><strong><mark>backed Obama</u></strong></mark> in big numbers, <u><strong><mark>resonates as evidence</mark> that they must confront</u></strong> the <u><strong>immigration</u></strong> issue.¶ “<u><strong>The politics of self-deportation are behind us</u></strong>,” said Graham, referring to GOP candidate Mitt Romney’s suggestion in the presidential campaign. “It was an impractical solution. Quite frankly, it’s offensive. <u><strong><mark>Every corner of the Republican Party</u></strong></mark>, from libertarians to the (Republican National Committee), House Republicans and the rank-and-file Republican Party member, <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong></mark> now <u><strong><mark>understanding there has to be</mark> an earned pathway to <mark>citizenship</u></strong></mark>.”¶ After consideration by the Judiciary Committee, <u><strong>floor action could start in the Senate in May,</u></strong> Schumer said.¶ Meanwhile two <u><strong><mark>lawmakers i</u></strong>nvolved</mark> in writing a bipartisan immigration bill <u><strong><mark>in the House</u></strong></mark>, Reps. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill., and Mario Diaz-Balart, R-Fla., <u><strong><mark>sounded optimistic that they</mark>, too, <mark>would have a deal</mark> soon</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>that could be reconciled with the Senate agreement</u></strong></mark>.</p> </s>

First uniqueness- US-Cuba ties down now and Chinese influence is expanding

US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard the continent has arguably never been so united and independent US attention to Latin America has waned in recent Latin American leaders urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway. China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US

(Shlomo, former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace, Project Syndicate, “Is the US Losing Latin America?,” June 5, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami) /wyo-mm MADRID – It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard”; on the contrary, the continent has arguably never been so united and independent. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America – and elsewhere as well. It is true that US attention to Latin America has waned in recent years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his “global war on terror.” His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, Latin American leaders felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It is also true that Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway. China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US. India is showing keen interest in the region’s energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela.

<h4><strong>First uniqueness- US-Cuba ties down now and Chinese influence is expanding</h4><p>Ben-Ami 13</p><p></strong>(Shlomo, former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace, Project Syndicate, “Is the US Losing Latin America?,” June 5, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami) /wyo-mm</p><p>MADRID – It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: <u><strong>US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard</u></strong>”; on the contrary, <u><strong>the continent has arguably never been so united and independent</u></strong>. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America – and elsewhere as well. It is true that <u><strong>US attention to Latin America has waned in recent</u></strong> years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his “global war on terror.” His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, <u><strong>Latin American leaders </u></strong>felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They <u><strong>urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent</u></strong>, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It is also true that <u><strong>Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway.</u></strong> <u><strong>China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US</u></strong>. India is showing keen interest in the region’s energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela.</p>

Ben-Ami 13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ben-Ami 13 fulltext: (Shlomo, former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace, Project Syndicate, “Is the US Losing Latin America?,” June 5, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami) /wyo-mm MADRID – It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard”; on the contrary, the continent has arguably never been so united and independent. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America – and elsewhere as well. It is true that US attention to Latin America has waned in recent years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his “global war on terror.” His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, Latin American leaders felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It is also true that Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway. China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US. India is showing keen interest in the region’s energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela. [/INST] <h4><strong>First uniqueness- US-Cuba ties down now and Chinese influence is expanding</h4><p>Ben-Ami 13</p><p></strong>(Shlomo, former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace, Project Syndicate, “Is the US Losing Latin America?,” June 5, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami) /wyo-mm</p><p>MADRID – It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: <u><strong>US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard</u></strong>”; on the contrary, <u><strong>the continent has arguably never been so united and independent</u></strong>. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America – and elsewhere as well. It is true that <u><strong>US attention to Latin America has waned in recent</u></strong> years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his “global war on terror.” His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, <u><strong>Latin American leaders </u></strong>felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They <u><strong>urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent</u></strong>, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It is also true that <u><strong>Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway.</u></strong> <u><strong>China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US</u></strong>. India is showing keen interest in the region’s energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela.</p> </s>

[C.] removing the embargo is key to accessing oil revenue in Cuba

emisphere29. 11. (Jun 18, 2009), Accessed online via Proquest] Wyo-MB United States' officials are certainly aware of Cuba's oil-producing potenti Cuba has five billion barrels of crude oil off its northern shores; Havana claims it has twenty billion. Five billion barrels would put Cuba on par with Colombia or Ecuador, while twenty billion barrels would make Cuba's oil capacity comparable to that of the United States' and place it among the top fifteen oil reserves in the world Cuba's oil is attracting the attention of oil companies from around the globe Havana has publicly stated that it welcomes American investment, but U.S. oil companies are incapable of proceeding without an official go-ahead from Washington We are open to U.S. oil companies interested in exploration, production and services." U.S. oil tycoons have shown definite interest, Until trade barriers are removed, Chevron is unable to do business in Cuba. Companies like us would have to see a change in U.S. policy before we evaluate whether there's interest It is not too late for the U.S. to develop a stake in Cuba's nascent oil output. It takes between three and five years to develop oil reserves, and as of yet, there has been no major oil discovery off the island. After lifting the embargo, U.S. oil companies could most likely work out an arrangement whereby the U.S. would exchange its reserves with nearby holdings of foreign companies, allowing the U.S. access to Cuba's oil even after all of the contracts had been signed. This could save transportation costs appreciably, because U.S. companies wouldn't have to go halfway around the world in search of oil refineries U.S. oil equipment and service companies like Halliburton, however, already have lost the opportunity to build refineries, pipelines, and ports, sacrificing tens of millions of dollars in revenue. U.S. companies' oil contracts are not just significant for their own potential profits, but also for American consumers' access to reasonably priced neighboring oil. With oil prices recovering access to more oil sources could become a matter of serious importance.

[Lily, Research Associate The council on hemispheric relations, Cuban Oil: Havana's Potential Geo-Political Bombshell, Washington Report on the Hemisphere29. 11. (Jun 18, 2009), Accessed online via Proquest] Wyo-MB Desperate to end its dependence on oil from the Middle East, United States' officials are certainly aware of Cuba's oil-producing potential. In its 2004 assessment, the U.S. Geological survey found that Cuba has five billion barrels of crude oil off its northern shores; Havana claims it has twenty billion. Five billion barrels would put Cuba on par with Colombia or Ecuador, while twenty billion barrels would make Cuba's oil capacity comparable to that of the United States' and place it among the top fifteen oil reserves in the world. Either way, Cuba's oil is attracting the attention of oil companies from around the globe. At the moment, Spain's Repsol, Brazil's Petrobras, and Norway's StatoilHydro are overseeing exploratory drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. India, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Venezuela also have signed deals with Cuba.¶ Havana has publicly stated that it welcomes American investment, but U.S. oil companies are incapable of proceeding without an official go-ahead from Washington. As Juan Fleites, vice president of Havana's state oil company Cubapetroleo, said, "We are open to U.S. oil companies interested in exploration, production and services." U.S. oil tycoons have shown definite interest, but Kurt Glaubitz, a spokesman for Chevron, explained, "Until trade barriers are removed, Chevron is unable to do business in Cuba. Companies like us would have to see a change in U.S. policy before we evaluate whether there's interest." The aforementioned foreign companies already have contracted for Cuba's twenty-one of the fifty-nine offshore drilling blocks, and another twenty- three blocks are currently under negotiation by other foreign nations, including Russia and China.¶ A U.S. Stake in Cuban Oil?¶ It is not too late for the U.S. to develop a stake in Cuba's nascent oil output. It takes between three and five years to develop oil reserves, and as of yet, there has been no major oil discovery off the island. Repsol struck oil in 2004, but not enough to sell commercially. Several other foreign firms are currently using seismic testing, which assesses the oil content of potential deposits, after which they will probably begin exploring in 2010 or 2011. The exploration manager for Cubapetroleo, Rafael Tenreyro Pérez, has called the incoming results from seismic testing in Cuba's reserves "very encouraging."¶ After lifting the embargo, U.S. oil companies could most likely work out an arrangement whereby the U.S. would exchange its reserves with nearby holdings of foreign companies, allowing the U.S. access to Cuba's oil even after all of the contracts had been signed. This could save transportation costs appreciably, because U.S. companies wouldn't have to go halfway around the world in search of oil refineries, with Cuba only 90 miles away.¶ U.S. oil equipment and service companies like Halliburton, however, already have lost the opportunity to build refineries, pipelines, and ports, sacrificing tens of millions of dollars in revenue. U.S. companies' oil contracts are not just significant for their own potential profits, but also for American consumers' access to reasonably priced neighboring oil. With oil prices recovering from a December low of $32.40 a barrel back to around $70 a barrel, access to more oil sources could become a matter of serious importance.

<h4>[C.]<strong> removing the embargo is key to accessing oil revenue in Cuba</h4><p>Fesler, 2009</p><p></strong>[Lily, Research Associate The council on hemispheric relations, Cuban Oil: Havana's Potential Geo-Political Bombshell, Washington Report on the H<u><strong>emisphere29. 11. (Jun 18, 2009), Accessed online via Proquest] Wyo-MB</p><p></u></strong>Desperate to end its dependence on oil from the Middle East, <u><strong>United States' officials are certainly aware of Cuba's oil-producing potenti</u></strong>al. In its 2004 assessment, the U.S. Geological survey found that <u><strong>Cuba has five billion barrels of crude oil off its northern shores; Havana claims it has twenty billion. Five billion barrels would put Cuba on par with Colombia or Ecuador, while twenty billion barrels would make Cuba's oil capacity comparable to that of the United States' and place it among the top fifteen oil reserves in the world</u></strong>. Either way, <u><strong>Cuba's oil is attracting the attention of oil companies from around the globe</u></strong>. At the moment, Spain's Repsol, Brazil's Petrobras, and Norway's StatoilHydro are overseeing exploratory drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. India, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Venezuela also have signed deals with Cuba.¶ <u><strong>Havana has publicly stated that it welcomes American investment, but U.S. oil companies are incapable of proceeding without an official go-ahead from Washington</u></strong>. As Juan Fleites, vice president of Havana's state oil company Cubapetroleo, said, "<u><strong>We are open to U.S. oil companies interested in exploration, production and services." U.S. oil tycoons have shown definite interest, </u></strong>but Kurt Glaubitz, a spokesman for Chevron, explained, "<u><strong>Until trade barriers are removed, Chevron is unable to do business in Cuba. Companies like us would have to see a change in U.S. policy before we evaluate whether there's interest</u></strong>." The aforementioned foreign companies already have contracted for Cuba's twenty-one of the fifty-nine offshore drilling blocks, and another twenty- three blocks are currently under negotiation by other foreign nations, including Russia and China.¶ A U.S. Stake in Cuban Oil?¶ <u><strong>It is not too late for the U.S. to develop a stake in Cuba's nascent oil output. It takes between three and five years to develop oil reserves, and as of yet, there has been no major oil discovery off the island.</u></strong> Repsol struck oil in 2004, but not enough to sell commercially. Several other foreign firms are currently using seismic testing, which assesses the oil content of potential deposits, after which they will probably begin exploring in 2010 or 2011. The exploration manager for Cubapetroleo, Rafael Tenreyro Pérez, has called the incoming results from seismic testing in Cuba's reserves "very encouraging."¶ <u><strong>After lifting the embargo, U.S. oil companies could most likely work out an arrangement whereby the U.S. would exchange its reserves with nearby holdings of foreign companies, allowing the U.S. access to Cuba's oil even after all of the contracts had been signed. This could save transportation costs appreciably, because U.S. companies wouldn't have to go halfway around the world in search of oil refineries</u></strong>, with Cuba only 90 miles away.¶ <u><strong>U.S. oil equipment and service companies like Halliburton, however, already have lost the opportunity to build refineries, pipelines, and ports, sacrificing tens of millions of dollars in revenue. U.S. companies' oil contracts are not just significant for their own potential profits, but also for American consumers' access to reasonably priced neighboring oil.</u></strong> <u><strong>With oil prices recovering </u></strong>from a December low of $32.40 a barrel back to around $70 a barrel, <u><strong>access to more oil sources could become a matter of serious importance.</p></u></strong>

Fesler, 2009

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Fesler, 2009 fulltext: [Lily, Research Associate The council on hemispheric relations, Cuban Oil: Havana's Potential Geo-Political Bombshell, Washington Report on the Hemisphere29. 11. (Jun 18, 2009), Accessed online via Proquest] Wyo-MB Desperate to end its dependence on oil from the Middle East, United States' officials are certainly aware of Cuba's oil-producing potential. In its 2004 assessment, the U.S. Geological survey found that Cuba has five billion barrels of crude oil off its northern shores; Havana claims it has twenty billion. Five billion barrels would put Cuba on par with Colombia or Ecuador, while twenty billion barrels would make Cuba's oil capacity comparable to that of the United States' and place it among the top fifteen oil reserves in the world. Either way, Cuba's oil is attracting the attention of oil companies from around the globe. At the moment, Spain's Repsol, Brazil's Petrobras, and Norway's StatoilHydro are overseeing exploratory drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. India, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Venezuela also have signed deals with Cuba.¶ Havana has publicly stated that it welcomes American investment, but U.S. oil companies are incapable of proceeding without an official go-ahead from Washington. As Juan Fleites, vice president of Havana's state oil company Cubapetroleo, said, "We are open to U.S. oil companies interested in exploration, production and services." U.S. oil tycoons have shown definite interest, but Kurt Glaubitz, a spokesman for Chevron, explained, "Until trade barriers are removed, Chevron is unable to do business in Cuba. Companies like us would have to see a change in U.S. policy before we evaluate whether there's interest." The aforementioned foreign companies already have contracted for Cuba's twenty-one of the fifty-nine offshore drilling blocks, and another twenty- three blocks are currently under negotiation by other foreign nations, including Russia and China.¶ A U.S. Stake in Cuban Oil?¶ It is not too late for the U.S. to develop a stake in Cuba's nascent oil output. It takes between three and five years to develop oil reserves, and as of yet, there has been no major oil discovery off the island. Repsol struck oil in 2004, but not enough to sell commercially. Several other foreign firms are currently using seismic testing, which assesses the oil content of potential deposits, after which they will probably begin exploring in 2010 or 2011. The exploration manager for Cubapetroleo, Rafael Tenreyro Pérez, has called the incoming results from seismic testing in Cuba's reserves "very encouraging."¶ After lifting the embargo, U.S. oil companies could most likely work out an arrangement whereby the U.S. would exchange its reserves with nearby holdings of foreign companies, allowing the U.S. access to Cuba's oil even after all of the contracts had been signed. This could save transportation costs appreciably, because U.S. companies wouldn't have to go halfway around the world in search of oil refineries, with Cuba only 90 miles away.¶ U.S. oil equipment and service companies like Halliburton, however, already have lost the opportunity to build refineries, pipelines, and ports, sacrificing tens of millions of dollars in revenue. U.S. companies' oil contracts are not just significant for their own potential profits, but also for American consumers' access to reasonably priced neighboring oil. With oil prices recovering from a December low of $32.40 a barrel back to around $70 a barrel, access to more oil sources could become a matter of serious importance. [/INST] <h4>[C.]<strong> removing the embargo is key to accessing oil revenue in Cuba</h4><p>Fesler, 2009</p><p></strong>[Lily, Research Associate The council on hemispheric relations, Cuban Oil: Havana's Potential Geo-Political Bombshell, Washington Report on the H<u><strong>emisphere29. 11. (Jun 18, 2009), Accessed online via Proquest] Wyo-MB</p><p></u></strong>Desperate to end its dependence on oil from the Middle East, <u><strong>United States' officials are certainly aware of Cuba's oil-producing potenti</u></strong>al. In its 2004 assessment, the U.S. Geological survey found that <u><strong>Cuba has five billion barrels of crude oil off its northern shores; Havana claims it has twenty billion. Five billion barrels would put Cuba on par with Colombia or Ecuador, while twenty billion barrels would make Cuba's oil capacity comparable to that of the United States' and place it among the top fifteen oil reserves in the world</u></strong>. Either way, <u><strong>Cuba's oil is attracting the attention of oil companies from around the globe</u></strong>. At the moment, Spain's Repsol, Brazil's Petrobras, and Norway's StatoilHydro are overseeing exploratory drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. India, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Venezuela also have signed deals with Cuba.¶ <u><strong>Havana has publicly stated that it welcomes American investment, but U.S. oil companies are incapable of proceeding without an official go-ahead from Washington</u></strong>. As Juan Fleites, vice president of Havana's state oil company Cubapetroleo, said, "<u><strong>We are open to U.S. oil companies interested in exploration, production and services." U.S. oil tycoons have shown definite interest, </u></strong>but Kurt Glaubitz, a spokesman for Chevron, explained, "<u><strong>Until trade barriers are removed, Chevron is unable to do business in Cuba. Companies like us would have to see a change in U.S. policy before we evaluate whether there's interest</u></strong>." The aforementioned foreign companies already have contracted for Cuba's twenty-one of the fifty-nine offshore drilling blocks, and another twenty- three blocks are currently under negotiation by other foreign nations, including Russia and China.¶ A U.S. Stake in Cuban Oil?¶ <u><strong>It is not too late for the U.S. to develop a stake in Cuba's nascent oil output. It takes between three and five years to develop oil reserves, and as of yet, there has been no major oil discovery off the island.</u></strong> Repsol struck oil in 2004, but not enough to sell commercially. Several other foreign firms are currently using seismic testing, which assesses the oil content of potential deposits, after which they will probably begin exploring in 2010 or 2011. The exploration manager for Cubapetroleo, Rafael Tenreyro Pérez, has called the incoming results from seismic testing in Cuba's reserves "very encouraging."¶ <u><strong>After lifting the embargo, U.S. oil companies could most likely work out an arrangement whereby the U.S. would exchange its reserves with nearby holdings of foreign companies, allowing the U.S. access to Cuba's oil even after all of the contracts had been signed. This could save transportation costs appreciably, because U.S. companies wouldn't have to go halfway around the world in search of oil refineries</u></strong>, with Cuba only 90 miles away.¶ <u><strong>U.S. oil equipment and service companies like Halliburton, however, already have lost the opportunity to build refineries, pipelines, and ports, sacrificing tens of millions of dollars in revenue. U.S. companies' oil contracts are not just significant for their own potential profits, but also for American consumers' access to reasonably priced neighboring oil.</u></strong> <u><strong>With oil prices recovering </u></strong>from a December low of $32.40 a barrel back to around $70 a barrel, <u><strong>access to more oil sources could become a matter of serious importance.</p></u></strong> </s>

Iran-Venezuela ties cause prolif and Latin American instability

as Chavez cultivates a strong alliance with Iran analysts are wondering: could there be a nuclear arms race in Latin America? regional tensions are bubbling Latin America is today a nuclear free zone Venezuela and Iran are working to build a nuclear village in Venezuela the two countries are cooperating in matters related to uranium extraction Venezuela could become home to an Iranian nuclear arsenal bomb could be a short cut to earning the respect of political foes and wielding enough power to intimidate regional or world players The fear of a nuclear Venezuela is based almost entirely on the close and continuing relationship between Venezuela and Iran If Western efforts fail Venezuela can serve as both a source of instability in Latin America, and a strategic threat to the U S with nuclear weapons in America's back yard

as Chavez cultivates a strong alliance with Iran analysts are wondering: could there be a nuclear arms race in Latin America? regional tensions are bubbling The fear of a nuclear Venezuela is based almost entirely on the close and continuing relationship between Venezuela and Iran If Western efforts fail, Venezuela can serve as both a source of instability in Latin America, and a strategic threat to the U S with nuclear weapons in America's back yard

Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez has an iron grip on his country, and has attempted aggressively to expand his reach into neighboring Latin American nations. His open hostility toward Colombia and other Western allies has sparked an arms race in a region known for internal instability, but that rarely engages in hostilities between nations. Now, as Chavez cultivates a strong alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which continues to inch closer to achieving a nuclear weapon, analysts are wondering: could there be a nuclear arms race in Latin America?¶ Latin America in Context¶ While Latin America has been a breeding ground of tumult in the last century, most of it was the result of internal strife and inner social and political conflict. Conflicts between Latin American nations have been rare. Exceptions include the war between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969, tensions between Chile and Argentina in 1978, and fighting between Peru and Ecuador in 1995. These minor conflicts aside, Latin America has avoided regional conflict primarily because the larger powers—Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico—do not claim hegemony over their neighbors.¶ The Rise of Chavez¶ With the rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, however, regional tensions are bubbling to the surface. Since 1999, Chavez has been gradually undermining his country's democratic system by imposing various constitutional "reforms" that wrest control of the legislative branch, the courts, and the electoral council. Moreover, he has moved to pass educational laws aimed at indoctrinating students with Chavez's own "Bolivarian doctrine." Chavez, who has used the instruments of government to harass unions and human rights advocates, and to inhibit free speech and voting rights, is fast converting Venezuela into a totalitarian state under his absolute control.¶ Chavez is now working to increase his power beyond Venezuela. In 2007, he presented a road map detailing his goal of consolidating his leadership over other countries willing to accept his social and political recipe in the "South American community." Indeed, Chavez seeks a hegemonic block of countries in Latin America under his control that could challenge the United States, a country Chavez rejects as imperialist and standing in the way of true 21st century, revolutionary socialism.¶ To this end, Chavez leverages his country's multi-billion dollar oil revenue to interfere in other countries' affairs. He mostly supports and funds Latin American electoral candidates that share radical socialist views. This strategy has been a successful one for Chavez in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. Dependent upon Chavez's oil-based largesse, the leaders of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua adopted Chavez's ideology, and have sought to implement measures aimed at exercising tighter control over their populations.¶ The summer 2009 crisis in Honduras, for example, was the direct result of meddling by Chavez. The Venezuelan strongman succeeded in influencing President Mel Zelaya to seek an indefinite term in office. This would have provided Zelaya with virtually unlimited power, and in the process strengthened Chavez's bid for regional hegemony.¶ In the countries where his favorite candidates have not been successful, Chavez aggressively tries to influence the opposition. To this end, Chavez funded several violent rebellions in Peru, as well as Colombia, a country he views as a U.S. proxy and an archenemy of his revolution. Indeed, Chavez established a strong alliance with the Colombian guerillas known as the Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and even facilitated the activities of the Colombian drug cartels by allowing Venezuelan territory to be used by these groups. In addition to these destabilizing activities, Chavez also frequently speaks publicly about the possibility of war against Colombia, and tells his military to prepare for such an occurrence.¶ The Arming of Venezuela¶ Currently, the Venezuelan army is no match for the Colombian army, which is far superior in numbers and training. Indeed, Venezuela would likely lose a number of battles against other Latin American armies. For this reason, Venezuela recently secured a $2.2 billion line of credit from Russia for new arms purchases. According to their agreement, Venezuela will buy 92 T-72 battle tanks, Smerch rocket artillery systems, and the Antey 2500 anti-ballistic missile system. In recent years, Venezuela has also acquired two-dozen Su-30MK2 fighter jets and received a license to manufacture AK-103 assault rifles.¶ The arming of Venezuela has not gone unnoticed. Analysts of Latin American affairs are now increasingly wary of Chavez's build-up, particularly in light of the Venezuelan leader's close relationship with Iran, a budding nuclear power. Indeed, it would come as no surprise if Chavez sought a nuclear weapon. After all, he is a leader who seeks broader power in the region.¶ Does Chavez Want Nukes?¶ Latin America is today a nuclear free zone. In 1967, 24 Latin American countries signed a multilateral agreement banning the manufacture, acquisition, testing, deployment, or use of nuclear weapons in Latin America (The Treaty of Tlatelolco). The need for the treaty became clear after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.¶ For a while, Brazil and Argentina maintained an ambiguous posture towards the treaty; they supported the ban on weapons, but sought to enhance their civilian nuclear programs. Since 1990, however, both countries have become parties to a non-proliferation treaty and pledged full commitment to a nuclear weapons free zone. Both countries have allowed mutual nuclear inspections. Observers have even highlighted the Brazil-Argentina nuclear agreement as an ideal model to be applied worldwide, particularly for India and Pakistan.¶ In 2005, Chavez announced his desire to develop a civil nuclear program. He reportedly raised the possibility of gaining assistance from Argentina and Brazil, since both nations still maintained facilities. When Chavez further called for cooperation between these countries and Iran, both governments quietly refused.¶ Venezuela and Iran¶ During the visit of Iranian President Mohammed Khatami to Caracas in March 2005, Venezuela and Iran signed an agreement of commercial and technological cooperation. Chavez took the opportunity to publicly defend Iran's right to produce atomic energy, and continue research in the area of nuclear development. Chavez soon issued several other statements to this effect, thereby becoming one of the most outspoken supporters of the Iranian nuclear program.¶ In March 2006, the two countries established a $200 million development fund and signed bilateral deals to build homes and exploit petroleum. Venezuelan opposition groups soon warned that the deal also might have involved the transfer of uranium from Iran to Venezuela. Israel's external security apparatus, the Mossad, then provided the exact locations of uranium production in Venezuela. The existence of Venezuelan facilities soon was corroborated by a Venezuelan nuclear expert, an Israeli official, and in September 2009, the Venezuelan minister of mining, Rodolfo Sanz.¶ Chavez, for his part, seems content to publicize the existence of a Venezuelan nuclear program. He declared that Venezuela and Iran are working to build a nuclear village in Venezuela, which "will serve peaceful purposes." Subsequent reports indicate that the two countries are cooperating in matters related to uranium extraction. Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Roger Noriega also suggests that Venezuela could become home to an Iranian nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Iran and Venezuela signed an agreement on military-related matters in November 2008, but the content of the agreement remains largely unknown.¶ No Nukes… Yet¶ The acquisition of nuclear weapons is a reasonable next step for Chavez. A nuclear weapon could provide him with the respect, fear, and deterrence he seeks to carry out his imperial aspirations. Indeed, the bomb could be a short cut to earning the respect of political foes and wielding enough power to intimidate regional or world players.¶ Perhaps with this in mind, Venezuela signed an agreement with Russia in September 2008 to build a nuclear power plant. The Russian company in charge of the project would be Atomstroyexport, the same firm assisting Iran with its Bushehr nuclear plant.¶ Still, it must be stated clearly that there is no credible evidence to indicate that Venezuela has even the most basic infrastructure needed for a nuclear program. As one senior advisor to Brazil's foreign ministry stated in 2005, "Venezuela cannot fulfill these [nuclear] ambitions since it has no nuclear infrastructure and no nuclear engineer." This still holds true today.¶ The fear of a nuclear Venezuela is based almost entirely on the close and continuing relationship between Venezuela and Iran. Venezuela provides assistance to Iran in skirting financial sanctions. For example, Chavez has agreed to sell refined petroleum to Iran to help the Mullahs offset the potential damage of Western sanctions against its oil supply chain. Chavez also supports Iran through diplomatic rants against Israel and the United States, and serves as Iran's top source of rhetorical support in Latin America.¶ Iran is appreciative of Chavez, who has yet to cash in on the good will he has created. The fear is that the Venezuelan leader might ask his friends in Tehran to not just help him create a nuclear program, but rather to simply supply him with weapons.¶ The Threat in Perspective¶ The White House, to date, is less threatened by Venezuela. Dan Restrepo, Senior Director for Latin America at the National Security Council, stated in a recent interview with El Nuevo Herald that he does not see Venezuela as a challenge to U.S. national security, stating that the days of the "hot and cold war" are over. Similarly, the Organization of American States (OAS) has largely ignored Chavez's bellicose public statements and foreign policies.¶ Iran, one could argue further, does not yet have an operational nuclear weapons program. If Western diplomacy and sanctions are effective, Tehran will not be able to provide Chavez with the weapons he seeks.¶ If, however, Western efforts fail, and Iran becomes a nuclear power, Venezuela can serve as both a source of instability in Latin America, and a strategic threat to the United States, with nuclear weapons in America's back yard. As such, as the Iranian crisis reaches it peak, the activities of Hugo Chavez must be monitored closely.

<h4>Iran-Venezuela ties cause prolif and Latin American instability</h4><p><strong>Fleischman ’09</strong> [Luis Fleischman is an adjunct professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University, and an advisor to the Menges Hemispheric Security Project at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C., “The Nuclearization of Latin America?” inFocus Quarterly, Volume 3, Number 4, Winter 2009, <u>http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/1528/nuclearization-of-latin-america</u>]</p><p>Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez has an iron grip on his country, and has attempted aggressively to expand his reach into neighboring Latin American nations. His open hostility toward Colombia and other Western allies has sparked an arms race in a region known for internal instability, but that rarely engages in hostilities between nations. Now, <u><mark>as Chavez cultivates a strong alliance with</u></mark> the Islamic Republic of <u><mark>Iran</u></mark>, which continues to inch closer to achieving a nuclear weapon, <u><mark>analysts are wondering: could there be a nuclear arms race in Latin America?</u></mark>¶ Latin America in Context¶ While Latin America has been a breeding ground of tumult in the last century, most of it was the result of internal strife and inner social and political conflict. Conflicts between Latin American nations have been rare. Exceptions include the war between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969, tensions between Chile and Argentina in 1978, and fighting between Peru and Ecuador in 1995. These minor conflicts aside, Latin America has avoided regional conflict primarily because the larger powers—Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico—do not claim hegemony over their neighbors.¶ The Rise of Chavez¶ With the rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, however, <u><mark>regional tensions are bubbling</u></mark> to the surface. Since 1999, Chavez has been gradually undermining his country's democratic system by imposing various constitutional "reforms" that wrest control of the legislative branch, the courts, and the electoral council. Moreover, he has moved to pass educational laws aimed at indoctrinating students with Chavez's own "Bolivarian doctrine." Chavez, who has used the instruments of government to harass unions and human rights advocates, and to inhibit free speech and voting rights, is fast converting Venezuela into a totalitarian state under his absolute control.¶ Chavez is now working to increase his power beyond Venezuela. In 2007, he presented a road map detailing his goal of consolidating his leadership over other countries willing to accept his social and political recipe in the "South American community." Indeed, Chavez seeks a hegemonic block of countries in Latin America under his control that could challenge the United States, a country Chavez rejects as imperialist and standing in the way of true 21st century, revolutionary socialism.¶ To this end, Chavez leverages his country's multi-billion dollar oil revenue to interfere in other countries' affairs. He mostly supports and funds Latin American electoral candidates that share radical socialist views. This strategy has been a successful one for Chavez in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. Dependent upon Chavez's oil-based largesse, the leaders of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua adopted Chavez's ideology, and have sought to implement measures aimed at exercising tighter control over their populations.¶ The summer 2009 crisis in Honduras, for example, was the direct result of meddling by Chavez. The Venezuelan strongman succeeded in influencing President Mel Zelaya to seek an indefinite term in office. This would have provided Zelaya with virtually unlimited power, and in the process strengthened Chavez's bid for regional hegemony.¶ In the countries where his favorite candidates have not been successful, Chavez aggressively tries to influence the opposition. To this end, Chavez funded several violent rebellions in Peru, as well as Colombia, a country he views as a U.S. proxy and an archenemy of his revolution. Indeed, Chavez established a strong alliance with the Colombian guerillas known as the Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and even facilitated the activities of the Colombian drug cartels by allowing Venezuelan territory to be used by these groups. In addition to these destabilizing activities, Chavez also frequently speaks publicly about the possibility of war against Colombia, and tells his military to prepare for such an occurrence.¶ The Arming of Venezuela¶ Currently, the Venezuelan army is no match for the Colombian army, which is far superior in numbers and training. Indeed, Venezuela would likely lose a number of battles against other Latin American armies. For this reason, Venezuela recently secured a $2.2 billion line of credit from Russia for new arms purchases. According to their agreement, Venezuela will buy 92 T-72 battle tanks, Smerch rocket artillery systems, and the Antey 2500 anti-ballistic missile system. In recent years, Venezuela has also acquired two-dozen Su-30MK2 fighter jets and received a license to manufacture AK-103 assault rifles.¶ The arming of Venezuela has not gone unnoticed. Analysts of Latin American affairs are now increasingly wary of Chavez's build-up, particularly in light of the Venezuelan leader's close relationship with Iran, a budding nuclear power. Indeed, it would come as no surprise if Chavez sought a nuclear weapon. After all, he is a leader who seeks broader power in the region.¶ Does Chavez Want Nukes?¶ <u>Latin America is today a nuclear free zone</u>. In 1967, 24 Latin American countries signed a multilateral agreement banning the manufacture, acquisition, testing, deployment, or use of nuclear weapons in Latin America (The Treaty of Tlatelolco). The need for the treaty became clear after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.¶ For a while, Brazil and Argentina maintained an ambiguous posture towards the treaty; they supported the ban on weapons, but sought to enhance their civilian nuclear programs. Since 1990, however, both countries have become parties to a non-proliferation treaty and pledged full commitment to a nuclear weapons free zone. Both countries have allowed mutual nuclear inspections. Observers have even highlighted the Brazil-Argentina nuclear agreement as an ideal model to be applied worldwide, particularly for India and Pakistan.¶ In 2005, Chavez announced his desire to develop a civil nuclear program. He reportedly raised the possibility of gaining assistance from Argentina and Brazil, since both nations still maintained facilities. When Chavez further called for cooperation between these countries and Iran, both governments quietly refused.¶ Venezuela and Iran¶ During the visit of Iranian President Mohammed Khatami to Caracas in March 2005, Venezuela and Iran signed an agreement of commercial and technological cooperation. Chavez took the opportunity to publicly defend Iran's right to produce atomic energy, and continue research in the area of nuclear development. Chavez soon issued several other statements to this effect, thereby becoming one of the most outspoken supporters of the Iranian nuclear program.¶ In March 2006, the two countries established a $200 million development fund and signed bilateral deals to build homes and exploit petroleum. Venezuelan opposition groups soon warned that the deal also might have involved the transfer of uranium from Iran to Venezuela. Israel's external security apparatus, the Mossad, then provided the exact locations of uranium production in Venezuela. The existence of Venezuelan facilities soon was corroborated by a Venezuelan nuclear expert, an Israeli official, and in September 2009, the Venezuelan minister of mining, Rodolfo Sanz.¶ Chavez, for his part, seems content to publicize the existence of a Venezuelan nuclear program. He declared that <u>Venezuela and Iran are working to build a nuclear village in Venezuela</u>, which "will serve peaceful purposes." Subsequent reports indicate that <u>the two countries are cooperating in matters related to uranium extraction</u>. Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Roger Noriega also suggests that <u>Venezuela could become home to an Iranian nuclear arsenal</u>. Indeed, Iran and Venezuela signed an agreement on military-related matters in November 2008, but the content of the agreement remains largely unknown.¶ No Nukes… Yet¶ The acquisition of nuclear weapons is a reasonable next step for Chavez. A nuclear weapon could provide him with the respect, fear, and deterrence he seeks to carry out his imperial aspirations. Indeed, the <u>bomb could be a short cut to earning the respect of political foes and wielding enough power to intimidate regional or world players</u>.¶ Perhaps with this in mind, Venezuela signed an agreement with Russia in September 2008 to build a nuclear power plant. The Russian company in charge of the project would be Atomstroyexport, the same firm assisting Iran with its Bushehr nuclear plant.¶ Still, it must be stated clearly that there is no credible evidence to indicate that Venezuela has even the most basic infrastructure needed for a nuclear program. As one senior advisor to Brazil's foreign ministry stated in 2005, "Venezuela cannot fulfill these [nuclear] ambitions since it has no nuclear infrastructure and no nuclear engineer." This still holds true today.¶ <u><mark>The fear of a nuclear Venezuela is based almost entirely on the close and continuing relationship between Venezuela and Iran</u></mark>. Venezuela provides assistance to Iran in skirting financial sanctions. For example, Chavez has agreed to sell refined petroleum to Iran to help the Mullahs offset the potential damage of Western sanctions against its oil supply chain. Chavez also supports Iran through diplomatic rants against Israel and the United States, and serves as Iran's top source of rhetorical support in Latin America.¶ Iran is appreciative of Chavez, who has yet to cash in on the good will he has created. The fear is that the Venezuelan leader might ask his friends in Tehran to not just help him create a nuclear program, but rather to simply supply him with weapons.¶ The Threat in Perspective¶ The White House, to date, is less threatened by Venezuela. Dan Restrepo, Senior Director for Latin America at the National Security Council, stated in a recent interview with El Nuevo Herald that he does not see Venezuela as a challenge to U.S. national security, stating that the days of the "hot and cold war" are over. Similarly, the Organization of American States (OAS) has largely ignored Chavez's bellicose public statements and foreign policies.¶ Iran, one could argue further, does not yet have an operational nuclear weapons program. If Western diplomacy and sanctions are effective, Tehran will not be able to provide Chavez with the weapons he seeks.¶ <u><mark>If</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>Western efforts fail</u>,</mark> and Iran becomes a nuclear power, <u><mark>Venezuela can serve as both a source of instability in Latin America, and a strategic threat to the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates, <u><mark>with nuclear weapons in America's back yard</u></mark>. As such, as the Iranian crisis reaches it peak, the activities of Hugo Chavez must be monitored closely.</p>

Fleischman ’09 [Luis Fleischman is an adjunct professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University, and an advisor to the Menges Hemispheric Security Project at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C., “The Nuclearization of Latin America?” inFocus Quarterly, Volume 3, Number 4, Winter 2009, http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/1528/nuclearization-of-latin-america]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Fleischman ’09 [Luis Fleischman is an adjunct professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University, and an advisor to the Menges Hemispheric Security Project at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C., “The Nuclearization of Latin America?” inFocus Quarterly, Volume 3, Number 4, Winter 2009, http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/1528/nuclearization-of-latin-america] fulltext: Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez has an iron grip on his country, and has attempted aggressively to expand his reach into neighboring Latin American nations. His open hostility toward Colombia and other Western allies has sparked an arms race in a region known for internal instability, but that rarely engages in hostilities between nations. Now, as Chavez cultivates a strong alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which continues to inch closer to achieving a nuclear weapon, analysts are wondering: could there be a nuclear arms race in Latin America?¶ Latin America in Context¶ While Latin America has been a breeding ground of tumult in the last century, most of it was the result of internal strife and inner social and political conflict. Conflicts between Latin American nations have been rare. Exceptions include the war between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969, tensions between Chile and Argentina in 1978, and fighting between Peru and Ecuador in 1995. These minor conflicts aside, Latin America has avoided regional conflict primarily because the larger powers—Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico—do not claim hegemony over their neighbors.¶ The Rise of Chavez¶ With the rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, however, regional tensions are bubbling to the surface. Since 1999, Chavez has been gradually undermining his country's democratic system by imposing various constitutional "reforms" that wrest control of the legislative branch, the courts, and the electoral council. Moreover, he has moved to pass educational laws aimed at indoctrinating students with Chavez's own "Bolivarian doctrine." Chavez, who has used the instruments of government to harass unions and human rights advocates, and to inhibit free speech and voting rights, is fast converting Venezuela into a totalitarian state under his absolute control.¶ Chavez is now working to increase his power beyond Venezuela. In 2007, he presented a road map detailing his goal of consolidating his leadership over other countries willing to accept his social and political recipe in the "South American community." Indeed, Chavez seeks a hegemonic block of countries in Latin America under his control that could challenge the United States, a country Chavez rejects as imperialist and standing in the way of true 21st century, revolutionary socialism.¶ To this end, Chavez leverages his country's multi-billion dollar oil revenue to interfere in other countries' affairs. He mostly supports and funds Latin American electoral candidates that share radical socialist views. This strategy has been a successful one for Chavez in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. Dependent upon Chavez's oil-based largesse, the leaders of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua adopted Chavez's ideology, and have sought to implement measures aimed at exercising tighter control over their populations.¶ The summer 2009 crisis in Honduras, for example, was the direct result of meddling by Chavez. The Venezuelan strongman succeeded in influencing President Mel Zelaya to seek an indefinite term in office. This would have provided Zelaya with virtually unlimited power, and in the process strengthened Chavez's bid for regional hegemony.¶ In the countries where his favorite candidates have not been successful, Chavez aggressively tries to influence the opposition. To this end, Chavez funded several violent rebellions in Peru, as well as Colombia, a country he views as a U.S. proxy and an archenemy of his revolution. Indeed, Chavez established a strong alliance with the Colombian guerillas known as the Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and even facilitated the activities of the Colombian drug cartels by allowing Venezuelan territory to be used by these groups. In addition to these destabilizing activities, Chavez also frequently speaks publicly about the possibility of war against Colombia, and tells his military to prepare for such an occurrence.¶ The Arming of Venezuela¶ Currently, the Venezuelan army is no match for the Colombian army, which is far superior in numbers and training. Indeed, Venezuela would likely lose a number of battles against other Latin American armies. For this reason, Venezuela recently secured a $2.2 billion line of credit from Russia for new arms purchases. According to their agreement, Venezuela will buy 92 T-72 battle tanks, Smerch rocket artillery systems, and the Antey 2500 anti-ballistic missile system. In recent years, Venezuela has also acquired two-dozen Su-30MK2 fighter jets and received a license to manufacture AK-103 assault rifles.¶ The arming of Venezuela has not gone unnoticed. Analysts of Latin American affairs are now increasingly wary of Chavez's build-up, particularly in light of the Venezuelan leader's close relationship with Iran, a budding nuclear power. Indeed, it would come as no surprise if Chavez sought a nuclear weapon. After all, he is a leader who seeks broader power in the region.¶ Does Chavez Want Nukes?¶ Latin America is today a nuclear free zone. In 1967, 24 Latin American countries signed a multilateral agreement banning the manufacture, acquisition, testing, deployment, or use of nuclear weapons in Latin America (The Treaty of Tlatelolco). The need for the treaty became clear after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.¶ For a while, Brazil and Argentina maintained an ambiguous posture towards the treaty; they supported the ban on weapons, but sought to enhance their civilian nuclear programs. Since 1990, however, both countries have become parties to a non-proliferation treaty and pledged full commitment to a nuclear weapons free zone. Both countries have allowed mutual nuclear inspections. Observers have even highlighted the Brazil-Argentina nuclear agreement as an ideal model to be applied worldwide, particularly for India and Pakistan.¶ In 2005, Chavez announced his desire to develop a civil nuclear program. He reportedly raised the possibility of gaining assistance from Argentina and Brazil, since both nations still maintained facilities. When Chavez further called for cooperation between these countries and Iran, both governments quietly refused.¶ Venezuela and Iran¶ During the visit of Iranian President Mohammed Khatami to Caracas in March 2005, Venezuela and Iran signed an agreement of commercial and technological cooperation. Chavez took the opportunity to publicly defend Iran's right to produce atomic energy, and continue research in the area of nuclear development. Chavez soon issued several other statements to this effect, thereby becoming one of the most outspoken supporters of the Iranian nuclear program.¶ In March 2006, the two countries established a $200 million development fund and signed bilateral deals to build homes and exploit petroleum. Venezuelan opposition groups soon warned that the deal also might have involved the transfer of uranium from Iran to Venezuela. Israel's external security apparatus, the Mossad, then provided the exact locations of uranium production in Venezuela. The existence of Venezuelan facilities soon was corroborated by a Venezuelan nuclear expert, an Israeli official, and in September 2009, the Venezuelan minister of mining, Rodolfo Sanz.¶ Chavez, for his part, seems content to publicize the existence of a Venezuelan nuclear program. He declared that Venezuela and Iran are working to build a nuclear village in Venezuela, which "will serve peaceful purposes." Subsequent reports indicate that the two countries are cooperating in matters related to uranium extraction. Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Roger Noriega also suggests that Venezuela could become home to an Iranian nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Iran and Venezuela signed an agreement on military-related matters in November 2008, but the content of the agreement remains largely unknown.¶ No Nukes… Yet¶ The acquisition of nuclear weapons is a reasonable next step for Chavez. A nuclear weapon could provide him with the respect, fear, and deterrence he seeks to carry out his imperial aspirations. Indeed, the bomb could be a short cut to earning the respect of political foes and wielding enough power to intimidate regional or world players.¶ Perhaps with this in mind, Venezuela signed an agreement with Russia in September 2008 to build a nuclear power plant. The Russian company in charge of the project would be Atomstroyexport, the same firm assisting Iran with its Bushehr nuclear plant.¶ Still, it must be stated clearly that there is no credible evidence to indicate that Venezuela has even the most basic infrastructure needed for a nuclear program. As one senior advisor to Brazil's foreign ministry stated in 2005, "Venezuela cannot fulfill these [nuclear] ambitions since it has no nuclear infrastructure and no nuclear engineer." This still holds true today.¶ The fear of a nuclear Venezuela is based almost entirely on the close and continuing relationship between Venezuela and Iran. Venezuela provides assistance to Iran in skirting financial sanctions. For example, Chavez has agreed to sell refined petroleum to Iran to help the Mullahs offset the potential damage of Western sanctions against its oil supply chain. Chavez also supports Iran through diplomatic rants against Israel and the United States, and serves as Iran's top source of rhetorical support in Latin America.¶ Iran is appreciative of Chavez, who has yet to cash in on the good will he has created. The fear is that the Venezuelan leader might ask his friends in Tehran to not just help him create a nuclear program, but rather to simply supply him with weapons.¶ The Threat in Perspective¶ The White House, to date, is less threatened by Venezuela. Dan Restrepo, Senior Director for Latin America at the National Security Council, stated in a recent interview with El Nuevo Herald that he does not see Venezuela as a challenge to U.S. national security, stating that the days of the "hot and cold war" are over. Similarly, the Organization of American States (OAS) has largely ignored Chavez's bellicose public statements and foreign policies.¶ Iran, one could argue further, does not yet have an operational nuclear weapons program. If Western diplomacy and sanctions are effective, Tehran will not be able to provide Chavez with the weapons he seeks.¶ If, however, Western efforts fail, and Iran becomes a nuclear power, Venezuela can serve as both a source of instability in Latin America, and a strategic threat to the United States, with nuclear weapons in America's back yard. As such, as the Iranian crisis reaches it peak, the activities of Hugo Chavez must be monitored closely. [/INST] <h4>Iran-Venezuela ties cause prolif and Latin American instability</h4><p><strong>Fleischman ’09</strong> [Luis Fleischman is an adjunct professor of Sociology and Political Science at Florida Atlantic University, and an advisor to the Menges Hemispheric Security Project at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C., “The Nuclearization of Latin America?” inFocus Quarterly, Volume 3, Number 4, Winter 2009, <u>http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/1528/nuclearization-of-latin-america</u>]</p><p>Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez has an iron grip on his country, and has attempted aggressively to expand his reach into neighboring Latin American nations. His open hostility toward Colombia and other Western allies has sparked an arms race in a region known for internal instability, but that rarely engages in hostilities between nations. Now, <u><mark>as Chavez cultivates a strong alliance with</u></mark> the Islamic Republic of <u><mark>Iran</u></mark>, which continues to inch closer to achieving a nuclear weapon, <u><mark>analysts are wondering: could there be a nuclear arms race in Latin America?</u></mark>¶ Latin America in Context¶ While Latin America has been a breeding ground of tumult in the last century, most of it was the result of internal strife and inner social and political conflict. Conflicts between Latin American nations have been rare. Exceptions include the war between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969, tensions between Chile and Argentina in 1978, and fighting between Peru and Ecuador in 1995. These minor conflicts aside, Latin America has avoided regional conflict primarily because the larger powers—Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico—do not claim hegemony over their neighbors.¶ The Rise of Chavez¶ With the rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, however, <u><mark>regional tensions are bubbling</u></mark> to the surface. Since 1999, Chavez has been gradually undermining his country's democratic system by imposing various constitutional "reforms" that wrest control of the legislative branch, the courts, and the electoral council. Moreover, he has moved to pass educational laws aimed at indoctrinating students with Chavez's own "Bolivarian doctrine." Chavez, who has used the instruments of government to harass unions and human rights advocates, and to inhibit free speech and voting rights, is fast converting Venezuela into a totalitarian state under his absolute control.¶ Chavez is now working to increase his power beyond Venezuela. In 2007, he presented a road map detailing his goal of consolidating his leadership over other countries willing to accept his social and political recipe in the "South American community." Indeed, Chavez seeks a hegemonic block of countries in Latin America under his control that could challenge the United States, a country Chavez rejects as imperialist and standing in the way of true 21st century, revolutionary socialism.¶ To this end, Chavez leverages his country's multi-billion dollar oil revenue to interfere in other countries' affairs. He mostly supports and funds Latin American electoral candidates that share radical socialist views. This strategy has been a successful one for Chavez in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. Dependent upon Chavez's oil-based largesse, the leaders of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua adopted Chavez's ideology, and have sought to implement measures aimed at exercising tighter control over their populations.¶ The summer 2009 crisis in Honduras, for example, was the direct result of meddling by Chavez. The Venezuelan strongman succeeded in influencing President Mel Zelaya to seek an indefinite term in office. This would have provided Zelaya with virtually unlimited power, and in the process strengthened Chavez's bid for regional hegemony.¶ In the countries where his favorite candidates have not been successful, Chavez aggressively tries to influence the opposition. To this end, Chavez funded several violent rebellions in Peru, as well as Colombia, a country he views as a U.S. proxy and an archenemy of his revolution. Indeed, Chavez established a strong alliance with the Colombian guerillas known as the Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and even facilitated the activities of the Colombian drug cartels by allowing Venezuelan territory to be used by these groups. In addition to these destabilizing activities, Chavez also frequently speaks publicly about the possibility of war against Colombia, and tells his military to prepare for such an occurrence.¶ The Arming of Venezuela¶ Currently, the Venezuelan army is no match for the Colombian army, which is far superior in numbers and training. Indeed, Venezuela would likely lose a number of battles against other Latin American armies. For this reason, Venezuela recently secured a $2.2 billion line of credit from Russia for new arms purchases. According to their agreement, Venezuela will buy 92 T-72 battle tanks, Smerch rocket artillery systems, and the Antey 2500 anti-ballistic missile system. In recent years, Venezuela has also acquired two-dozen Su-30MK2 fighter jets and received a license to manufacture AK-103 assault rifles.¶ The arming of Venezuela has not gone unnoticed. Analysts of Latin American affairs are now increasingly wary of Chavez's build-up, particularly in light of the Venezuelan leader's close relationship with Iran, a budding nuclear power. Indeed, it would come as no surprise if Chavez sought a nuclear weapon. After all, he is a leader who seeks broader power in the region.¶ Does Chavez Want Nukes?¶ <u>Latin America is today a nuclear free zone</u>. In 1967, 24 Latin American countries signed a multilateral agreement banning the manufacture, acquisition, testing, deployment, or use of nuclear weapons in Latin America (The Treaty of Tlatelolco). The need for the treaty became clear after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.¶ For a while, Brazil and Argentina maintained an ambiguous posture towards the treaty; they supported the ban on weapons, but sought to enhance their civilian nuclear programs. Since 1990, however, both countries have become parties to a non-proliferation treaty and pledged full commitment to a nuclear weapons free zone. Both countries have allowed mutual nuclear inspections. Observers have even highlighted the Brazil-Argentina nuclear agreement as an ideal model to be applied worldwide, particularly for India and Pakistan.¶ In 2005, Chavez announced his desire to develop a civil nuclear program. He reportedly raised the possibility of gaining assistance from Argentina and Brazil, since both nations still maintained facilities. When Chavez further called for cooperation between these countries and Iran, both governments quietly refused.¶ Venezuela and Iran¶ During the visit of Iranian President Mohammed Khatami to Caracas in March 2005, Venezuela and Iran signed an agreement of commercial and technological cooperation. Chavez took the opportunity to publicly defend Iran's right to produce atomic energy, and continue research in the area of nuclear development. Chavez soon issued several other statements to this effect, thereby becoming one of the most outspoken supporters of the Iranian nuclear program.¶ In March 2006, the two countries established a $200 million development fund and signed bilateral deals to build homes and exploit petroleum. Venezuelan opposition groups soon warned that the deal also might have involved the transfer of uranium from Iran to Venezuela. Israel's external security apparatus, the Mossad, then provided the exact locations of uranium production in Venezuela. The existence of Venezuelan facilities soon was corroborated by a Venezuelan nuclear expert, an Israeli official, and in September 2009, the Venezuelan minister of mining, Rodolfo Sanz.¶ Chavez, for his part, seems content to publicize the existence of a Venezuelan nuclear program. He declared that <u>Venezuela and Iran are working to build a nuclear village in Venezuela</u>, which "will serve peaceful purposes." Subsequent reports indicate that <u>the two countries are cooperating in matters related to uranium extraction</u>. Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Roger Noriega also suggests that <u>Venezuela could become home to an Iranian nuclear arsenal</u>. Indeed, Iran and Venezuela signed an agreement on military-related matters in November 2008, but the content of the agreement remains largely unknown.¶ No Nukes… Yet¶ The acquisition of nuclear weapons is a reasonable next step for Chavez. A nuclear weapon could provide him with the respect, fear, and deterrence he seeks to carry out his imperial aspirations. Indeed, the <u>bomb could be a short cut to earning the respect of political foes and wielding enough power to intimidate regional or world players</u>.¶ Perhaps with this in mind, Venezuela signed an agreement with Russia in September 2008 to build a nuclear power plant. The Russian company in charge of the project would be Atomstroyexport, the same firm assisting Iran with its Bushehr nuclear plant.¶ Still, it must be stated clearly that there is no credible evidence to indicate that Venezuela has even the most basic infrastructure needed for a nuclear program. As one senior advisor to Brazil's foreign ministry stated in 2005, "Venezuela cannot fulfill these [nuclear] ambitions since it has no nuclear infrastructure and no nuclear engineer." This still holds true today.¶ <u><mark>The fear of a nuclear Venezuela is based almost entirely on the close and continuing relationship between Venezuela and Iran</u></mark>. Venezuela provides assistance to Iran in skirting financial sanctions. For example, Chavez has agreed to sell refined petroleum to Iran to help the Mullahs offset the potential damage of Western sanctions against its oil supply chain. Chavez also supports Iran through diplomatic rants against Israel and the United States, and serves as Iran's top source of rhetorical support in Latin America.¶ Iran is appreciative of Chavez, who has yet to cash in on the good will he has created. The fear is that the Venezuelan leader might ask his friends in Tehran to not just help him create a nuclear program, but rather to simply supply him with weapons.¶ The Threat in Perspective¶ The White House, to date, is less threatened by Venezuela. Dan Restrepo, Senior Director for Latin America at the National Security Council, stated in a recent interview with El Nuevo Herald that he does not see Venezuela as a challenge to U.S. national security, stating that the days of the "hot and cold war" are over. Similarly, the Organization of American States (OAS) has largely ignored Chavez's bellicose public statements and foreign policies.¶ Iran, one could argue further, does not yet have an operational nuclear weapons program. If Western diplomacy and sanctions are effective, Tehran will not be able to provide Chavez with the weapons he seeks.¶ <u><mark>If</u></mark>, however, <u><mark>Western efforts fail</u>,</mark> and Iran becomes a nuclear power, <u><mark>Venezuela can serve as both a source of instability in Latin America, and a strategic threat to the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates, <u><mark>with nuclear weapons in America's back yard</u></mark>. As such, as the Iranian crisis reaches it peak, the activities of Hugo Chavez must be monitored closely.</p> </s>

(__) Talks fail- Israel Fears Pakistan will abandon the talks at the first moment, and will pursue other avenues to accomplish goals

Netanyahu repeatedly expressed his desire to begin negotiations without preconditions he is reluctant to make highly sensitive and significant concessions to Palestinian demands, just in order to get talks moving, and without receiving trade-offs in return. Netanyahu does not want to weaken Israel’s negotiating position before talks begin, and also faces political pressure from right-wing elements within his coalition. Many Israelis suspect that Abbas is not serious about the talks, and will re-enter negotiations only temporarily, to avoid getting blamed for the failure of Kerry’s efforts. They believe he is likely to abandon talks at the first opportunity and resume efforts to isolate Israel and get unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood in the UN and other international forums.

Netanyahu has repeatedly expressed his desire to begin negotiations without preconditions and has publicly expressed his belief in the desirability of a peace agreement for Israel to head of the possibility of bi-national state. However, he is reluctant to make highly sensitive and significant concessions to Palestinian demands, just in order to get talks moving, and without receiving trade-offs in return. Netanyahu does not want to weaken Israel’s negotiating position before talks begin, and also faces political pressure from right-wing elements within his coalition. Many Israelis also suspect that Abbas is not serious about the talks, and will re-enter negotiations only temporarily, in order to avoid getting blamed internationally for the failure of Kerry’s efforts. They believe he is likely to abandon talks at the first opportunity and resume efforts to isolate Israel and get unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood in the UN and other international forums.

<h4>(__) <strong>Talks fail- Israel Fears Pakistan will abandon the talks at the first moment, and will pursue other avenues to accomplish goals </h4><p>EJP 7/2</p><p></strong>[EJP- European Jewish Press, “US Secretary of State John Kerry’s latest Israeli-Palestinian shuttle: what are the results ?”, 02/Jul/2013, <u>http://www.ejpress.org/article/66876<strong>, \\wyo-bb]</p><p>Netanyahu</u></strong> has <u><strong>repeatedly expressed his desire to begin negotiations without preconditions</u></strong> and has publicly expressed his belief in the desirability of a peace agreement for Israel to head of the possibility of bi-national state. However, <u><strong>he is reluctant to make highly sensitive and significant concessions to Palestinian demands, just in order to get talks moving, and without receiving trade-offs in return. Netanyahu does not want to weaken Israel’s negotiating position before talks begin, and also faces political pressure from right-wing elements within his coalition. Many Israelis</u></strong> also <u><strong>suspect that Abbas</u></strong> <u><strong>is not serious about the talks, and will re-enter negotiations only temporarily,</u></strong> in order <u><strong>to avoid getting blamed</u></strong> internationally <u><strong>for the failure of Kerry’s efforts.</u></strong> <u><strong>They believe he is likely to abandon talks at the first opportunity and resume efforts to isolate Israel and get unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood in the UN and other international forums.</p></u></strong>

EJP 7/2 [EJP- European Jewish Press, “US Secretary of State John Kerry’s latest Israeli-Palestinian shuttle: what are the results ?”, 02/Jul/2013, http://www.ejpress.org/article/66876, \\wyo-bb]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: EJP 7/2 [EJP- European Jewish Press, “US Secretary of State John Kerry’s latest Israeli-Palestinian shuttle: what are the results ?”, 02/Jul/2013, http://www.ejpress.org/article/66876, \\wyo-bb] fulltext: Netanyahu has repeatedly expressed his desire to begin negotiations without preconditions and has publicly expressed his belief in the desirability of a peace agreement for Israel to head of the possibility of bi-national state. However, he is reluctant to make highly sensitive and significant concessions to Palestinian demands, just in order to get talks moving, and without receiving trade-offs in return. Netanyahu does not want to weaken Israel’s negotiating position before talks begin, and also faces political pressure from right-wing elements within his coalition. Many Israelis also suspect that Abbas is not serious about the talks, and will re-enter negotiations only temporarily, in order to avoid getting blamed internationally for the failure of Kerry’s efforts. They believe he is likely to abandon talks at the first opportunity and resume efforts to isolate Israel and get unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood in the UN and other international forums. [/INST] <h4>(__) <strong>Talks fail- Israel Fears Pakistan will abandon the talks at the first moment, and will pursue other avenues to accomplish goals </h4><p>EJP 7/2</p><p></strong>[EJP- European Jewish Press, “US Secretary of State John Kerry’s latest Israeli-Palestinian shuttle: what are the results ?”, 02/Jul/2013, <u>http://www.ejpress.org/article/66876<strong>, \\wyo-bb]</p><p>Netanyahu</u></strong> has <u><strong>repeatedly expressed his desire to begin negotiations without preconditions</u></strong> and has publicly expressed his belief in the desirability of a peace agreement for Israel to head of the possibility of bi-national state. However, <u><strong>he is reluctant to make highly sensitive and significant concessions to Palestinian demands, just in order to get talks moving, and without receiving trade-offs in return. Netanyahu does not want to weaken Israel’s negotiating position before talks begin, and also faces political pressure from right-wing elements within his coalition. Many Israelis</u></strong> also <u><strong>suspect that Abbas</u></strong> <u><strong>is not serious about the talks, and will re-enter negotiations only temporarily,</u></strong> in order <u><strong>to avoid getting blamed</u></strong> internationally <u><strong>for the failure of Kerry’s efforts.</u></strong> <u><strong>They believe he is likely to abandon talks at the first opportunity and resume efforts to isolate Israel and get unilateral recognition of Palestinian statehood in the UN and other international forums.</p></u></strong> </s>

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<h4>[insert no-internal link e.g.] </h4>

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Second, link- US engagement in Cuba undermines Chinese influence and crowds them out-

Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region bilateral trade increased to $1.83 billion in 2010 it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba

(James, Nolan Chart, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped,” June 29, 2011, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html) /wyo-mm) Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral trade increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba.

<h4><strong>Second, link- US engagement in Cuba undermines Chinese influence and crowds them out-</h4><p>Luko 11</p><p></strong>(James, Nolan Chart, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped,” June 29, 2011, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html) /wyo-mm)</p><p><u><strong>Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region</u></strong>, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, <u><strong>bilateral trade increased</u></strong> from $440 million in 2001 <u><strong>to $1.83 billion in 2010</u></strong>. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, <u><strong>it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan</u></strong>. <u><strong>Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources</u></strong>. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] <u><strong>The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba</u></strong>.</p>

Luko 11

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Luko 11 fulltext: (James, Nolan Chart, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped,” June 29, 2011, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html) /wyo-mm) Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral trade increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba. [/INST] <h4><strong>Second, link- US engagement in Cuba undermines Chinese influence and crowds them out-</h4><p>Luko 11</p><p></strong>(James, Nolan Chart, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped,” June 29, 2011, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html) /wyo-mm)</p><p><u><strong>Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region</u></strong>, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, <u><strong>bilateral trade increased</u></strong> from $440 million in 2001 <u><strong>to $1.83 billion in 2010</u></strong>. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, <u><strong>it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan</u></strong>. <u><strong>Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources</u></strong>. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] <u><strong>The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba</u></strong>.</p> </s>

U.S. economy strong—economists predicting healthy growth now

this long economic slog has been growing old the surprising new view of a number of economists in academia and on Wall Street are predicting healthier, more lasting growth. the stock market has risen so sharply

[Nelson, has covered the economy and economics for the business section of The New York Times since August 2012, Even Pessimists Feel Optimistic About the American Economy, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/business/economy/even-pessimists-feel-optimistic-over-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0] /Wyo-MB But could the New Normal, as this long economic slog has been called, be growing old?¶ That is the surprising new view of a number of economists in academia and on Wall Street, who are now predicting something the United States has not experienced in years: healthier, more lasting growth.¶ The improving outlook is one reason the stock market has risen so sharply this year, even if street-level evidence for a turnaround, like strong job growth and income gains, has been scant so far.

<h4><strong>U.S. economy strong—economists predicting healthy growth now</h4><p>Schwartz, 6-15-13</p><p></strong>[Nelson, has covered the economy and economics for the business section of The New York Times since August 2012, Even Pessimists Feel Optimistic About the American Economy, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/business/economy/even-pessimists-feel-optimistic-over-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0] /Wyo-MB</p><p>But could the New Normal, as <u><strong>this long economic slog has been</u></strong> called, be <u><strong>growing old</u></strong>?¶ That is <u><strong>the surprising new view of a number of economists in academia and on Wall Street</u></strong>, who <u><strong>are</u></strong> now <u><strong>predicting</u></strong> something the United States has not experienced in years: <u><strong>healthier, more lasting growth.</u></strong>¶ The improving outlook is one reason <u><strong>the stock market has risen so sharply</u> this year, even if street-level evidence for a turnaround, like strong job growth and income gains, has been scant so far.</p></strong>

Schwartz, 6-15-13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Schwartz, 6-15-13 fulltext: [Nelson, has covered the economy and economics for the business section of The New York Times since August 2012, Even Pessimists Feel Optimistic About the American Economy, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/business/economy/even-pessimists-feel-optimistic-over-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0] /Wyo-MB But could the New Normal, as this long economic slog has been called, be growing old?¶ That is the surprising new view of a number of economists in academia and on Wall Street, who are now predicting something the United States has not experienced in years: healthier, more lasting growth.¶ The improving outlook is one reason the stock market has risen so sharply this year, even if street-level evidence for a turnaround, like strong job growth and income gains, has been scant so far. [/INST] <h4><strong>U.S. economy strong—economists predicting healthy growth now</h4><p>Schwartz, 6-15-13</p><p></strong>[Nelson, has covered the economy and economics for the business section of The New York Times since August 2012, Even Pessimists Feel Optimistic About the American Economy, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/business/economy/even-pessimists-feel-optimistic-over-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0] /Wyo-MB</p><p>But could the New Normal, as <u><strong>this long economic slog has been</u></strong> called, be <u><strong>growing old</u></strong>?¶ That is <u><strong>the surprising new view of a number of economists in academia and on Wall Street</u></strong>, who <u><strong>are</u></strong> now <u><strong>predicting</u></strong> something the United States has not experienced in years: <u><strong>healthier, more lasting growth.</u></strong>¶ The improving outlook is one reason <u><strong>the stock market has risen so sharply</u> this year, even if street-level evidence for a turnaround, like strong job growth and income gains, has been scant so far.</p></strong> </s>

B. Link: Economic engagement with Latin America causes congressional backlash that costs Obama political capital

When considering foreign assistance levels for Latin American Congress might examine issues of political will The nations of Latin America have a mixed record in terms of demonstrating program sustainability political will has often been lacking especially with regard to raising sufficient government revenue to sustain efforts

When considering foreign assistance levels for Latin American and Caribbean nations, Congress might examine the issues of political will and program sustainability. According to the State Department’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the United States should “assess and monitor host nations’ political will to make the reforms necessary to make effective use of U.S. assistance to ensure our assistance is being targeted where it can have the most impact.”76 Unless partner nations are willing to implement complementary reforms and take ownership and sustain programs as aid is reduced and withdrawn, the results of U.S. assistance will likely be limited and short-lived. The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have a mixed record in terms of demonstrating political will and ensuring program sustainability. The Colombian government, which has benefitted from high levels of U.S. assistance for more than a decade, has undertaken numerous reforms and raised revenue. As a result, the United States is able to carry out a managed transition of its assistance programs in the country in which aid is slowly reduced as Colombia takes over financial and technical responsibility.77 Similarly, USAID is closing its mission in Panama, and closing out its voluntary family planning programs in a number of other Latin American countries because partner nations have developed the capacity to manage and fund the programs on their own.78 Despite these successes, numerous GAO reports over the past decade indicate that political will has often been lacking in the region, especially with regard to raising sufficient government revenue to sustain efforts initiated with U.S. support. A 2003 study of U.S. democracy programs in six Latin American nations found “cases in which U.S.-funded training programs, computer systems, and police equipment had languished for lack of resources after U.S. support ended.”79 Likewise, a 2010 study of counter-narcotics programs found that several countries in the region were unable to use U.S.-provided boats for patrol or interdiction operations due to a lack of funding for fuel and maintenance.80 Even MCC-funded projects, in which assistance is contingent on partner nation actions, have run into problems with program sustainability. A July 2011 study of the MCC compact in Honduras found that the lifespan of roads built to improve small farmers’ access to markets may be relatively limited as the municipalities where they were constructed lack the equipment, expertise, and funding for road maintenance.81

<h4>B. Link: Economic engagement with Latin America causes congressional backlash that costs Obama political capital</h4><p>Peter J. <strong>Meyer and</strong> Mark P. <strong>Sullivan</strong>, Specialist in Latin American Affairs and Analyst in Latin American Affairs “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations”, June 26th, <strong>2012</strong>, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf] </p><p><u><strong>When considering foreign assistance levels for Latin American</u></strong> and Caribbean nations, <u><strong>Congress might examine</u></strong> the <u><strong>issues of political will</u></strong> and program sustainability. According to the State Department’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the United States should “assess and monitor host nations’ political will to make the reforms necessary to make effective use of U.S. assistance to ensure our assistance is being targeted where it can have the most impact.”76 Unless partner nations are willing to implement complementary reforms and take ownership and sustain programs as aid is reduced and withdrawn, the results of U.S. assistance will likely be limited and short-lived. <u><strong>The nations of Latin America</u></strong> and the Caribbean <u><strong>have a mixed record in terms of demonstrating</u></strong> political will and ensuring <u><strong>program sustainability</u></strong>. The Colombian government, which has benefitted from high levels of U.S. assistance for more than a decade, has undertaken numerous reforms and raised revenue. As a result, the United States is able to carry out a managed transition of its assistance programs in the country in which aid is slowly reduced as Colombia takes over financial and technical responsibility.77 Similarly, USAID is closing its mission in Panama, and closing out its voluntary family planning programs in a number of other Latin American countries because partner nations have developed the capacity to manage and fund the programs on their own.78 Despite these successes, numerous GAO reports over the past decade indicate that <u><strong>political will has often been lacking</u></strong> in the region, <u><strong>especially with regard to raising sufficient government revenue to sustain efforts</u></strong> initiated with U.S. support. A 2003 study of U.S. democracy programs in six Latin American nations found “cases in which U.S.-funded training programs, computer systems, and police equipment had languished for lack of resources after U.S. support ended.”79 Likewise, a 2010 study of counter-narcotics programs found that several countries in the region were unable to use U.S.-provided boats for patrol or interdiction operations due to a lack of funding for fuel and maintenance.80 Even MCC-funded projects, in which assistance is contingent on partner nation actions, have run into problems with program sustainability. A July 2011 study of the MCC compact in Honduras found that the lifespan of roads built to improve small farmers’ access to markets may be relatively limited as the municipalities where they were constructed lack the equipment, expertise, and funding for road maintenance.81</p>

Peter J. Meyer and Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs and Analyst in Latin American Affairs “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations”, June 26th, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Peter J. Meyer and Mark P. Sullivan, Specialist in Latin American Affairs and Analyst in Latin American Affairs “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations”, June 26th, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf] fulltext: When considering foreign assistance levels for Latin American and Caribbean nations, Congress might examine the issues of political will and program sustainability. According to the State Department’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the United States should “assess and monitor host nations’ political will to make the reforms necessary to make effective use of U.S. assistance to ensure our assistance is being targeted where it can have the most impact.”76 Unless partner nations are willing to implement complementary reforms and take ownership and sustain programs as aid is reduced and withdrawn, the results of U.S. assistance will likely be limited and short-lived. The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have a mixed record in terms of demonstrating political will and ensuring program sustainability. The Colombian government, which has benefitted from high levels of U.S. assistance for more than a decade, has undertaken numerous reforms and raised revenue. As a result, the United States is able to carry out a managed transition of its assistance programs in the country in which aid is slowly reduced as Colombia takes over financial and technical responsibility.77 Similarly, USAID is closing its mission in Panama, and closing out its voluntary family planning programs in a number of other Latin American countries because partner nations have developed the capacity to manage and fund the programs on their own.78 Despite these successes, numerous GAO reports over the past decade indicate that political will has often been lacking in the region, especially with regard to raising sufficient government revenue to sustain efforts initiated with U.S. support. A 2003 study of U.S. democracy programs in six Latin American nations found “cases in which U.S.-funded training programs, computer systems, and police equipment had languished for lack of resources after U.S. support ended.”79 Likewise, a 2010 study of counter-narcotics programs found that several countries in the region were unable to use U.S.-provided boats for patrol or interdiction operations due to a lack of funding for fuel and maintenance.80 Even MCC-funded projects, in which assistance is contingent on partner nation actions, have run into problems with program sustainability. A July 2011 study of the MCC compact in Honduras found that the lifespan of roads built to improve small farmers’ access to markets may be relatively limited as the municipalities where they were constructed lack the equipment, expertise, and funding for road maintenance.81 [/INST] <h4>B. Link: Economic engagement with Latin America causes congressional backlash that costs Obama political capital</h4><p>Peter J. <strong>Meyer and</strong> Mark P. <strong>Sullivan</strong>, Specialist in Latin American Affairs and Analyst in Latin American Affairs “U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2013 Appropriations”, June 26th, <strong>2012</strong>, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42582.pdf] </p><p><u><strong>When considering foreign assistance levels for Latin American</u></strong> and Caribbean nations, <u><strong>Congress might examine</u></strong> the <u><strong>issues of political will</u></strong> and program sustainability. According to the State Department’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the United States should “assess and monitor host nations’ political will to make the reforms necessary to make effective use of U.S. assistance to ensure our assistance is being targeted where it can have the most impact.”76 Unless partner nations are willing to implement complementary reforms and take ownership and sustain programs as aid is reduced and withdrawn, the results of U.S. assistance will likely be limited and short-lived. <u><strong>The nations of Latin America</u></strong> and the Caribbean <u><strong>have a mixed record in terms of demonstrating</u></strong> political will and ensuring <u><strong>program sustainability</u></strong>. The Colombian government, which has benefitted from high levels of U.S. assistance for more than a decade, has undertaken numerous reforms and raised revenue. As a result, the United States is able to carry out a managed transition of its assistance programs in the country in which aid is slowly reduced as Colombia takes over financial and technical responsibility.77 Similarly, USAID is closing its mission in Panama, and closing out its voluntary family planning programs in a number of other Latin American countries because partner nations have developed the capacity to manage and fund the programs on their own.78 Despite these successes, numerous GAO reports over the past decade indicate that <u><strong>political will has often been lacking</u></strong> in the region, <u><strong>especially with regard to raising sufficient government revenue to sustain efforts</u></strong> initiated with U.S. support. A 2003 study of U.S. democracy programs in six Latin American nations found “cases in which U.S.-funded training programs, computer systems, and police equipment had languished for lack of resources after U.S. support ended.”79 Likewise, a 2010 study of counter-narcotics programs found that several countries in the region were unable to use U.S.-provided boats for patrol or interdiction operations due to a lack of funding for fuel and maintenance.80 Even MCC-funded projects, in which assistance is contingent on partner nation actions, have run into problems with program sustainability. A July 2011 study of the MCC compact in Honduras found that the lifespan of roads built to improve small farmers’ access to markets may be relatively limited as the municipalities where they were constructed lack the equipment, expertise, and funding for road maintenance.81</p> </s>

[D.] Lifting the embargo solves trade relations and boosts the US economy

] /Wyo-MB Trade levels between Cuba and the U.S. could reach $5 billion annually by ¶ removing the trade embargo, resulting in a boost to American agribusinesses A policy environment open to ¶ international trade and investment is a necessary ingredient to sustain higher rates ¶ of economic growth and to promote political freedom through exposure to new ¶ technology, communications, and democratic ideas The additional creation of wealth will help to advance social, political, and ¶ economic conditions independent of the governing authorities in Cuba. ¶ By allowing free travel to and from Cuba, potential for the marketing and ¶ sale of agricultural and medical goods would expand enormously, further boosting ¶ the economies of the U.S. and Cuba. The U.S. International Trade Commission ¶ estimated that if travel restrictions to Cuba were lifted, the number of U.S. travelers ¶ would increase from less than 200,000 to between 550,00 and one million annually The increase in U.S. visitors would in turn ¶ increase demand for more and higher quality goods and would provide more money ¶ for the government to purchase U.S. goods Allowing U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba would boost the tourism industry in the ¶ U.S. and create thousands of new jobs . agricultural sales to Cuba would be a ¶ significant advancement. Business leaders and entrepreneurs from the U.S. would ¶ gain a competitive edge by having the opportunity to travel to Cuba and becoming ¶ familiar with the Cuban market and meting face-to-face with their Cuban ¶ counterparts.

[Chelsea, Barnard College, Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a Broken Policy, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf] /Wyo-MB Trade levels between Cuba and the U.S. could reach $5 billion annually by ¶ removing the trade embargo, resulting in a boost to American agribusinesses while ¶ also helping to alleviate hunger among Cubans. A policy environment open to ¶ international trade and investment is a necessary ingredient to sustain higher rates ¶ of economic growth and to promote political freedom through exposure to new ¶ technology, communications, and democratic ideas (Griswold, 1; Sachs and ¶ Warner). Allowing Cuba to more freely import U.S. food is a means of lowering ¶ domestic prices and increasing incomes of the poor, food availability and domestic ¶ production. U.S. companies will introduce new technologies and production ¶ methods, while raising wages and labor standards as a result of trading with Cuba. ¶ The additional creation of wealth will help to advance social, political, and ¶ economic conditions independent of the governing authorities in Cuba. The most ¶ economically open countries today are more than three times as likely to enjoy full ¶ political and civil freedoms as those that are relatively closed (Griswold, 1). ¶ Lifting certain trade restrictions would assist Cuba in its efforts to recover ¶ from the damage caused by its recent hurricanes. If the U.S. exempted construction ¶ equipment and agricultural machinery from the Cuban trade ban through regulatory ¶ action, the Cuban people could benefit from the loosening of restrictions without ¶ overhauling the entire embargo. ¶ By allowing free travel to and from Cuba, potential for the marketing and ¶ sale of agricultural and medical goods would expand enormously, further boosting ¶ the economies of the U.S. and Cuba. The U.S. International Trade Commission ¶ estimated that if travel restrictions to Cuba were lifted, the number of U.S. travelers ¶ would increase from less than 200,000 to between 550,00 and one million annually ¶ (U.S. International Trade Commission). The increase in U.S. visitors would in turn ¶ increase demand for more and higher quality goods and would provide more money ¶ for the government to purchase U.S. goods, according to the Commission report. ¶ Allowing U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba would boost the tourism industry in the ¶ U.S. and create thousands of new jobs. Even lifting the travel restrictions on groups ¶ or individuals directly engaged in U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba would be a ¶ significant advancement. Business leaders and entrepreneurs from the U.S. would ¶ gain a competitive edge by having the opportunity to travel to Cuba and becoming ¶ familiar with the Cuban market and meting face-to-face with their Cuban ¶ counterparts.

<h4>[D.] <strong>Lifting the embargo solves trade relations and boosts the US economy</h4><p>Zimmerman, 2010</p><p></strong>[Chelsea, Barnard College, Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a Broken Policy, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf<u><strong>] /Wyo-MB</p><p>Trade levels between Cuba and the U.S. could reach $5 billion annually by ¶ removing the trade embargo, resulting in a boost to American agribusinesses</u></strong> while ¶ also helping to alleviate hunger among Cubans. <u><strong>A policy environment open to ¶ international trade and investment is a necessary ingredient to sustain higher rates ¶ of economic growth and to promote political freedom through exposure to new ¶ technology, communications, and democratic ideas</u></strong> (Griswold, 1; Sachs and ¶ Warner). Allowing Cuba to more freely import U.S. food is a means of lowering ¶ domestic prices and increasing incomes of the poor, food availability and domestic ¶ production. U.S. companies will introduce new technologies and production ¶ methods, while raising wages and labor standards as a result of trading with Cuba. ¶ <u><strong>The additional creation of wealth will help to advance social, political, and ¶ economic conditions independent of the governing authorities in Cuba.</u></strong> The most ¶ economically open countries today are more than three times as likely to enjoy full ¶ political and civil freedoms as those that are relatively closed (Griswold, 1). ¶ Lifting certain trade restrictions would assist Cuba in its efforts to recover ¶ from the damage caused by its recent hurricanes. If the U.S. exempted construction ¶ equipment and agricultural machinery from the Cuban trade ban through regulatory ¶ action, the Cuban people could benefit from the loosening of restrictions without ¶ overhauling the entire embargo. <u><strong>¶ By allowing free travel to and from Cuba, potential for the marketing and ¶ sale of agricultural and medical goods would expand enormously, further boosting ¶ the economies of the U.S. and Cuba. The U.S. International Trade Commission ¶ estimated that if travel restrictions to Cuba were lifted, the number of U.S. travelers ¶ would increase from less than 200,000 to between 550,00 and one million annually</u></strong> ¶ (U.S. International Trade Commission). <u><strong>The increase in U.S. visitors would in turn ¶ increase demand for more and higher quality goods and would provide more money ¶ for the government to purchase U.S. goods</u></strong>, according to the Commission report. ¶ <u><strong>Allowing U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba would boost the tourism industry in the ¶ U.S. and create thousands of new jobs</u></strong>. Even lifting the travel restrictions on groups ¶ or individuals directly engaged in U.S<u><strong>. agricultural sales to Cuba would be a ¶ significant advancement. Business leaders and entrepreneurs from the U.S. would ¶ gain a competitive edge by having the opportunity to travel to Cuba and becoming ¶ familiar with the Cuban market and meting face-to-face with their Cuban ¶ counterparts.</p></u></strong>

Zimmerman, 2010

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Zimmerman, 2010 fulltext: [Chelsea, Barnard College, Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a Broken Policy, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf] /Wyo-MB Trade levels between Cuba and the U.S. could reach $5 billion annually by ¶ removing the trade embargo, resulting in a boost to American agribusinesses while ¶ also helping to alleviate hunger among Cubans. A policy environment open to ¶ international trade and investment is a necessary ingredient to sustain higher rates ¶ of economic growth and to promote political freedom through exposure to new ¶ technology, communications, and democratic ideas (Griswold, 1; Sachs and ¶ Warner). Allowing Cuba to more freely import U.S. food is a means of lowering ¶ domestic prices and increasing incomes of the poor, food availability and domestic ¶ production. U.S. companies will introduce new technologies and production ¶ methods, while raising wages and labor standards as a result of trading with Cuba. ¶ The additional creation of wealth will help to advance social, political, and ¶ economic conditions independent of the governing authorities in Cuba. The most ¶ economically open countries today are more than three times as likely to enjoy full ¶ political and civil freedoms as those that are relatively closed (Griswold, 1). ¶ Lifting certain trade restrictions would assist Cuba in its efforts to recover ¶ from the damage caused by its recent hurricanes. If the U.S. exempted construction ¶ equipment and agricultural machinery from the Cuban trade ban through regulatory ¶ action, the Cuban people could benefit from the loosening of restrictions without ¶ overhauling the entire embargo. ¶ By allowing free travel to and from Cuba, potential for the marketing and ¶ sale of agricultural and medical goods would expand enormously, further boosting ¶ the economies of the U.S. and Cuba. The U.S. International Trade Commission ¶ estimated that if travel restrictions to Cuba were lifted, the number of U.S. travelers ¶ would increase from less than 200,000 to between 550,00 and one million annually ¶ (U.S. International Trade Commission). The increase in U.S. visitors would in turn ¶ increase demand for more and higher quality goods and would provide more money ¶ for the government to purchase U.S. goods, according to the Commission report. ¶ Allowing U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba would boost the tourism industry in the ¶ U.S. and create thousands of new jobs. Even lifting the travel restrictions on groups ¶ or individuals directly engaged in U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba would be a ¶ significant advancement. Business leaders and entrepreneurs from the U.S. would ¶ gain a competitive edge by having the opportunity to travel to Cuba and becoming ¶ familiar with the Cuban market and meting face-to-face with their Cuban ¶ counterparts. [/INST] <h4>[D.] <strong>Lifting the embargo solves trade relations and boosts the US economy</h4><p>Zimmerman, 2010</p><p></strong>[Chelsea, Barnard College, Rethinking The Cuban Trade Embargo: An Opportune Time To Mend a Broken Policy, http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Fellows2010/Zimmerman.pdf<u><strong>] /Wyo-MB</p><p>Trade levels between Cuba and the U.S. could reach $5 billion annually by ¶ removing the trade embargo, resulting in a boost to American agribusinesses</u></strong> while ¶ also helping to alleviate hunger among Cubans. <u><strong>A policy environment open to ¶ international trade and investment is a necessary ingredient to sustain higher rates ¶ of economic growth and to promote political freedom through exposure to new ¶ technology, communications, and democratic ideas</u></strong> (Griswold, 1; Sachs and ¶ Warner). Allowing Cuba to more freely import U.S. food is a means of lowering ¶ domestic prices and increasing incomes of the poor, food availability and domestic ¶ production. U.S. companies will introduce new technologies and production ¶ methods, while raising wages and labor standards as a result of trading with Cuba. ¶ <u><strong>The additional creation of wealth will help to advance social, political, and ¶ economic conditions independent of the governing authorities in Cuba.</u></strong> The most ¶ economically open countries today are more than three times as likely to enjoy full ¶ political and civil freedoms as those that are relatively closed (Griswold, 1). ¶ Lifting certain trade restrictions would assist Cuba in its efforts to recover ¶ from the damage caused by its recent hurricanes. If the U.S. exempted construction ¶ equipment and agricultural machinery from the Cuban trade ban through regulatory ¶ action, the Cuban people could benefit from the loosening of restrictions without ¶ overhauling the entire embargo. <u><strong>¶ By allowing free travel to and from Cuba, potential for the marketing and ¶ sale of agricultural and medical goods would expand enormously, further boosting ¶ the economies of the U.S. and Cuba. The U.S. International Trade Commission ¶ estimated that if travel restrictions to Cuba were lifted, the number of U.S. travelers ¶ would increase from less than 200,000 to between 550,00 and one million annually</u></strong> ¶ (U.S. International Trade Commission). <u><strong>The increase in U.S. visitors would in turn ¶ increase demand for more and higher quality goods and would provide more money ¶ for the government to purchase U.S. goods</u></strong>, according to the Commission report. ¶ <u><strong>Allowing U.S. citizens to travel to Cuba would boost the tourism industry in the ¶ U.S. and create thousands of new jobs</u></strong>. Even lifting the travel restrictions on groups ¶ or individuals directly engaged in U.S<u><strong>. agricultural sales to Cuba would be a ¶ significant advancement. Business leaders and entrepreneurs from the U.S. would ¶ gain a competitive edge by having the opportunity to travel to Cuba and becoming ¶ familiar with the Cuban market and meting face-to-face with their Cuban ¶ counterparts.</p></u></strong> </s>

Proliferation causes nuclear war

Proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations is the gravest threat facing the US and the world Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons – and its likely willingness to give them to proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al Qaeda for use – will stimulate another regional surge of proliferation as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and others follow suit. In no time the cascade will be global, as states like Venezuela rush to protect themselves. With nuclear weapons widespread, and nuclear material even more readily available, terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons will not be difficult. We’re moving toward a world of nuclear horror and chaos, a return from which appears impossible

Proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations is the gravest threat facing the US and the world Iran’s acquisition and willingness to give them to proxies will stimulate another regional surge of proliferation the cascade will be global, as states like Venezuela With nuclear weapons widespread, and nuclear material even more readily available, terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons will not be difficult. We’re moving toward a world of nuclear horror and chaos

Proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations is the gravest threat facing the US and the world. For twenty years two irresponsible and belligerent rogue states have been working intensely to develop nuclear weapons production capabilities. The world has protested and wrung its hands. North Korea has now tested primitive weapons, and Iran is close to producing them. When North Korea succeeds in weaponizing its designs, it will sell them to anyone desiring to buy – including terrorists. Neighboring states such as South Korea and Japan will be forced to go nuclear in self-protection. Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons – and its likely willingness to give them to proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al Qaeda for use – will stimulate another regional surge of proliferation as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and others follow suit. In no time the cascade will be global, as states like Venezuela, Germany, Brazil, and Argentina, rush to protect themselves. With nuclear weapons widespread, and nuclear material even more readily available, terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons will not be difficult. We’re moving toward a world of nuclear horror and chaos, a return from which appears impossible.

<h4>Proliferation causes nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Monroe 9-12</strong>-12 [Robert, vice admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “Nonproliferation requires enforcement,” http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/249049-nonproliferation-requires-enforcement]</p><p><u><mark>Proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations is the gravest threat facing the US and the world</u></mark>. For twenty years two irresponsible and belligerent rogue states have been working intensely to develop nuclear weapons production capabilities. The world has protested and wrung its hands. North Korea has now tested primitive weapons, and Iran is close to producing them. When North Korea succeeds in weaponizing its designs, it will sell them to anyone desiring to buy – including terrorists. Neighboring states such as South Korea and Japan will be forced to go nuclear in self-protection. <u><mark>Iran’s acquisition</mark> of nuclear weapons – <mark>and</mark> its likely <mark>willingness to give them to proxies</mark> such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al Qaeda for use – <mark>will stimulate another regional surge of proliferation</mark> as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and others follow suit. In no time <mark>the cascade will be global, as states like Venezuela</u></mark>, Germany, Brazil, and Argentina, <u>rush to protect themselves.</u> <u><mark>With nuclear weapons widespread, and nuclear material even more readily available, terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons will not be difficult. We’re moving toward a world of nuclear horror and chaos</mark>, a return from which appears impossible</u>. </p>

Monroe 9-12-12 [Robert, vice admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “Nonproliferation requires enforcement,” http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/249049-nonproliferation-requires-enforcement]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Monroe 9-12-12 [Robert, vice admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “Nonproliferation requires enforcement,” http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/249049-nonproliferation-requires-enforcement] fulltext: Proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations is the gravest threat facing the US and the world. For twenty years two irresponsible and belligerent rogue states have been working intensely to develop nuclear weapons production capabilities. The world has protested and wrung its hands. North Korea has now tested primitive weapons, and Iran is close to producing them. When North Korea succeeds in weaponizing its designs, it will sell them to anyone desiring to buy – including terrorists. Neighboring states such as South Korea and Japan will be forced to go nuclear in self-protection. Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons – and its likely willingness to give them to proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al Qaeda for use – will stimulate another regional surge of proliferation as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and others follow suit. In no time the cascade will be global, as states like Venezuela, Germany, Brazil, and Argentina, rush to protect themselves. With nuclear weapons widespread, and nuclear material even more readily available, terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons will not be difficult. We’re moving toward a world of nuclear horror and chaos, a return from which appears impossible. [/INST] <h4>Proliferation causes nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Monroe 9-12</strong>-12 [Robert, vice admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), “Nonproliferation requires enforcement,” http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/249049-nonproliferation-requires-enforcement]</p><p><u><mark>Proliferation of nuclear weapons among nations is the gravest threat facing the US and the world</u></mark>. For twenty years two irresponsible and belligerent rogue states have been working intensely to develop nuclear weapons production capabilities. The world has protested and wrung its hands. North Korea has now tested primitive weapons, and Iran is close to producing them. When North Korea succeeds in weaponizing its designs, it will sell them to anyone desiring to buy – including terrorists. Neighboring states such as South Korea and Japan will be forced to go nuclear in self-protection. <u><mark>Iran’s acquisition</mark> of nuclear weapons – <mark>and</mark> its likely <mark>willingness to give them to proxies</mark> such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al Qaeda for use – <mark>will stimulate another regional surge of proliferation</mark> as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and others follow suit. In no time <mark>the cascade will be global, as states like Venezuela</u></mark>, Germany, Brazil, and Argentina, <u>rush to protect themselves.</u> <u><mark>With nuclear weapons widespread, and nuclear material even more readily available, terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons will not be difficult. We’re moving toward a world of nuclear horror and chaos</mark>, a return from which appears impossible</u>. </p> </s>

(__) Neither Israel nor Palestine is capable, at the moment, to entertain the prospect of peace, the Peace process must be put on hold

te.org/templateC05.php?CID=2628) neither Israelis nor Palestinians are actually eager for what it takes to achieve rapid diplomatic movement. no Israeli government is likely to consider ceding critical assets to a Palestinian interlocutor so weak that it lost power in the one small piece of territory once under its total control. now is not really the most propitious time to press for diplomatic progress, though they may want the illusion of diplomacy for local political purposes. Yet it is unclear why Washington would want to busy itself with an empty exercise that distracts from the important business of fixing the problems that produced the current situation.

(“In the wake of the Hamas Coup: Rethinking America’s ‘Grand Strategy’ for the New Palestinian Authority” June 26, Robert Satloff, executive director of The Washington Institute, D.Phil., St. Antony's College, University of Oxford; M.A., Harvard University; B.A., Duke University, The Washington Institute on Near East Policy, 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2628) But, rhetoric to the contrary, there is reason to believe that neither Israelis nor Palestinians are actually eager for what it takes to achieve rapid diplomatic movement. On the one hand, no Israeli government is likely to consider ceding critical assets to a Palestinian interlocutor so weak that it lost power in the one small piece of territory once under its total control. (Indeed, press reports suggest that Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert rebuffed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's political horizon proposal during his visit to Washington last week.) On the other hand, no rump Palestinian government, still reeling from defeat, is likely to make concessions on the key issues -- such as refugees -- essential to any peace deal. In the current environment, it would be no surprise if leaders on both sides agreed that now is not really the most propitious time to press for diplomatic progress, though they may want the illusion of diplomacy for local political purposes. Yet it is unclear why Washington would want to busy itself with an empty exercise that distracts from the important business of fixing the problems that produced the current situation.

<h4>(__) <strong>Neither Israel nor Palestine is capable, at the moment, to entertain the prospect of peace, the Peace process must be put on hold</h4><p>Staloff, 2007</p><p></strong>(“In the wake of the Hamas Coup: Rethinking America’s ‘Grand Strategy’ for the New Palestinian Authority” June 26, Robert Satloff, executive director of The Washington Institute, D.Phil., St. Antony's College, University of Oxford; M.A., Harvard University; B.A., Duke University, The Washington Institute on Near East Policy, 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitu<u><strong>te.org/templateC05.php?CID=2628)</p><p></u></strong>But, rhetoric to the contrary, there is reason to believe that <u><strong>neither Israelis nor Palestinians are actually eager for what it takes to achieve rapid diplomatic movement.</u></strong> On the one hand, <u><strong>no Israeli government is likely to consider ceding critical assets to a Palestinian interlocutor so weak that it lost power in the one small piece of territory once under its total control.</u></strong> (Indeed, press reports suggest that Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert rebuffed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's political horizon proposal during his visit to Washington last week.) On the other hand, no rump Palestinian government, still reeling from defeat, is likely to make concessions on the key issues -- such as refugees -- essential to any peace deal. </p><p>In the current environment, it would be no surprise if leaders on both sides agreed that <u><strong>now is not really the most propitious time to press for diplomatic progress, though they may want the illusion of diplomacy for local political purposes. Yet it is unclear why Washington would want to busy itself with an empty exercise that distracts from the important business of fixing the problems that produced the current situation. </p></u></strong>

Staloff, 2007

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Staloff, 2007 fulltext: (“In the wake of the Hamas Coup: Rethinking America’s ‘Grand Strategy’ for the New Palestinian Authority” June 26, Robert Satloff, executive director of The Washington Institute, D.Phil., St. Antony's College, University of Oxford; M.A., Harvard University; B.A., Duke University, The Washington Institute on Near East Policy, 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2628) But, rhetoric to the contrary, there is reason to believe that neither Israelis nor Palestinians are actually eager for what it takes to achieve rapid diplomatic movement. On the one hand, no Israeli government is likely to consider ceding critical assets to a Palestinian interlocutor so weak that it lost power in the one small piece of territory once under its total control. (Indeed, press reports suggest that Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert rebuffed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's political horizon proposal during his visit to Washington last week.) On the other hand, no rump Palestinian government, still reeling from defeat, is likely to make concessions on the key issues -- such as refugees -- essential to any peace deal. In the current environment, it would be no surprise if leaders on both sides agreed that now is not really the most propitious time to press for diplomatic progress, though they may want the illusion of diplomacy for local political purposes. Yet it is unclear why Washington would want to busy itself with an empty exercise that distracts from the important business of fixing the problems that produced the current situation. [/INST] <h4>(__) <strong>Neither Israel nor Palestine is capable, at the moment, to entertain the prospect of peace, the Peace process must be put on hold</h4><p>Staloff, 2007</p><p></strong>(“In the wake of the Hamas Coup: Rethinking America’s ‘Grand Strategy’ for the New Palestinian Authority” June 26, Robert Satloff, executive director of The Washington Institute, D.Phil., St. Antony's College, University of Oxford; M.A., Harvard University; B.A., Duke University, The Washington Institute on Near East Policy, 2007, http://www.washingtoninstitu<u><strong>te.org/templateC05.php?CID=2628)</p><p></u></strong>But, rhetoric to the contrary, there is reason to believe that <u><strong>neither Israelis nor Palestinians are actually eager for what it takes to achieve rapid diplomatic movement.</u></strong> On the one hand, <u><strong>no Israeli government is likely to consider ceding critical assets to a Palestinian interlocutor so weak that it lost power in the one small piece of territory once under its total control.</u></strong> (Indeed, press reports suggest that Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert rebuffed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's political horizon proposal during his visit to Washington last week.) On the other hand, no rump Palestinian government, still reeling from defeat, is likely to make concessions on the key issues -- such as refugees -- essential to any peace deal. </p><p>In the current environment, it would be no surprise if leaders on both sides agreed that <u><strong>now is not really the most propitious time to press for diplomatic progress, though they may want the illusion of diplomacy for local political purposes. Yet it is unclear why Washington would want to busy itself with an empty exercise that distracts from the important business of fixing the problems that produced the current situation. </p></u></strong> </s>

-----No internal-link: Saudi already backstopped

Oil output by O P E C rose in May to the highest level since 2008 as Saudi Arabia pumped crude at the fastest pace in at least 23 years, a Bloomberg survey showed OPEC production gained 20,000 barrels to an average 31.595 million barrels a day in May from a revised 31.575 million in April, according to the survey Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi said he wanted to see the Brent crude contract drop to $100 a barrel Brent was the lowest close since Oct. 4. The Saudis are making it abundantly clear that they will keep the market said Lynch, president of S E E R They wanted to see prices fall, and that’s finally taking place

output by O P E C rose to the highest level as Saudi pumped at the fastest pace in 23 years Naimi wanted to see Brent drop The Saudis are making it abundantly clear that they will keep the market They wanted to see prices fall, and that’s taking place

Oil output by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries rose in May to the highest level since 2008 as Saudi Arabia pumped crude at the fastest pace in at least 23 years, a Bloomberg survey showed. OPEC production gained 20,000 barrels to an average 31.595 million barrels a day in May from a revised 31.575 million in April, according to the survey of oil companies, producers and analysts. Output increased to the highest level since October 2008. The April total was revised 170,000 barrels a day higher. Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s biggest producer, bolstered output by 80,000 barrels to 9.9 million barrels a day this month, the highest level since at least January 1989, based on monthly data compiled by Bloomberg. Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi said on May 13 in Adelaide, Australia, that he wanted to see the Brent crude contract drop to $100 a barrel. Brent oil for July settlement decreased $1.60, or 1.6 percent, to $101.87 a barrel on the London-based ICE Futures Europe exchange. It was the lowest close since Oct. 4. “The Saudis are making it abundantly clear that they will keep the market well supplied,” said Michael Lynch, president of Strategic Energy & Economic Research in Winchester, Massachusetts. “They wanted to see prices fall, and that’s finally taking place.”

<h4>-----No internal-link: Saudi already backstopped</h4><p><strong><mark>PETERSEN AND SHENK ‘12</strong></mark> – Bloomberg Staff Writers (Karyn. Mark Shenk. “Saudi Output Rises to Highest Level in at Least 23 Years”. May 31. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/saudi-output-rises-to-highest-in-at-least-23-years-opec.html)</p><p><u>Oil <mark>output by</u></mark> the <u><mark>O</u></mark>rganization of <u><mark>P</u></mark>etroleum <u><mark>E</u></mark>xporting <u><mark>C</u></mark>ountries <u><mark>rose</mark> in May <mark>to the highest level</mark> since 2008 <mark>as Saudi</mark> Arabia <mark>pumped</mark> crude <strong><mark>at the fastest pace in</strong></mark> at least <strong><mark>23 years</strong></mark>, a Bloomberg survey showed</u>. <u>OPEC production gained 20,000 barrels to an average 31.595 million barrels a day in May from a revised 31.575 million in April, according to the survey</u> of oil companies, producers and analysts. Output increased to the highest level since October 2008. The April total was revised 170,000 barrels a day higher. Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s biggest producer, bolstered output by 80,000 barrels to 9.9 million barrels a day this month, the highest level since at least January 1989, based on monthly data compiled by Bloomberg. <u>Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Ali al-<mark>Naimi </mark>said</u> on May 13 in Adelaide, Australia, that <u>he <mark>wanted to see</mark> the <mark>Brent</mark> crude contract <mark>drop </mark>to $100 a barrel</u>. <u>Brent</u> oil for July settlement decreased $1.60, or 1.6 percent, to $101.87 a barrel on the London-based ICE Futures Europe exchange. It <u>was the lowest close since Oct. 4.</u> “<u><strong><mark>The Saudis are making it abundantly clear that they will keep the market </u></strong></mark>well supplied,” <u>said</u> Michael <u>Lynch, president of S</u>trategic <u>E</u>nergy & <u>E</u>conomic <u>R</u>esearch in Winchester, Massachusetts. “<u><mark>They wanted to see prices fall, and that’s</mark> finally <mark>taking</mark> <mark>place</u></mark>.” </p>

PETERSEN AND SHENK ‘12 – Bloomberg Staff Writers (Karyn. Mark Shenk. “Saudi Output Rises to Highest Level in at Least 23 Years”. May 31. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/saudi-output-rises-to-highest-in-at-least-23-years-opec.html)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: PETERSEN AND SHENK ‘12 – Bloomberg Staff Writers (Karyn. Mark Shenk. “Saudi Output Rises to Highest Level in at Least 23 Years”. May 31. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/saudi-output-rises-to-highest-in-at-least-23-years-opec.html) fulltext: Oil output by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries rose in May to the highest level since 2008 as Saudi Arabia pumped crude at the fastest pace in at least 23 years, a Bloomberg survey showed. OPEC production gained 20,000 barrels to an average 31.595 million barrels a day in May from a revised 31.575 million in April, according to the survey of oil companies, producers and analysts. Output increased to the highest level since October 2008. The April total was revised 170,000 barrels a day higher. Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s biggest producer, bolstered output by 80,000 barrels to 9.9 million barrels a day this month, the highest level since at least January 1989, based on monthly data compiled by Bloomberg. Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi said on May 13 in Adelaide, Australia, that he wanted to see the Brent crude contract drop to $100 a barrel. Brent oil for July settlement decreased $1.60, or 1.6 percent, to $101.87 a barrel on the London-based ICE Futures Europe exchange. It was the lowest close since Oct. 4. “The Saudis are making it abundantly clear that they will keep the market well supplied,” said Michael Lynch, president of Strategic Energy & Economic Research in Winchester, Massachusetts. “They wanted to see prices fall, and that’s finally taking place.” [/INST] <h4>-----No internal-link: Saudi already backstopped</h4><p><strong><mark>PETERSEN AND SHENK ‘12</strong></mark> – Bloomberg Staff Writers (Karyn. Mark Shenk. “Saudi Output Rises to Highest Level in at Least 23 Years”. May 31. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/saudi-output-rises-to-highest-in-at-least-23-years-opec.html)</p><p><u>Oil <mark>output by</u></mark> the <u><mark>O</u></mark>rganization of <u><mark>P</u></mark>etroleum <u><mark>E</u></mark>xporting <u><mark>C</u></mark>ountries <u><mark>rose</mark> in May <mark>to the highest level</mark> since 2008 <mark>as Saudi</mark> Arabia <mark>pumped</mark> crude <strong><mark>at the fastest pace in</strong></mark> at least <strong><mark>23 years</strong></mark>, a Bloomberg survey showed</u>. <u>OPEC production gained 20,000 barrels to an average 31.595 million barrels a day in May from a revised 31.575 million in April, according to the survey</u> of oil companies, producers and analysts. Output increased to the highest level since October 2008. The April total was revised 170,000 barrels a day higher. Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s biggest producer, bolstered output by 80,000 barrels to 9.9 million barrels a day this month, the highest level since at least January 1989, based on monthly data compiled by Bloomberg. <u>Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Ali al-<mark>Naimi </mark>said</u> on May 13 in Adelaide, Australia, that <u>he <mark>wanted to see</mark> the <mark>Brent</mark> crude contract <mark>drop </mark>to $100 a barrel</u>. <u>Brent</u> oil for July settlement decreased $1.60, or 1.6 percent, to $101.87 a barrel on the London-based ICE Futures Europe exchange. It <u>was the lowest close since Oct. 4.</u> “<u><strong><mark>The Saudis are making it abundantly clear that they will keep the market </u></strong></mark>well supplied,” <u>said</u> Michael <u>Lynch, president of S</u>trategic <u>E</u>nergy & <u>E</u>conomic <u>R</u>esearch in Winchester, Massachusetts. “<u><mark>They wanted to see prices fall, and that’s</mark> finally <mark>taking</mark> <mark>place</u></mark>.” </p> </s>

Economy is resilient and decline doesn’t cause war

http://www.newsweek.com/2009/12/11/the-secrets-of-stability.print.html the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries how much has the world really changed Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think.

Others predicted that economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West ll, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many The current global economic system is inherently resilient

Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, December 12, 2009, “The Secrets of Stability: Why terrorism and economic turmoil won't keep the world down for long” Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/12/11/the-secrets-of-stability.print.html) One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' “says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?" This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

<h4><strong>Economy is resilient and decline doesn’t cause war </h4><p>Zakaria 9</p><p></strong> Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, December 12, 2009, “The Secrets of Stability: Why terrorism and economic turmoil won't keep the world down for long” Newsweek, <u>http://www.newsweek.com/2009/12/11/the-secrets-of-stability.print.html</u>)</p><p>One year ago, <u><strong>the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system</u></strong>, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, <u><strong>was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization</u></strong>—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—<u><strong>were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled</u></strong>. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." <u><strong><mark>Others predicted that</mark> these <mark>economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries</u></strong></mark>. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, <u><strong>how much has the world really changed</u></strong>? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. <u><strong><mark>Severe problems remain,</mark> <mark>like high unemployment in the West</mark>, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overa<mark>ll, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.</u></strong></mark> A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' “says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?" <u><strong>This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By <mark>massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage</u></strong>.</mark> (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) <u><strong>The <mark>extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many</u></strong></mark>. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe <u><strong>there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. <mark>The current global economic system is inherently</mark> more <mark>resilient</mark> than we think.</u></strong> The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.</p>

Zakaria 9

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Zakaria 9 fulltext: Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, December 12, 2009, “The Secrets of Stability: Why terrorism and economic turmoil won't keep the world down for long” Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/12/11/the-secrets-of-stability.print.html) One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' “says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?" This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature. [/INST] <h4><strong>Economy is resilient and decline doesn’t cause war </h4><p>Zakaria 9</p><p></strong> Editor of Newsweek, BA from Yale, PhD in pol sci, Harvard. He serves on the board of Yale University, The Council on Foreign Relations, The Trilateral Commission, and Shakespeare and Company. Named "one of the 21 most important people of the 21st Century" (Fareed, December 12, 2009, “The Secrets of Stability: Why terrorism and economic turmoil won't keep the world down for long” Newsweek, <u>http://www.newsweek.com/2009/12/11/the-secrets-of-stability.print.html</u>)</p><p>One year ago, <u><strong>the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system</u></strong>, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, <u><strong>was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization</u></strong>—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—<u><strong>were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled</u></strong>. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." <u><strong><mark>Others predicted that</mark> these <mark>economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries</u></strong></mark>. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, <u><strong>how much has the world really changed</u></strong>? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. <u><strong><mark>Severe problems remain,</mark> <mark>like high unemployment in the West</mark>, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overa<mark>ll, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all.</u></strong></mark> A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' “says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?" <u><strong>This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By <mark>massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage</u></strong>.</mark> (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) <u><strong>The <mark>extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many</u></strong></mark>. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe <u><strong>there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. <mark>The current global economic system is inherently</mark> more <mark>resilient</mark> than we think.</u></strong> The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.</p> </s>

C. Internal link: Obama’s political capital is key to pass comprehensive immigration reform

this is a new congressional session, and pessimism might be wrong For the first time in a decade conditions are aligned for bipartisan deal-making Congress might actually do something and satisfy the wishes of Americans hungry for action There are threads of it and that's encouraging defining success is important -- and requires pragmatism. There's little hope that this Congress can reverse the powerful special interests and partisan media that has gripped Washington the question is whether Republican leaders in the House, President Obama, and Senate Democrats can facilitate a reprieve to show the public that the institution is still functional Cutting a deal with the broad backing of both parties is a question of learning to pass laws in spite of them. ¶ The makeup of the 113th Congress and the occupant of the White House make conditions riper for bipartisan legislation than at any time since Bush's first year Washington has had little interest in passing consequential legislation This session is different Neither party has unilateral control, and yet there is an appetite, in the first year of Obama's second term, to make a serious attempt to legislate The last time Capitol Hill saw something similar came in 2001 The parallel is 1996 which bridges the end of Clinton's first term and the beginning of his second. That two-year span saw agreements on a series of important issues, ranging from two big-ticket items to lesser-known achievements The similarity between that period and now extends beyond the split control of government

pessimism might be wrong conditions are aligned for bipartisan deal-making that Congress might satisfy Americans hungry for action There are threads and that's encouraging defining success requires pragmatism. There's little hope that Congress can reverse partisan media the question is whether Republican in the House Obama, and Democrats can facilitate a reprieve to show t the institution functional. Cutting a deal with both parties is a question of learning to pass laws in spite The makeup of Congress make conditions ripe This session is different Neither party has unilateral control there is an appetite to legislate

Nevertheless, this is a new congressional session, and Boren's pessimism might possibly be proved wrong. For the first time in a decade, if not longer, conditions are aligned for bipartisan deal-making, raising hopes that Congress might actually do something and satisfy the wishes of millions of Americans hungry for action. "I am pleased with the signs I see in Congress today to try to make deals," said Lee Hamilton, who was a veteran Democratic House member from Indiana. "There are threads of it -- it's not a fabric yet -- but there are threads, and that's encouraging."¶ In today's context, defining success is important -- and requires a healthy dose of both skepticism and pragmatism. There's little hope that this Congress can reverse the -- exacerbated by, among other things, powerful special interests and partisan media -- that has gripped Washington. The forces that drove Rep. Boren out of Congress remain potent, and the legislative atmosphere on Capitol Hill is still toxic. Instead of a long-term course correction, the question is whether Republican leaders in the House, President Obama, and Senate Democrats can facilitate a reprieve -- if only to show the public that the institution is still functional. Cutting a deal with the broad backing of both parties isn't a question so much of relieving those pressures as of learning to pass laws in spite of them. ¶ The makeup of the 113th Congress and the occupant of the White House make conditions riper for bipartisan legislation than at any time since President George W. Bush's first years in office. Since then, Washington has been in the grip of one of two dynamics: Either one party has held Congress and the presidency, or one party, possessing limited power, has had little interest in passing consequential legislation.¶ The latter was the case last session, when Republicans controlled only the House. In most cases, they used this chamber to approve legislation, such as Rep. Paul Ryan's eponymous budget, that helped define the party's agenda but had no chance of gaining approval in the Senate (much less withstanding a veto from the White House). They were trying to wait out a president whom they believed would be sent packing in 2013.¶ Democrats were in a similar position from 2007 to 2009, when they controlled Congress but wanted to wait out Bush's tenure. The lack of bipartisanship, of course, didn't prevent major legislation from becoming law over the past 10 years. But when Democrats controlled Washington and passed the Affordable Care Act in 2010, or similarly empowered Republicans approved Medicare Part D in 2003, they didn't need the backing of the other party -- and by and large didn't get it.¶ This session is different. Neither party has unilateral control, and yet there is an appetite, in the first year of Obama's second term, to make a serious attempt to legislate. The last time Capitol Hill saw something similar came in 2001 and 2002. Republicans suddenly lost the Senate when Sen. Jim Jeffords of Vermont defected from the GOP in the early summer, but Congress still overwhelmingly approved the No Child Left Behind Act months later (although the first round of Bush's tax cuts passed with only a dozen or so Democrats on board in each chamber). Later, the parties worked together to approve a slew of national security issues after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.¶ But drawing comparisons to that period is difficult because of 9/11; and, besides, most of Bush's term is hardly associated with bipartisan comity. The better parallel -- and the experience current optimists point to -- is 1996 and 1997, which bridges the end of President Clinton's first term and the beginning of his second. That two-year span saw agreements on a series of important issues, ranging from two big-ticket items (welfare reform and a balanced-budget agreement) to lesser-known achievements (such as raising the minimum wage). The similarity between that period and now extends beyond the split control of government. Only a year earlier, Republicans had ridden the "revolution" of 1994 into control of Congress, when they promised to push their agenda whether Clinton approved or not. But the party ultimately dealt with political setbacks, none more damaging than the government shutdown of 1996. <<Roarty continues>>

<h4>C. Internal link: Obama’s political capital is key to pass comprehensive immigration reform</h4><p>Alex <strong>Roarty, </strong>politics for the National Journal and the Atlantic “There's Reason to Be Optimistic About Congress—Seriously” The Atlantic, 2/21/<strong>2013</strong> </p><p>Nevertheless, <u><strong>this is a new congressional session, and</u></strong> Boren's <u><strong><mark>pessimism might</mark> </u></strong>possibly <u><strong><mark>be</u></strong></mark> proved <u><strong><mark>wrong</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>For the first time in a decade</u></strong>, if not longer, <u><strong><mark>conditions are aligned for bipartisan deal-making</u></strong></mark>, raising hopes <mark>that <u><strong>Congress might</mark> actually do something and <mark>satisfy</mark> the wishes of</u></strong> millions of <u><strong><mark>Americans hungry for action</u></strong></mark>. "I am pleased with the signs I see in Congress today to try to make deals," said Lee Hamilton, who was a veteran Democratic House member from Indiana. "<u><strong><mark>There are threads</mark> of it</u></strong> -- it's not a fabric yet -- but there are threads, <u><strong><mark>and that's encouraging</u></strong></mark>."¶ In today's context, <u><strong><mark>defining success</mark> is important -- and <mark>requires</u></strong></mark> a healthy dose of both skepticism and <u><strong><mark>pragmatism.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>There's little hope that</mark> this <mark>Congress can reverse</mark> the</u></strong> -- exacerbated by, among other things, <u><strong>powerful special interests and <mark>partisan media</u></strong></mark> -- <u><strong>that has gripped Washington</u></strong>. The forces that drove Rep. Boren out of Congress remain potent, and the legislative atmosphere on Capitol Hill is still toxic. Instead of a long-term course correction, <u><strong><mark>the question is whether Republican</mark> leaders <mark>in the House</mark>, President <mark>Obama, and</mark> Senate <mark>Democrats can facilitate a reprieve</u></strong></mark> -- if only <u><strong><mark>to show t</mark>he public that <mark>the institution</mark> is still <mark>functional</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>Cutting a deal</mark> <mark>with</mark> the broad backing of <mark>both parties</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong></mark>n't <u><strong><mark>a question</u></strong></mark> so much of relieving those pressures as <u><strong><mark>of learning to pass laws in spite</mark> of them. ¶ <mark>The makeup of</mark> the 113th <mark>Congress</mark> and the occupant of the White House <mark>make conditions ripe</mark>r for bipartisan legislation than at any time since</u></strong> President George W. <u><strong>Bush's first year</u></strong>s in office. Since then, <u><strong>Washington has </u></strong>been in the grip of one of two dynamics: Either one party has held Congress and the presidency, or one party, possessing limited power, has <u><strong>had little interest in passing consequential legislation</u></strong>.¶ The latter was the case last session, when Republicans controlled only the House. In most cases, they used this chamber to approve legislation, such as Rep. Paul Ryan's eponymous budget, that helped define the party's agenda but had no chance of gaining approval in the Senate (much less withstanding a veto from the White House). They were trying to wait out a president whom they believed would be sent packing in 2013.¶ Democrats were in a similar position from 2007 to 2009, when they controlled Congress but wanted to wait out Bush's tenure. The lack of bipartisanship, of course, didn't prevent major legislation from becoming law over the past 10 years. But when Democrats controlled Washington and passed the Affordable Care Act in 2010, or similarly empowered Republicans approved Medicare Part D in 2003, they didn't need the backing of the other party -- and by and large didn't get it.¶ <u><strong><mark>This session is different</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Neither party has unilateral control</mark>, and yet <mark>there is an appetite</mark>, in the first year of Obama's second term, <mark>to</mark> make a serious attempt to <mark>legislate</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The last time Capitol Hill saw something similar came in 2001</u></strong> and 2002. Republicans suddenly lost the Senate when Sen. Jim Jeffords of Vermont defected from the GOP in the early summer, but Congress still overwhelmingly approved the No Child Left Behind Act months later (although the first round of Bush's tax cuts passed with only a dozen or so Democrats on board in each chamber). Later, the parties worked together to approve a slew of national security issues after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.¶ But drawing comparisons to that period is difficult because of 9/11; and, besides, most of Bush's term is hardly associated with bipartisan comity. <u><strong>The</u></strong> better <u><strong>parallel </u></strong>-- and the experience current optimists point to -- <u><strong>is 1996</u></strong> and 1997, <u><strong>which bridges the end of</u></strong> President <u><strong>Clinton's first term and the beginning of his second. That two-year span saw agreements on a series of important issues, ranging from two big-ticket items</u></strong> (welfare reform and a balanced-budget agreement) <u><strong>to lesser-known achievements</u></strong> (such as raising the minimum wage). <u><strong>The similarity between that period and now extends beyond the split control of government</u></strong>. Only a year earlier, Republicans had ridden the "revolution" of 1994 into control of Congress, when they promised to push their agenda whether Clinton approved or not. But the party ultimately dealt with political setbacks, none more damaging than the government shutdown of 1996. </p><p><<Roarty continues>></p>

Alex Roarty, politics for the National Journal and the Atlantic “There's Reason to Be Optimistic About Congress—Seriously” The Atlantic, 2/21/2013

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Alex Roarty, politics for the National Journal and the Atlantic “There's Reason to Be Optimistic About Congress—Seriously” The Atlantic, 2/21/2013 fulltext: Nevertheless, this is a new congressional session, and Boren's pessimism might possibly be proved wrong. For the first time in a decade, if not longer, conditions are aligned for bipartisan deal-making, raising hopes that Congress might actually do something and satisfy the wishes of millions of Americans hungry for action. "I am pleased with the signs I see in Congress today to try to make deals," said Lee Hamilton, who was a veteran Democratic House member from Indiana. "There are threads of it -- it's not a fabric yet -- but there are threads, and that's encouraging."¶ In today's context, defining success is important -- and requires a healthy dose of both skepticism and pragmatism. There's little hope that this Congress can reverse the -- exacerbated by, among other things, powerful special interests and partisan media -- that has gripped Washington. The forces that drove Rep. Boren out of Congress remain potent, and the legislative atmosphere on Capitol Hill is still toxic. Instead of a long-term course correction, the question is whether Republican leaders in the House, President Obama, and Senate Democrats can facilitate a reprieve -- if only to show the public that the institution is still functional. Cutting a deal with the broad backing of both parties isn't a question so much of relieving those pressures as of learning to pass laws in spite of them. ¶ The makeup of the 113th Congress and the occupant of the White House make conditions riper for bipartisan legislation than at any time since President George W. Bush's first years in office. Since then, Washington has been in the grip of one of two dynamics: Either one party has held Congress and the presidency, or one party, possessing limited power, has had little interest in passing consequential legislation.¶ The latter was the case last session, when Republicans controlled only the House. In most cases, they used this chamber to approve legislation, such as Rep. Paul Ryan's eponymous budget, that helped define the party's agenda but had no chance of gaining approval in the Senate (much less withstanding a veto from the White House). They were trying to wait out a president whom they believed would be sent packing in 2013.¶ Democrats were in a similar position from 2007 to 2009, when they controlled Congress but wanted to wait out Bush's tenure. The lack of bipartisanship, of course, didn't prevent major legislation from becoming law over the past 10 years. But when Democrats controlled Washington and passed the Affordable Care Act in 2010, or similarly empowered Republicans approved Medicare Part D in 2003, they didn't need the backing of the other party -- and by and large didn't get it.¶ This session is different. Neither party has unilateral control, and yet there is an appetite, in the first year of Obama's second term, to make a serious attempt to legislate. The last time Capitol Hill saw something similar came in 2001 and 2002. Republicans suddenly lost the Senate when Sen. Jim Jeffords of Vermont defected from the GOP in the early summer, but Congress still overwhelmingly approved the No Child Left Behind Act months later (although the first round of Bush's tax cuts passed with only a dozen or so Democrats on board in each chamber). Later, the parties worked together to approve a slew of national security issues after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.¶ But drawing comparisons to that period is difficult because of 9/11; and, besides, most of Bush's term is hardly associated with bipartisan comity. The better parallel -- and the experience current optimists point to -- is 1996 and 1997, which bridges the end of President Clinton's first term and the beginning of his second. That two-year span saw agreements on a series of important issues, ranging from two big-ticket items (welfare reform and a balanced-budget agreement) to lesser-known achievements (such as raising the minimum wage). The similarity between that period and now extends beyond the split control of government. Only a year earlier, Republicans had ridden the "revolution" of 1994 into control of Congress, when they promised to push their agenda whether Clinton approved or not. But the party ultimately dealt with political setbacks, none more damaging than the government shutdown of 1996. <<Roarty continues>> [/INST] <h4>C. Internal link: Obama’s political capital is key to pass comprehensive immigration reform</h4><p>Alex <strong>Roarty, </strong>politics for the National Journal and the Atlantic “There's Reason to Be Optimistic About Congress—Seriously” The Atlantic, 2/21/<strong>2013</strong> </p><p>Nevertheless, <u><strong>this is a new congressional session, and</u></strong> Boren's <u><strong><mark>pessimism might</mark> </u></strong>possibly <u><strong><mark>be</u></strong></mark> proved <u><strong><mark>wrong</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>For the first time in a decade</u></strong>, if not longer, <u><strong><mark>conditions are aligned for bipartisan deal-making</u></strong></mark>, raising hopes <mark>that <u><strong>Congress might</mark> actually do something and <mark>satisfy</mark> the wishes of</u></strong> millions of <u><strong><mark>Americans hungry for action</u></strong></mark>. "I am pleased with the signs I see in Congress today to try to make deals," said Lee Hamilton, who was a veteran Democratic House member from Indiana. "<u><strong><mark>There are threads</mark> of it</u></strong> -- it's not a fabric yet -- but there are threads, <u><strong><mark>and that's encouraging</u></strong></mark>."¶ In today's context, <u><strong><mark>defining success</mark> is important -- and <mark>requires</u></strong></mark> a healthy dose of both skepticism and <u><strong><mark>pragmatism.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>There's little hope that</mark> this <mark>Congress can reverse</mark> the</u></strong> -- exacerbated by, among other things, <u><strong>powerful special interests and <mark>partisan media</u></strong></mark> -- <u><strong>that has gripped Washington</u></strong>. The forces that drove Rep. Boren out of Congress remain potent, and the legislative atmosphere on Capitol Hill is still toxic. Instead of a long-term course correction, <u><strong><mark>the question is whether Republican</mark> leaders <mark>in the House</mark>, President <mark>Obama, and</mark> Senate <mark>Democrats can facilitate a reprieve</u></strong></mark> -- if only <u><strong><mark>to show t</mark>he public that <mark>the institution</mark> is still <mark>functional</u></strong>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>Cutting a deal</mark> <mark>with</mark> the broad backing of <mark>both parties</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong></mark>n't <u><strong><mark>a question</u></strong></mark> so much of relieving those pressures as <u><strong><mark>of learning to pass laws in spite</mark> of them. ¶ <mark>The makeup of</mark> the 113th <mark>Congress</mark> and the occupant of the White House <mark>make conditions ripe</mark>r for bipartisan legislation than at any time since</u></strong> President George W. <u><strong>Bush's first year</u></strong>s in office. Since then, <u><strong>Washington has </u></strong>been in the grip of one of two dynamics: Either one party has held Congress and the presidency, or one party, possessing limited power, has <u><strong>had little interest in passing consequential legislation</u></strong>.¶ The latter was the case last session, when Republicans controlled only the House. In most cases, they used this chamber to approve legislation, such as Rep. Paul Ryan's eponymous budget, that helped define the party's agenda but had no chance of gaining approval in the Senate (much less withstanding a veto from the White House). They were trying to wait out a president whom they believed would be sent packing in 2013.¶ Democrats were in a similar position from 2007 to 2009, when they controlled Congress but wanted to wait out Bush's tenure. The lack of bipartisanship, of course, didn't prevent major legislation from becoming law over the past 10 years. But when Democrats controlled Washington and passed the Affordable Care Act in 2010, or similarly empowered Republicans approved Medicare Part D in 2003, they didn't need the backing of the other party -- and by and large didn't get it.¶ <u><strong><mark>This session is different</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Neither party has unilateral control</mark>, and yet <mark>there is an appetite</mark>, in the first year of Obama's second term, <mark>to</mark> make a serious attempt to <mark>legislate</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>The last time Capitol Hill saw something similar came in 2001</u></strong> and 2002. Republicans suddenly lost the Senate when Sen. Jim Jeffords of Vermont defected from the GOP in the early summer, but Congress still overwhelmingly approved the No Child Left Behind Act months later (although the first round of Bush's tax cuts passed with only a dozen or so Democrats on board in each chamber). Later, the parties worked together to approve a slew of national security issues after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.¶ But drawing comparisons to that period is difficult because of 9/11; and, besides, most of Bush's term is hardly associated with bipartisan comity. <u><strong>The</u></strong> better <u><strong>parallel </u></strong>-- and the experience current optimists point to -- <u><strong>is 1996</u></strong> and 1997, <u><strong>which bridges the end of</u></strong> President <u><strong>Clinton's first term and the beginning of his second. That two-year span saw agreements on a series of important issues, ranging from two big-ticket items</u></strong> (welfare reform and a balanced-budget agreement) <u><strong>to lesser-known achievements</u></strong> (such as raising the minimum wage). <u><strong>The similarity between that period and now extends beyond the split control of government</u></strong>. Only a year earlier, Republicans had ridden the "revolution" of 1994 into control of Congress, when they promised to push their agenda whether Clinton approved or not. But the party ultimately dealt with political setbacks, none more damaging than the government shutdown of 1996. </p><p><<Roarty continues>></p> </s>

Chinese influence in the region key to the global economy

] Latin American markets are valuable for Chinese companies they allow the PRC to diversify its export base when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets The region has an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell higher value products the PRC has overcome resistance by established interests businesspeople and government have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance China has applied pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open , the PRC will need to rely increasingly on goodwill as well as its influence with governments of the region to resolve such problems when they occur The rise of China is tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation Because of this the PRC see the country’s sustained growth and development and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the U S is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China’s attainment of observer status were efforts to keep them from being used “against” Chinese interests. the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets to secure bilateral free trade agreements whose effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.

[R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University.Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf] Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China has also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chávez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase, the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region, to resolve such problems when they occur.The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country’s sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China’s attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used “against” Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.

<h4><strong>Chinese influence in the region key to the global economy </h4><p>Ellis 11</p><p></strong>[R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University.Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf<u><strong>]</p><p></u></strong>Access to Latin American Markets. <u><strong>Latin American markets are</u></strong> becoming increasingly <u><strong>valuable for Chinese</u></strong> <u><strong>companies</u></strong> because <u><strong>they allow the PRC to </u></strong>expand and <u><strong>diversify its export base</u></strong> at a time <u><strong>when economic growth is</u></strong> <u><strong>slowing in traditional markets</u></strong> such as the United States and Europe. <u><strong>The region has</u></strong> also proven <u><strong>an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell </u></strong>more sophisticated, <u><strong>higher value</u></strong> added <u><strong>products</u></strong> in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, <u><strong>the PRC has</u></strong> often had to <u><strong>overcome resistance by </u></strong>organized and often politically well-connected <u><strong>established interests</u></strong> in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of <u><strong>businesspeople and government</u></strong> officials in those nations <u><strong>have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance</u></strong>. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, <u><strong>China has applied</u></strong> more explicit <u><strong>pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open</u></strong> to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China has also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chávez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase<u><strong>, the PRC will need to rely increasingly on </u></strong>a combination of <u><strong>goodwill</u></strong> and fear to deter action against its personnel, <u><strong>as well as its influence with governments of the region</u></strong>, <u><strong>to resolve such problems when they occur</u></strong>.<u><strong>The rise of China is</u></strong> intimately <u><strong>tied to the global economy</u></strong> <u><strong>through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation</u></strong>. <u><strong>Because of this</u></strong>, some within <u><strong>the PRC</u></strong> leadership <u><strong>see the country’s</u></strong> <u><strong>sustained growth and development</u></strong>, <u><strong>and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the</u></strong> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests.</u></strong> <u><strong>In Latin America, China’s attainment of observer status</u></strong> in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 <u><strong>were efforts to</u></strong> obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to <u><strong>keep them from being used “against” Chinese interests.</u></strong> In addition, <u><strong>the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets</u></strong> by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica <u><strong>to secure bilateral free trade agreements</u></strong>, <u><strong>whose</u></strong> practical <u><strong>effect is to move</u></strong> <u><strong>Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block</u></strong> (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) <u><strong>in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.</p></u></strong>

Ellis 11

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ellis 11 fulltext: [R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University.Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf] Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China has also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chávez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase, the PRC will need to rely increasingly on a combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence with governments of the region, to resolve such problems when they occur.The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership see the country’s sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China’s attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used “against” Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged. [/INST] <h4><strong>Chinese influence in the region key to the global economy </h4><p>Ellis 11</p><p></strong>[R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University.Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf<u><strong>]</p><p></u></strong>Access to Latin American Markets. <u><strong>Latin American markets are</u></strong> becoming increasingly <u><strong>valuable for Chinese</u></strong> <u><strong>companies</u></strong> because <u><strong>they allow the PRC to </u></strong>expand and <u><strong>diversify its export base</u></strong> at a time <u><strong>when economic growth is</u></strong> <u><strong>slowing in traditional markets</u></strong> such as the United States and Europe. <u><strong>The region has</u></strong> also proven <u><strong>an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell </u></strong>more sophisticated, <u><strong>higher value</u></strong> added <u><strong>products</u></strong> in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, <u><strong>the PRC has</u></strong> often had to <u><strong>overcome resistance by </u></strong>organized and often politically well-connected <u><strong>established interests</u></strong> in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of <u><strong>businesspeople and government</u></strong> officials in those nations <u><strong>have played a key role in the political will to overcome the resistance</u></strong>. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, <u><strong>China has applied</u></strong> more explicit <u><strong>pressures to induce Latin America to keep its markets open</u></strong> to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China has also used its economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the Chávez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15 Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime, protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November 2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35 police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela, became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase<u><strong>, the PRC will need to rely increasingly on </u></strong>a combination of <u><strong>goodwill</u></strong> and fear to deter action against its personnel, <u><strong>as well as its influence with governments of the region</u></strong>, <u><strong>to resolve such problems when they occur</u></strong>.<u><strong>The rise of China is</u></strong> intimately <u><strong>tied to the global economy</u></strong> <u><strong>through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation</u></strong>. <u><strong>Because of this</u></strong>, some within <u><strong>the PRC</u></strong> leadership <u><strong>see the country’s</u></strong> <u><strong>sustained growth and development</u></strong>, <u><strong>and thus the stability of the regime, threatened if an actor such as the</u></strong> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>is able to limit that cooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests.</u></strong> <u><strong>In Latin America, China’s attainment of observer status</u></strong> in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 <u><strong>were efforts to</u></strong> obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to <u><strong>keep them from being used “against” Chinese interests.</u></strong> In addition, <u><strong>the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets</u></strong> by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica <u><strong>to secure bilateral free trade agreements</u></strong>, <u><strong>whose</u></strong> practical <u><strong>effect is to move</u></strong> <u><strong>Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block</u></strong> (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) <u><strong>in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.</p></u></strong> </s>

[E.] lifting the embargo solves trade relations with Cuba, bolsters the economy, and boosts ties to Latin America

As the Obama administration slowly inches towards normalizing its relations with Cuba, pressure is mounting on the new president to lift the embargo , the Cuban embargo witnessed the loss of its stated purpose years ago and is now gratuitously hobbling the diplomacy of Cuba and the United States A lift of the "blockade," as many Cubans call the embargo, would give Havana the opportunity to repay some of its debts and afford everyday necessities. Normalized relations would give the U.S. access to Cuban oil exploration and drilling, and allow the U.S. to implement environmental regulations aimed at protecting the Florida coast from potential oil spills. Enhanced trade with Cuba could generate up to $1.9 billion for the U.S.'s cash-strapped economy, and the image of the U.S. in Latin America undoubtedly would encounter a much-needed boost. Very few deny that both nations would benefit from the embargo's end and trade normalization.

[Lily, Research Associate The council on hemispheric relations, Cuban Oil: Havana's Potential Geo-Political Bombshell, Washington Report on the Hemisphere29. 11. (Jun 18, 2009), Accessed online via Proquest] Wyo-MB As the Obama administration slowly inches towards normalizing its relations with Cuba, pressure is mounting on the new president to lift the decades-old and universally acknowledged anachronistic embargo. In order to underline the many impacts of the embargo, this article continues COHAs ongoing series on U. S. -Cuba bilateral relations. A relic of the Cold War, the Cuban embargo witnessed the loss of its stated purpose years ago and is now gratuitously hobbling the diplomacy of Cuba and the United States. At the same time, Cuba is struggling to pay for necessary imports and provide energy sources for its people. A lift of the "blockade," as many Cubans call the embargo, would give Havana the opportunity to repay some of its debts and afford everyday necessities. Normalized relations would give the U.S. access to Cuban oil exploration and drilling, and allow the U.S. to implement environmental regulations aimed at protecting the Florida coast from potential oil spills. Enhanced trade with Cuba could generate up to $1.9 billion for the U.S.'s cash-strapped economy, and the image of the U.S. in Latin America undoubtedly would encounter a much-needed boost. Very few deny that both nations would benefit from the embargo's end and trade normalization.

<h4>[E.] <strong>lifting the embargo solves trade relations with Cuba, bolsters the economy, and boosts ties to Latin America</h4><p>Fesler, 2009</p><p></strong>[Lily, Research Associate The council on hemispheric relations, Cuban Oil: Havana's Potential Geo-Political Bombshell, Washington Report on the Hemisphere29. 11. (Jun 18, 2009), Accessed online via Proquest] Wyo-MB</p><p><u><strong>As the Obama administration slowly inches towards normalizing its relations with Cuba, pressure is mounting on the new president to lift the</u></strong> decades-old and universally acknowledged anachronistic <u><strong>embargo</u></strong>. In order to underline the many impacts of the embargo, this article continues COHAs ongoing series on U. S. -Cuba bilateral relations. A relic of the Cold War<u><strong>, the Cuban embargo witnessed the loss of its stated purpose years ago and is now gratuitously hobbling the diplomacy of Cuba and the United States</u></strong>. At the same time, Cuba is struggling to pay for necessary imports and provide energy sources for its people. <u><strong>A lift of the "blockade," as many Cubans call the embargo, would give Havana the opportunity to repay some of its debts and afford everyday necessities. Normalized relations would give the U.S. access to Cuban oil exploration and drilling, and allow the U.S. to implement environmental regulations aimed at protecting the Florida coast from potential oil spills. Enhanced trade with Cuba could generate up to $1.9 billion for the U.S.'s cash-strapped economy, and the image of the U.S. in Latin America undoubtedly would encounter a much-needed boost. Very few deny that both nations would benefit from the embargo's end and trade normalization.</p></u></strong>

Fesler, 2009

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Fesler, 2009 fulltext: [Lily, Research Associate The council on hemispheric relations, Cuban Oil: Havana's Potential Geo-Political Bombshell, Washington Report on the Hemisphere29. 11. (Jun 18, 2009), Accessed online via Proquest] Wyo-MB As the Obama administration slowly inches towards normalizing its relations with Cuba, pressure is mounting on the new president to lift the decades-old and universally acknowledged anachronistic embargo. In order to underline the many impacts of the embargo, this article continues COHAs ongoing series on U. S. -Cuba bilateral relations. A relic of the Cold War, the Cuban embargo witnessed the loss of its stated purpose years ago and is now gratuitously hobbling the diplomacy of Cuba and the United States. At the same time, Cuba is struggling to pay for necessary imports and provide energy sources for its people. A lift of the "blockade," as many Cubans call the embargo, would give Havana the opportunity to repay some of its debts and afford everyday necessities. Normalized relations would give the U.S. access to Cuban oil exploration and drilling, and allow the U.S. to implement environmental regulations aimed at protecting the Florida coast from potential oil spills. Enhanced trade with Cuba could generate up to $1.9 billion for the U.S.'s cash-strapped economy, and the image of the U.S. in Latin America undoubtedly would encounter a much-needed boost. Very few deny that both nations would benefit from the embargo's end and trade normalization. [/INST] <h4>[E.] <strong>lifting the embargo solves trade relations with Cuba, bolsters the economy, and boosts ties to Latin America</h4><p>Fesler, 2009</p><p></strong>[Lily, Research Associate The council on hemispheric relations, Cuban Oil: Havana's Potential Geo-Political Bombshell, Washington Report on the Hemisphere29. 11. (Jun 18, 2009), Accessed online via Proquest] Wyo-MB</p><p><u><strong>As the Obama administration slowly inches towards normalizing its relations with Cuba, pressure is mounting on the new president to lift the</u></strong> decades-old and universally acknowledged anachronistic <u><strong>embargo</u></strong>. In order to underline the many impacts of the embargo, this article continues COHAs ongoing series on U. S. -Cuba bilateral relations. A relic of the Cold War<u><strong>, the Cuban embargo witnessed the loss of its stated purpose years ago and is now gratuitously hobbling the diplomacy of Cuba and the United States</u></strong>. At the same time, Cuba is struggling to pay for necessary imports and provide energy sources for its people. <u><strong>A lift of the "blockade," as many Cubans call the embargo, would give Havana the opportunity to repay some of its debts and afford everyday necessities. Normalized relations would give the U.S. access to Cuban oil exploration and drilling, and allow the U.S. to implement environmental regulations aimed at protecting the Florida coast from potential oil spills. Enhanced trade with Cuba could generate up to $1.9 billion for the U.S.'s cash-strapped economy, and the image of the U.S. in Latin America undoubtedly would encounter a much-needed boost. Very few deny that both nations would benefit from the embargo's end and trade normalization.</p></u></strong> </s>

Iran-Venezuela ties cause prolif and terrorism- causes nuclear war

Given Iran’s nuclear capabilities, there is concern throughout the region and in the United States as to what role supportive countries like Venezuela might play in the advancement and proliferation of nuclear tech We are very worried that nuclear war be brought to our neighborhood Venezuela “could have important reserves of Uranium Chávez announced an agreement with Russia for assistance in developing a nuclear energy program and plans for the establishment of a “nuclear village” with technological assistance from Iran What worries us is Iran’s history of activities in the region and especially its links to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks that took place in Buenos Aires That is a concern principally because of the connections between the government of Iran, which is a state sponsor of terrorism, and Hezbollah

Given Iran’s nuclear capabilities, there is concern throughout the region as to what role supportive countries like ¶ Venezuela might play in the advancement and proliferation of nuclear ¶ tech We are very worried that nuclear war be brought to our neighborhood Venezuela “could have important reserves of Uranium What worries us is Iran’s history of activities in the region and especially its links ¶ to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks that took place in Buenos Aires That is a concern principally because of the connections between the government of Iran, which is a state sponsor of ¶ terrorism, and Hezbollah

Given Iran’s nuclear capabilities, there is concern throughout the region and in the United States as to what role supportive countries like ¶ Venezuela might play in the advancement and proliferation of nuclear ¶ technologies. Colombian President Álvaro Uribe has expressed concern saying, “We are very worried and I can’t refrain from saying so, ¶ that nuclear war be brought to our neighborhood. This is very serious, ¶ very worrying,”19 and with seemingly good reason. In September 2009, ¶ “Iran said it test-fired short-range missiles, just days after it confirmed ¶ it is building a second uranium-enrichment facility.”20 Rodolfo Sanz, ¶ Venezuela’s minister of basic industries and mining has indicated that ¶ Venezuela “could have important reserves of Uranium,” and while he ¶ rejects allegations that Venezuela is supplying Iran’s nuclear program, ¶ he did confirm that “Iran is helping us with geophysical aerial probes ¶ and geochemical analyses.”21 In September 2009, Chávez announced an ¶ agreement with Russia for assistance in developing a nuclear energy program and plans for the establishment of a “nuclear village” with technological assistance from Iran.22¶ Asked if Washington is worried, Thomas Shannon, then the top ¶ State Department official for Latin America, responded, “What worries us is Iran’s history of activities in the region and especially its links ¶ to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks that took place in Buenos Aires,” ¶ concluding, “Past is prologue.”23 As far back as November 2007, the ¶ United States House of Representatives passed a resolution “expressing ¶ concern about threats to the U.S. by deepening economic and security ¶ ties between Iran and like-minded regimes in the Western Hemisphere, ¶ including Venezuela.” The resolution had its base in “evidence that ¶ Iranian-backed Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization, raises millions from counterfeit products produced in the tri-border region of ¶ Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, and growing efforts backed by Iran to ¶ foment anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism.”24 It is therefore no surprise that in 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Chávez ¶ government of “employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah ¶ facilitators and fundraisers.” 25 In a hearing before the Senate Armed ¶ Services Committee, Navy Admiral James Stavridis, then Commander ¶ of the U.S. Southern Command, testified that “We have seen… an increase in a wide level of activity by the Iranian government in this region.” He continued, “That is a concern principally because of the connections between the government of Iran, which is a state sponsor of ¶ terrorism, and Hezbollah.”26 It is relevant to note that at the printing of ¶ this publication, there is global controversy over Ahmadinejad’s nomination of Ahmad Vahidi as the minister of defense for Iran. Vahidi is one ¶ of five Iranian officials wanted by Interpol to face charges in Argentina ¶ for alleged involvement in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires.27 Without providing any specifics, Stavridis also ¶ testified, “We have been seeing in Colombia a direct connection between Hezbollah activity and narco-trafficking activity.”28 In October ¶ 2008, following a two-year investigation, 36 suspects were arrested in ¶ Colombia on charges related to cocaine smuggling and money laundering. Gladys Sanchez, the lead investigator for the case said, “The profits ¶ from the sales of drugs went to finance Hezbollah. This is an example ¶ of how narco-trafficking is a theme of interest to all criminal organizations, the FARC, the paramilitaries and terrorists.” 29

<h4>Iran-Venezuela ties cause prolif and terrorism- causes nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Stubits ‘09</strong> [Adam Stubits is program associate for the Wilson Center’s Latin ¶ American Program. He received his B.A. in Political Science and M.P.A ¶ with an emphasis in international organizations from The American ¶ University. His research interests include citizen security in Latin ¶ America, informal international organizations and the role of public administration in development. Prior to coming to the Wilson Center, ¶ he was a special assistant for International Accounts with the Corporate ¶ Executive Board and before that a Development Officer with Partners ¶ of the Americas, “Iran In Latin America: Threat or ‘axis of annoyance’?” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran_in_LA.pdf]</p><p><u><mark>Given Iran’s nuclear capabilities, there is concern throughout the region</mark> and in the United States <mark>as to what role supportive countries like </u>¶<u> Venezuela might play in the advancement and proliferation of nuclear </u>¶<u> tech</u></mark>nologies. Colombian President Álvaro Uribe has expressed concern saying, “<u><mark>We are very worried</u></mark> and I can’t refrain from saying so, ¶ <u><mark>that nuclear war be brought to our neighborhood</u></mark>. This is very serious, ¶ very worrying,”19 and with seemingly good reason. In September 2009, ¶ “Iran said it test-fired short-range missiles, just days after it confirmed ¶ it is building a second uranium-enrichment facility.”20 Rodolfo Sanz, ¶ Venezuela’s minister of basic industries and mining has indicated that ¶ <u><mark>Venezuela “could have important reserves of Uranium</u></mark>,” and while he ¶ rejects allegations that Venezuela is supplying Iran’s nuclear program, ¶ he did confirm that “Iran is helping us with geophysical aerial probes ¶ and geochemical analyses.”21 In September 2009, <u>Chávez announced an </u>¶<u> agreement with Russia for assistance in developing a nuclear energy program and plans for the establishment of a “nuclear village” with technological assistance from Iran</u>.22¶ Asked if Washington is worried, Thomas Shannon, then the top ¶ State Department official for Latin America, responded, “<u><mark>What worries us is Iran’s history of activities in the region and especially its links </u>¶<u> to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks that took place in Buenos Aires</u></mark>,” ¶ concluding, “Past is prologue.”23 As far back as November 2007, the ¶ United States House of Representatives passed a resolution “expressing ¶ concern about threats to the U.S. by deepening economic and security ¶ ties between Iran and like-minded regimes in the Western Hemisphere, ¶ including Venezuela.” The resolution had its base in “evidence that ¶ Iranian-backed Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization, raises millions from counterfeit products produced in the tri-border region of ¶ Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, and growing efforts backed by Iran to ¶ foment anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism.”24 It is therefore no surprise that in 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Chávez ¶ government of “employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah ¶ facilitators and fundraisers.” 25 In a hearing before the Senate Armed ¶ Services Committee, Navy Admiral James Stavridis, then Commander ¶ of the U.S. Southern Command, testified that “We have seen… an increase in a wide level of activity by the Iranian government in this region.” He continued, “<u><mark>That is a concern principally because of the connections between the government of Iran, which is a state sponsor of </u>¶<u> terrorism, and Hezbollah</u></mark>.”26 It is relevant to note that at the printing of ¶ this publication, there is global controversy over Ahmadinejad’s nomination of Ahmad Vahidi as the minister of defense for Iran. Vahidi is one ¶ of five Iranian officials wanted by Interpol to face charges in Argentina ¶ for alleged involvement in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires.27 Without providing any specifics, Stavridis also ¶ testified, “We have been seeing in Colombia a direct connection between Hezbollah activity and narco-trafficking activity.”28 In October ¶ 2008, following a two-year investigation, 36 suspects were arrested in ¶ Colombia on charges related to cocaine smuggling and money laundering. Gladys Sanchez, the lead investigator for the case said, “The profits ¶ from the sales of drugs went to finance Hezbollah. This is an example ¶ of how narco-trafficking is a theme of interest to all criminal organizations, the FARC, the paramilitaries and terrorists.” 29</p>

Stubits ‘09 [Adam Stubits is program associate for the Wilson Center’s Latin ¶ American Program. He received his B.A. in Political Science and M.P.A ¶ with an emphasis in international organizations from The American ¶ University. His research interests include citizen security in Latin ¶ America, informal international organizations and the role of public administration in development. Prior to coming to the Wilson Center, ¶ he was a special assistant for International Accounts with the Corporate ¶ Executive Board and before that a Development Officer with Partners ¶ of the Americas, “Iran In Latin America: Threat or ‘axis of annoyance’?” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran_in_LA.pdf]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Stubits ‘09 [Adam Stubits is program associate for the Wilson Center’s Latin ¶ American Program. He received his B.A. in Political Science and M.P.A ¶ with an emphasis in international organizations from The American ¶ University. His research interests include citizen security in Latin ¶ America, informal international organizations and the role of public administration in development. Prior to coming to the Wilson Center, ¶ he was a special assistant for International Accounts with the Corporate ¶ Executive Board and before that a Development Officer with Partners ¶ of the Americas, “Iran In Latin America: Threat or ‘axis of annoyance’?” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran_in_LA.pdf] fulltext: Given Iran’s nuclear capabilities, there is concern throughout the region and in the United States as to what role supportive countries like ¶ Venezuela might play in the advancement and proliferation of nuclear ¶ technologies. Colombian President Álvaro Uribe has expressed concern saying, “We are very worried and I can’t refrain from saying so, ¶ that nuclear war be brought to our neighborhood. This is very serious, ¶ very worrying,”19 and with seemingly good reason. In September 2009, ¶ “Iran said it test-fired short-range missiles, just days after it confirmed ¶ it is building a second uranium-enrichment facility.”20 Rodolfo Sanz, ¶ Venezuela’s minister of basic industries and mining has indicated that ¶ Venezuela “could have important reserves of Uranium,” and while he ¶ rejects allegations that Venezuela is supplying Iran’s nuclear program, ¶ he did confirm that “Iran is helping us with geophysical aerial probes ¶ and geochemical analyses.”21 In September 2009, Chávez announced an ¶ agreement with Russia for assistance in developing a nuclear energy program and plans for the establishment of a “nuclear village” with technological assistance from Iran.22¶ Asked if Washington is worried, Thomas Shannon, then the top ¶ State Department official for Latin America, responded, “What worries us is Iran’s history of activities in the region and especially its links ¶ to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks that took place in Buenos Aires,” ¶ concluding, “Past is prologue.”23 As far back as November 2007, the ¶ United States House of Representatives passed a resolution “expressing ¶ concern about threats to the U.S. by deepening economic and security ¶ ties between Iran and like-minded regimes in the Western Hemisphere, ¶ including Venezuela.” The resolution had its base in “evidence that ¶ Iranian-backed Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization, raises millions from counterfeit products produced in the tri-border region of ¶ Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, and growing efforts backed by Iran to ¶ foment anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism.”24 It is therefore no surprise that in 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Chávez ¶ government of “employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah ¶ facilitators and fundraisers.” 25 In a hearing before the Senate Armed ¶ Services Committee, Navy Admiral James Stavridis, then Commander ¶ of the U.S. Southern Command, testified that “We have seen… an increase in a wide level of activity by the Iranian government in this region.” He continued, “That is a concern principally because of the connections between the government of Iran, which is a state sponsor of ¶ terrorism, and Hezbollah.”26 It is relevant to note that at the printing of ¶ this publication, there is global controversy over Ahmadinejad’s nomination of Ahmad Vahidi as the minister of defense for Iran. Vahidi is one ¶ of five Iranian officials wanted by Interpol to face charges in Argentina ¶ for alleged involvement in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires.27 Without providing any specifics, Stavridis also ¶ testified, “We have been seeing in Colombia a direct connection between Hezbollah activity and narco-trafficking activity.”28 In October ¶ 2008, following a two-year investigation, 36 suspects were arrested in ¶ Colombia on charges related to cocaine smuggling and money laundering. Gladys Sanchez, the lead investigator for the case said, “The profits ¶ from the sales of drugs went to finance Hezbollah. This is an example ¶ of how narco-trafficking is a theme of interest to all criminal organizations, the FARC, the paramilitaries and terrorists.” 29 [/INST] <h4>Iran-Venezuela ties cause prolif and terrorism- causes nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Stubits ‘09</strong> [Adam Stubits is program associate for the Wilson Center’s Latin ¶ American Program. He received his B.A. in Political Science and M.P.A ¶ with an emphasis in international organizations from The American ¶ University. His research interests include citizen security in Latin ¶ America, informal international organizations and the role of public administration in development. Prior to coming to the Wilson Center, ¶ he was a special assistant for International Accounts with the Corporate ¶ Executive Board and before that a Development Officer with Partners ¶ of the Americas, “Iran In Latin America: Threat or ‘axis of annoyance’?” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran_in_LA.pdf]</p><p><u><mark>Given Iran’s nuclear capabilities, there is concern throughout the region</mark> and in the United States <mark>as to what role supportive countries like </u>¶<u> Venezuela might play in the advancement and proliferation of nuclear </u>¶<u> tech</u></mark>nologies. Colombian President Álvaro Uribe has expressed concern saying, “<u><mark>We are very worried</u></mark> and I can’t refrain from saying so, ¶ <u><mark>that nuclear war be brought to our neighborhood</u></mark>. This is very serious, ¶ very worrying,”19 and with seemingly good reason. In September 2009, ¶ “Iran said it test-fired short-range missiles, just days after it confirmed ¶ it is building a second uranium-enrichment facility.”20 Rodolfo Sanz, ¶ Venezuela’s minister of basic industries and mining has indicated that ¶ <u><mark>Venezuela “could have important reserves of Uranium</u></mark>,” and while he ¶ rejects allegations that Venezuela is supplying Iran’s nuclear program, ¶ he did confirm that “Iran is helping us with geophysical aerial probes ¶ and geochemical analyses.”21 In September 2009, <u>Chávez announced an </u>¶<u> agreement with Russia for assistance in developing a nuclear energy program and plans for the establishment of a “nuclear village” with technological assistance from Iran</u>.22¶ Asked if Washington is worried, Thomas Shannon, then the top ¶ State Department official for Latin America, responded, “<u><mark>What worries us is Iran’s history of activities in the region and especially its links </u>¶<u> to Hezbollah and the terrorist attacks that took place in Buenos Aires</u></mark>,” ¶ concluding, “Past is prologue.”23 As far back as November 2007, the ¶ United States House of Representatives passed a resolution “expressing ¶ concern about threats to the U.S. by deepening economic and security ¶ ties between Iran and like-minded regimes in the Western Hemisphere, ¶ including Venezuela.” The resolution had its base in “evidence that ¶ Iranian-backed Hezbollah, a designated terrorist organization, raises millions from counterfeit products produced in the tri-border region of ¶ Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, and growing efforts backed by Iran to ¶ foment anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism.”24 It is therefore no surprise that in 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Chávez ¶ government of “employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah ¶ facilitators and fundraisers.” 25 In a hearing before the Senate Armed ¶ Services Committee, Navy Admiral James Stavridis, then Commander ¶ of the U.S. Southern Command, testified that “We have seen… an increase in a wide level of activity by the Iranian government in this region.” He continued, “<u><mark>That is a concern principally because of the connections between the government of Iran, which is a state sponsor of </u>¶<u> terrorism, and Hezbollah</u></mark>.”26 It is relevant to note that at the printing of ¶ this publication, there is global controversy over Ahmadinejad’s nomination of Ahmad Vahidi as the minister of defense for Iran. Vahidi is one ¶ of five Iranian officials wanted by Interpol to face charges in Argentina ¶ for alleged involvement in the 1994 bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires.27 Without providing any specifics, Stavridis also ¶ testified, “We have been seeing in Colombia a direct connection between Hezbollah activity and narco-trafficking activity.”28 In October ¶ 2008, following a two-year investigation, 36 suspects were arrested in ¶ Colombia on charges related to cocaine smuggling and money laundering. Gladys Sanchez, the lead investigator for the case said, “The profits ¶ from the sales of drugs went to finance Hezbollah. This is an example ¶ of how narco-trafficking is a theme of interest to all criminal organizations, the FARC, the paramilitaries and terrorists.” 29</p> </s>

(__) The peace process won’t solve terrorism – empirically proven

supporters of the Peace Process base their argument on an unwarranted assumption the prospect of bringing final resolution to the territorial" dispute between Israel and the Arabs the dispute is not about territory but about God the entire Islamic world's opposition to Israel stems from doctrinal hatred of a "cancerous" Jewish state in its midst. Indeed, if the Palestinian opposition to Israel is only about West Bank and Gaza, why were there so many Arab terrorist attacks against Jews when these disputed territories were in Arab hands

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE PEACE PROCESS: AN HISTORICAL ELUCIDATION, April, http://www.freeman.org/m_online/apr98/beres1.htm Jewish supporters of the Middle East Peace Process base their argument on an altogether unwarranted assumption, that is, that the Oslo Accords hold the prospect of bringing final resolution to the longstanding "territorial" dispute between Israel and the Arabs. Yet, these Accords link a terrorist organization whose sole aim of negotiation is to supplant the State of Israel with a State of Palestine. Moreover, the dispute is not about territory, as the Jewish supporters still seem to believe, but about God. As any casual reading of the Arab press will disclose, from 1948 to the present, the entire Islamic world's opposition to Israel - including opposition of the P.L.O.- stems from doctrinal hatred of a "cancerous" Jewish state in its midst. Indeed, if the Palestinian opposition to Israel is only about West Bank (Judea/Samaria) and Gaza, why were there so many Arab terrorist attacks against Jews between 1948 and 1967, when these disputed territories were in Arab hands?

<h4>(__) The peace process won’t solve terrorism – empirically proven</h4><p><strong>BERES</strong>, 19<strong>98</p><p></strong>WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE PEACE PROCESS: AN HISTORICAL ELUCIDATION, April, http://www.freeman.org/m_online/apr98/beres1.htm</p><p>Jewish <u><strong>supporters of the </u></strong>Middle East <u><strong>Peace Process base their argument on an </u></strong>altogether <u><strong>unwarranted assumption</u></strong>, that is, that the Oslo Accords hold <u><strong>the prospect of bringing final resolution to the </u></strong>longstanding "<u><strong>territorial" dispute between Israel and the Arabs</u></strong>. Yet, these Accords link a terrorist organization whose sole aim of negotiation is to supplant the State of Israel with a State of Palestine. Moreover, <u><strong>the dispute is not about territory</u></strong>, as the Jewish supporters still seem to believe, <u><strong>but about God</u></strong>. As any casual reading of the Arab press will disclose, from 1948 to the present, <u><strong>the entire Islamic world's opposition to Israel</u></strong> - including opposition of the P.L.O.- <u><strong>stems from doctrinal hatred of a "cancerous" Jewish state in its midst. Indeed, if the Palestinian opposition to Israel is only about West Bank</u></strong> (Judea/Samaria) <u><strong>and Gaza, why were there so many Arab terrorist attacks against Jews</u></strong> between 1948 and 1967, <u><strong>when these disputed territories were in Arab hands</u>? </p></strong>

BERES, 1998

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: BERES, 1998 fulltext: WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE PEACE PROCESS: AN HISTORICAL ELUCIDATION, April, http://www.freeman.org/m_online/apr98/beres1.htm Jewish supporters of the Middle East Peace Process base their argument on an altogether unwarranted assumption, that is, that the Oslo Accords hold the prospect of bringing final resolution to the longstanding "territorial" dispute between Israel and the Arabs. Yet, these Accords link a terrorist organization whose sole aim of negotiation is to supplant the State of Israel with a State of Palestine. Moreover, the dispute is not about territory, as the Jewish supporters still seem to believe, but about God. As any casual reading of the Arab press will disclose, from 1948 to the present, the entire Islamic world's opposition to Israel - including opposition of the P.L.O.- stems from doctrinal hatred of a "cancerous" Jewish state in its midst. Indeed, if the Palestinian opposition to Israel is only about West Bank (Judea/Samaria) and Gaza, why were there so many Arab terrorist attacks against Jews between 1948 and 1967, when these disputed territories were in Arab hands? [/INST] <h4>(__) The peace process won’t solve terrorism – empirically proven</h4><p><strong>BERES</strong>, 19<strong>98</p><p></strong>WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE PEACE PROCESS: AN HISTORICAL ELUCIDATION, April, http://www.freeman.org/m_online/apr98/beres1.htm</p><p>Jewish <u><strong>supporters of the </u></strong>Middle East <u><strong>Peace Process base their argument on an </u></strong>altogether <u><strong>unwarranted assumption</u></strong>, that is, that the Oslo Accords hold <u><strong>the prospect of bringing final resolution to the </u></strong>longstanding "<u><strong>territorial" dispute between Israel and the Arabs</u></strong>. Yet, these Accords link a terrorist organization whose sole aim of negotiation is to supplant the State of Israel with a State of Palestine. Moreover, <u><strong>the dispute is not about territory</u></strong>, as the Jewish supporters still seem to believe, <u><strong>but about God</u></strong>. As any casual reading of the Arab press will disclose, from 1948 to the present, <u><strong>the entire Islamic world's opposition to Israel</u></strong> - including opposition of the P.L.O.- <u><strong>stems from doctrinal hatred of a "cancerous" Jewish state in its midst. Indeed, if the Palestinian opposition to Israel is only about West Bank</u></strong> (Judea/Samaria) <u><strong>and Gaza, why were there so many Arab terrorist attacks against Jews</u></strong> between 1948 and 1967, <u><strong>when these disputed territories were in Arab hands</u>? </p></strong> </s>

No impact to disruptions – empirics prove a multitudes of mechanisms generate economic resiliency

While dependence on oil has increased vulnerability to interruptions has not. The world has weathered several major interruptions none of which produced economic damage this is attributable to measures adopted including building strategic reserves, promoting free trade and investment, developing diplomatic and military instruments to secure trade market or political trends, and a large volume of excess capacity,

While dependence increased vulnerability has not The world has weathered several major interruptions none which produced damage this is attributable to measures adopted including reserves trade and investment developing instruments to secure trade market or political trends a large volume of excess capacity

Progress has been made in this area. While global dependence on oil imports has generally increased since 1980, vulnerability to short-term interruptions has not. The world has weathered several major interruptions since 1980, namely the tanker war in the late 80s, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, none of which has produced economic damage approaching either the magnitude or the duration of the 70s disruptions. In part, this is attributable to measures adopted to manage such risks, including building strategic reserves, promoting free trade and investment, and developing traditional diplomatic and military instruments to secure that trade. In part, it is attributable to favorable market or political trends, such as the decline in the share of oil in GDP and the increased access to potentially productive lands as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union. But primarily, it was due to the fact that OPEC since 1980 has had available a large volume of excess capacity, which it has generally used to offset any such shortfalls.

<h4>No impact to disruptions – empirics prove a multitudes of mechanisms generate economic resiliency </h4><p><strong>API 2004</strong> (American Petroleum Institute, “Achieving Energy Security in an Interdependent World,” most recent date cited – 2004, http://www.api.org/policy-and-issues/policy-items/safety/achieving-energy-security-in-an-interdependent-world.aspx, )</p><p>Progress has been made in this area. <u><mark>While</u></mark> global <u><mark>dependence</mark> on oil</u> imports <u>has</u> generally <u><mark>increased</u></mark> since 1980, <u><mark>vulnerability</mark> to</u> short-term <u>interruptions <mark>has not</mark>. <mark>The world has weathered several major interruptions</u></mark> since 1980, namely the tanker war in the late 80s, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, <u><strong><mark>none</strong></mark> of <mark>which</u></mark> has <u><mark>produced </mark>economic <mark>damage</u></mark> approaching either the magnitude or the duration of the 70s disruptions. In part, <u><mark>this is attributable to measures adopted</u></mark> to manage such risks, <u><mark>including</mark> building strategic <mark>reserves</mark>, promoting free <mark>trade and investment</mark>,</u> and <u><mark>developing</u></mark> traditional <u>diplomatic and military <mark>instruments to secure</u></mark> that <u><mark>trade</u></mark>. In part, it is attributable to favorable <u><mark>market or political trends</mark>,</u> such as the decline in the share of oil in GDP <u>and </u>the increased access to potentially productive lands as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union. But primarily, it was due to the fact that OPEC since 1980 has had available <u><mark>a large volume of excess capacity</mark>,</u> which it has generally used to offset any such shortfalls.</p>

API 2004 (American Petroleum Institute, “Achieving Energy Security in an Interdependent World,” most recent date cited – 2004, http://www.api.org/policy-and-issues/policy-items/safety/achieving-energy-security-in-an-interdependent-world.aspx, )

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: API 2004 (American Petroleum Institute, “Achieving Energy Security in an Interdependent World,” most recent date cited – 2004, http://www.api.org/policy-and-issues/policy-items/safety/achieving-energy-security-in-an-interdependent-world.aspx, ) fulltext: Progress has been made in this area. While global dependence on oil imports has generally increased since 1980, vulnerability to short-term interruptions has not. The world has weathered several major interruptions since 1980, namely the tanker war in the late 80s, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, none of which has produced economic damage approaching either the magnitude or the duration of the 70s disruptions. In part, this is attributable to measures adopted to manage such risks, including building strategic reserves, promoting free trade and investment, and developing traditional diplomatic and military instruments to secure that trade. In part, it is attributable to favorable market or political trends, such as the decline in the share of oil in GDP and the increased access to potentially productive lands as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union. But primarily, it was due to the fact that OPEC since 1980 has had available a large volume of excess capacity, which it has generally used to offset any such shortfalls. [/INST] <h4>No impact to disruptions – empirics prove a multitudes of mechanisms generate economic resiliency </h4><p><strong>API 2004</strong> (American Petroleum Institute, “Achieving Energy Security in an Interdependent World,” most recent date cited – 2004, http://www.api.org/policy-and-issues/policy-items/safety/achieving-energy-security-in-an-interdependent-world.aspx, )</p><p>Progress has been made in this area. <u><mark>While</u></mark> global <u><mark>dependence</mark> on oil</u> imports <u>has</u> generally <u><mark>increased</u></mark> since 1980, <u><mark>vulnerability</mark> to</u> short-term <u>interruptions <mark>has not</mark>. <mark>The world has weathered several major interruptions</u></mark> since 1980, namely the tanker war in the late 80s, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, <u><strong><mark>none</strong></mark> of <mark>which</u></mark> has <u><mark>produced </mark>economic <mark>damage</u></mark> approaching either the magnitude or the duration of the 70s disruptions. In part, <u><mark>this is attributable to measures adopted</u></mark> to manage such risks, <u><mark>including</mark> building strategic <mark>reserves</mark>, promoting free <mark>trade and investment</mark>,</u> and <u><mark>developing</u></mark> traditional <u>diplomatic and military <mark>instruments to secure</u></mark> that <u><mark>trade</u></mark>. In part, it is attributable to favorable <u><mark>market or political trends</mark>,</u> such as the decline in the share of oil in GDP <u>and </u>the increased access to potentially productive lands as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union. But primarily, it was due to the fact that OPEC since 1980 has had available <u><mark>a large volume of excess capacity</mark>,</u> which it has generally used to offset any such shortfalls.</p> </s>

Economic Decline doesn’t cause war

as global economic news brightens globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts can be attributed to the global recession , the last new entry predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. the only two potential state-on-state wars ) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.

<h4>Economic Decline doesn’t cause war</h4><p><strong>Barnett 9</strong> (Thomas, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, August 25, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)</p><p>When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, <u><strong>as global economic news brightens </u></strong>and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how <u><strong>globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts </u></strong>listed by GlobalSecurity.org <u><strong>can be </u></strong>clearly <u><strong>attributed to the global recession</u></strong>. Indeed<u><strong>, the last new entry</u></strong> (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) <u><strong>predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. </u></strong>Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, <u><strong>the only two potential state-on-state wars </u></strong>(North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran<u><strong>) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions</u></strong> (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), <u><strong>our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis:</u></strong> e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). <u><strong>Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn</u></strong>, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.</p>

Barnett 9 (Thomas, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, August 25, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Barnett 9 (Thomas, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, August 25, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx) fulltext: When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. [/INST] <h4>Economic Decline doesn’t cause war</h4><p><strong>Barnett 9</strong> (Thomas, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, August 25, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)</p><p>When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, <u><strong>as global economic news brightens </u></strong>and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how <u><strong>globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts </u></strong>listed by GlobalSecurity.org <u><strong>can be </u></strong>clearly <u><strong>attributed to the global recession</u></strong>. Indeed<u><strong>, the last new entry</u></strong> (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) <u><strong>predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. </u></strong>Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, <u><strong>the only two potential state-on-state wars </u></strong>(North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran<u><strong>) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions</u></strong> (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), <u><strong>our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis:</u></strong> e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). <u><strong>Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn</u></strong>, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces.</p> </s>

D. Impact – US-India Relations

<h4>D. Impact – US-India Relations</h4>

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: None fulltext: None [/INST] <h4>D. Impact – US-India Relations</h4> </s>

Extinction

political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum A fragmented China could also result in - nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

economic collapse resulting in civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on stability. A fragmented China could result in nuc s falling into the hands of warlords a disintegrating China would pose a threat to the world

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario- nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords. From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

<h4>Extinction</h4><p><strong>Yee and Storey 2</strong> Herbert is a Professor of Politics and IR @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian is a Lecturer in Defence Studies @ Deakin University. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p. 5 </p><p>The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of <u>political and <mark>economic collapse </mark>in the PRC, <mark>resulting in</mark> territorial fragmentation, <mark>civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries</mark>. </u>Naturally, any or all of <u><mark>these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on </mark>regional <mark>stability.</mark> </u>Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These <u>problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum </u>in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. <u><mark>A fragmented China could</mark> also <mark>result in</mark> </u>another nightmare scenario<u>- <strong><mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s falling into the hands of</mark> irresponsible</strong> local provincial leaders or <strong><mark>warlords</u></strong></mark>. From this perspective, <u><mark>a disintegrating China would</mark> also <mark>pose a threat to </mark>its neighbours and <strong><mark>the world</mark>.</p></u></strong>

Yee and Storey 2 Herbert is a Professor of Politics and IR @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian is a Lecturer in Defence Studies @ Deakin University. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p. 5

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Yee and Storey 2 Herbert is a Professor of Politics and IR @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian is a Lecturer in Defence Studies @ Deakin University. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p. 5 fulltext: The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario- nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords. From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world. [/INST] <h4>Extinction</h4><p><strong>Yee and Storey 2</strong> Herbert is a Professor of Politics and IR @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian is a Lecturer in Defence Studies @ Deakin University. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p. 5 </p><p>The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of <u>political and <mark>economic collapse </mark>in the PRC, <mark>resulting in</mark> territorial fragmentation, <mark>civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries</mark>. </u>Naturally, any or all of <u><mark>these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on </mark>regional <mark>stability.</mark> </u>Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These <u>problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum </u>in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. <u><mark>A fragmented China could</mark> also <mark>result in</mark> </u>another nightmare scenario<u>- <strong><mark>nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s falling into the hands of</mark> irresponsible</strong> local provincial leaders or <strong><mark>warlords</u></strong></mark>. From this perspective, <u><mark>a disintegrating China would</mark> also <mark>pose a threat to </mark>its neighbours and <strong><mark>the world</mark>.</p></u></strong> </s>

[F.] those trade relations allow the United States to overcome economic decline

The events of recent months have demonstrated that the Western Hemisphere’s countries remain interdependent; The real economy has suffered as well, and growth forecasts for the region have been revised downward countries of the LAC region are better prepared to weather the current global financial crisis than past episodes of financial turmoil. The region’s current account deficit is small, inflation is under control in most economies, and fiscal conditions have generally improved. The region has also benefited from high commodity prices and large capital inflows Its countries could suffer from a sharp decline in commodity prices, as well as from a reduction in capital flows from advanced economies. Also, leading international banks—which have a strong presence in the region and are key players in financial intermediation—could act as transmission lines for external shocks. , Latin America remains important to the United States in at least two respects. If the LAC region grows at rates of more than 3 percent a year even in a weak global economy, its countries will play a valuable role as buyers of U.S. goods and services, helping the U.S. economy export its way out of the crisis if the region’s economy deteriorates further, the problems associated with poverty, crime, inequality, and migration may worsen and could potentially spill across borders coping with the hemispheric impact of the financial crisis will be a major policy challenge with economic as well as political and security implications

The advent of a new administration in Washington opens the door to a fresh look at this increasingly interdependent relationship. This report is also particularly timely in the context of the current financial crisis, which is having profound regional as well as global implications. The events of recent months have demonstrated that the Western Hemisphere’s countries remain interdependent; developments in U.S. financial markets are rapidly reflected in the LAC region. Stock prices across the region have declined, currencies have weakened, and the cost of funds for governments and corporations has increased. The real economy has suffered as well, and growth forecasts for the region have been revised downward, especially for those countries that rely more heavily on trade and remittance flows from the United States, such as Mexico and the Central American and Caribbean nations. In response, the United States has approved $30 billion in currency swaps for each Mexico and Brazil to help them stabilize their currencies and meet immediate debt obligations, and the International Monetary Fund has nearly doubled its limit on loans to developing countries. Most observers believe that the countries of the LAC region are better prepared to weather the current global financial crisis than past episodes of financial turmoil. The region’s current account deficit is small, inflation is under control in most economies, and fiscal conditions have generally improved. The region has also benefited from high commodity prices and large capital inflows. Several countries have amassed sizable international reserves. But the region is not immune from the crisis. Its countries could suffer from a sharp decline in commodity prices, as well as from a reduction in capital flows from advanced economies. Also, leading international banks—which have a strong presence in the region and are key players in financial intermediation—could act as transmission lines for external shocks. As the crisis unfolds, Latin America remains important to the United States in at least two respects. If the LAC region grows at rates of more than 3 percent a year—as the International Monetary Fund currently projects—even in a weak global economy, its countries will play a valuable role as buyers of U.S. goods and services, helping the U.S. economy export its way out of the crisis. Conversely, if the region’s economy deteriorates further, the problems associated with poverty, crime, inequality, and migration may worsen and could potentially spill across borders. For the United States, coping with the hemispheric impact of the financial crisis will be a major policy challenge with economic as well as political and security implications.

<h4>[F.] <strong>those trade relations allow the United States to overcome economic decline</h4><p>Brookings 8 </p><p></strong>(The Brookings Institution. November. Rethinking. U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/1124_latin_america_partnership.aspx)</p><p>The advent of a new administration in Washington opens the door to a fresh look at this increasingly interdependent relationship. This report is also particularly timely in the context of the current financial crisis, which is having profound regional as well as global implications. <u><strong>The events of recent months have demonstrated that the Western Hemisphere’s countries remain interdependent;</u></strong> developments in U.S. financial markets are rapidly reflected in the LAC region. Stock prices across the region have declined, currencies have weakened, and the cost of funds for governments and corporations has increased. <u><strong>The real economy has suffered as well, and growth forecasts for the region have been revised downward</u></strong>, especially for those countries that rely more heavily on trade and remittance flows from the United States, such as Mexico and the Central American and Caribbean nations. In response, the United States has approved $30 billion in currency swaps for each Mexico and Brazil to help them stabilize their currencies and meet immediate debt obligations, and the International Monetary Fund has nearly doubled its limit on loans to developing countries. Most observers believe that the <u><strong>countries of the LAC region are better prepared to weather the current global financial crisis than past episodes of financial turmoil. The region’s current account deficit is small, inflation is under control in most economies, and fiscal conditions have generally improved. The region has also benefited from high commodity prices and large capital inflows</u></strong>. Several countries have amassed sizable international reserves. But the region is not immune from the crisis. <u><strong>Its countries could suffer from a sharp decline in commodity prices, as well as from a reduction in capital flows from advanced economies. Also, leading international banks—which have a strong presence in the region and are key players in financial intermediation—could act as transmission lines for external shocks. </u></strong>As the crisis unfolds<u><strong>, Latin America remains important to the United States in at least two respects. If the LAC region grows at rates of more than 3 percent a year</u></strong>—as the International Monetary Fund currently projects—<u><strong>even in a weak global economy, its countries will play a valuable role as buyers of U.S. goods and services, helping the U.S. economy export its way out of the crisis</u></strong>. Conversely, <u><strong>if the region’s economy deteriorates further, the problems associated with poverty, crime, inequality, and migration may worsen and could potentially spill across borders</u></strong>. For the United States, <u><strong>coping with the hemispheric impact of the financial crisis will be a major policy challenge with economic as well as political and security implications</u></strong>.</p>

Brookings 8 (The Brookings Institution. November. Rethinking. U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/1124_latin_america_partnership.aspx)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Brookings 8 (The Brookings Institution. November. Rethinking. U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/1124_latin_america_partnership.aspx) fulltext: The advent of a new administration in Washington opens the door to a fresh look at this increasingly interdependent relationship. This report is also particularly timely in the context of the current financial crisis, which is having profound regional as well as global implications. The events of recent months have demonstrated that the Western Hemisphere’s countries remain interdependent; developments in U.S. financial markets are rapidly reflected in the LAC region. Stock prices across the region have declined, currencies have weakened, and the cost of funds for governments and corporations has increased. The real economy has suffered as well, and growth forecasts for the region have been revised downward, especially for those countries that rely more heavily on trade and remittance flows from the United States, such as Mexico and the Central American and Caribbean nations. In response, the United States has approved $30 billion in currency swaps for each Mexico and Brazil to help them stabilize their currencies and meet immediate debt obligations, and the International Monetary Fund has nearly doubled its limit on loans to developing countries. Most observers believe that the countries of the LAC region are better prepared to weather the current global financial crisis than past episodes of financial turmoil. The region’s current account deficit is small, inflation is under control in most economies, and fiscal conditions have generally improved. The region has also benefited from high commodity prices and large capital inflows. Several countries have amassed sizable international reserves. But the region is not immune from the crisis. Its countries could suffer from a sharp decline in commodity prices, as well as from a reduction in capital flows from advanced economies. Also, leading international banks—which have a strong presence in the region and are key players in financial intermediation—could act as transmission lines for external shocks. As the crisis unfolds, Latin America remains important to the United States in at least two respects. If the LAC region grows at rates of more than 3 percent a year—as the International Monetary Fund currently projects—even in a weak global economy, its countries will play a valuable role as buyers of U.S. goods and services, helping the U.S. economy export its way out of the crisis. Conversely, if the region’s economy deteriorates further, the problems associated with poverty, crime, inequality, and migration may worsen and could potentially spill across borders. For the United States, coping with the hemispheric impact of the financial crisis will be a major policy challenge with economic as well as political and security implications. [/INST] <h4>[F.] <strong>those trade relations allow the United States to overcome economic decline</h4><p>Brookings 8 </p><p></strong>(The Brookings Institution. November. Rethinking. U.S.–Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/1124_latin_america_partnership.aspx)</p><p>The advent of a new administration in Washington opens the door to a fresh look at this increasingly interdependent relationship. This report is also particularly timely in the context of the current financial crisis, which is having profound regional as well as global implications. <u><strong>The events of recent months have demonstrated that the Western Hemisphere’s countries remain interdependent;</u></strong> developments in U.S. financial markets are rapidly reflected in the LAC region. Stock prices across the region have declined, currencies have weakened, and the cost of funds for governments and corporations has increased. <u><strong>The real economy has suffered as well, and growth forecasts for the region have been revised downward</u></strong>, especially for those countries that rely more heavily on trade and remittance flows from the United States, such as Mexico and the Central American and Caribbean nations. In response, the United States has approved $30 billion in currency swaps for each Mexico and Brazil to help them stabilize their currencies and meet immediate debt obligations, and the International Monetary Fund has nearly doubled its limit on loans to developing countries. Most observers believe that the <u><strong>countries of the LAC region are better prepared to weather the current global financial crisis than past episodes of financial turmoil. The region’s current account deficit is small, inflation is under control in most economies, and fiscal conditions have generally improved. The region has also benefited from high commodity prices and large capital inflows</u></strong>. Several countries have amassed sizable international reserves. But the region is not immune from the crisis. <u><strong>Its countries could suffer from a sharp decline in commodity prices, as well as from a reduction in capital flows from advanced economies. Also, leading international banks—which have a strong presence in the region and are key players in financial intermediation—could act as transmission lines for external shocks. </u></strong>As the crisis unfolds<u><strong>, Latin America remains important to the United States in at least two respects. If the LAC region grows at rates of more than 3 percent a year</u></strong>—as the International Monetary Fund currently projects—<u><strong>even in a weak global economy, its countries will play a valuable role as buyers of U.S. goods and services, helping the U.S. economy export its way out of the crisis</u></strong>. Conversely, <u><strong>if the region’s economy deteriorates further, the problems associated with poverty, crime, inequality, and migration may worsen and could potentially spill across borders</u></strong>. For the United States, <u><strong>coping with the hemispheric impact of the financial crisis will be a major policy challenge with economic as well as political and security implications</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Iran-Venezuela alliance causes terrorism- Latin America is a unique risk

Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation Now we are faced with a new threat in Latin America that comes from the growing collaborations between Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah and transnational criminal organizations

Terrorism remains a serious threat the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program only heightens concern that Iran ¶ or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation Now we are ¶ faced with a new threat in Latin America that comes from the growing collaborations between ¶ Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah and transnational criminal organizations

Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional ¶ Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 ¶ homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a ¶ more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist ¶ organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to ¶ exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. This second edition ¶ emphasizes America’s ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing ¶ presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs to exploit paths ¶ into the United States.¶ During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for ¶ violent terrorist plots against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim ¶ extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects had either connections to ¶ special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were ¶ radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al ¶ Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists ¶ around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused ¶ Fort Hood gunman; “underwear bomber” Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of ¶ Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In ¶ several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit “jihad” against the United ¶ States. These instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist ¶ arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the ¶ United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their associates. ¶ In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on ¶ Osama bin Laden’s compound indicated the world’s most wanted terrorist sought to use¶ operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to ¶ conduct terror operations.3¶ The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al ¶ Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who ¶ then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the ¶ possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil ¶ into a weapon of mass destruction.¶ Further, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel ¶ might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran ¶ or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation. ¶ Confronting the threat at the Southwest border has ¶ a broader meaning today than it did six years ago. ¶ As this report explains, the United States tightened¶ security at airports and land ports of entry in the ¶ wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, ¶ but the U.S.-Mexico border is an obvious weak link ¶ in the chain. Criminal elements could migrate down ¶ this path of least resistance, and with them the ¶ terrorists who continue to seek our destruction. The ¶ federal government must meet the challenge to secure America’s unlocked back door from the ¶ dual threat of drug cartels and terrorist organizations who are lined up, and working together, to ¶ enter.¶ One of the central criticisms made by the 9/11 Commission regarding the September 11, 2001 ¶ terrorist attacks was a failure of imagination in piecing together the threat picture from al-Qaeda ¶ before it was too late. Recognizing and proactively confronting threats has presented a perennial ¶ challenge to our country. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we failed to deal with the ¶ Soviet threat before it resulted in a full-blown crisis that threatened nuclear war. Now we are ¶ faced with a new threat in Latin America that comes from the growing collaborations between ¶ Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah and transnational criminal organizations. Similar to the Cuban ¶ missile crisis, the evidence to compel action exists; the only question is whether we possess the ¶ imagination to connect the dots before another disaster strikes. The intent of this report is to¶ present that evidence, not to incite anxiety, but rather to reinvigorate vigilance towards our ¶ Southwest border and beyond to the threats we face in Latin America.

<h4>Iran-Venezuela alliance causes terrorism- Latin America is a unique risk</h4><p><strong>McCaul ’12</strong> [Michael, U.S. Representative for Texas's 10th congressional district, former Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Former Chief of Counterterrorism and National Security for Texas's branch of the US Attorney's office, “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” November, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf] </p><p><u><mark>Terrorism remains a serious threat</mark> to the security of the United States</u>. The Congressional ¶ Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 ¶ homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. <u>Of growing concern and potentially a </u>¶<u> more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist </u>¶<u> organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to </u>¶<u> exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected</u>. This second edition ¶ emphasizes America’s ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing ¶ presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs to exploit paths ¶ into the United States.¶ During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for ¶ violent terrorist plots against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim ¶ extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects had either connections to ¶ special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were ¶ radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al ¶ Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists ¶ around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused ¶ Fort Hood gunman; “underwear bomber” Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of ¶ Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In ¶ several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit “jihad” against the United ¶ States. These instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist ¶ arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the ¶ United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their associates. ¶ In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on ¶ Osama bin Laden’s compound indicated the world’s most wanted terrorist sought to use¶ operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to ¶ conduct terror operations.3¶ The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al ¶ Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who ¶ then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the ¶ possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil ¶ into a weapon of mass destruction.¶ Further, <u><mark>the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program</u></mark>, and the uncertainty of whether Israel ¶ might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, <u><mark>only heightens concern that Iran </u>¶<u> or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation</u></mark>. ¶ Confronting the threat at the Southwest border has ¶ a broader meaning today than it did six years ago. ¶ As this report explains, the United States tightened¶ security at airports and land ports of entry in the ¶ wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, ¶ but the U.S.-Mexico border is an obvious weak link ¶ in the chain. Criminal elements could migrate down ¶ this path of least resistance, and with them the ¶ terrorists who continue to seek our destruction. The ¶ federal government must meet the challenge to secure America’s unlocked back door from the ¶ dual threat of drug cartels and terrorist organizations who are lined up, and working together, to ¶ enter.¶ One of the central criticisms made by the 9/11 Commission regarding the September 11, 2001 ¶ terrorist attacks was a failure of imagination in piecing together the threat picture from al-Qaeda ¶ before it was too late. Recognizing and proactively confronting threats has presented a perennial ¶ challenge to our country. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we failed to deal with the ¶ Soviet threat before it resulted in a full-blown crisis that threatened nuclear war. <u><mark>Now we are </u>¶<u> faced with a new threat in Latin America that comes from the growing collaborations between </u>¶<u> Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah and transnational criminal organizations</u></mark>. Similar to the Cuban ¶ missile crisis, the evidence to compel action exists; the only question is whether we possess the ¶ imagination to connect the dots before another disaster strikes. The intent of this report is to¶ present that evidence, not to incite anxiety, but rather to reinvigorate vigilance towards our ¶ Southwest border and beyond to the threats we face in Latin America.</p>

McCaul ’12 [Michael, U.S. Representative for Texas's 10th congressional district, former Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Former Chief of Counterterrorism and National Security for Texas's branch of the US Attorney's office, “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” November, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: McCaul ’12 [Michael, U.S. Representative for Texas's 10th congressional district, former Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Former Chief of Counterterrorism and National Security for Texas's branch of the US Attorney's office, “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” November, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf] fulltext: Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional ¶ Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 ¶ homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a ¶ more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist ¶ organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to ¶ exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. This second edition ¶ emphasizes America’s ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing ¶ presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs to exploit paths ¶ into the United States.¶ During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for ¶ violent terrorist plots against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim ¶ extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects had either connections to ¶ special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were ¶ radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al ¶ Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists ¶ around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused ¶ Fort Hood gunman; “underwear bomber” Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of ¶ Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In ¶ several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit “jihad” against the United ¶ States. These instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist ¶ arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the ¶ United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their associates. ¶ In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on ¶ Osama bin Laden’s compound indicated the world’s most wanted terrorist sought to use¶ operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to ¶ conduct terror operations.3¶ The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al ¶ Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who ¶ then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the ¶ possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil ¶ into a weapon of mass destruction.¶ Further, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel ¶ might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran ¶ or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation. ¶ Confronting the threat at the Southwest border has ¶ a broader meaning today than it did six years ago. ¶ As this report explains, the United States tightened¶ security at airports and land ports of entry in the ¶ wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, ¶ but the U.S.-Mexico border is an obvious weak link ¶ in the chain. Criminal elements could migrate down ¶ this path of least resistance, and with them the ¶ terrorists who continue to seek our destruction. The ¶ federal government must meet the challenge to secure America’s unlocked back door from the ¶ dual threat of drug cartels and terrorist organizations who are lined up, and working together, to ¶ enter.¶ One of the central criticisms made by the 9/11 Commission regarding the September 11, 2001 ¶ terrorist attacks was a failure of imagination in piecing together the threat picture from al-Qaeda ¶ before it was too late. Recognizing and proactively confronting threats has presented a perennial ¶ challenge to our country. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we failed to deal with the ¶ Soviet threat before it resulted in a full-blown crisis that threatened nuclear war. Now we are ¶ faced with a new threat in Latin America that comes from the growing collaborations between ¶ Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah and transnational criminal organizations. Similar to the Cuban ¶ missile crisis, the evidence to compel action exists; the only question is whether we possess the ¶ imagination to connect the dots before another disaster strikes. The intent of this report is to¶ present that evidence, not to incite anxiety, but rather to reinvigorate vigilance towards our ¶ Southwest border and beyond to the threats we face in Latin America. [/INST] <h4>Iran-Venezuela alliance causes terrorism- Latin America is a unique risk</h4><p><strong>McCaul ’12</strong> [Michael, U.S. Representative for Texas's 10th congressional district, former Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, Former Chief of Counterterrorism and National Security for Texas's branch of the US Attorney's office, “A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border,” November, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf] </p><p><u><mark>Terrorism remains a serious threat</mark> to the security of the United States</u>. The Congressional ¶ Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 ¶ homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. <u>Of growing concern and potentially a </u>¶<u> more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist </u>¶<u> organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to </u>¶<u> exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected</u>. This second edition ¶ emphasizes America’s ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing ¶ presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs to exploit paths ¶ into the United States.¶ During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for ¶ violent terrorist plots against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim ¶ extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects had either connections to ¶ special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were ¶ radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al ¶ Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists ¶ around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused ¶ Fort Hood gunman; “underwear bomber” Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of ¶ Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In ¶ several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit “jihad” against the United ¶ States. These instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist ¶ arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the ¶ United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their associates. ¶ In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on ¶ Osama bin Laden’s compound indicated the world’s most wanted terrorist sought to use¶ operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to ¶ conduct terror operations.3¶ The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al ¶ Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who ¶ then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the ¶ possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil ¶ into a weapon of mass destruction.¶ Further, <u><mark>the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program</u></mark>, and the uncertainty of whether Israel ¶ might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, <u><mark>only heightens concern that Iran </u>¶<u> or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation</u></mark>. ¶ Confronting the threat at the Southwest border has ¶ a broader meaning today than it did six years ago. ¶ As this report explains, the United States tightened¶ security at airports and land ports of entry in the ¶ wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, ¶ but the U.S.-Mexico border is an obvious weak link ¶ in the chain. Criminal elements could migrate down ¶ this path of least resistance, and with them the ¶ terrorists who continue to seek our destruction. The ¶ federal government must meet the challenge to secure America’s unlocked back door from the ¶ dual threat of drug cartels and terrorist organizations who are lined up, and working together, to ¶ enter.¶ One of the central criticisms made by the 9/11 Commission regarding the September 11, 2001 ¶ terrorist attacks was a failure of imagination in piecing together the threat picture from al-Qaeda ¶ before it was too late. Recognizing and proactively confronting threats has presented a perennial ¶ challenge to our country. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we failed to deal with the ¶ Soviet threat before it resulted in a full-blown crisis that threatened nuclear war. <u><mark>Now we are </u>¶<u> faced with a new threat in Latin America that comes from the growing collaborations between </u>¶<u> Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah and transnational criminal organizations</u></mark>. Similar to the Cuban ¶ missile crisis, the evidence to compel action exists; the only question is whether we possess the ¶ imagination to connect the dots before another disaster strikes. The intent of this report is to¶ present that evidence, not to incite anxiety, but rather to reinvigorate vigilance towards our ¶ Southwest border and beyond to the threats we face in Latin America.</p> </s>

(__) No solvency for peace process.

) KH the regional environment has rarely been less conducive to peacemaking But that plan was always long on symbolism and short on substance, and, given the current state of uncertainty in the Arab world, it’s no longer clear whether all states can deliver. This chicken-and-egg dynamic is likely to constrain what can be done on the peace process until the Iranian file becomes clearer

“John Kerry, Lone Ranger of the Middle East: The Secretary of State's Quixotic Bid to Reset the Peace Process” Aaron David Miller vice president for New Initiatives at the Woodrow Wilson Center. June 26, 2013 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139532/aaron-david-miller/john-kerry-lone-ranger-of-the-middle-east) KH Moreover, the regional environment has rarely been less conducive to peacemaking. Many commentators still reference the 2002 Arab League initiative that promised recognition of Israel in exchange for delivery on a two-state solution. But that plan was always long on symbolism and short on substance, and, given the current state of uncertainty in the Arab world, it’s no longer clear whether all the Arab states can deliver. Hamas is ensconced in Gaza with a formidable stockpile of high trajectory weapons. The Egyptian-Israeli relationship is cold, and the Muslim Brotherhood–led government is unlikely to strongly support a two-state solution or Palestinian concessions on Jerusalem. Syria is imploding, drawing in Iran and Hezbollah ever closer to defend the Assad regime. None of this augurs well for making big decisions, particularly for an Israeli prime minister deeply suspicious of the Arabs and focused much more on Iran and its nuclear program. To be sure, a breakthrough on the Palestinian issue would help isolate Iran. Still, it’s hard to see Netanyahu making big moves on the Palestinian issue until it’s much clearer where Iran stands on the nuclear issue following the recent presidential elections. This chicken-and-egg dynamic is likely to constrain what can be done on the peace process until the Iranian file becomes clearer.

<h4><strong>(__) No solvency for peace process.</h4><p>Miller, 13</p><p></strong>“John Kerry, Lone Ranger of the Middle East: The Secretary of State's Quixotic Bid to Reset the Peace Process” Aaron David Miller vice president for New Initiatives at the Woodrow Wilson Center. June 26, 2013 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139532/aaron-david-miller/john-kerry-lone-ranger-of-the-middle-east<u><strong>) KH</p><p></u></strong>Moreover, <u><strong>the regional environment has rarely been less conducive to peacemaking</u></strong>. Many commentators still reference the 2002 Arab League initiative that promised recognition of Israel in exchange for delivery on a two-state solution. <u><strong>But that plan was always long on symbolism and short on substance, and, given the current state of uncertainty in the Arab world, it’s no longer clear whether all </u></strong>the Arab<u><strong> states can deliver.</p><p></u></strong>Hamas is ensconced in Gaza with a formidable stockpile of high trajectory weapons. The Egyptian-Israeli relationship is cold, and the Muslim Brotherhood–led government is unlikely to strongly support a two-state solution or Palestinian concessions on Jerusalem. Syria is imploding, drawing in Iran and Hezbollah ever closer to defend the Assad regime.</p><p>None of this augurs well for making big decisions, particularly for an Israeli prime minister deeply suspicious of the Arabs and focused much more on Iran and its nuclear program. To be sure, a breakthrough on the Palestinian issue would help isolate Iran. Still, it’s hard to see Netanyahu making big moves on the Palestinian issue until it’s much clearer where Iran stands on the nuclear issue following the recent presidential elections. <u><strong>This chicken-and-egg dynamic is likely to constrain what can be done on the peace process until the Iranian file becomes clearer</u></strong>. </p>

Miller, 13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Miller, 13 fulltext: “John Kerry, Lone Ranger of the Middle East: The Secretary of State's Quixotic Bid to Reset the Peace Process” Aaron David Miller vice president for New Initiatives at the Woodrow Wilson Center. June 26, 2013 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139532/aaron-david-miller/john-kerry-lone-ranger-of-the-middle-east) KH Moreover, the regional environment has rarely been less conducive to peacemaking. Many commentators still reference the 2002 Arab League initiative that promised recognition of Israel in exchange for delivery on a two-state solution. But that plan was always long on symbolism and short on substance, and, given the current state of uncertainty in the Arab world, it’s no longer clear whether all the Arab states can deliver. Hamas is ensconced in Gaza with a formidable stockpile of high trajectory weapons. The Egyptian-Israeli relationship is cold, and the Muslim Brotherhood–led government is unlikely to strongly support a two-state solution or Palestinian concessions on Jerusalem. Syria is imploding, drawing in Iran and Hezbollah ever closer to defend the Assad regime. None of this augurs well for making big decisions, particularly for an Israeli prime minister deeply suspicious of the Arabs and focused much more on Iran and its nuclear program. To be sure, a breakthrough on the Palestinian issue would help isolate Iran. Still, it’s hard to see Netanyahu making big moves on the Palestinian issue until it’s much clearer where Iran stands on the nuclear issue following the recent presidential elections. This chicken-and-egg dynamic is likely to constrain what can be done on the peace process until the Iranian file becomes clearer. [/INST] <h4><strong>(__) No solvency for peace process.</h4><p>Miller, 13</p><p></strong>“John Kerry, Lone Ranger of the Middle East: The Secretary of State's Quixotic Bid to Reset the Peace Process” Aaron David Miller vice president for New Initiatives at the Woodrow Wilson Center. June 26, 2013 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139532/aaron-david-miller/john-kerry-lone-ranger-of-the-middle-east<u><strong>) KH</p><p></u></strong>Moreover, <u><strong>the regional environment has rarely been less conducive to peacemaking</u></strong>. Many commentators still reference the 2002 Arab League initiative that promised recognition of Israel in exchange for delivery on a two-state solution. <u><strong>But that plan was always long on symbolism and short on substance, and, given the current state of uncertainty in the Arab world, it’s no longer clear whether all </u></strong>the Arab<u><strong> states can deliver.</p><p></u></strong>Hamas is ensconced in Gaza with a formidable stockpile of high trajectory weapons. The Egyptian-Israeli relationship is cold, and the Muslim Brotherhood–led government is unlikely to strongly support a two-state solution or Palestinian concessions on Jerusalem. Syria is imploding, drawing in Iran and Hezbollah ever closer to defend the Assad regime.</p><p>None of this augurs well for making big decisions, particularly for an Israeli prime minister deeply suspicious of the Arabs and focused much more on Iran and its nuclear program. To be sure, a breakthrough on the Palestinian issue would help isolate Iran. Still, it’s hard to see Netanyahu making big moves on the Palestinian issue until it’s much clearer where Iran stands on the nuclear issue following the recent presidential elections. <u><strong>This chicken-and-egg dynamic is likely to constrain what can be done on the peace process until the Iranian file becomes clearer</u></strong>. </p> </s>

OPEC has production costs that will ensure higher prices --- Marginal prices are the most important

at some point we get to the end of cheap oil, we’ve only expensive oil left and then we seem to have actually reached that end of cheap oil part It’s the marginal, not the unit or average, costs which have the greatest influence upon prices in a market.

at some point we get to the end of cheap oil we seem to have reached that part It’s the marginal costs which have the greatest influence upon a market

At least peak oil is here if I’ve understood what the peak oil argument is properly. And my problem with the peak oil argument is that it isn’t really very clear in itself as to what it means. From what I understand at some point we get to the end of cheap oil, we’ve only expensive oil left and then, well, and then apparently something terrible happens. But I’ve never been able to get from anyone a clear description of what it is that’s terrible that then happens. However, we seem to have actually reached that end of cheap oil part, at least we have if this analysis is true: Tracking data from the 50 largest listed oil and gas producing companies globally (ex FSU) indicates that cash, production and unit costs in 2011 grew at a rate significantly faster than the 10 year average. Last year production costs increased 26% y-o-y, while the unit cost of production increased by 21% y-o-y to US$35.88/bbl. This is significantly higher than the longer term cost growth rates, highlighting continued cost pressures faced by the E&P industry as the incremental barrel continues to become more expensive to produce. The marginal cost of the 50 largest oil and gas producers globally increased to US$92/bbl in 2011, an increase of 11% y-o-y and in-line with historical average CAGR growth. Assuming another double digit increase this year, marginal costs for the 50 largest oil and gas producers could reach close to US$100/bbl. It’s the marginal, not the unit or average, costs which have the greatest influence upon prices in a market. Obviously so: those supplies with the highest marginal costs will be the first to disappear if the market price drops.

<h4>OPEC has production costs that will ensure higher prices --- Marginal prices are the <u>most important</h4><p></u><strong><mark>WORSTALL ’12</strong></mark> – Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute (Tim, “Peak Oil is Here: Now What?”. May 2. http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/05/02/peak-oil-is-here-now-what/)</p><p>At least peak oil is here if I’ve understood what the peak oil argument is properly. And my problem with the peak oil argument is that it isn’t really very clear in itself as to what it means. From what I understand <u><mark>at some point we get to the end of cheap oil</mark>, we’ve only expensive oil left and then</u>, well, and then apparently something terrible happens. But I’ve never been able to get from anyone a clear description of what it is that’s terrible that then happens. However, <u><mark>we seem to have</mark> actually <mark>reached that</mark> end of cheap oil <mark>part</u></mark>, at least we have if this analysis is true: Tracking data from the 50 largest listed oil and gas producing companies globally (ex FSU) indicates that cash, production and unit costs in 2011 grew at a rate significantly faster than the 10 year average. Last year production costs increased 26% y-o-y, while the unit cost of production increased by 21% y-o-y to US$35.88/bbl. This is significantly higher than the longer term cost growth rates, highlighting continued cost pressures faced by the E&P industry as the incremental barrel continues to become more expensive to produce. The marginal cost of the 50 largest oil and gas producers globally increased to US$92/bbl in 2011, an increase of 11% y-o-y and in-line with historical average CAGR growth. Assuming another double digit increase this year, marginal costs for the 50 largest oil and gas producers could reach close to US$100/bbl. <u><mark>It’s the marginal</mark>, not the unit or average, <mark>costs which have the <strong>greatest influence</strong> upon</mark> prices in <mark>a market</mark>.</u> Obviously so: those supplies with the highest marginal costs will be the first to disappear if the market price drops.</p>

WORSTALL ’12 – Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute (Tim, “Peak Oil is Here: Now What?”. May 2. http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/05/02/peak-oil-is-here-now-what/)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: WORSTALL ’12 – Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute (Tim, “Peak Oil is Here: Now What?”. May 2. http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/05/02/peak-oil-is-here-now-what/) fulltext: At least peak oil is here if I’ve understood what the peak oil argument is properly. And my problem with the peak oil argument is that it isn’t really very clear in itself as to what it means. From what I understand at some point we get to the end of cheap oil, we’ve only expensive oil left and then, well, and then apparently something terrible happens. But I’ve never been able to get from anyone a clear description of what it is that’s terrible that then happens. However, we seem to have actually reached that end of cheap oil part, at least we have if this analysis is true: Tracking data from the 50 largest listed oil and gas producing companies globally (ex FSU) indicates that cash, production and unit costs in 2011 grew at a rate significantly faster than the 10 year average. Last year production costs increased 26% y-o-y, while the unit cost of production increased by 21% y-o-y to US$35.88/bbl. This is significantly higher than the longer term cost growth rates, highlighting continued cost pressures faced by the E&P industry as the incremental barrel continues to become more expensive to produce. The marginal cost of the 50 largest oil and gas producers globally increased to US$92/bbl in 2011, an increase of 11% y-o-y and in-line with historical average CAGR growth. Assuming another double digit increase this year, marginal costs for the 50 largest oil and gas producers could reach close to US$100/bbl. It’s the marginal, not the unit or average, costs which have the greatest influence upon prices in a market. Obviously so: those supplies with the highest marginal costs will be the first to disappear if the market price drops. [/INST] <h4>OPEC has production costs that will ensure higher prices --- Marginal prices are the <u>most important</h4><p></u><strong><mark>WORSTALL ’12</strong></mark> – Fellow at the Adam Smith Institute (Tim, “Peak Oil is Here: Now What?”. May 2. http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/05/02/peak-oil-is-here-now-what/)</p><p>At least peak oil is here if I’ve understood what the peak oil argument is properly. And my problem with the peak oil argument is that it isn’t really very clear in itself as to what it means. From what I understand <u><mark>at some point we get to the end of cheap oil</mark>, we’ve only expensive oil left and then</u>, well, and then apparently something terrible happens. But I’ve never been able to get from anyone a clear description of what it is that’s terrible that then happens. However, <u><mark>we seem to have</mark> actually <mark>reached that</mark> end of cheap oil <mark>part</u></mark>, at least we have if this analysis is true: Tracking data from the 50 largest listed oil and gas producing companies globally (ex FSU) indicates that cash, production and unit costs in 2011 grew at a rate significantly faster than the 10 year average. Last year production costs increased 26% y-o-y, while the unit cost of production increased by 21% y-o-y to US$35.88/bbl. This is significantly higher than the longer term cost growth rates, highlighting continued cost pressures faced by the E&P industry as the incremental barrel continues to become more expensive to produce. The marginal cost of the 50 largest oil and gas producers globally increased to US$92/bbl in 2011, an increase of 11% y-o-y and in-line with historical average CAGR growth. Assuming another double digit increase this year, marginal costs for the 50 largest oil and gas producers could reach close to US$100/bbl. <u><mark>It’s the marginal</mark>, not the unit or average, <mark>costs which have the <strong>greatest influence</strong> upon</mark> prices in <mark>a market</mark>.</u> Obviously so: those supplies with the highest marginal costs will be the first to disappear if the market price drops.</p> </s>

Even if the embargo gives business opportunities—it would only marginally boost the economy

Lifting the embargo would not turn the U.S. economy around. But it would be of marginal assistance to the overall economy There is a vast fleet of U.S.-made automobiles on the road here, but none more recent than 1959. An end to the embargo would give U.S. manufacturers an opportunity to compete for business in Cuba

[Robert, 9-8-11, Los Angeles Times, Lift the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/08/opinion/la-oe-mcelvaine-cuba-20110908] /Wyo-MB Lifting the embargo would not turn the U.S. economy around. But it would be of marginal assistance to the overall economy and could be of substantial help to businesses and employment in industries that would have significant exports to the island.¶ Cuba is, of course, well known as a living museum of the golden age of the Detroit automotive industry. There is a vast fleet of U.S.-made automobiles on the road here, but none more recent than 1959. In addition to the common Russian-built Ladas, the newer models include Mercedes, BMWs, Nissans, Hyundais — just about every car make except those made in the U.S. And even the old American cars here often have new Japanese-made engines in them. An end to the embargo would give U.S. manufacturers an opportunity to compete for business in Cuba.¶

<h4><strong>Even if the embargo gives business opportunities—it would only marginally boost the economy</h4><p>McElvaine, 2011</p><p></strong>[Robert, 9-8-11, Los Angeles Times, Lift the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/08/opinion/la-oe-mcelvaine-cuba-20110908] /Wyo-MB</p><p><u><strong>Lifting the embargo would not turn the U.S. economy around. But it would be of marginal assistance to the overall economy</u></strong> and could be of substantial help to businesses and employment in industries that would have significant exports to the island.¶ Cuba is, of course, well known as a living museum of the golden age of the Detroit automotive industry. <u><strong>There is a vast fleet of U.S.-made automobiles on the road here, but none more recent than 1959.</u></strong> In addition to the common Russian-built Ladas, the newer models include Mercedes, BMWs, Nissans, Hyundais — just about every car make except those made in the U.S. And even the old American cars here often have new Japanese-made engines in them.<u><strong> An end to the embargo would give U.S. manufacturers an opportunity to compete for business in Cuba</u></strong>.¶ </p>

McElvaine, 2011

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: McElvaine, 2011 fulltext: [Robert, 9-8-11, Los Angeles Times, Lift the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/08/opinion/la-oe-mcelvaine-cuba-20110908] /Wyo-MB Lifting the embargo would not turn the U.S. economy around. But it would be of marginal assistance to the overall economy and could be of substantial help to businesses and employment in industries that would have significant exports to the island.¶ Cuba is, of course, well known as a living museum of the golden age of the Detroit automotive industry. There is a vast fleet of U.S.-made automobiles on the road here, but none more recent than 1959. In addition to the common Russian-built Ladas, the newer models include Mercedes, BMWs, Nissans, Hyundais — just about every car make except those made in the U.S. And even the old American cars here often have new Japanese-made engines in them. An end to the embargo would give U.S. manufacturers an opportunity to compete for business in Cuba.¶ [/INST] <h4><strong>Even if the embargo gives business opportunities—it would only marginally boost the economy</h4><p>McElvaine, 2011</p><p></strong>[Robert, 9-8-11, Los Angeles Times, Lift the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/08/opinion/la-oe-mcelvaine-cuba-20110908] /Wyo-MB</p><p><u><strong>Lifting the embargo would not turn the U.S. economy around. But it would be of marginal assistance to the overall economy</u></strong> and could be of substantial help to businesses and employment in industries that would have significant exports to the island.¶ Cuba is, of course, well known as a living museum of the golden age of the Detroit automotive industry. <u><strong>There is a vast fleet of U.S.-made automobiles on the road here, but none more recent than 1959.</u></strong> In addition to the common Russian-built Ladas, the newer models include Mercedes, BMWs, Nissans, Hyundais — just about every car make except those made in the U.S. And even the old American cars here often have new Japanese-made engines in them.<u><strong> An end to the embargo would give U.S. manufacturers an opportunity to compete for business in Cuba</u></strong>.¶ </p> </s>

1. CIR solves US-India relations – builds trade relationships

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India There is widespread consensus academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries Countries like India weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and still see the immigration opportunity as a plus

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between India

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China."¶ There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said.¶ "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

<h4>1. CIR solves US-India relations – builds trade relationships</h4><p><strong>LA Times</strong>, “Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform,” 11/19/<strong>12</p><p><u><mark>"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas</u></strong></mark>," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see <u><strong>at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas</u></strong> that <u><strong>would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India</u></strong> and China."¶ <u><strong>There is widespread consensus</u></strong> among economists and <u><strong>academics <mark>that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between</mark> countries</u></strong><mark> </mark>and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said.¶ "<u><strong>Countries like <mark>India</u></strong></mark> and China <u><strong>weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and</u></strong> I think they <u><strong>still see the immigration opportunity as a</u></strong> bigger <u><strong>plus</u></strong> than not," he said.</p>

LA Times, “Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform,” 11/19/12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: LA Times, “Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform,” 11/19/12 fulltext: "Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China."¶ There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said.¶ "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said. [/INST] <h4>1. CIR solves US-India relations – builds trade relationships</h4><p><strong>LA Times</strong>, “Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform,” 11/19/<strong>12</p><p><u><mark>"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas</u></strong></mark>," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see <u><strong>at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas</u></strong> that <u><strong>would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India</u></strong> and China."¶ <u><strong>There is widespread consensus</u></strong> among economists and <u><strong>academics <mark>that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between</mark> countries</u></strong><mark> </mark>and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said.¶ "<u><strong>Countries like <mark>India</u></strong></mark> and China <u><strong>weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and</u></strong> I think they <u><strong>still see the immigration opportunity as a</u></strong> bigger <u><strong>plus</u></strong> than not," he said.</p> </s>

First uniqueness- US-Cuba ties down now and Chinese influence is expanding

US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard the continent has arguably never been so united and independent US attention to Latin America has waned in recent Latin American leaders urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway. China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US

(Shlomo, former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace, Project Syndicate, “Is the US Losing Latin America?,” June 5, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami) /wyo-mm MADRID – It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard”; on the contrary, the continent has arguably never been so united and independent. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America – and elsewhere as well. It is true that US attention to Latin America has waned in recent years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his “global war on terror.” His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, Latin American leaders felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It is also true that Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway. China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US. India is showing keen interest in the region’s energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela.

<h4><strong>First uniqueness- US-Cuba ties down now and Chinese influence is expanding</h4><p>Ben-Ami 13</p><p></strong>(Shlomo, former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace, Project Syndicate, “Is the US Losing Latin America?,” June 5, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami) /wyo-mm</p><p>MADRID – It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: <u><strong>US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard</u></strong>”; on the contrary, <u><strong>the continent has arguably never been so united and independent</u></strong>. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America – and elsewhere as well. It is true that <u><strong>US attention to Latin America has waned in recent</u></strong> years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his “global war on terror.” His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, <u><strong>Latin American leaders </u></strong>felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They <u><strong>urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent</u></strong>, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It is also true that <u><strong>Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway.</u></strong> <u><strong>China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US</u></strong>. India is showing keen interest in the region’s energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela.</p>

Ben-Ami 13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ben-Ami 13 fulltext: (Shlomo, former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace, Project Syndicate, “Is the US Losing Latin America?,” June 5, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami) /wyo-mm MADRID – It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard”; on the contrary, the continent has arguably never been so united and independent. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America – and elsewhere as well. It is true that US attention to Latin America has waned in recent years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his “global war on terror.” His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, Latin American leaders felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It is also true that Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway. China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US. India is showing keen interest in the region’s energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela. [/INST] <h4><strong>First uniqueness- US-Cuba ties down now and Chinese influence is expanding</h4><p>Ben-Ami 13</p><p></strong>(Shlomo, former Israeli foreign minister and internal security minister, is Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace, Project Syndicate, “Is the US Losing Latin America?,” June 5, 2013, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami) /wyo-mm</p><p>MADRID – It is a mantra increasingly heard around the world: <u><strong>US power is in decline. And nowhere does this seem truer than in Latin America. No longer is the region regarded as America’s “backyard</u></strong>”; on the contrary, <u><strong>the continent has arguably never been so united and independent</u></strong>. But this view fails to capture the true nature of US influence in Latin America – and elsewhere as well. It is true that <u><strong>US attention to Latin America has waned in recent</u></strong> years. President George W. Bush was more focused on his “global war on terror.” His successor, Barack Obama, seemed to give the region little thought as well, at least in his first term. Indeed, at the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, <u><strong>Latin American leaders </u></strong>felt sufficiently confident and united to challenge US priorities in the region. They <u><strong>urged the US to lift its embargo on Cuba, claiming that it had damaged relations with the rest of the continent</u></strong>, and to do more to combat drug use on its own turf, through education and social work, rather than supplying arms to fight the drug lords in Latin America – a battle that all acknowledged has been an utter failure. It is also true that <u><strong>Latin American countries have pursued a massive expansion of economic ties beyond America’s sway.</u></strong> <u><strong>China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner and rapidly closing the gap with the US</u></strong>. India is showing keen interest in the region’s energy industry, and has signed export agreements in the defense sector. Iran has strengthened its economic and military ties, especially in Venezuela.</p> </s>

[G.] Economic decline causes protectionism and war

economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power economic crisis could usher in a redistribution of relative power that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations if expectations of trade decline the likelihood for conflict increases Crisis could be the trigger for decreased trade expectations others considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict during economic downturn Diversionary theory’ suggests when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increase incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states

economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict redistribution of relative power leads to miscalculation future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable states are likely to gain benefits from trade as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, if expectations of trade decline likelihood for conflict increases Crisis could trigger decreased trade expectations Blomberg and Hess find correlation between internal conflict and external conflict during economic downturn Diversionary theory’ suggests governments have incentives to fabricate military conflicts

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crisis could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increase incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

<h4>[G.] Economic decline causes protectionism and war </h4><p><strong>Royal 10</strong> – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215</p><p>Less intuitive is how periods of <u><strong><mark>economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict</u></strong></mark>. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that <u><strong>rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power</u></strong> and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as <u><strong>economic crisis could usher in a <mark>redistribution of relative power</u></strong></mark> (see also Gilpin, 1981) <u><strong>that <mark>leads to</mark> uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of <mark>miscalculation</u></strong></mark> (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) <u><strong>theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘<mark>future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable</mark> in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He argues that interdependent <mark>states are likely to gain </mark>pacific <mark>benefits from trade</mark> so long <mark>as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations</u></strong>,</mark> However, <u><strong><mark>if</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>expectations of</u></strong></mark> future <u><strong><mark>trade decline</u></strong></mark>, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, <u><strong>the <mark>likelihood for conflict increases</u></strong></mark>, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. <u><strong><mark>Crisis could</u></strong></mark> potentially <u><strong>be the <mark>trigger</mark> for <mark>decreased trade expectations</u></strong></mark> either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, <u><strong>others</strong> </u>have <u><strong>considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. <mark>Blomberg and Hess</u></strong></mark> (2002) <u><strong><mark>find</mark> a strong <mark>correlation between internal conflict and external conflict</u></strong></mark>, particularly <u><strong><mark>during</u></strong></mark> periods of <u><strong><mark>economic downturn</u></strong></mark>. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘<u><strong><mark>Diversionary theory’ suggests</u></strong></mark> that, <u><strong>when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting <mark>governments have</mark> increase <mark>incentives to fabricate </mark>external <mark>military conflicts</mark> to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect</strong>.</u> Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that <u><strong>the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states</u></strong>, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.</p>

Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Royal 10 – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215 fulltext: Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crisis could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increase incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention. [/INST] <h4>[G.] Economic decline causes protectionism and war </h4><p><strong>Royal 10</strong> – Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215</p><p>Less intuitive is how periods of <u><strong><mark>economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict</u></strong></mark>. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that <u><strong>rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power</u></strong> and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as <u><strong>economic crisis could usher in a <mark>redistribution of relative power</u></strong></mark> (see also Gilpin, 1981) <u><strong>that <mark>leads to</mark> uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of <mark>miscalculation</u></strong></mark> (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) <u><strong>theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘<mark>future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable</mark> in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He argues that interdependent <mark>states are likely to gain </mark>pacific <mark>benefits from trade</mark> so long <mark>as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations</u></strong>,</mark> However, <u><strong><mark>if</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>expectations of</u></strong></mark> future <u><strong><mark>trade decline</u></strong></mark>, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, <u><strong>the <mark>likelihood for conflict increases</u></strong></mark>, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. <u><strong><mark>Crisis could</u></strong></mark> potentially <u><strong>be the <mark>trigger</mark> for <mark>decreased trade expectations</u></strong></mark> either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, <u><strong>others</strong> </u>have <u><strong>considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. <mark>Blomberg and Hess</u></strong></mark> (2002) <u><strong><mark>find</mark> a strong <mark>correlation between internal conflict and external conflict</u></strong></mark>, particularly <u><strong><mark>during</u></strong></mark> periods of <u><strong><mark>economic downturn</u></strong></mark>. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘<u><strong><mark>Diversionary theory’ suggests</u></strong></mark> that, <u><strong>when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting <mark>governments have</mark> increase <mark>incentives to fabricate </mark>external <mark>military conflicts</mark> to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect</strong>.</u> Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that <u><strong>the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states</u></strong>, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.</p> </s>

Terrorism causes nuclear war

some sort of terrorist attack especially nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more states raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties at what stage would Russia and China be ruled out , if the act occurred against a backdrop of existing tension with Russia and/or China would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst Washington’s early response might raise the possibility of an unwanted confrontation the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert it is possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force temptations to preempt grow

nuclear terrorism, could precipitate catalytic nuclear war between superpowers if the act occurred against a backdrop of existing tension with Russia or China would political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst the president place the country’s nuclear arsenal, on a higher alert Moscow or China might mistakenly read this temptations to preempt grow

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability

<h4>Terrorism causes nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Ayson ‘10</strong> [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” July, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7, InformaWorld]</p><p>But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that <u>some sort of terrorist attack</u>, and <u>especially</u> an act of <u><mark>nuclear terrorism, could precipitate</mark> a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more</u> of the <u>states</u> that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as <u>raising the risks of a <strong><mark>catalytic nuclear war</strong></mark> <mark>between</mark> the <mark>superpowers</mark> started by third parties</u>. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But <u>at what stage would Russia and China be</u> definitely <u>ruled out</u> in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular<u>, <mark>if the act </u></mark>of nuclear terrorism<u> <mark>occurred against a backdrop of existing tension</mark> </u>in Washington’s relations<u> <mark>with Russia</mark> and/<mark>or China</u></mark>, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, <u><mark>would </mark>officials and <mark>political leaders not be tempted to <strong>assume the worst</u></strong></mark>? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? <u>Washington’s early response</u> to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil <u>might</u> also <u>raise the possibility of an unwanted</u> (and nuclear aided) <u>confrontation</u> with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, <u><mark>the</mark> U.S. <mark>president</mark> might be expected to <mark>place the country’s</u></mark> armed forces, including its <u><mark>nuclear arsenal, on a higher</mark> stage of <mark>alert</u></mark>. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, <u>it is </u>just <u>possible that <mark>Moscow</mark> and/<mark>or China might mistakenly read this </mark>as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force</u> (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the <u><mark>temptations to preempt</mark> </u>such actions might<u> <mark>grow</u></mark>, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability</p>

Ayson ‘10 [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” July, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7, InformaWorld]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ayson ‘10 [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” July, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7, InformaWorld] fulltext: But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability [/INST] <h4>Terrorism causes nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Ayson ‘10</strong> [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” July, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7, InformaWorld]</p><p>But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that <u>some sort of terrorist attack</u>, and <u>especially</u> an act of <u><mark>nuclear terrorism, could precipitate</mark> a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more</u> of the <u>states</u> that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as <u>raising the risks of a <strong><mark>catalytic nuclear war</strong></mark> <mark>between</mark> the <mark>superpowers</mark> started by third parties</u>. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But <u>at what stage would Russia and China be</u> definitely <u>ruled out</u> in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular<u>, <mark>if the act </u></mark>of nuclear terrorism<u> <mark>occurred against a backdrop of existing tension</mark> </u>in Washington’s relations<u> <mark>with Russia</mark> and/<mark>or China</u></mark>, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, <u><mark>would </mark>officials and <mark>political leaders not be tempted to <strong>assume the worst</u></strong></mark>? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? <u>Washington’s early response</u> to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil <u>might</u> also <u>raise the possibility of an unwanted</u> (and nuclear aided) <u>confrontation</u> with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, <u><mark>the</mark> U.S. <mark>president</mark> might be expected to <mark>place the country’s</u></mark> armed forces, including its <u><mark>nuclear arsenal, on a higher</mark> stage of <mark>alert</u></mark>. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, <u>it is </u>just <u>possible that <mark>Moscow</mark> and/<mark>or China might mistakenly read this </mark>as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force</u> (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the <u><mark>temptations to preempt</mark> </u>such actions might<u> <mark>grow</u></mark>, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability</p> </s>

(__) Can’t solve peace talks: Israelis and Palestinians not ready to come to the table yet.

) KH there is the question of whether the Israelis and the Palestinians feel a real sense of urgency, which is the prerequisite to their taking the negotiations seriously. Right now, the answer is absolutely not. Neither Netanyahu nor Abbas is desperate enough yet; nor do they see sufficient incentives to justify the risk of changing the status quo. In short, neither Abbas nor Netanyahu is prepared to pay the price of what a conflict-ending accord would cost.

“John Kerry, Lone Ranger of the Middle East: The Secretary of State's Quixotic Bid to Reset the Peace Process” Aaron David Miller vice president for New Initiatives at the Woodrow Wilson Center. June 26, 2013 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139532/aaron-david-miller/john-kerry-lone-ranger-of-the-middle-east) KH Then there is the question of whether the Israelis and the Palestinians feel a real sense of urgency, which is the prerequisite to their taking the negotiations seriously. Right now, the answer is absolutely not. Neither Netanyahu nor Abbas is desperate enough yet; nor do they see sufficient incentives to justify the risk of changing the status quo. In short, neither Abbas nor Netanyahu is prepared to pay the price of what a conflict-ending accord would cost.

<h4>(__) <strong>Can’t solve peace talks: Israelis and Palestinians not ready to come to the table yet.</h4><p>Miller, 13</p><p></strong>“John Kerry, Lone Ranger of the Middle East: The Secretary of State's Quixotic Bid to Reset the Peace Process” Aaron David Miller vice president for New Initiatives at the Woodrow Wilson Center. June 26, 2013 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139532/aaron-david-miller/john-kerry-lone-ranger-of-the-middle-east<u><strong>) KH</p><p></u></strong>Then <u><strong>there is the question of whether the Israelis and the Palestinians feel a real sense of urgency, which is the prerequisite to their taking the negotiations seriously. Right now, the answer is absolutely not.</u></strong> <u><strong>Neither Netanyahu nor Abbas is desperate enough yet; nor do they see sufficient incentives to justify the risk of changing the status quo. In short, neither Abbas nor Netanyahu is prepared to pay the price of what a conflict-ending accord would cost.</p></u></strong>

Miller, 13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Miller, 13 fulltext: “John Kerry, Lone Ranger of the Middle East: The Secretary of State's Quixotic Bid to Reset the Peace Process” Aaron David Miller vice president for New Initiatives at the Woodrow Wilson Center. June 26, 2013 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139532/aaron-david-miller/john-kerry-lone-ranger-of-the-middle-east) KH Then there is the question of whether the Israelis and the Palestinians feel a real sense of urgency, which is the prerequisite to their taking the negotiations seriously. Right now, the answer is absolutely not. Neither Netanyahu nor Abbas is desperate enough yet; nor do they see sufficient incentives to justify the risk of changing the status quo. In short, neither Abbas nor Netanyahu is prepared to pay the price of what a conflict-ending accord would cost. [/INST] <h4>(__) <strong>Can’t solve peace talks: Israelis and Palestinians not ready to come to the table yet.</h4><p>Miller, 13</p><p></strong>“John Kerry, Lone Ranger of the Middle East: The Secretary of State's Quixotic Bid to Reset the Peace Process” Aaron David Miller vice president for New Initiatives at the Woodrow Wilson Center. June 26, 2013 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139532/aaron-david-miller/john-kerry-lone-ranger-of-the-middle-east<u><strong>) KH</p><p></u></strong>Then <u><strong>there is the question of whether the Israelis and the Palestinians feel a real sense of urgency, which is the prerequisite to their taking the negotiations seriously. Right now, the answer is absolutely not.</u></strong> <u><strong>Neither Netanyahu nor Abbas is desperate enough yet; nor do they see sufficient incentives to justify the risk of changing the status quo. In short, neither Abbas nor Netanyahu is prepared to pay the price of what a conflict-ending accord would cost.</p></u></strong> </s>

OPEC will try to maintain high prices

Even Douglas Holtz-Eakin, the top economist has written, "Domestic action to increase production will not lower gas prices set on a global market If U.S. producers were able to massively ramp up output, the ultimate impact would mostly boil down to one big question: How would other big oil producers (mainly the Saudis and the rest of OPEC) respond to a surge in U.S. supplies? To stop prices from falling, they could cut back their output in response to new U.S. production, much as they've tried to in the past That's essentially what happens in the much-cited projections by the E I A

Even Eakin, the top economist has written, "Domestic production will not lower prices on a global market. If producers massively ramp up the Saudis and OPEC To stop prices from falling could cut back their output That's in the projections by the E I A

"We Can Drill Our Way Out of High Prices." Don't bet on it. Some people claim that unleashing U.S. oil and gas resources would slash the price of crude. Who can forget the cries of "Drill, Baby, Drill!" that saturated airwaves during the 2008 presidential campaign? Others insist that, because oil is priced on a global market, increased U.S. output wouldn't move the needle. Even Douglas Holtz-Eakin, the top economist for John McCain's 2008 presidential campaign, has written, "Domestic action to increase production will not lower gas prices set on a global market." The precise truth lies somewhere in between. If U.S. producers were able to massively ramp up output, the ultimate impact would mostly boil down to one big question: How would other big oil producers (mainly the Saudis and the rest of OPEC) respond to a surge in U.S. supplies? To stop prices from falling, they could cut back their output in response to new U.S. production, much as they've tried to in the past. That's essentially what happens in the much-cited projections by the Energy Information Administration. In one recent exercise, for example, it looked at what would happen to gasoline prices if U.S. oil production grew by about a million barrels a day. The net impact was a mere 4 cents a gallon fall. Why? All but a sliver of the increase in U.S. output was matched by cutbacks in the Middle East, leaving oil prices barely changed.

<h4>OPEC will <u>try to maintain</u> high prices</h4><p><strong><mark>LEVI ’12</strong></mark> - David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Relations and director of its Program on Energy Security and Climate Change (Levi, Michael. “Think Again: The American Energy Boom”. August, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom)</p><p>"We Can Drill Our Way Out of High Prices."</p><p>Don't bet on it. Some people claim that unleashing U.S. oil and gas resources would slash the price of crude. Who can forget the cries of "Drill, Baby, Drill!" that saturated airwaves during the 2008 presidential campaign? Others insist that, because oil is priced on a global market, increased U.S. output wouldn't move the needle. <u><mark>Even</mark> Douglas Holtz-<mark>Eakin, the top economist</mark> </u>for John McCain's 2008 presidential campaign, <u><mark>has written, "Domestic</mark> action to increase <mark>production will not lower</mark> gas <mark>prices</mark> set <mark>on a global market</u>.</mark>" The precise truth lies somewhere in between. <u><mark>If</mark> U.S. <mark>producers</mark> were able to <mark>massively ramp up</mark> output, the ultimate impact would mostly boil down to one big question: How would other big oil producers (mainly <mark>the</mark> <mark>Saudis and</mark> the rest of <mark>OPEC</mark>) respond to a surge in U.S. supplies?</u> <u><strong><mark>To stop prices from falling</strong></mark>, they <strong><mark>could cut back their output</strong></mark> in response to new U.S. production, much as they've tried to in the past</u>. <u><mark>That's</mark> essentially what happens <mark>in the</mark> much-cited <mark>projections by the E</u></mark>nergy <u><mark>I</u></mark>nformation <u><mark>A</u></mark>dministration. In one recent exercise, for example, it looked at what would happen to gasoline prices if U.S. oil production grew by about a million barrels a day. The net impact was a mere 4 cents a gallon fall. Why? All but a sliver of the increase in U.S. output was matched by cutbacks in the Middle East, leaving oil prices barely changed.</p>

LEVI ’12 - David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Relations and director of its Program on Energy Security and Climate Change (Levi, Michael. “Think Again: The American Energy Boom”. August, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: LEVI ’12 - David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Relations and director of its Program on Energy Security and Climate Change (Levi, Michael. “Think Again: The American Energy Boom”. August, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom) fulltext: "We Can Drill Our Way Out of High Prices." Don't bet on it. Some people claim that unleashing U.S. oil and gas resources would slash the price of crude. Who can forget the cries of "Drill, Baby, Drill!" that saturated airwaves during the 2008 presidential campaign? Others insist that, because oil is priced on a global market, increased U.S. output wouldn't move the needle. Even Douglas Holtz-Eakin, the top economist for John McCain's 2008 presidential campaign, has written, "Domestic action to increase production will not lower gas prices set on a global market." The precise truth lies somewhere in between. If U.S. producers were able to massively ramp up output, the ultimate impact would mostly boil down to one big question: How would other big oil producers (mainly the Saudis and the rest of OPEC) respond to a surge in U.S. supplies? To stop prices from falling, they could cut back their output in response to new U.S. production, much as they've tried to in the past. That's essentially what happens in the much-cited projections by the Energy Information Administration. In one recent exercise, for example, it looked at what would happen to gasoline prices if U.S. oil production grew by about a million barrels a day. The net impact was a mere 4 cents a gallon fall. Why? All but a sliver of the increase in U.S. output was matched by cutbacks in the Middle East, leaving oil prices barely changed. [/INST] <h4>OPEC will <u>try to maintain</u> high prices</h4><p><strong><mark>LEVI ’12</strong></mark> - David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the Council on Foreign Relations and director of its Program on Energy Security and Climate Change (Levi, Michael. “Think Again: The American Energy Boom”. August, 2012. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/18/think_again_the_american_energy_boom)</p><p>"We Can Drill Our Way Out of High Prices."</p><p>Don't bet on it. Some people claim that unleashing U.S. oil and gas resources would slash the price of crude. Who can forget the cries of "Drill, Baby, Drill!" that saturated airwaves during the 2008 presidential campaign? Others insist that, because oil is priced on a global market, increased U.S. output wouldn't move the needle. <u><mark>Even</mark> Douglas Holtz-<mark>Eakin, the top economist</mark> </u>for John McCain's 2008 presidential campaign, <u><mark>has written, "Domestic</mark> action to increase <mark>production will not lower</mark> gas <mark>prices</mark> set <mark>on a global market</u>.</mark>" The precise truth lies somewhere in between. <u><mark>If</mark> U.S. <mark>producers</mark> were able to <mark>massively ramp up</mark> output, the ultimate impact would mostly boil down to one big question: How would other big oil producers (mainly <mark>the</mark> <mark>Saudis and</mark> the rest of <mark>OPEC</mark>) respond to a surge in U.S. supplies?</u> <u><strong><mark>To stop prices from falling</strong></mark>, they <strong><mark>could cut back their output</strong></mark> in response to new U.S. production, much as they've tried to in the past</u>. <u><mark>That's</mark> essentially what happens <mark>in the</mark> much-cited <mark>projections by the E</u></mark>nergy <u><mark>I</u></mark>nformation <u><mark>A</u></mark>dministration. In one recent exercise, for example, it looked at what would happen to gasoline prices if U.S. oil production grew by about a million barrels a day. The net impact was a mere 4 cents a gallon fall. Why? All but a sliver of the increase in U.S. output was matched by cutbacks in the Middle East, leaving oil prices barely changed.</p> </s>

Other countries trade for goods cheaper than the US and will crowd out economic gains

. Cuban purchases of U.S. goods have plunged as the island increasingly turns to countries like China, Brazil, Vietnam and Venezuela, which offer cheaper deals, long-term credits and less hassle over payment and shipping.¶ "The pattern that we see is it's just continuing to either be lower each year, or if it does increase, it's just not a lot at all, No executives should be going to a travel agent and buying a ticket to go down to Havana thinking that there's going to be a change

[Associate press, Floundering US Exports to Cuba Buck Optimism, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/11/10/floundering-us-exports-to-cuba-buck-optimism/] /Wyo-MB But cold numbers belie the enthusiasm on the convention center floor. Cuban purchases of U.S. goods have plunged as the island increasingly turns to countries like China, Brazil, Vietnam and Venezuela, which offer cheaper deals, long-term credits and less hassle over payment and shipping.¶ "The pattern that we see is it's just continuing to either be lower each year, or if it does increase, it's just not a lot at all," said John Kavulich, senior policy adviser to the New York-based U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. "No executives should be going to a travel agent and buying a ticket to go down to Havana thinking that there's going to be a change."

<h4><strong>Other countries trade for goods cheaper than the US and will crowd out economic gains</h4><p>AP, 11-10-12</p><p></strong>[Associate press, Floundering US Exports to Cuba Buck Optimism, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/11/10/floundering-us-exports-to-cuba-buck-optimism/] /Wyo-MB</p><p>But cold numbers belie the enthusiasm on the convention center floor<u><strong>. Cuban purchases of U.S. goods have plunged as the island increasingly turns to countries like China, Brazil, Vietnam and Venezuela, which offer cheaper deals, long-term credits and less hassle over payment and shipping.¶ "The pattern that we see is it's just continuing to either be lower each year, or if it does increase, it's just not a lot at all,</u></strong>" said John Kavulich, senior policy adviser to the New York-based U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. "<u><strong>No executives should be going to a travel agent and buying a ticket to go down to Havana thinking that there's going to be a change</u></strong>."</p>

AP, 11-10-12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: AP, 11-10-12 fulltext: [Associate press, Floundering US Exports to Cuba Buck Optimism, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/11/10/floundering-us-exports-to-cuba-buck-optimism/] /Wyo-MB But cold numbers belie the enthusiasm on the convention center floor. Cuban purchases of U.S. goods have plunged as the island increasingly turns to countries like China, Brazil, Vietnam and Venezuela, which offer cheaper deals, long-term credits and less hassle over payment and shipping.¶ "The pattern that we see is it's just continuing to either be lower each year, or if it does increase, it's just not a lot at all," said John Kavulich, senior policy adviser to the New York-based U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. "No executives should be going to a travel agent and buying a ticket to go down to Havana thinking that there's going to be a change." [/INST] <h4><strong>Other countries trade for goods cheaper than the US and will crowd out economic gains</h4><p>AP, 11-10-12</p><p></strong>[Associate press, Floundering US Exports to Cuba Buck Optimism, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/11/10/floundering-us-exports-to-cuba-buck-optimism/] /Wyo-MB</p><p>But cold numbers belie the enthusiasm on the convention center floor<u><strong>. Cuban purchases of U.S. goods have plunged as the island increasingly turns to countries like China, Brazil, Vietnam and Venezuela, which offer cheaper deals, long-term credits and less hassle over payment and shipping.¶ "The pattern that we see is it's just continuing to either be lower each year, or if it does increase, it's just not a lot at all,</u></strong>" said John Kavulich, senior policy adviser to the New York-based U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. "<u><strong>No executives should be going to a travel agent and buying a ticket to go down to Havana thinking that there's going to be a change</u></strong>."</p> </s>

2. Key to every existential threat

A strengthened U.S.-India strategic partnership is thus imperative in this new era. The transformation of U.S. ties with New Delhi over the past 10 years, led by Presidents Clinton and Bush, stands as one of the most significant triumphs of recent American foreign policy. Many prominent Indians and Americans, however, now fear this rapid expansion of ties has stalled. Past projects remain incomplete, few new ideas have been embraced by both sides, and the forward momentum that characterized recent cooperation has subsided. it is critical to rejuvenate the U.S.- India partnership and put U.S. relations with India on a more solid foundation. . . r. U.S. interests in a closer relationship with India include:¶ • Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power.¶ • Strengthening an open global trad[e]ing system.¶ • Protecting and preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms).¶ • Countering terrorism and violent extremism.¶ • Ensuring access to secure global energy resources.¶ • Bolstering the international nonproliferation regime.¶ • Promoting democracy and human rights.¶ • Fostering greater stability, security and economic prosperity in South Asia, including in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.¶ A strong U.S.-India strategic partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s continued peace and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the likelihood of a peaceful Chinese rise increases if it ascends in a region where the great democratic powers are also strong. Growing U.S.-India strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, a strengthened relationship with India, a natural democratic partner, will signal that the United States remains committed to a strong and enduring presence in Asia. India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually all major global challenges. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting regional and global partnership.

strengthened U.S.-India partnership is imperative interests in a relationship with India include: • Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power. • Strengthening global trad[e] • Countering terrorism • Ensuring access to energy resources. • Bolstering nonprolif • Promoting democracy • Fostering stability in Pakistan, Afghanistan partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s peace likelihood of peaceful Chinese rise increases where democratic powers are strong. a strengthened relationship will signal the U S remains committed to enduring presence in Asia.

A strengthened U.S.-India strategic partnership is thus imperative in this new era. The transformation of U.S. ties with New Delhi over the past 10 years, led by Presidents Clinton and Bush, stands as one of the most significant triumphs of recent American foreign policy. It has also been a bipartisan success. In the last several years alone, the United States and India have completed a landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreement, enhanced military ties, expanded defense trade, increased bilateral trade and investment and deepened their global political cooperation.¶ Many prominent Indians and Americans, however, now fear this rapid expansion of ties has stalled. Past projects remain incomplete, few new ideas have been embraced by both sides, and the forward momentum that characterized recent cooperation has subsided. The Obama administration has taken significant steps to break through this inertia, including with its Strategic Dialogue this spring and President Obama’s planned state visit to India in November 2010. Yet there remains a sense among observers in both countries that this critical relationship is falling short of its promise.¶ We believe it is critical to rejuvenate the U.S.- India partnership and put U.S. relations with India on a more solid foundation. The relationship requires a bold leap forward. The United States should establish a vision for what it seeks in the relationship and give concrete meaning to the phrase “strategic partnership.” A nonpartisan working group of experts met at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) over the past eight months to review the main pillars of the U.S.-India relationship and we articulate here a specific agenda of action.¶ In order to chart a more ambitious U.S.-India strategic partnership, we believe that the United States should commit, publicly and explicitly, to work with India in support of its permanent membership in an enlarged U.N. Security Council; seek a broad expansion of bilateral trade and investment, beginning with a Bilateral Investment Treaty; greatly expand the security relationship and boost defense trade; support Indian membership in key export control organizations, a step toward integrating India into global nonproliferation efforts; and liberalize U.S. export controls, including the removal of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) subsidiaries from the U.S. Entity List.¶ These and the other actions outlined in this report will require India to make a number of commitments and policy changes, including taking rapid action to fully implement the Civil Nuclear Agreement; raising its caps on foreign investment; reducing barriers to defense and other forms of trade; enhancing its rules for protecting patents and other intellectual property; further harmonizing its export control lists with multilateral regimes; and seeking closer cooperation with the United States and like-minded partners in international organizations, including the United Nations. ¶ The U.S. relationship with India should be rooted in shared interests and values and should not be simply transactional or limited to occasional collaboration. India’s rise to global power is, we believe, in America’s strategic interest. As a result, the United States should not only seek a closer relationship with India, but actively assist its further emergence as a great power.¶ U.S. interests in a closer relationship with India include:¶ • Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power.¶ • Strengthening an open global trad[e]ing system.¶ • Protecting and preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms).¶ • Countering terrorism and violent extremism.¶ • Ensuring access to secure global energy resources.¶ • Bolstering the international nonproliferation regime.¶ • Promoting democracy and human rights.¶ • Fostering greater stability, security and economic prosperity in South Asia, including in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.¶ A strong U.S.-India strategic partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s continued peace and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the likelihood of a peaceful Chinese rise increases if it ascends in a region where the great democratic powers are also strong. Growing U.S.-India strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, a strengthened relationship with India, a natural democratic partner, will signal that the United States remains committed to a strong and enduring presence in Asia.¶ The need for closer U.S.-India cooperation goes well beyond regional concerns. In light of its rise, India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually all major global challenges. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting regional and global partnership.

<h4>2. Key to every existential threat </h4><p>Richard <strong>Armitage et al</strong>, President of Armitage International and former Deputy Secretary of State, “Natural Allies: A Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India Relations,” October <strong>2010<u> </p><p>A <mark>strengthened U.S.-India</mark> strategic <mark>partnership is</mark> thus <mark>imperative</mark> in this new era. The transformation of U.S. ties with New Delhi over the past 10 years, led by Presidents Clinton and Bush, stands as one of the most significant triumphs of recent American foreign policy.</u></strong> It has also been a bipartisan success. In the last several years alone, the United States and India have completed a landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreement, enhanced military ties, expanded defense trade, increased bilateral trade and investment and deepened their global political cooperation.¶ <u><strong>Many prominent Indians and Americans, however, now fear this rapid expansion of ties has stalled. Past projects remain incomplete, few new ideas have been embraced by both sides, and the forward momentum that characterized recent cooperation has subsided.</u></strong> The Obama administration has taken significant steps to break through this inertia, including with its Strategic Dialogue this spring and President Obama’s planned state visit to India in November 2010. Yet there remains a sense among observers in both countries that this critical relationship is falling short of its promise.¶ We believe <u><strong>it is critical to rejuvenate the U.S.- India partnership and put U.S. relations with India on a more solid foundation.</u></strong> The relationship requires a bold leap forward. The United States should establish a vision for what it seeks in the relationship and give concrete meaning to the phrase “strategic partnership.” A nonpartisan working group of experts met at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) over the past eight months to review the main pillars of the U.S.-India relationship and we articulate here a specific agenda of action.¶ In order to chart a more ambitious U.S.-India strategic partnership, we believe that the United States should commit, publicly and explicitly, to work with India in support of its permanent membership in an enlarged U.N. Security Council; seek a broad expansion of bilateral trade and investment, beginning with a Bilateral Investment Treaty; greatly expand the security relationship and boost defense trade; support Indian membership in key export control organizations, a step toward integrating India into global nonproliferation efforts; and liberalize U.S. export controls, including the removal of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) subsidiaries from the U.S. Entity List<u><strong>.</u></strong>¶ These and the other actions outlined in this report will require India to make a number of commitments and policy changes, including taking rapid action to fully implement the Civil Nuclear Agreement; raising its caps on foreign investment; reducing barriers to defense and other forms of trade; enhancing its rules for protecting patents and other intellectual property; further harmonizing its export control lists with multilateral regimes; and seeking closer cooperation with the United States and like-minded partners in international organizations, including the United Nations<u><strong>.</u></strong> ¶ The U.S. relationship with India should be rooted in shared interests and values and should not be simply transactional or limited to occasional collaboration. India’s rise to global power is, we believe, in America’s strategic interest. As a result, the United States should not only seek a closer relationship with India, but actively assist its further emergence as a great powe<u><strong>r.</u></strong>¶ <u><strong>U.S. <mark>interests in a</mark> closer <mark>relationship with India include:</mark>¶ <mark>• Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power.</mark>¶ <mark>• Strengthening</mark> an open <mark>global trad[e]</mark>ing system.¶ • Protecting and preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms).¶ <mark>• Countering terrorism</mark> and violent extremism.¶ <mark>• Ensuring access to</mark> secure global <mark>energy resources.</mark>¶ <mark>• Bolstering</mark> the international <mark>nonprolif</mark>eration regime.¶ <mark>• Promoting democracy</mark> and human rights.¶ <mark>• Fostering</mark> greater <mark>stability</mark>, security and economic prosperity <mark>in</mark> South Asia, including in <mark>Pakistan, Afghanistan</mark>, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.¶ A strong U.S.-India strategic <mark>partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s</mark> continued <mark>peace</mark> and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the <mark>likelihood of</mark> a <mark>peaceful Chinese rise increases</mark> if it ascends in a region <mark>where</mark> the great <mark>democratic powers are</mark> also <mark>strong.</mark> Growing U.S.-India strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, <mark>a strengthened relationship</mark> with India, a natural democratic partner, <mark>will signal</mark> that <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>remains committed to</mark> a strong and <mark>enduring presence in Asia.</u></strong></mark>¶ The need for closer U.S.-India cooperation goes well beyond regional concerns. In light of its rise, <u><strong>India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually all major global challenges. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting regional and global partnership.</p></u></strong>

Richard Armitage et al, President of Armitage International and former Deputy Secretary of State, “Natural Allies: A Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India Relations,” October 2010

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Richard Armitage et al, President of Armitage International and former Deputy Secretary of State, “Natural Allies: A Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India Relations,” October 2010 fulltext: A strengthened U.S.-India strategic partnership is thus imperative in this new era. The transformation of U.S. ties with New Delhi over the past 10 years, led by Presidents Clinton and Bush, stands as one of the most significant triumphs of recent American foreign policy. It has also been a bipartisan success. In the last several years alone, the United States and India have completed a landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreement, enhanced military ties, expanded defense trade, increased bilateral trade and investment and deepened their global political cooperation.¶ Many prominent Indians and Americans, however, now fear this rapid expansion of ties has stalled. Past projects remain incomplete, few new ideas have been embraced by both sides, and the forward momentum that characterized recent cooperation has subsided. The Obama administration has taken significant steps to break through this inertia, including with its Strategic Dialogue this spring and President Obama’s planned state visit to India in November 2010. Yet there remains a sense among observers in both countries that this critical relationship is falling short of its promise.¶ We believe it is critical to rejuvenate the U.S.- India partnership and put U.S. relations with India on a more solid foundation. The relationship requires a bold leap forward. The United States should establish a vision for what it seeks in the relationship and give concrete meaning to the phrase “strategic partnership.” A nonpartisan working group of experts met at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) over the past eight months to review the main pillars of the U.S.-India relationship and we articulate here a specific agenda of action.¶ In order to chart a more ambitious U.S.-India strategic partnership, we believe that the United States should commit, publicly and explicitly, to work with India in support of its permanent membership in an enlarged U.N. Security Council; seek a broad expansion of bilateral trade and investment, beginning with a Bilateral Investment Treaty; greatly expand the security relationship and boost defense trade; support Indian membership in key export control organizations, a step toward integrating India into global nonproliferation efforts; and liberalize U.S. export controls, including the removal of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) subsidiaries from the U.S. Entity List.¶ These and the other actions outlined in this report will require India to make a number of commitments and policy changes, including taking rapid action to fully implement the Civil Nuclear Agreement; raising its caps on foreign investment; reducing barriers to defense and other forms of trade; enhancing its rules for protecting patents and other intellectual property; further harmonizing its export control lists with multilateral regimes; and seeking closer cooperation with the United States and like-minded partners in international organizations, including the United Nations. ¶ The U.S. relationship with India should be rooted in shared interests and values and should not be simply transactional or limited to occasional collaboration. India’s rise to global power is, we believe, in America’s strategic interest. As a result, the United States should not only seek a closer relationship with India, but actively assist its further emergence as a great power.¶ U.S. interests in a closer relationship with India include:¶ • Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power.¶ • Strengthening an open global trad[e]ing system.¶ • Protecting and preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms).¶ • Countering terrorism and violent extremism.¶ • Ensuring access to secure global energy resources.¶ • Bolstering the international nonproliferation regime.¶ • Promoting democracy and human rights.¶ • Fostering greater stability, security and economic prosperity in South Asia, including in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.¶ A strong U.S.-India strategic partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s continued peace and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the likelihood of a peaceful Chinese rise increases if it ascends in a region where the great democratic powers are also strong. Growing U.S.-India strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, a strengthened relationship with India, a natural democratic partner, will signal that the United States remains committed to a strong and enduring presence in Asia.¶ The need for closer U.S.-India cooperation goes well beyond regional concerns. In light of its rise, India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually all major global challenges. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting regional and global partnership. [/INST] <h4>2. Key to every existential threat </h4><p>Richard <strong>Armitage et al</strong>, President of Armitage International and former Deputy Secretary of State, “Natural Allies: A Blueprint for the Future of U.S.-India Relations,” October <strong>2010<u> </p><p>A <mark>strengthened U.S.-India</mark> strategic <mark>partnership is</mark> thus <mark>imperative</mark> in this new era. The transformation of U.S. ties with New Delhi over the past 10 years, led by Presidents Clinton and Bush, stands as one of the most significant triumphs of recent American foreign policy.</u></strong> It has also been a bipartisan success. In the last several years alone, the United States and India have completed a landmark civil nuclear cooperation agreement, enhanced military ties, expanded defense trade, increased bilateral trade and investment and deepened their global political cooperation.¶ <u><strong>Many prominent Indians and Americans, however, now fear this rapid expansion of ties has stalled. Past projects remain incomplete, few new ideas have been embraced by both sides, and the forward momentum that characterized recent cooperation has subsided.</u></strong> The Obama administration has taken significant steps to break through this inertia, including with its Strategic Dialogue this spring and President Obama’s planned state visit to India in November 2010. Yet there remains a sense among observers in both countries that this critical relationship is falling short of its promise.¶ We believe <u><strong>it is critical to rejuvenate the U.S.- India partnership and put U.S. relations with India on a more solid foundation.</u></strong> The relationship requires a bold leap forward. The United States should establish a vision for what it seeks in the relationship and give concrete meaning to the phrase “strategic partnership.” A nonpartisan working group of experts met at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) over the past eight months to review the main pillars of the U.S.-India relationship and we articulate here a specific agenda of action.¶ In order to chart a more ambitious U.S.-India strategic partnership, we believe that the United States should commit, publicly and explicitly, to work with India in support of its permanent membership in an enlarged U.N. Security Council; seek a broad expansion of bilateral trade and investment, beginning with a Bilateral Investment Treaty; greatly expand the security relationship and boost defense trade; support Indian membership in key export control organizations, a step toward integrating India into global nonproliferation efforts; and liberalize U.S. export controls, including the removal of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) subsidiaries from the U.S. Entity List<u><strong>.</u></strong>¶ These and the other actions outlined in this report will require India to make a number of commitments and policy changes, including taking rapid action to fully implement the Civil Nuclear Agreement; raising its caps on foreign investment; reducing barriers to defense and other forms of trade; enhancing its rules for protecting patents and other intellectual property; further harmonizing its export control lists with multilateral regimes; and seeking closer cooperation with the United States and like-minded partners in international organizations, including the United Nations<u><strong>.</u></strong> ¶ The U.S. relationship with India should be rooted in shared interests and values and should not be simply transactional or limited to occasional collaboration. India’s rise to global power is, we believe, in America’s strategic interest. As a result, the United States should not only seek a closer relationship with India, but actively assist its further emergence as a great powe<u><strong>r.</u></strong>¶ <u><strong>U.S. <mark>interests in a</mark> closer <mark>relationship with India include:</mark>¶ <mark>• Ensuring a stable Asian and global balance of power.</mark>¶ <mark>• Strengthening</mark> an open <mark>global trad[e]</mark>ing system.¶ • Protecting and preserving access to the global commons (air, sea, space, and cyber realms).¶ <mark>• Countering terrorism</mark> and violent extremism.¶ <mark>• Ensuring access to</mark> secure global <mark>energy resources.</mark>¶ <mark>• Bolstering</mark> the international <mark>nonprolif</mark>eration regime.¶ <mark>• Promoting democracy</mark> and human rights.¶ <mark>• Fostering</mark> greater <mark>stability</mark>, security and economic prosperity <mark>in</mark> South Asia, including in <mark>Pakistan, Afghanistan</mark>, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.¶ A strong U.S.-India strategic <mark>partnership will prove indispensable to the region’s</mark> continued <mark>peace</mark> and prosperity. Both India and the United States have a vital interest in maintaining a stable balance of power in Asia. Neither seeks containment of China, but the <mark>likelihood of</mark> a <mark>peaceful Chinese rise increases</mark> if it ascends in a region <mark>where</mark> the great <mark>democratic powers are</mark> also <mark>strong.</mark> Growing U.S.-India strategic ties will ensure that Asia will not have a vacuum of power and will make it easier for both Washington and New Delhi to have productive relations with Beijing. In addition, <mark>a strengthened relationship</mark> with India, a natural democratic partner, <mark>will signal</mark> that <mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>remains committed to</mark> a strong and <mark>enduring presence in Asia.</u></strong></mark>¶ The need for closer U.S.-India cooperation goes well beyond regional concerns. In light of its rise, <u><strong>India will play an increasingly vital role in addressing virtually all major global challenges. Now is the time to transform a series of bilateral achievements into a lasting regional and global partnership.</p></u></strong> </s>

Second, link- US engagement in Cuba undermines Chinese influence and crowds them out-

Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region bilateral trade increased to $1.83 billion in 2010 it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba

(James, Nolan Chart, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped,” June 29, 2011, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html) /wyo-mm) Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral trade increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba.

<h4><strong>Second, link- US engagement in Cuba undermines Chinese influence and crowds them out-</h4><p>Luko 11</p><p></strong>(James, Nolan Chart, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped,” June 29, 2011, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html) /wyo-mm)</p><p><u><strong>Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region</u></strong>, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, <u><strong>bilateral trade increased</u></strong> from $440 million in 2001 <u><strong>to $1.83 billion in 2010</u></strong>. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, <u><strong>it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan</u></strong>. <u><strong>Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources</u></strong>. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] <u><strong>The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba</u></strong>.</p>

Luko 11

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Luko 11 fulltext: (James, Nolan Chart, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped,” June 29, 2011, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html) /wyo-mm) Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral trade increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan. Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba. [/INST] <h4><strong>Second, link- US engagement in Cuba undermines Chinese influence and crowds them out-</h4><p>Luko 11</p><p></strong>(James, Nolan Chart, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped,” June 29, 2011, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html) /wyo-mm)</p><p><u><strong>Cuba is China's biggest trade partner in the Caribbean region</u></strong>, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, <u><strong>bilateral trade increased</u></strong> from $440 million in 2001 <u><strong>to $1.83 billion in 2010</u></strong>. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed offshore oil deals and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, <u><strong>it will be a source of leverage against America whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and Taiwan</u></strong>. <u><strong>Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources</u></strong>. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] <u><strong>The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverse Americas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba</u></strong>.</p> </s>

[A.] Current policy toward Cuba destroys effective democracy and humans rights promotion

the purpose of sanctions is to bring about behavior seen as in conformity with the goals and standards of a society and to prevent behavior that is inconsistent with these goals and standards These goals , in the Cuban context, would be democracy and a vested interest in human rights the sanctions that the United States has placed on Cuba have done little to address the systematic violations of human rights in Cuba The American embargo is not sufficient to democratize Cuba and improve human rights. economic sanctions on Cuba have been ineffective. As other states trade and interact freely with Cuba, the lack of partnership with America is only a minor hindrance to Cuba’s economy. the sanctions are detrimental to the United States economy, as Cuba could potentially be a geostrategic economic partner. More importantly, since economic sanctions are not directly related to the goal of improved human rights, the effect of these sanctions is also unrelated; continued economic sanctions against Cuba create no incentive for the Cuban government to promote better human rights, especially when the sanctions do not have international support. Empirically, it is clear that since its inception, the policy has not succeeded in promoting democratization or improving human rights. Something more must be done in order to improve the situation American sanctions during the Cold War strengthened Castro’s ideological position and created opportunities for involvement by the Soviet Union, thereby decreasing the likelihood of democratization and improvement in human rights The embargo also became a scapegoat for the Castro administration, which laid blame for poor human rights conditions on the embargo policy itself isolating Cuba as an enemy of democracy during the Cold War essentially made the goals of democratization in the country unachievable While the embargo may have been strategic during the Cold War as a bulwark against communism, the long-term effects of the policy have essentially precluded the possibility for democracy in Cuba. Even after the end of the Cold War, communism persists in Cuba and human rights violations are systemic; America’s policy has not achieved its goals and has become a relic of the Cold War era. The prospects for democracy and improvement in human rights seem as bleak as ever

[Brandon, Contributing writer of Prospect Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, EVALUATING THE CUBAN EMBARGO, 7-22-12, http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/] /Wyo-MB Ayubi, Bissell, Korsah and Lerner suggest that “the purpose of sanctions is to bring about behavior seen as in conformity with the goals and standards of a society and to prevent behavior that is inconsistent with these goals and standards” (Ayubi 1). These goals and standards, in the Cuban context, would be democracy and a vested interest in human rights. However, the sanctions that the United States has placed on Cuba in the past half century have done little to address the systematic violations of human rights in Cuba. § 3.1: The American embargo is not sufficient to democratize Cuba and improve human rights. Without the help and support of multilateral institutions, economic sanctions on Cuba have been ineffective. As other states trade and interact freely with Cuba, the lack of partnership with America is only a minor hindrance to Cuba’s economy. Moreover, the sanctions are detrimental to the United States economy, as Cuba could potentially be a geostrategic economic partner. More importantly, since economic sanctions are not directly related to the goal of improved human rights, the effect of these sanctions is also unrelated; continued economic sanctions against Cuba create no incentive for the Cuban government to promote better human rights, especially when the sanctions do not have international support. Empirically, it is clear that since its inception, the policy has not succeeded in promoting democratization or improving human rights. Something more must be done in order to improve the situation. § 3.2: American sanctions during the Cold War strengthened Castro’s ideological position and created opportunities for involvement by the Soviet Union, thereby decreasing the likelihood of democratization and improvement in human rights. Cuba’s revolution could not have come at a worse time for America. The emergence of a communist state in the western hemisphere allowed the Soviet Union to extend its influence, and the United States’ rejection of Cuba only widened the window of opportunity for Soviet involvement. The embargo also became a scapegoat for the Castro administration, which laid blame for poor human rights conditions on the embargo policy itself (Fontaine 18 – 22). Furthermore, as Ratliff and Fontaine suggest, isolating Cuba as an enemy of democracy during the Cold War essentially made the goals of democratization in the country unachievable (Fontaine 30). While the embargo may have been strategic during the Cold War as a bulwark against communism, the long-term effects of the policy have essentially precluded the possibility for democracy in Cuba. Even after the end of the Cold War, communism persists in Cuba and human rights violations are systemic; America’s policy has not achieved its goals and has become a relic of the Cold War era. The prospects for democracy and improvement in human rights seem as bleak as ever.

<h4>[A.] Current policy toward Cuba <strong>destroys effective democracy and humans rights promotion </h4><p>Amash, 2012</p><p></strong>[Brandon, Contributing writer of Prospect Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, EVALUATING THE CUBAN EMBARGO, 7-22-12, http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/] /Wyo-MB</p><p>Ayubi, Bissell, Korsah and Lerner suggest that “<u><strong>the purpose of sanctions is to bring about behavior seen as in conformity with the goals and standards of a society and to prevent behavior that is inconsistent with these goals and standards</u></strong>” (Ayubi 1). <u><strong>These goals</u></strong> and standards<u><strong>, in the Cuban context, would be democracy and a vested interest in human</u></strong> <u><strong>rights</u></strong>. However, <u><strong>the sanctions that the United States has placed on</u></strong> <u><strong>Cuba</u></strong> in the past half century <u><strong>have done little to address the systematic violations of human rights in Cuba</u></strong>.</p><p>§ 3.1: <u><strong>The American embargo is not sufficient to democratize Cuba and improve human rights.</u></strong> Without the help and support of multilateral institutions, <u><strong>economic sanctions on Cuba have been ineffective. As other states trade and interact freely with Cuba, the lack of partnership with America is only a minor hindrance to Cuba’s economy.</u></strong> Moreover, <u><strong>the sanctions are detrimental to the United States economy, as Cuba could potentially be a geostrategic economic partner. More importantly, since economic sanctions are not directly related to the goal of improved human rights, the effect of these sanctions is also unrelated; continued economic sanctions against Cuba create no incentive for the Cuban government to promote better human rights, especially when the sanctions do not have international support. Empirically, it is clear that since its inception, the policy has not succeeded in promoting democratization or improving human rights. Something more must be done in order to improve the situation</u></strong>. § 3.2: <u><strong>American sanctions during the Cold War strengthened Castro’s ideological position and created opportunities for involvement by the Soviet Union, thereby decreasing the likelihood of democratization and improvement in human rights</u></strong>. Cuba’s revolution could not have come at a worse time for America. The emergence of a communist state in the western hemisphere allowed the Soviet Union to extend its influence, and the United States’ rejection of Cuba only widened the window of opportunity for Soviet involvement. <u><strong>The embargo also became a scapegoat for the Castro administration, which laid blame for poor human rights conditions on the embargo policy itself</u></strong> (Fontaine 18 – 22). Furthermore, as Ratliff and Fontaine suggest, <u><strong>isolating Cuba as an enemy of democracy during the Cold War essentially made the goals of democratization in the country unachievable</u></strong> (Fontaine 30). <u><strong>While the embargo may have been strategic during the Cold War as a bulwark against communism, the long-term effects of the policy have essentially precluded the possibility for democracy in Cuba. Even after the end of the Cold War, communism persists in Cuba and human rights violations are systemic; America’s policy has not achieved its goals and has become a relic of the Cold War era. The prospects for democracy and improvement in human rights seem as bleak as ever</u></strong>.</p>

Amash, 2012

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Amash, 2012 fulltext: [Brandon, Contributing writer of Prospect Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, EVALUATING THE CUBAN EMBARGO, 7-22-12, http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/] /Wyo-MB Ayubi, Bissell, Korsah and Lerner suggest that “the purpose of sanctions is to bring about behavior seen as in conformity with the goals and standards of a society and to prevent behavior that is inconsistent with these goals and standards” (Ayubi 1). These goals and standards, in the Cuban context, would be democracy and a vested interest in human rights. However, the sanctions that the United States has placed on Cuba in the past half century have done little to address the systematic violations of human rights in Cuba. § 3.1: The American embargo is not sufficient to democratize Cuba and improve human rights. Without the help and support of multilateral institutions, economic sanctions on Cuba have been ineffective. As other states trade and interact freely with Cuba, the lack of partnership with America is only a minor hindrance to Cuba’s economy. Moreover, the sanctions are detrimental to the United States economy, as Cuba could potentially be a geostrategic economic partner. More importantly, since economic sanctions are not directly related to the goal of improved human rights, the effect of these sanctions is also unrelated; continued economic sanctions against Cuba create no incentive for the Cuban government to promote better human rights, especially when the sanctions do not have international support. Empirically, it is clear that since its inception, the policy has not succeeded in promoting democratization or improving human rights. Something more must be done in order to improve the situation. § 3.2: American sanctions during the Cold War strengthened Castro’s ideological position and created opportunities for involvement by the Soviet Union, thereby decreasing the likelihood of democratization and improvement in human rights. Cuba’s revolution could not have come at a worse time for America. The emergence of a communist state in the western hemisphere allowed the Soviet Union to extend its influence, and the United States’ rejection of Cuba only widened the window of opportunity for Soviet involvement. The embargo also became a scapegoat for the Castro administration, which laid blame for poor human rights conditions on the embargo policy itself (Fontaine 18 – 22). Furthermore, as Ratliff and Fontaine suggest, isolating Cuba as an enemy of democracy during the Cold War essentially made the goals of democratization in the country unachievable (Fontaine 30). While the embargo may have been strategic during the Cold War as a bulwark against communism, the long-term effects of the policy have essentially precluded the possibility for democracy in Cuba. Even after the end of the Cold War, communism persists in Cuba and human rights violations are systemic; America’s policy has not achieved its goals and has become a relic of the Cold War era. The prospects for democracy and improvement in human rights seem as bleak as ever. [/INST] <h4>[A.] Current policy toward Cuba <strong>destroys effective democracy and humans rights promotion </h4><p>Amash, 2012</p><p></strong>[Brandon, Contributing writer of Prospect Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, EVALUATING THE CUBAN EMBARGO, 7-22-12, http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/] /Wyo-MB</p><p>Ayubi, Bissell, Korsah and Lerner suggest that “<u><strong>the purpose of sanctions is to bring about behavior seen as in conformity with the goals and standards of a society and to prevent behavior that is inconsistent with these goals and standards</u></strong>” (Ayubi 1). <u><strong>These goals</u></strong> and standards<u><strong>, in the Cuban context, would be democracy and a vested interest in human</u></strong> <u><strong>rights</u></strong>. However, <u><strong>the sanctions that the United States has placed on</u></strong> <u><strong>Cuba</u></strong> in the past half century <u><strong>have done little to address the systematic violations of human rights in Cuba</u></strong>.</p><p>§ 3.1: <u><strong>The American embargo is not sufficient to democratize Cuba and improve human rights.</u></strong> Without the help and support of multilateral institutions, <u><strong>economic sanctions on Cuba have been ineffective. As other states trade and interact freely with Cuba, the lack of partnership with America is only a minor hindrance to Cuba’s economy.</u></strong> Moreover, <u><strong>the sanctions are detrimental to the United States economy, as Cuba could potentially be a geostrategic economic partner. More importantly, since economic sanctions are not directly related to the goal of improved human rights, the effect of these sanctions is also unrelated; continued economic sanctions against Cuba create no incentive for the Cuban government to promote better human rights, especially when the sanctions do not have international support. Empirically, it is clear that since its inception, the policy has not succeeded in promoting democratization or improving human rights. Something more must be done in order to improve the situation</u></strong>. § 3.2: <u><strong>American sanctions during the Cold War strengthened Castro’s ideological position and created opportunities for involvement by the Soviet Union, thereby decreasing the likelihood of democratization and improvement in human rights</u></strong>. Cuba’s revolution could not have come at a worse time for America. The emergence of a communist state in the western hemisphere allowed the Soviet Union to extend its influence, and the United States’ rejection of Cuba only widened the window of opportunity for Soviet involvement. <u><strong>The embargo also became a scapegoat for the Castro administration, which laid blame for poor human rights conditions on the embargo policy itself</u></strong> (Fontaine 18 – 22). Furthermore, as Ratliff and Fontaine suggest, <u><strong>isolating Cuba as an enemy of democracy during the Cold War essentially made the goals of democratization in the country unachievable</u></strong> (Fontaine 30). <u><strong>While the embargo may have been strategic during the Cold War as a bulwark against communism, the long-term effects of the policy have essentially precluded the possibility for democracy in Cuba. Even after the end of the Cold War, communism persists in Cuba and human rights violations are systemic; America’s policy has not achieved its goals and has become a relic of the Cold War era. The prospects for democracy and improvement in human rights seem as bleak as ever</u></strong>.</p> </s>

Iran-Venezuela alliance causes terrorism

Chavez and Ahmadinejad have historically done what they can to be in an “indirect conflict” with us Venezuela is in close proximity to our shores which poses a new threat the two countries began international flights connecting Iran and Syria with Caracas. Immigration concerns have surfaced in light of 9/11 with many documented cases of terrorists gaining entry into the Americas with fake passports, visas, and other “allegedly official” documents. Now that there are flights leaving directly from “hot-spots” in the Middle East and going to Venezuela, there are more “lesscomplicated” ways for terrorists to gain access to the U.S

Chavez and Ahmadinejad have historically done what they can to be in an “indirect ¶ conflict” with us Venezuela ¶ is in close proximity to our shores which poses a new threat the two countries began international ¶ flights connecting Iran and Syria with Caracas. Immigration concerns have surfaced in light of ¶ 9/11 with many documented cases of terrorists gaining entry into the Americas with fake ¶ passports, visas, and other “allegedly official” documents. Now that there are flights leaving ¶ directly from “hot-spots” in the Middle East and going to Venezuela, there are more “lesscomplicated” ways for terrorists to gain access to the U.S

The disgust of the United States of America, shared by Chavez and Ahmadinejad, fuel ¶ their relationship. The two leaders have historically done what they can to be in an “indirect ¶ conflict” with us. Now they are supporting each other as members of an “international outsider’s ¶ club.” Ahmadinejad’s last visit to Caracas resulted in playfully delivered threats from both he ¶ and Chavez. In this case, the United States waited for a problem to erupt before taking heed. ¶ Now that the leaders are using playful gestures, and applying indirect threats, the U.S. has started ¶ to wonder if Iran is exporting their nuclear program to South America. Regrettably, Venezuela ¶ is in close proximity to our shores which poses a new threat. ¶ The history between Iran and Venezuela is quite strong and has been so for many ¶ decades. The beginning of this alliance started when they founded the Organization of ¶ Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec) “to ensure themselves better terms from foreign oil ¶ companies.” Venezuela has enjoyed several benefits from this relationship with the promise of ¶ many more. It was reported in 2008 that the two nations have signed a variety of agreements in ¶ agriculture, petrochemicals, oil exploration in the Orinoco region of Venezuela, and the ¶ manufacturing of automobiles, bicycles, and tractors. Iran and Venezuela also reported in April ¶ 2009 that a there was a new development bank for “economic projects in both countries, with ¶ each country reportedly providing $100 million in initial capital (Sullivan, 2010).”¶ More problematic for the United States is that the two countries began international ¶ flights connecting Iran and Syria with Caracas. Immigration concerns have surfaced in light of ¶ 9/11 with many documented cases of terrorists gaining entry into the Americas with fake ¶ passports, visas, and other “allegedly official” documents. Now that there are flights leaving ¶ directly from “hot-spots” in the Middle East and going to Venezuela, there are more “lesscomplicated” ways for terrorists to gain access to the U.S.

<h4>Iran-Venezuela alliance causes terrorism</h4><p><strong>Fugitt ’12</strong> [Kristina Michele Fugitt, School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy¶ Norwich University, “The Export of Iran’s Nuclear Program to Latin America: Implications for United States Security,” Global Security Studies, Summer 2012, Volume 3, Issue 3, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Fugitt%20Iran%20LA.pdf]</p><p>The disgust of the United States of America, shared by <u><mark>Chavez and Ahmadinejad</u></mark>, fuel ¶ their relationship. The two leaders <u><mark>have historically done what they can to be in an “indirect </u>¶<u> conflict” with us</u></mark>. Now they are supporting each other as members of an “international outsider’s ¶ club.” Ahmadinejad’s last visit to Caracas resulted in playfully delivered threats from both he ¶ and Chavez. In this case, the United States waited for a problem to erupt before taking heed. ¶ Now that the leaders are using playful gestures, and applying indirect threats, the U.S. has started ¶ to wonder if Iran is exporting their nuclear program to South America. Regrettably, <u><mark>Venezuela </u>¶<u> is in close proximity to our shores which poses a new threat</u></mark>. ¶ The history between Iran and Venezuela is quite strong and has been so for many ¶ decades. The beginning of this alliance started when they founded the Organization of ¶ Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec) “to ensure themselves better terms from foreign oil ¶ companies.” Venezuela has enjoyed several benefits from this relationship with the promise of ¶ many more. It was reported in 2008 that the two nations have signed a variety of agreements in ¶ agriculture, petrochemicals, oil exploration in the Orinoco region of Venezuela, and the ¶ manufacturing of automobiles, bicycles, and tractors. Iran and Venezuela also reported in April ¶ 2009 that a there was a new development bank for “economic projects in both countries, with ¶ each country reportedly providing $100 million in initial capital (Sullivan, 2010).”¶ More problematic for the United States is that <u><mark>the two countries began international </u>¶<u> flights connecting Iran and Syria with Caracas. Immigration concerns have surfaced in light of </u>¶<u> 9/11 with many documented cases of terrorists gaining entry into the Americas with fake </u>¶<u> passports, visas, and other “allegedly official” documents. Now that there are flights leaving </u>¶<u> directly from “hot-spots” in the Middle East and going to Venezuela, there are more “lesscomplicated” ways for terrorists to gain access to the U.S</u></mark>. </p>

Fugitt ’12 [Kristina Michele Fugitt, School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy¶ Norwich University, “The Export of Iran’s Nuclear Program to Latin America: Implications for United States Security,” Global Security Studies, Summer 2012, Volume 3, Issue 3, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Fugitt%20Iran%20LA.pdf]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Fugitt ’12 [Kristina Michele Fugitt, School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy¶ Norwich University, “The Export of Iran’s Nuclear Program to Latin America: Implications for United States Security,” Global Security Studies, Summer 2012, Volume 3, Issue 3, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Fugitt%20Iran%20LA.pdf] fulltext: The disgust of the United States of America, shared by Chavez and Ahmadinejad, fuel ¶ their relationship. The two leaders have historically done what they can to be in an “indirect ¶ conflict” with us. Now they are supporting each other as members of an “international outsider’s ¶ club.” Ahmadinejad’s last visit to Caracas resulted in playfully delivered threats from both he ¶ and Chavez. In this case, the United States waited for a problem to erupt before taking heed. ¶ Now that the leaders are using playful gestures, and applying indirect threats, the U.S. has started ¶ to wonder if Iran is exporting their nuclear program to South America. Regrettably, Venezuela ¶ is in close proximity to our shores which poses a new threat. ¶ The history between Iran and Venezuela is quite strong and has been so for many ¶ decades. The beginning of this alliance started when they founded the Organization of ¶ Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec) “to ensure themselves better terms from foreign oil ¶ companies.” Venezuela has enjoyed several benefits from this relationship with the promise of ¶ many more. It was reported in 2008 that the two nations have signed a variety of agreements in ¶ agriculture, petrochemicals, oil exploration in the Orinoco region of Venezuela, and the ¶ manufacturing of automobiles, bicycles, and tractors. Iran and Venezuela also reported in April ¶ 2009 that a there was a new development bank for “economic projects in both countries, with ¶ each country reportedly providing $100 million in initial capital (Sullivan, 2010).”¶ More problematic for the United States is that the two countries began international ¶ flights connecting Iran and Syria with Caracas. Immigration concerns have surfaced in light of ¶ 9/11 with many documented cases of terrorists gaining entry into the Americas with fake ¶ passports, visas, and other “allegedly official” documents. Now that there are flights leaving ¶ directly from “hot-spots” in the Middle East and going to Venezuela, there are more “lesscomplicated” ways for terrorists to gain access to the U.S. [/INST] <h4>Iran-Venezuela alliance causes terrorism</h4><p><strong>Fugitt ’12</strong> [Kristina Michele Fugitt, School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy¶ Norwich University, “The Export of Iran’s Nuclear Program to Latin America: Implications for United States Security,” Global Security Studies, Summer 2012, Volume 3, Issue 3, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Fugitt%20Iran%20LA.pdf]</p><p>The disgust of the United States of America, shared by <u><mark>Chavez and Ahmadinejad</u></mark>, fuel ¶ their relationship. The two leaders <u><mark>have historically done what they can to be in an “indirect </u>¶<u> conflict” with us</u></mark>. Now they are supporting each other as members of an “international outsider’s ¶ club.” Ahmadinejad’s last visit to Caracas resulted in playfully delivered threats from both he ¶ and Chavez. In this case, the United States waited for a problem to erupt before taking heed. ¶ Now that the leaders are using playful gestures, and applying indirect threats, the U.S. has started ¶ to wonder if Iran is exporting their nuclear program to South America. Regrettably, <u><mark>Venezuela </u>¶<u> is in close proximity to our shores which poses a new threat</u></mark>. ¶ The history between Iran and Venezuela is quite strong and has been so for many ¶ decades. The beginning of this alliance started when they founded the Organization of ¶ Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec) “to ensure themselves better terms from foreign oil ¶ companies.” Venezuela has enjoyed several benefits from this relationship with the promise of ¶ many more. It was reported in 2008 that the two nations have signed a variety of agreements in ¶ agriculture, petrochemicals, oil exploration in the Orinoco region of Venezuela, and the ¶ manufacturing of automobiles, bicycles, and tractors. Iran and Venezuela also reported in April ¶ 2009 that a there was a new development bank for “economic projects in both countries, with ¶ each country reportedly providing $100 million in initial capital (Sullivan, 2010).”¶ More problematic for the United States is that <u><mark>the two countries began international </u>¶<u> flights connecting Iran and Syria with Caracas. Immigration concerns have surfaced in light of </u>¶<u> 9/11 with many documented cases of terrorists gaining entry into the Americas with fake </u>¶<u> passports, visas, and other “allegedly official” documents. Now that there are flights leaving </u>¶<u> directly from “hot-spots” in the Middle East and going to Venezuela, there are more “lesscomplicated” ways for terrorists to gain access to the U.S</u></mark>. </p> </s>

(__) The peace process leads to nuclear terrorism

the Peace Process might generate nuclear terrorism via its ongoing legitimization of various terrorist groups diplomatic actions could give aid and comfort to terrorist groups, making it easier for- them to ultimately gain access to the essential implements of nuclear terrorist attack. Under the terms of the Peace Process, Israel's legitimization of terrorist groups is paralleling Israel's loss of strategic depth The Peace Process is producing a Palestinian state. In this connection, nuclear terrorist threats against Israel likely will increase because, tactically, the sanctuary benefits of "Palestine" will make it easier to plan and to carry out a nuclear terrorist operation, and to regain all of Israel Abbas attitudes are far from mainstream Palestinian public opinion http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn1 as long as Abbas is the legal head of state with an unconstitutional government, he will not be able to sign any agreement that makes substantial concessions at odds with the Palestinian national consensus http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn2 Because one third of the Palestinian MPs are in Israeli jails and Israel imposes restrictions on the movement of the remaining MPs, the PLC) could only in theory meet to discuss an extension of the state of emergency for a second time or give a vote of confidence http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn3 The Palestinian Authority can return to constitutionality either by the release of the jailed MPs, or, through new elections. Only a government empowered and legitimized by the Palestinian constitution will be able to negotiate with Israel. Otherwise, the agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority risk being deemed illegitimate

One way in which the Peace Process might generate nuclear terrorism against Israel would be via its ongoing legitimization of various terrorist groups. For example, when the Clinton Administration prodded Jerusalem to enter into the Oslo Process and proceeded to host Israel's formal agreement with the PLO on September 13, 1993,9" it instantly transformed Yasser Arafat and his terrorist network into a jurisprudentially and politically acceptable organization. Such diplomatic actions could give aid and comfort to terrorist groups, making it easier for- them to ultimately gain access to the essential implements of nuclear terrorist attack. Under the terms of the Peace Process, Israel's legitimization of terrorist groups is paralleling Israel's loss of strategic depth. In this situation, terrorists may draw encouragement from both the palpable weakening of Israeli power (a weakening that could inspire death-blow forms of higher-order terrorist attack) and from the idea that their ends justified their means. The Peace Process is producing a Palestinian state. In this connection, nuclear terrorist threats against Israel likely will increase because, tactically, the sanctuary benefits of "Palestine" will make it easier to plan and to carry out a nuclear terrorist operation, and to regain all "lost territories" (i.e., all of Israel). (__) The peace process can’t succeed because the Palestinian Authority lacks the institutional capacity to ratify any agreements Sergio Yahni, September 9, 2k7 (Alternative Information Center “Can the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process be Renewed?”) But Mahmoud Abbas attitudes are far from mainstream Palestinian public opinion. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), most of the Palestinians oppose an agreement by which settlement blocks will remain on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, oppose concessions on Jerusalem and support the right of return of the Palestinian people. HYPERLINK "http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html" \l "_ftn1" \o "_ftnref1" http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn1 At the same time, as long as President Abbas is the legal head of state with an unconstitutional government, he will not be able to sign any agreement that makes substantial concessions at odds with the Palestinian national consensus. According to Article 110 (1) of the Palestinian Basic Law, http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn2 the president “may declare a state of emergency by a decree” when there is a threat to national security caused by war, invasion, armed insurrection, or at a time of natural disaster for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.” This state of emergency can be extended for additional thirty days only with the approval of two thirds of the parliament. Because one third of the Palestinian MPs are in Israeli jails and Israel imposes restrictions on the movement of the remaining MPs, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) could only in theory meet to discuss an extension of the state of emergency for a second time in August or give a vote of confidence for Salam Fayyad’s appointed government. http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn3 However, it is unlikely that the current PLC, which has a Hamas majority, will endorse the state of emergency or Salam Fayyad’s government. The Palestinian Authority can return to constitutionality either by the release of the jailed MPs, or, through new elections. Only a government empowered and legitimized by the Palestinian constitution will be able to negotiate with Israel. Otherwise, the agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority risk being deemed illegitimate.

<h4>(__) <strong>The peace process leads to nuclear terrorism</h4><p>Beres, 1997</p><p></strong>(<u><strong>Louis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Winter 1997 (Dickinson Journal of International Law “After the "Peace Process:" Israel, Palestine, and Regional Nuclear War”)</p><p></u></strong>One way in which <u><strong>the Peace Process might generate nuclear terrorism</u></strong> against Israel would be <u><strong>via its ongoing legitimization of various terrorist groups</u></strong>. For example, when the Clinton Administration prodded Jerusalem to enter into the Oslo Process and proceeded to host Israel's formal agreement with the PLO on September 13, 1993,9" it instantly transformed Yasser Arafat and his terrorist network into a jurisprudentially and politically acceptable organization. Such <u><strong>diplomatic actions could give aid and comfort to terrorist groups, making it easier for- them to ultimately gain access to the essential implements of nuclear terrorist attack.</p><p>Under the terms of the Peace Process, Israel's legitimization of terrorist groups is paralleling Israel's loss of strategic depth</u></strong>. In this situation, terrorists may draw encouragement from both the palpable weakening of Israeli power (a weakening that could inspire death-blow forms of higher-order terrorist attack) and from the idea that their ends justified their means.</p><p><u><strong>The Peace Process is producing a Palestinian state. In this connection, nuclear terrorist threats against Israel likely will increase because, tactically, the sanctuary benefits of "Palestine" will make it easier to plan and to carry out a nuclear terrorist operation, and to regain</u></strong> all "lost territories" (i.e., <u><strong>all of Israel</u>).</p><p>(__) The peace process can’t succeed because the Palestinian Authority lacks the institutional capacity to ratify any agreements</p><p></strong>Sergio <strong>Yahni</strong>, September 9, <strong>2k7</strong> (Alternative Information Center “Can the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process be Renewed?”)</p><p>But Mahmoud <u><strong>Abbas attitudes are far from mainstream Palestinian public opinion</u></strong>. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), most of the Palestinians oppose an agreement by which settlement blocks will remain on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, oppose concessions on Jerusalem and support the right of return of the Palestinian people. HYPERLINK "http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html" \l "_ftn1" \o "_ftnref1" <u>http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn1</u> </p><p>At the same time, <u><strong>as long as</u></strong> President <u><strong>Abbas is the legal head of state with an unconstitutional government, he will not be able to sign any agreement that makes substantial concessions at odds with the Palestinian national consensus</u></strong>. </p><p>According to Article 110 (1) of the Palestinian Basic Law, <u>http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn2</u> the president “may declare a state of emergency by a decree” when there is a threat to national security caused by war, invasion, armed insurrection, or at a time of natural disaster for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.” This state of emergency can be extended for additional thirty days only with the approval of two thirds of the parliament. </p><p><u><strong>Because one third of the Palestinian MPs are in Israeli jails and Israel imposes restrictions on the movement of the remaining MPs, the</u></strong> Palestinian Legislative Council (<u><strong>PLC) could only in theory meet to discuss an extension of the state of emergency for a second time</u></strong> in August <u><strong>or give a vote of confidence</u></strong> for Salam Fayyad’s appointed government. <u>http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn3</u> However, it is unlikely that the current PLC, which has a Hamas majority, will endorse the state of emergency or Salam Fayyad’s government. </p><p><u><strong>The Palestinian Authority can return to constitutionality either by the release of the jailed MPs, or, through new elections. Only a government empowered and legitimized by the Palestinian constitution will be able to negotiate with Israel. Otherwise, the agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority risk being deemed illegitimate</u></strong>. </p>

Beres, 1997 (Louis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Winter 1997 (Dickinson Journal of International Law “After the "Peace Process:" Israel, Palestine, and Regional Nuclear War”)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Beres, 1997 (Louis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Winter 1997 (Dickinson Journal of International Law “After the "Peace Process:" Israel, Palestine, and Regional Nuclear War”) fulltext: One way in which the Peace Process might generate nuclear terrorism against Israel would be via its ongoing legitimization of various terrorist groups. For example, when the Clinton Administration prodded Jerusalem to enter into the Oslo Process and proceeded to host Israel's formal agreement with the PLO on September 13, 1993,9" it instantly transformed Yasser Arafat and his terrorist network into a jurisprudentially and politically acceptable organization. Such diplomatic actions could give aid and comfort to terrorist groups, making it easier for- them to ultimately gain access to the essential implements of nuclear terrorist attack. Under the terms of the Peace Process, Israel's legitimization of terrorist groups is paralleling Israel's loss of strategic depth. In this situation, terrorists may draw encouragement from both the palpable weakening of Israeli power (a weakening that could inspire death-blow forms of higher-order terrorist attack) and from the idea that their ends justified their means. The Peace Process is producing a Palestinian state. In this connection, nuclear terrorist threats against Israel likely will increase because, tactically, the sanctuary benefits of "Palestine" will make it easier to plan and to carry out a nuclear terrorist operation, and to regain all "lost territories" (i.e., all of Israel). (__) The peace process can’t succeed because the Palestinian Authority lacks the institutional capacity to ratify any agreements Sergio Yahni, September 9, 2k7 (Alternative Information Center “Can the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process be Renewed?”) But Mahmoud Abbas attitudes are far from mainstream Palestinian public opinion. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), most of the Palestinians oppose an agreement by which settlement blocks will remain on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, oppose concessions on Jerusalem and support the right of return of the Palestinian people. HYPERLINK "http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html" \l "_ftn1" \o "_ftnref1" http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn1 At the same time, as long as President Abbas is the legal head of state with an unconstitutional government, he will not be able to sign any agreement that makes substantial concessions at odds with the Palestinian national consensus. According to Article 110 (1) of the Palestinian Basic Law, http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn2 the president “may declare a state of emergency by a decree” when there is a threat to national security caused by war, invasion, armed insurrection, or at a time of natural disaster for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.” This state of emergency can be extended for additional thirty days only with the approval of two thirds of the parliament. Because one third of the Palestinian MPs are in Israeli jails and Israel imposes restrictions on the movement of the remaining MPs, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) could only in theory meet to discuss an extension of the state of emergency for a second time in August or give a vote of confidence for Salam Fayyad’s appointed government. http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn3 However, it is unlikely that the current PLC, which has a Hamas majority, will endorse the state of emergency or Salam Fayyad’s government. The Palestinian Authority can return to constitutionality either by the release of the jailed MPs, or, through new elections. Only a government empowered and legitimized by the Palestinian constitution will be able to negotiate with Israel. Otherwise, the agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority risk being deemed illegitimate. [/INST] <h4>(__) <strong>The peace process leads to nuclear terrorism</h4><p>Beres, 1997</p><p></strong>(<u><strong>Louis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, Winter 1997 (Dickinson Journal of International Law “After the "Peace Process:" Israel, Palestine, and Regional Nuclear War”)</p><p></u></strong>One way in which <u><strong>the Peace Process might generate nuclear terrorism</u></strong> against Israel would be <u><strong>via its ongoing legitimization of various terrorist groups</u></strong>. For example, when the Clinton Administration prodded Jerusalem to enter into the Oslo Process and proceeded to host Israel's formal agreement with the PLO on September 13, 1993,9" it instantly transformed Yasser Arafat and his terrorist network into a jurisprudentially and politically acceptable organization. Such <u><strong>diplomatic actions could give aid and comfort to terrorist groups, making it easier for- them to ultimately gain access to the essential implements of nuclear terrorist attack.</p><p>Under the terms of the Peace Process, Israel's legitimization of terrorist groups is paralleling Israel's loss of strategic depth</u></strong>. In this situation, terrorists may draw encouragement from both the palpable weakening of Israeli power (a weakening that could inspire death-blow forms of higher-order terrorist attack) and from the idea that their ends justified their means.</p><p><u><strong>The Peace Process is producing a Palestinian state. In this connection, nuclear terrorist threats against Israel likely will increase because, tactically, the sanctuary benefits of "Palestine" will make it easier to plan and to carry out a nuclear terrorist operation, and to regain</u></strong> all "lost territories" (i.e., <u><strong>all of Israel</u>).</p><p>(__) The peace process can’t succeed because the Palestinian Authority lacks the institutional capacity to ratify any agreements</p><p></strong>Sergio <strong>Yahni</strong>, September 9, <strong>2k7</strong> (Alternative Information Center “Can the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process be Renewed?”)</p><p>But Mahmoud <u><strong>Abbas attitudes are far from mainstream Palestinian public opinion</u></strong>. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), most of the Palestinians oppose an agreement by which settlement blocks will remain on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, oppose concessions on Jerusalem and support the right of return of the Palestinian people. HYPERLINK "http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html" \l "_ftn1" \o "_ftnref1" <u>http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn1</u> </p><p>At the same time, <u><strong>as long as</u></strong> President <u><strong>Abbas is the legal head of state with an unconstitutional government, he will not be able to sign any agreement that makes substantial concessions at odds with the Palestinian national consensus</u></strong>. </p><p>According to Article 110 (1) of the Palestinian Basic Law, <u>http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn2</u> the president “may declare a state of emergency by a decree” when there is a threat to national security caused by war, invasion, armed insurrection, or at a time of natural disaster for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.” This state of emergency can be extended for additional thirty days only with the approval of two thirds of the parliament. </p><p><u><strong>Because one third of the Palestinian MPs are in Israeli jails and Israel imposes restrictions on the movement of the remaining MPs, the</u></strong> Palestinian Legislative Council (<u><strong>PLC) could only in theory meet to discuss an extension of the state of emergency for a second time</u></strong> in August <u><strong>or give a vote of confidence</u></strong> for Salam Fayyad’s appointed government. <u>http://www.alternativenews.org/news/english/can-the-israeli-palestinian-peace-process-be-renewed-20070909.html - _ftn3</u> However, it is unlikely that the current PLC, which has a Hamas majority, will endorse the state of emergency or Salam Fayyad’s government. </p><p><u><strong>The Palestinian Authority can return to constitutionality either by the release of the jailed MPs, or, through new elections. Only a government empowered and legitimized by the Palestinian constitution will be able to negotiate with Israel. Otherwise, the agreements signed by the Palestinian Authority risk being deemed illegitimate</u></strong>. </p> </s>

Status quo achieves independence within a year, triggering all of their links

America got an early Christmas gift this year with the news that as a nation we're about to become energy independent The Energy Department reported that in 2012 America will produce 83 percent of all the energy it needs to power its automobiles and airplanes this year and is on course to be 100 percent energy independent next year. we're not as linked to unstable oil reserves in the Middle East or elsewhere The U S is poised to pass Saudi Arabia

we're about to become energy independent The Energy Department reported that America will produce 83 percent of all the energy it needs this year and is on course to be 100 percent energy independent next year. we're not as linked to the Middle East or elsewhere The U S is poised to pass Saudi Arabia

Ho! Ho! Ho! America got an early Christmas gift this year with the news that as a nation we're about to become energy independent — at least in terms of fossil fuels. The Energy Department reported this week that in 2012 America will produce 83 percent of all the energy it needs to power its automobiles and airplanes this year and is on course to be 100 percent energy independent next year. And that should be a sign of relief to us all. For now, at least, we're not as linked to unstable oil reserves in the Middle East or elsewhere. The United States is poised to pass Saudi Arabia as the largest oil-producing nation on Earth.

<h4>Status quo achieves independence within a year, triggering all of their links</h4><p><strong>The Gleaner ‘12</strong>, editorial, "Nation's Total Energy Independence Gift for Future Generations," December 27, http://www.courierpress.com/news/2012/dec/27/nations-total-energy-independence-gift-for/</p><p>Ho! Ho! Ho! <u>America got an early Christmas gift this year with the news that as a nation <mark>we're about to become energy independent</u></mark> — at least in terms of fossil fuels. <u><mark>The Energy Department reported </u></mark>this week<u><mark> that</mark> in 2012 <mark>America will produce 83 percent of all the energy it needs</mark> to power its automobiles and airplanes <mark>this year and is <strong>on course to be 100 percent energy independent</strong> next year. </u></mark>And that should be a sign of relief to us all. For now, at least, <u><mark>we're not as linked to </mark>unstable oil reserves in <mark>the Middle East or elsewhere</u></mark>. <u><mark>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>is poised to pass Saudi Arabia</u></mark> as the largest oil-producing nation on Earth.</p>

The Gleaner ‘12, editorial, "Nation's Total Energy Independence Gift for Future Generations," December 27, http://www.courierpress.com/news/2012/dec/27/nations-total-energy-independence-gift-for/

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: The Gleaner ‘12, editorial, "Nation's Total Energy Independence Gift for Future Generations," December 27, http://www.courierpress.com/news/2012/dec/27/nations-total-energy-independence-gift-for/ fulltext: Ho! Ho! Ho! America got an early Christmas gift this year with the news that as a nation we're about to become energy independent — at least in terms of fossil fuels. The Energy Department reported this week that in 2012 America will produce 83 percent of all the energy it needs to power its automobiles and airplanes this year and is on course to be 100 percent energy independent next year. And that should be a sign of relief to us all. For now, at least, we're not as linked to unstable oil reserves in the Middle East or elsewhere. The United States is poised to pass Saudi Arabia as the largest oil-producing nation on Earth. [/INST] <h4>Status quo achieves independence within a year, triggering all of their links</h4><p><strong>The Gleaner ‘12</strong>, editorial, "Nation's Total Energy Independence Gift for Future Generations," December 27, http://www.courierpress.com/news/2012/dec/27/nations-total-energy-independence-gift-for/</p><p>Ho! Ho! Ho! <u>America got an early Christmas gift this year with the news that as a nation <mark>we're about to become energy independent</u></mark> — at least in terms of fossil fuels. <u><mark>The Energy Department reported </u></mark>this week<u><mark> that</mark> in 2012 <mark>America will produce 83 percent of all the energy it needs</mark> to power its automobiles and airplanes <mark>this year and is <strong>on course to be 100 percent energy independent</strong> next year. </u></mark>And that should be a sign of relief to us all. For now, at least, <u><mark>we're not as linked to </mark>unstable oil reserves in <mark>the Middle East or elsewhere</u></mark>. <u><mark>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>is poised to pass Saudi Arabia</u></mark> as the largest oil-producing nation on Earth.</p> </s>

Financing from tourism and lifting embargo just sustains the regime in Cuba

] /Wyo-MB there is the idea that further increasing American tourism to this nearby Caribbean island will at least aid their impoverished citizens in some manner, but this is neither a straight-forward nor easy solution remittances and travel by Cuban Americans, is perhaps the single largest source of revenue to the most repressive government in the region.” It is also a common belief that the Cuban embargo is a leading cause of poverty among the Cuban citizens and that lifting the embargo would go a long way toward improving the Cuban standard of living. However, no amount of money can increase the living standards there as long as their current regime stands the authorities were already skimming 20 percent of the remittances from Cuban-Americans and 90 percent of the salary paid to Cubans by non-American foreign investors,” . Lifting the trade embargo will not increase the general prosperity of the Cuban people, but it will increase the prosperity of the government Ergo, the poverty and dire situation of the Cuban people cannot be blamed on the United States or the embargo.

[Mitchell, International Policy Digest, Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo, 5-9-13, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cuban-embargo/] /Wyo-MB Still there is the idea that further increasing American tourism to this nearby Caribbean island will at least aid their impoverished citizens in some manner, but this is neither a straight-forward nor easy solution. From the annual throng of American visitors, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio declared at a 2011 Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Hearing that an estimated, “$4 billion a year flow directly to the Cuban government from remittances and travel by Cuban Americans, which is perhaps the single largest source of revenue to the most repressive government in the region.” These remittances are sent by Americans to help their Cuban families, not support the Cuban government. It is also a common belief that the Cuban embargo is a leading cause of poverty among the Cuban citizens and that lifting the embargo would go a long way toward improving the Cuban standard of living. However, no amount of money can increase the living standards there as long as their current regime stands. “After all, the authorities were already skimming 20 percent of the remittances from Cuban-Americans and 90 percent of the salary paid to Cubans by non-American foreign investors,” states Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Senior Fellow of The Center on Global Prosperity at The Independent Institute. However unfortunate it may be, Cuba, in its current state, is a nation consisting only of a wealthy and powerful few and an impoverished and oppressed proletariat, who possess little to no means to escape or even improve their fate. Lifting the trade embargo will not increase the general prosperity of the Cuban people, but it will increase the prosperity of the government. Ergo, the poverty and dire situation of the Cuban people cannot be blamed on the United States or the embargo.

<h4><strong>Financing from tourism and lifting embargo just sustains the regime in Cuba</h4><p>Bustillo, 2013</p><p></strong>[Mitchell, International Policy Digest, Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo, 5-9-13, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cuban-embargo/<u><strong>] /Wyo-MB</p><p></u></strong>Still <u><strong>there is the idea that further increasing American tourism to this nearby Caribbean island will at least aid their impoverished citizens in some manner, but this is neither a straight-forward nor easy solution</u></strong>. From the annual throng of American visitors, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio declared at a 2011 Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Hearing that an estimated, “$4 billion a year flow directly to the Cuban government from <u><strong>remittances and travel by Cuban Americans,</u></strong> which <u><strong>is perhaps the single largest source of revenue to the most repressive government in the region.” </u></strong>These remittances are sent by Americans to help their Cuban families, not support the Cuban government. <u><strong>It is also a common belief that the Cuban embargo is a leading cause of poverty among the Cuban citizens and that lifting the embargo would go a long way toward improving the Cuban standard of living. However, no amount of money can increase the living standards there as long as their current regime stands</u></strong>. “After all, <u><strong>the authorities were already skimming 20 percent of the remittances from Cuban-Americans and 90 percent of the salary paid to Cubans by non-American foreign investors,”</u></strong> states Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Senior Fellow of The Center on Global Prosperity at The Independent Institute. However unfortunate it may be, Cuba, in its current state, is a nation consisting only of a wealthy and powerful few and an impoverished and oppressed proletariat, who possess little to no means to escape or even improve their fate<u><strong>. Lifting the trade embargo will not increase the general prosperity of the Cuban people, but it will increase the prosperity of the government</u></strong>. <u><strong>Ergo, the poverty and dire situation of the Cuban people cannot be blamed on the United States or the embargo.</p></u></strong>

Bustillo, 2013

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Bustillo, 2013 fulltext: [Mitchell, International Policy Digest, Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo, 5-9-13, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cuban-embargo/] /Wyo-MB Still there is the idea that further increasing American tourism to this nearby Caribbean island will at least aid their impoverished citizens in some manner, but this is neither a straight-forward nor easy solution. From the annual throng of American visitors, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio declared at a 2011 Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Hearing that an estimated, “$4 billion a year flow directly to the Cuban government from remittances and travel by Cuban Americans, which is perhaps the single largest source of revenue to the most repressive government in the region.” These remittances are sent by Americans to help their Cuban families, not support the Cuban government. It is also a common belief that the Cuban embargo is a leading cause of poverty among the Cuban citizens and that lifting the embargo would go a long way toward improving the Cuban standard of living. However, no amount of money can increase the living standards there as long as their current regime stands. “After all, the authorities were already skimming 20 percent of the remittances from Cuban-Americans and 90 percent of the salary paid to Cubans by non-American foreign investors,” states Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Senior Fellow of The Center on Global Prosperity at The Independent Institute. However unfortunate it may be, Cuba, in its current state, is a nation consisting only of a wealthy and powerful few and an impoverished and oppressed proletariat, who possess little to no means to escape or even improve their fate. Lifting the trade embargo will not increase the general prosperity of the Cuban people, but it will increase the prosperity of the government. Ergo, the poverty and dire situation of the Cuban people cannot be blamed on the United States or the embargo. [/INST] <h4><strong>Financing from tourism and lifting embargo just sustains the regime in Cuba</h4><p>Bustillo, 2013</p><p></strong>[Mitchell, International Policy Digest, Time to Strengthen the Cuban Embargo, 5-9-13, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/05/09/time-to-strengthen-the-cuban-embargo/<u><strong>] /Wyo-MB</p><p></u></strong>Still <u><strong>there is the idea that further increasing American tourism to this nearby Caribbean island will at least aid their impoverished citizens in some manner, but this is neither a straight-forward nor easy solution</u></strong>. From the annual throng of American visitors, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio declared at a 2011 Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Hearing that an estimated, “$4 billion a year flow directly to the Cuban government from <u><strong>remittances and travel by Cuban Americans,</u></strong> which <u><strong>is perhaps the single largest source of revenue to the most repressive government in the region.” </u></strong>These remittances are sent by Americans to help their Cuban families, not support the Cuban government. <u><strong>It is also a common belief that the Cuban embargo is a leading cause of poverty among the Cuban citizens and that lifting the embargo would go a long way toward improving the Cuban standard of living. However, no amount of money can increase the living standards there as long as their current regime stands</u></strong>. “After all, <u><strong>the authorities were already skimming 20 percent of the remittances from Cuban-Americans and 90 percent of the salary paid to Cubans by non-American foreign investors,”</u></strong> states Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Senior Fellow of The Center on Global Prosperity at The Independent Institute. However unfortunate it may be, Cuba, in its current state, is a nation consisting only of a wealthy and powerful few and an impoverished and oppressed proletariat, who possess little to no means to escape or even improve their fate<u><strong>. Lifting the trade embargo will not increase the general prosperity of the Cuban people, but it will increase the prosperity of the government</u></strong>. <u><strong>Ergo, the poverty and dire situation of the Cuban people cannot be blamed on the United States or the embargo.</p></u></strong> </s>

Yes CIR – CBO report generates momentum

the Congressional Budget Office’s report that the comprehensive immigration reform bill reduces the deficit is a “huge momentum boost.” This report is a huge momentum boost for immigration reform This debunks the idea that immigration reform is anything other than a boon to our economy and robs the bill’s opponents of one of their last remaining arguments.” the Gang of Eight’s bill would reduce the deficit by $197 billion over the next ten years and reduce the deficit an additional $700 billion

C B O report that immigration reduces the deficit is a “huge momentum boost.”¶ for reform and robs the opponents of one of their last remaining arguments

Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) said Tuesday that the Congressional Budget Office’s report that the comprehensive immigration reform bill reduces the deficit is a “huge momentum boost.”¶ “This report is a huge momentum boost for immigration reform,” Schumer said on the Senate floor moment after the CBO report was released. “This debunks the idea that immigration reform is anything other than a boon to our economy, and robs the bill’s opponents of one of their last remaining arguments.”¶ CBO estimated that the Gang of Eight’s bill would reduce the deficit by $197 billion over the next ten years and reduce the deficit an additional $700 billion during the second decade of its implementation.

<h4>Yes CIR – CBO report generates momentum </h4><p>Ramsey <strong>Cox</strong>, Politics for the Hill. “Schumer: CBO report is ‘huge momentum boost’ to immigration reform bill” The Hill, 6/18/<strong>13</strong> </p><p>Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) said Tuesday that <u><strong>the <mark>C</mark>ongressional <mark>B</mark>udget <mark>O</mark>ffice’s <mark>report that</mark> the comprehensive <mark>immigration</mark> reform bill <mark>reduces the deficit is a “huge momentum boost.”</u></strong>¶</mark> “<u><strong>This report is a huge momentum boost <mark>for</mark> immigration <mark>reform</u></strong></mark>,” Schumer said on the Senate floor moment after the CBO report was released. “<u><strong>This debunks the idea that immigration reform is anything other than a boon to our economy</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>and robs the</mark> bill’s <mark>opponents of one of their last remaining arguments</mark>.”</u></strong>¶ CBO estimated that <u><strong>the Gang of Eight’s bill would reduce the deficit by $197 billion over the next ten years and reduce the deficit an additional $700 billion</u></strong> during the second decade of its implementation.</p>

Ramsey Cox, Politics for the Hill. “Schumer: CBO report is ‘huge momentum boost’ to immigration reform bill” The Hill, 6/18/13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ramsey Cox, Politics for the Hill. “Schumer: CBO report is ‘huge momentum boost’ to immigration reform bill” The Hill, 6/18/13 fulltext: Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) said Tuesday that the Congressional Budget Office’s report that the comprehensive immigration reform bill reduces the deficit is a “huge momentum boost.”¶ “This report is a huge momentum boost for immigration reform,” Schumer said on the Senate floor moment after the CBO report was released. “This debunks the idea that immigration reform is anything other than a boon to our economy, and robs the bill’s opponents of one of their last remaining arguments.”¶ CBO estimated that the Gang of Eight’s bill would reduce the deficit by $197 billion over the next ten years and reduce the deficit an additional $700 billion during the second decade of its implementation. [/INST] <h4>Yes CIR – CBO report generates momentum </h4><p>Ramsey <strong>Cox</strong>, Politics for the Hill. “Schumer: CBO report is ‘huge momentum boost’ to immigration reform bill” The Hill, 6/18/<strong>13</strong> </p><p>Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) said Tuesday that <u><strong>the <mark>C</mark>ongressional <mark>B</mark>udget <mark>O</mark>ffice’s <mark>report that</mark> the comprehensive <mark>immigration</mark> reform bill <mark>reduces the deficit is a “huge momentum boost.”</u></strong>¶</mark> “<u><strong>This report is a huge momentum boost <mark>for</mark> immigration <mark>reform</u></strong></mark>,” Schumer said on the Senate floor moment after the CBO report was released. “<u><strong>This debunks the idea that immigration reform is anything other than a boon to our economy</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>and robs the</mark> bill’s <mark>opponents of one of their last remaining arguments</mark>.”</u></strong>¶ CBO estimated that <u><strong>the Gang of Eight’s bill would reduce the deficit by $197 billion over the next ten years and reduce the deficit an additional $700 billion</u></strong> during the second decade of its implementation.</p> </s>

Strong Chinese influence in LA key to China’s energy security- oil

Among the numerous needs of China, demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases instability of energy security Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity became a destination for China China must solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain.

(Wang, The Economic Observer, “In America’s Backyard: China in Latin America,” April 27, 2013, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml) /wyo-mm Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and China’s investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector.

<h4>Strong Chinese influence in LA <strong>key to China’s energy security- oil</h4><p>Xiaoxia 13</p><p></strong>(Wang, The Economic Observer, “In America’s Backyard: China in Latin America,” April 27, 2013, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml) /wyo-mm</p><p><u><strong>Among the numerous needs of China,</u></strong> the <u><strong>demand for oil has always been the</u></strong> <u><strong>most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases</u></strong> the <u><strong>instability of</u></strong> its <u><strong>energy security</u></strong>. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, <u><strong>Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity</u></strong> naturally <u><strong>became a destination for China</u></strong>.<u><strong> China</u></strong> must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It <u><strong>must</u></strong> also help <u><strong>solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain.</u></strong> Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and China’s investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector.</p>

Xiaoxia 13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Xiaoxia 13 fulltext: (Wang, The Economic Observer, “In America’s Backyard: China in Latin America,” April 27, 2013, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml) /wyo-mm Among the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became a destination for China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and China’s investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector. [/INST] <h4>Strong Chinese influence in LA <strong>key to China’s energy security- oil</h4><p>Xiaoxia 13</p><p></strong>(Wang, The Economic Observer, “In America’s Backyard: China in Latin America,” April 27, 2013, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml) /wyo-mm</p><p><u><strong>Among the numerous needs of China,</u></strong> the <u><strong>demand for oil has always been the</u></strong> <u><strong>most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become the world's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports, which increases</u></strong> the <u><strong>instability of</u></strong> its <u><strong>energy security</u></strong>. Diversification is inevitable. In this context, <u><strong>Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity</u></strong> naturally <u><strong>became a destination for China</u></strong>.<u><strong> China</u></strong> must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple role of consumer. It <u><strong>must</u></strong> also help <u><strong>solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply chain.</u></strong> Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries, and China’s investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its energy sector.</p> </s>

[B.] Removing the embargo bolsters US-Cuban relations and solve the promotion of democracy and human rights in Cuba and abroad

] /Wyo-MB intervention, use of force and economic sanctions have all failed at achieving democratization in Cuba One policy alternative for promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba that the United States has not attempted is the exact opposite of the approach it has taken for the past half century. Namely, the United States should lift the embargo on Cuba and reopen diplomatic relations in order to work internationally on improving human rights in Cuba A fresh policy of engagement towards Cuba has been delayed long enough.¶ Reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba will decrease the chances of conflict and will promote cooperation between the two countries economically, politically and socially Diplomatic relations and negotiations have proven to be effective in the past in similar situations, such as relations between Egypt and Israel democracy must come from within. […] Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country” mobilization on democratization which are inherently linked to the human rights violations in Cuba, is a first step to producing changes in Cuba. American engagement with the Cuban people lacking under the embargo policy, will provide the impetus in Cuban society to produce regime change , integrating U.S.-Cuba relations on a multilateral level will ease the burden on the United States in fostering democracy and a better human rights record in the country, as other states will be more involved in the process normalized relations will allow America to engage Cuba in new areas, opening the door for democratization and human rights improvements from within the Cuban state itself.¶ With diplomatic relations in place, the United States may directly promote human rights in the country through negotiations, conferences, arbitration and mediation. Providing the support, resources, and infrastructure to promote democratic systems in Cuba could produce immense improvements to the human rights situation in the nation. Normalizing diplomatic relations with the state will also allow America to truly support freedom of opinion and expression in Cuba, which it cannot currently promote under the isolationist policy. Furthermore, through diplomatic relations and friendly support, Cuba will be more willing to participate in the international system, as well as directly with the United States, as an ally. As the United States, along with the international community as a whole, helps and supports Cuba’s economic growth, Cuban society will eventually push for greater protection of human rights.¶ Lifting economic sanctions will improve economic growth in Cuba, which correlates to democratization that a strong economy is correlated to democracy this correlation is a causal link: economic growth directly leads to democratization. Lifting the current economic sanctions on Cuba and working together to improve economic situations in the state will allow their economy to grow, increasing the likelihood of democracy in the state, and thus promoting greater freedom of expression, opinion and dissent. A policy of engagement will be a long-term solution to promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba. This proposal, unique in that it is simply one of abandoning an antiquated policy and normalizing relations to be like those with any other country, does not present any large obstacles to implementation, either in the short run or the long run. Although effects of such a policy may be difficult to determine in the short term, promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba are long-term solutions engagement with the Cuban government and society, along with support from the international community, will provide the spark and guidance for the Cuban people to support and promote democracy, and thus give greater attention to human rights violations Instead of continued economic sanctions on Cuba, the United States should reopen diplomatic relations with Cuba, work multilaterally and use soft power to promote democracy and greater attention to human rights. This policy approach will decrease the hostility between the United States and Cuba, and cause Cuba to be more willing to participate internationally with attention to human rights violations. the embargo, as a relic of a different time, must be removed should the United States wish to gain any true ground in promoting human rights in Cuba.

[Brandon, Contributing writer of Prospect Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, EVALUATING THE CUBAN EMBARGO, 7-22-12, http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/] /Wyo-MB Although America’s previous policies of intervention, use of force and economic sanctions have all failed at achieving democratization in Cuba, not all options have been exhausted. One policy alternative for promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba that the United States has not attempted is the exact opposite of the approach it has taken for the past half century. Namely, the United States should lift the embargo on Cuba and reopen diplomatic relations in order to work internationally on improving human rights in Cuba. Unless Cuba, as a rogue state, is isolated internationally, rather than merely by the United States, the human rights situation in Cuba may never improve. A fresh policy of engagement towards Cuba has been delayed long enough.¶ § 4.1: Reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba will decrease the chances of conflict and will promote cooperation between the two countries economically, politically and socially. Diplomatic relations and negotiations have proven to be effective in the past in similar situations, such as the renewed relations between Egypt and Israel following the Camp David Accords. As Huddleston and Pascual state, “a great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within. […] Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country” (Huddleston 14). The mobilization of the Cuban people on the issues of democratization, which are inherently linked to the human rights violations in Cuba, is a first step to producing changes in Cuba. American engagement with the Cuban people, currently lacking under the embargo policy, will provide the impetus in Cuban society to produce regime change. Furthermore, integrating U.S.-Cuba relations on a multilateral level will ease the burden on the United States in fostering democracy and a better human rights record in the country, as other states will be more involved in the process. In contrast to a policy of isolation, normalized relations will allow America to engage Cuba in new areas, opening the door for democratization and human rights improvements from within the Cuban state itself.¶ § 4.2: With diplomatic relations in place, the United States may directly promote human rights in the country through negotiations, conferences, arbitration and mediation. Providing the support, resources, and infrastructure to promote democratic systems in Cuba could produce immense improvements to the human rights situation in the nation. Normalizing diplomatic relations with the state will also allow America to truly support freedom of opinion and expression in Cuba, which it cannot currently promote under the isolationist policy. Furthermore, through diplomatic relations and friendly support, Cuba will be more willing to participate in the international system, as well as directly with the United States, as an ally. As the United States, along with the international community as a whole, helps and supports Cuba’s economic growth, Cuban society will eventually push for greater protection of human rights.¶ § 4.3: Lifting economic sanctions will improve economic growth in Cuba, which correlates to democratization. Empirical evidence shows that a strong economy is correlated to democracy. According to the Modernization Theory of democratization, this correlation is a causal link: economic growth directly leads to democratization. Lifting the current economic sanctions on Cuba and working together to improve economic situations in the state will allow their economy to grow, increasing the likelihood of democracy in the state, and thus promoting greater freedom of expression, opinion and dissent.¶ § 4.4: A policy of engagement will be a long-term solution to promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba. This proposal, unique in that it is simply one of abandoning an antiquated policy and normalizing relations to be like those with any other country, does not present any large obstacles to implementation, either in the short run or the long run. The main challenge is in continuing to support such a policy and maintaining the normal diplomatic, economic and social relations with a country that has been isolated for such a long period of time. Although effects of such a policy may be difficult to determine in the short term, promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba are long-term solutions. As discussed above, engagement with the Cuban government and society, along with support from the international community, will provide the spark and guidance for the Cuban people to support and promote democracy, and thus give greater attention to human rights violations.¶ § 5. Conclusions:¶ Instead of continued economic sanctions on Cuba, the United States should reopen diplomatic relations with Cuba, work multilaterally and use soft power to promote democracy and greater attention to human rights. This policy approach will decrease the hostility between the United States and Cuba, and cause Cuba to be more willing to participate internationally with attention to human rights violations. After the end of the Cold War, United States foreign policy has found new directions, and the embargo, as a relic of a different time, must be removed should the United States wish to gain any true ground in promoting human rights in Cuba.

<h4>[B.] <strong>Removing the embargo bolsters US-Cuban relations and solve the promotion of democracy and human rights in Cuba and abroad </h4><p>Amash, 2012</p><p></strong>[Brandon, Contributing writer of Prospect Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, EVALUATING THE CUBAN EMBARGO, 7-22-12, http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/<u><strong>] /Wyo-MB</p><p></u></strong>Although America’s previous policies of <u><strong>intervention, use of force and economic sanctions have all failed at achieving democratization in Cuba</u></strong>, not all options have been exhausted. <u><strong>One policy alternative for promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba that the United States has not attempted is the exact opposite of the approach it has taken for the past half century. Namely, the United States should lift the embargo on Cuba and reopen diplomatic relations in order to work internationally on improving human rights in Cuba</u></strong>. Unless Cuba, as a rogue state, is isolated internationally, rather than merely by the United States, the human rights situation in Cuba may never improve. <u><strong>A fresh policy of engagement towards Cuba has been delayed long enough.¶ </u></strong>§ 4.1: <u><strong>Reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba will decrease the chances of conflict and will promote cooperation between the two countries economically, politically and socially</u></strong>. <u><strong>Diplomatic relations and negotiations have proven to be effective in the past in similar situations, such as</u></strong> the renewed <u><strong>relations between Egypt and Israel</u></strong> following the Camp David Accords. As Huddleston and Pascual state, “a great lesson of <u><strong>democracy</u></strong> is that it cannot be imposed; it <u><strong>must come from within. […] Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country” </u></strong>(Huddleston 14). The <u><strong>mobilization</u></strong> of the Cuban people <u><strong>on</u></strong> the issues of <u><strong>democratization</u></strong>, <u><strong>which are inherently linked to the human rights violations in Cuba, is a first step to producing changes in Cuba.</u></strong> <u><strong>American engagement with the Cuban people</u></strong>, currently <u><strong>lacking under the embargo policy, will provide the impetus in Cuban society to produce regime change</u></strong>. Furthermore<u><strong>, integrating U.S.-Cuba relations on a multilateral level will ease the burden on the United States in fostering democracy and a better human rights record in the country, as other states will be more involved in the process</u></strong>. In contrast to a policy of isolation, <u><strong>normalized relations will allow America to engage Cuba in new areas, opening the door for democratization and human rights improvements from within the Cuban state itself.¶ </u></strong>§ 4.2: <u><strong>With diplomatic relations in place, the United States may directly promote human rights in the country through negotiations, conferences, arbitration and mediation. Providing the support, resources, and infrastructure to promote democratic systems in Cuba could produce immense improvements to the human rights situation in the nation. Normalizing diplomatic relations with the state will also allow America to truly support freedom of opinion and expression in Cuba, which it cannot currently promote under the isolationist policy. Furthermore, through diplomatic relations and friendly support, Cuba will be more willing to participate in the international system, as well as directly with the United States, as an ally. As the United States, along with the international community as a whole, helps and supports Cuba’s economic growth, Cuban society will eventually push for greater protection of human rights.¶</u></strong> § 4.3: <u><strong>Lifting economic sanctions will improve economic growth in Cuba, which correlates to democratization</u></strong>. Empirical evidence shows <u><strong>that a strong economy is correlated to democracy</u></strong>. According to the Modernization Theory of democratization, <u><strong>this correlation is a causal link: economic growth directly leads to democratization. Lifting the current economic sanctions on Cuba and working together to improve economic situations in the state will allow their economy to grow, increasing the likelihood of democracy in the state, and thus promoting greater freedom of expression, opinion and dissent.</u></strong>¶ § 4.4: <u><strong>A policy of engagement will be a long-term solution to promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba. This proposal, unique in that it is simply one of abandoning an antiquated policy and normalizing relations to be like those with any other country, does not present any large obstacles to implementation, either in the short run or the long run.</u></strong> The main challenge is in continuing to support such a policy and maintaining the normal diplomatic, economic and social relations with a country that has been isolated for such a long period of time. <u><strong>Although effects of such a policy may be difficult to determine in the short term, promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba are long-term solutions</u></strong>. As discussed above, <u><strong>engagement with the Cuban government and society, along with support from the international community, will provide the spark and guidance for the Cuban people to support and promote democracy, and thus give greater attention to human rights violations</u></strong>.¶ § 5. Conclusions:¶ <u><strong>Instead of continued economic sanctions on Cuba, the United States should reopen diplomatic relations with Cuba, work multilaterally and use soft power to promote democracy and greater attention to human rights. This policy approach will decrease the hostility between the United States and Cuba, and cause Cuba to be more willing to participate internationally with attention to human rights violations.</u></strong> After the end of the Cold War, United States foreign policy has found new directions, and <u><strong>the embargo, as a relic of a different time, must be removed should the United States wish to gain any true ground in promoting human rights in Cuba.</p></u></strong>

Amash, 2012

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Amash, 2012 fulltext: [Brandon, Contributing writer of Prospect Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, EVALUATING THE CUBAN EMBARGO, 7-22-12, http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/] /Wyo-MB Although America’s previous policies of intervention, use of force and economic sanctions have all failed at achieving democratization in Cuba, not all options have been exhausted. One policy alternative for promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba that the United States has not attempted is the exact opposite of the approach it has taken for the past half century. Namely, the United States should lift the embargo on Cuba and reopen diplomatic relations in order to work internationally on improving human rights in Cuba. Unless Cuba, as a rogue state, is isolated internationally, rather than merely by the United States, the human rights situation in Cuba may never improve. A fresh policy of engagement towards Cuba has been delayed long enough.¶ § 4.1: Reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba will decrease the chances of conflict and will promote cooperation between the two countries economically, politically and socially. Diplomatic relations and negotiations have proven to be effective in the past in similar situations, such as the renewed relations between Egypt and Israel following the Camp David Accords. As Huddleston and Pascual state, “a great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within. […] Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country” (Huddleston 14). The mobilization of the Cuban people on the issues of democratization, which are inherently linked to the human rights violations in Cuba, is a first step to producing changes in Cuba. American engagement with the Cuban people, currently lacking under the embargo policy, will provide the impetus in Cuban society to produce regime change. Furthermore, integrating U.S.-Cuba relations on a multilateral level will ease the burden on the United States in fostering democracy and a better human rights record in the country, as other states will be more involved in the process. In contrast to a policy of isolation, normalized relations will allow America to engage Cuba in new areas, opening the door for democratization and human rights improvements from within the Cuban state itself.¶ § 4.2: With diplomatic relations in place, the United States may directly promote human rights in the country through negotiations, conferences, arbitration and mediation. Providing the support, resources, and infrastructure to promote democratic systems in Cuba could produce immense improvements to the human rights situation in the nation. Normalizing diplomatic relations with the state will also allow America to truly support freedom of opinion and expression in Cuba, which it cannot currently promote under the isolationist policy. Furthermore, through diplomatic relations and friendly support, Cuba will be more willing to participate in the international system, as well as directly with the United States, as an ally. As the United States, along with the international community as a whole, helps and supports Cuba’s economic growth, Cuban society will eventually push for greater protection of human rights.¶ § 4.3: Lifting economic sanctions will improve economic growth in Cuba, which correlates to democratization. Empirical evidence shows that a strong economy is correlated to democracy. According to the Modernization Theory of democratization, this correlation is a causal link: economic growth directly leads to democratization. Lifting the current economic sanctions on Cuba and working together to improve economic situations in the state will allow their economy to grow, increasing the likelihood of democracy in the state, and thus promoting greater freedom of expression, opinion and dissent.¶ § 4.4: A policy of engagement will be a long-term solution to promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba. This proposal, unique in that it is simply one of abandoning an antiquated policy and normalizing relations to be like those with any other country, does not present any large obstacles to implementation, either in the short run or the long run. The main challenge is in continuing to support such a policy and maintaining the normal diplomatic, economic and social relations with a country that has been isolated for such a long period of time. Although effects of such a policy may be difficult to determine in the short term, promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba are long-term solutions. As discussed above, engagement with the Cuban government and society, along with support from the international community, will provide the spark and guidance for the Cuban people to support and promote democracy, and thus give greater attention to human rights violations.¶ § 5. Conclusions:¶ Instead of continued economic sanctions on Cuba, the United States should reopen diplomatic relations with Cuba, work multilaterally and use soft power to promote democracy and greater attention to human rights. This policy approach will decrease the hostility between the United States and Cuba, and cause Cuba to be more willing to participate internationally with attention to human rights violations. After the end of the Cold War, United States foreign policy has found new directions, and the embargo, as a relic of a different time, must be removed should the United States wish to gain any true ground in promoting human rights in Cuba. [/INST] <h4>[B.] <strong>Removing the embargo bolsters US-Cuban relations and solve the promotion of democracy and human rights in Cuba and abroad </h4><p>Amash, 2012</p><p></strong>[Brandon, Contributing writer of Prospect Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, EVALUATING THE CUBAN EMBARGO, 7-22-12, http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/<u><strong>] /Wyo-MB</p><p></u></strong>Although America’s previous policies of <u><strong>intervention, use of force and economic sanctions have all failed at achieving democratization in Cuba</u></strong>, not all options have been exhausted. <u><strong>One policy alternative for promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba that the United States has not attempted is the exact opposite of the approach it has taken for the past half century. Namely, the United States should lift the embargo on Cuba and reopen diplomatic relations in order to work internationally on improving human rights in Cuba</u></strong>. Unless Cuba, as a rogue state, is isolated internationally, rather than merely by the United States, the human rights situation in Cuba may never improve. <u><strong>A fresh policy of engagement towards Cuba has been delayed long enough.¶ </u></strong>§ 4.1: <u><strong>Reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba will decrease the chances of conflict and will promote cooperation between the two countries economically, politically and socially</u></strong>. <u><strong>Diplomatic relations and negotiations have proven to be effective in the past in similar situations, such as</u></strong> the renewed <u><strong>relations between Egypt and Israel</u></strong> following the Camp David Accords. As Huddleston and Pascual state, “a great lesson of <u><strong>democracy</u></strong> is that it cannot be imposed; it <u><strong>must come from within. […] Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country” </u></strong>(Huddleston 14). The <u><strong>mobilization</u></strong> of the Cuban people <u><strong>on</u></strong> the issues of <u><strong>democratization</u></strong>, <u><strong>which are inherently linked to the human rights violations in Cuba, is a first step to producing changes in Cuba.</u></strong> <u><strong>American engagement with the Cuban people</u></strong>, currently <u><strong>lacking under the embargo policy, will provide the impetus in Cuban society to produce regime change</u></strong>. Furthermore<u><strong>, integrating U.S.-Cuba relations on a multilateral level will ease the burden on the United States in fostering democracy and a better human rights record in the country, as other states will be more involved in the process</u></strong>. In contrast to a policy of isolation, <u><strong>normalized relations will allow America to engage Cuba in new areas, opening the door for democratization and human rights improvements from within the Cuban state itself.¶ </u></strong>§ 4.2: <u><strong>With diplomatic relations in place, the United States may directly promote human rights in the country through negotiations, conferences, arbitration and mediation. Providing the support, resources, and infrastructure to promote democratic systems in Cuba could produce immense improvements to the human rights situation in the nation. Normalizing diplomatic relations with the state will also allow America to truly support freedom of opinion and expression in Cuba, which it cannot currently promote under the isolationist policy. Furthermore, through diplomatic relations and friendly support, Cuba will be more willing to participate in the international system, as well as directly with the United States, as an ally. As the United States, along with the international community as a whole, helps and supports Cuba’s economic growth, Cuban society will eventually push for greater protection of human rights.¶</u></strong> § 4.3: <u><strong>Lifting economic sanctions will improve economic growth in Cuba, which correlates to democratization</u></strong>. Empirical evidence shows <u><strong>that a strong economy is correlated to democracy</u></strong>. According to the Modernization Theory of democratization, <u><strong>this correlation is a causal link: economic growth directly leads to democratization. Lifting the current economic sanctions on Cuba and working together to improve economic situations in the state will allow their economy to grow, increasing the likelihood of democracy in the state, and thus promoting greater freedom of expression, opinion and dissent.</u></strong>¶ § 4.4: <u><strong>A policy of engagement will be a long-term solution to promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba. This proposal, unique in that it is simply one of abandoning an antiquated policy and normalizing relations to be like those with any other country, does not present any large obstacles to implementation, either in the short run or the long run.</u></strong> The main challenge is in continuing to support such a policy and maintaining the normal diplomatic, economic and social relations with a country that has been isolated for such a long period of time. <u><strong>Although effects of such a policy may be difficult to determine in the short term, promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba are long-term solutions</u></strong>. As discussed above, <u><strong>engagement with the Cuban government and society, along with support from the international community, will provide the spark and guidance for the Cuban people to support and promote democracy, and thus give greater attention to human rights violations</u></strong>.¶ § 5. Conclusions:¶ <u><strong>Instead of continued economic sanctions on Cuba, the United States should reopen diplomatic relations with Cuba, work multilaterally and use soft power to promote democracy and greater attention to human rights. This policy approach will decrease the hostility between the United States and Cuba, and cause Cuba to be more willing to participate internationally with attention to human rights violations.</u></strong> After the end of the Cold War, United States foreign policy has found new directions, and <u><strong>the embargo, as a relic of a different time, must be removed should the United States wish to gain any true ground in promoting human rights in Cuba.</p></u></strong> </s>

Poor Venezuelan relations causes terrorism- post-Chavez goodwill solves

Benjamin cited Venezuela as “not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts Venezuela is a country that provides support to foreign terrorist organizations It is a player in worldwide terrorism how many more years will the U.S. chide Venezuela for failing to cooperate on antiterrorism Chávez death may usher in friendly relations again between Venezuela and the U.S.

Benjamin cited Venezuela as “not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts Venezuela is a country that provides support to foreign terrorist organizations It is a player in worldwide terrorism how many more years will the U.S. chide Venezuela for failing to cooperate on antiterrorism Chávez death may usher in friendly relations again between Venezuela and the U.S

Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, the State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, released the Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 this week and cited Venezuela as “not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts” for the sixth consecutive year. The report is the U.S.’s annual evaluation of terrorism activities in countries around the world.¶ This year’s report highlighted Iran’s increasing influence and activities in the hemisphere: “The most disturbing manifestation of this was the Iranian plot against the Saudi Ambassador to the United States; the plot involved enlisting criminal elements from a transnational criminal organization [the Mexican Zeta cartel] to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador by bombing a restaurant in Washington DC.” Disturbing indeed.¶ Benjamin, speaking at a press briefing, flagged increasing concern for “Iran’s support for terrorism and Hezbollah’s activities” worldwide. Hezbollah is the Iranian-backed, Lebanon-based militant group designated by the U.S. as a terrorist organization.¶ “They’ve both stepped up their level of terrorist plotting over the past year and are engaging in their most active and aggressive campaigns since the 1990s,” Benjamin told reporters. ¶ Amid this most “aggressive” campaign, the report finds, Hezbollah sympathizers and supporters are also reportedly engaged in fundraising and support activity in Venezuela. All the while, Venezuela and Iran continue to strengthen their alliance through “economic, financial, and diplomatic cooperation […] as well as limited military related agreements.” ¶ In May 2011, the U.S. levied sanctions against Venezuela’s national oil company for violating the Iran Sanctions Act, and then re-imposed sanctions against the Venezuela Military Industries Company for violating the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Non-Proliferation Act. ¶ Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’ coziness with dictators goes beyond Iran. He provides both material and moral support to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who currently may be responsible for the deaths of 20,000 people. Then there’s that storied “bromance” between Chávez and the Castro brothers, who continue to rule the Cuban island with an iron fist. ¶ Beyond the rogue relations, the report mentions that a number of Venezuelans, including senior officials, have been designated for their connections to terrorist organizations, like Spain’s Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom—ETA) separatist group and Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC) guerrilla organization, and various drug cartels. ¶ For example, in September 2011, the U.S. designated four senior Venezuelan officials—including Defense Minister Henry Rangel—as “acting for or on behalf of the [FARC], in direct support of the group's narcotics and arms trafficking activities.”¶ How does this all add up? Venezuela is a country that provides support to foreign terrorist organizations; it violates non-proliferation agreements; its senior officials are designated drug traffickers; it actively fosters relations with other state sponsors of terrorism (e.g., Iran, Syria and Cuba); it sneers at international norms such as freedom of the press and hemispheric institutions like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. ¶ The sum of these parts equals that Venezuela isn’t just “not cooperating” on antiterrorism, but it is active in supporting terrorism. It is a player in worldwide terrorism. Beyond this State Department report there have been many other, more chilling examples of Venezuela’s nefarious activities—some potentially posing harm to U.S. interests. This prompts the next logical question: Why isn’t Venezuela designated as a state sponsor of terrorism? ¶ Otherwise, how many more years will the U.S. chide Venezuela for failing to cooperate on antiterrorism efforts? Perhaps it is waiting for some cataclysmic event, like a deadly attack by terrorists trained in Venezuela, to rationalize such a bold move. ¶ There’s also the thinking that if the U.S. waits long enough, an ill Chávez—whose disease remains shrouded in secrecy—may perish, and that his death may usher in friendly relations again between Venezuela and the U.S. But this approach relies too heavily on a naïve hope that the U.S. can just bide its time for the Chávez regime’s inevitable collapse. Because what would happen next?

<h4>Poor Venezuelan relations causes terrorism- post-Chavez goodwill solves</h4><p><strong>Harper ’12</strong> [Liz Harper, Master’s Degree in Latin American Studies, Political Economy from the University of California, Los Angeles, Senior Editor, U.S. Institute of Peace, Hoover Institution Media fellow at Stanford University, “Venezuela “Not Cooperating” on Antiterrorism Efforts,” August 2, http://americasquarterly.org/venezuela-not-cooperating-on-antiterrorism-efforts]</p><p>Ambassador Daniel <u><mark>Benjamin</u></mark>, the State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, released the Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 this week and <u><mark>cited Venezuela as “not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts</u></mark>” for the sixth consecutive year. The report is the U.S.’s annual evaluation of terrorism activities in countries around the world.¶ This year’s report highlighted Iran’s increasing influence and activities in the hemisphere: “The most disturbing manifestation of this was the Iranian plot against the Saudi Ambassador to the United States; the plot involved enlisting criminal elements from a transnational criminal organization [the Mexican Zeta cartel] to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador by bombing a restaurant in Washington DC.” Disturbing indeed.¶ Benjamin, speaking at a press briefing, flagged increasing concern for “Iran’s support for terrorism and Hezbollah’s activities” worldwide. Hezbollah is the Iranian-backed, Lebanon-based militant group designated by the U.S. as a terrorist organization.¶ “They’ve both stepped up their level of terrorist plotting over the past year and are engaging in their most active and aggressive campaigns since the 1990s,” Benjamin told reporters. ¶ Amid this most “aggressive” campaign, the report finds, Hezbollah sympathizers and supporters are also reportedly engaged in fundraising and support activity in Venezuela. All the while, Venezuela and Iran continue to strengthen their alliance through “economic, financial, and diplomatic cooperation […] as well as limited military related agreements.” ¶ In May 2011, the U.S. levied sanctions against Venezuela’s national oil company for violating the Iran Sanctions Act, and then re-imposed sanctions against the Venezuela Military Industries Company for violating the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Non-Proliferation Act. ¶ Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’ coziness with dictators goes beyond Iran. He provides both material and moral support to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who currently may be responsible for the deaths of 20,000 people. Then there’s that storied “bromance” between Chávez and the Castro brothers, who continue to rule the Cuban island with an iron fist. ¶ Beyond the rogue relations, the report mentions that a number of Venezuelans, including senior officials, have been designated for their connections to terrorist organizations, like Spain’s Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom—ETA) separatist group and Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC) guerrilla organization, and various drug cartels. ¶ For example, in September 2011, the U.S. designated four senior Venezuelan officials—including Defense Minister Henry Rangel—as “acting for or on behalf of the [FARC], in direct support of the group's narcotics and arms trafficking activities.”¶ How does this all add up? <u><mark>Venezuela is a country that provides support to foreign terrorist organizations</u></mark>; it violates non-proliferation agreements; its senior officials are designated drug traffickers; it actively fosters relations with other state sponsors of terrorism (e.g., Iran, Syria and Cuba); it sneers at international norms such as freedom of the press and hemispheric institutions like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. ¶ The sum of these parts equals that Venezuela isn’t just “not cooperating” on antiterrorism, but it is active in supporting terrorism. <u><mark>It is a player in worldwide terrorism</u></mark>. Beyond this State Department report there have been many other, more chilling examples of Venezuela’s nefarious activities—some potentially posing harm to U.S. interests. This prompts the next logical question: Why isn’t Venezuela designated as a state sponsor of terrorism? ¶ Otherwise, <u><mark>how many more years will the U.S. chide Venezuela for failing to cooperate on antiterrorism</u> </mark>efforts? Perhaps it is waiting for some cataclysmic event, like a deadly attack by terrorists trained in Venezuela, to rationalize such a bold move. ¶ There’s also the thinking that if the U.S. waits long enough, an ill <u><mark>Chávez</u></mark>—whose disease remains shrouded in secrecy—may perish, and that his <u><mark>death may usher in friendly relations again between Venezuela and the U.S</mark>.</u> But this approach relies too heavily on a naïve hope that the U.S. can just bide its time for the Chávez regime’s inevitable collapse. Because what would happen next?</p>

Harper ’12 [Liz Harper, Master’s Degree in Latin American Studies, Political Economy from the University of California, Los Angeles, Senior Editor, U.S. Institute of Peace, Hoover Institution Media fellow at Stanford University, “Venezuela “Not Cooperating” on Antiterrorism Efforts,” August 2, http://americasquarterly.org/venezuela-not-cooperating-on-antiterrorism-efforts]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Harper ’12 [Liz Harper, Master’s Degree in Latin American Studies, Political Economy from the University of California, Los Angeles, Senior Editor, U.S. Institute of Peace, Hoover Institution Media fellow at Stanford University, “Venezuela “Not Cooperating” on Antiterrorism Efforts,” August 2, http://americasquarterly.org/venezuela-not-cooperating-on-antiterrorism-efforts] fulltext: Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, the State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, released the Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 this week and cited Venezuela as “not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts” for the sixth consecutive year. The report is the U.S.’s annual evaluation of terrorism activities in countries around the world.¶ This year’s report highlighted Iran’s increasing influence and activities in the hemisphere: “The most disturbing manifestation of this was the Iranian plot against the Saudi Ambassador to the United States; the plot involved enlisting criminal elements from a transnational criminal organization [the Mexican Zeta cartel] to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador by bombing a restaurant in Washington DC.” Disturbing indeed.¶ Benjamin, speaking at a press briefing, flagged increasing concern for “Iran’s support for terrorism and Hezbollah’s activities” worldwide. Hezbollah is the Iranian-backed, Lebanon-based militant group designated by the U.S. as a terrorist organization.¶ “They’ve both stepped up their level of terrorist plotting over the past year and are engaging in their most active and aggressive campaigns since the 1990s,” Benjamin told reporters. ¶ Amid this most “aggressive” campaign, the report finds, Hezbollah sympathizers and supporters are also reportedly engaged in fundraising and support activity in Venezuela. All the while, Venezuela and Iran continue to strengthen their alliance through “economic, financial, and diplomatic cooperation […] as well as limited military related agreements.” ¶ In May 2011, the U.S. levied sanctions against Venezuela’s national oil company for violating the Iran Sanctions Act, and then re-imposed sanctions against the Venezuela Military Industries Company for violating the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Non-Proliferation Act. ¶ Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’ coziness with dictators goes beyond Iran. He provides both material and moral support to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who currently may be responsible for the deaths of 20,000 people. Then there’s that storied “bromance” between Chávez and the Castro brothers, who continue to rule the Cuban island with an iron fist. ¶ Beyond the rogue relations, the report mentions that a number of Venezuelans, including senior officials, have been designated for their connections to terrorist organizations, like Spain’s Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom—ETA) separatist group and Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC) guerrilla organization, and various drug cartels. ¶ For example, in September 2011, the U.S. designated four senior Venezuelan officials—including Defense Minister Henry Rangel—as “acting for or on behalf of the [FARC], in direct support of the group's narcotics and arms trafficking activities.”¶ How does this all add up? Venezuela is a country that provides support to foreign terrorist organizations; it violates non-proliferation agreements; its senior officials are designated drug traffickers; it actively fosters relations with other state sponsors of terrorism (e.g., Iran, Syria and Cuba); it sneers at international norms such as freedom of the press and hemispheric institutions like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. ¶ The sum of these parts equals that Venezuela isn’t just “not cooperating” on antiterrorism, but it is active in supporting terrorism. It is a player in worldwide terrorism. Beyond this State Department report there have been many other, more chilling examples of Venezuela’s nefarious activities—some potentially posing harm to U.S. interests. This prompts the next logical question: Why isn’t Venezuela designated as a state sponsor of terrorism? ¶ Otherwise, how many more years will the U.S. chide Venezuela for failing to cooperate on antiterrorism efforts? Perhaps it is waiting for some cataclysmic event, like a deadly attack by terrorists trained in Venezuela, to rationalize such a bold move. ¶ There’s also the thinking that if the U.S. waits long enough, an ill Chávez—whose disease remains shrouded in secrecy—may perish, and that his death may usher in friendly relations again between Venezuela and the U.S. But this approach relies too heavily on a naïve hope that the U.S. can just bide its time for the Chávez regime’s inevitable collapse. Because what would happen next? [/INST] <h4>Poor Venezuelan relations causes terrorism- post-Chavez goodwill solves</h4><p><strong>Harper ’12</strong> [Liz Harper, Master’s Degree in Latin American Studies, Political Economy from the University of California, Los Angeles, Senior Editor, U.S. Institute of Peace, Hoover Institution Media fellow at Stanford University, “Venezuela “Not Cooperating” on Antiterrorism Efforts,” August 2, http://americasquarterly.org/venezuela-not-cooperating-on-antiterrorism-efforts]</p><p>Ambassador Daniel <u><mark>Benjamin</u></mark>, the State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, released the Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 this week and <u><mark>cited Venezuela as “not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts</u></mark>” for the sixth consecutive year. The report is the U.S.’s annual evaluation of terrorism activities in countries around the world.¶ This year’s report highlighted Iran’s increasing influence and activities in the hemisphere: “The most disturbing manifestation of this was the Iranian plot against the Saudi Ambassador to the United States; the plot involved enlisting criminal elements from a transnational criminal organization [the Mexican Zeta cartel] to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador by bombing a restaurant in Washington DC.” Disturbing indeed.¶ Benjamin, speaking at a press briefing, flagged increasing concern for “Iran’s support for terrorism and Hezbollah’s activities” worldwide. Hezbollah is the Iranian-backed, Lebanon-based militant group designated by the U.S. as a terrorist organization.¶ “They’ve both stepped up their level of terrorist plotting over the past year and are engaging in their most active and aggressive campaigns since the 1990s,” Benjamin told reporters. ¶ Amid this most “aggressive” campaign, the report finds, Hezbollah sympathizers and supporters are also reportedly engaged in fundraising and support activity in Venezuela. All the while, Venezuela and Iran continue to strengthen their alliance through “economic, financial, and diplomatic cooperation […] as well as limited military related agreements.” ¶ In May 2011, the U.S. levied sanctions against Venezuela’s national oil company for violating the Iran Sanctions Act, and then re-imposed sanctions against the Venezuela Military Industries Company for violating the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Non-Proliferation Act. ¶ Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’ coziness with dictators goes beyond Iran. He provides both material and moral support to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who currently may be responsible for the deaths of 20,000 people. Then there’s that storied “bromance” between Chávez and the Castro brothers, who continue to rule the Cuban island with an iron fist. ¶ Beyond the rogue relations, the report mentions that a number of Venezuelans, including senior officials, have been designated for their connections to terrorist organizations, like Spain’s Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom—ETA) separatist group and Colombia’s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC) guerrilla organization, and various drug cartels. ¶ For example, in September 2011, the U.S. designated four senior Venezuelan officials—including Defense Minister Henry Rangel—as “acting for or on behalf of the [FARC], in direct support of the group's narcotics and arms trafficking activities.”¶ How does this all add up? <u><mark>Venezuela is a country that provides support to foreign terrorist organizations</u></mark>; it violates non-proliferation agreements; its senior officials are designated drug traffickers; it actively fosters relations with other state sponsors of terrorism (e.g., Iran, Syria and Cuba); it sneers at international norms such as freedom of the press and hemispheric institutions like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. ¶ The sum of these parts equals that Venezuela isn’t just “not cooperating” on antiterrorism, but it is active in supporting terrorism. <u><mark>It is a player in worldwide terrorism</u></mark>. Beyond this State Department report there have been many other, more chilling examples of Venezuela’s nefarious activities—some potentially posing harm to U.S. interests. This prompts the next logical question: Why isn’t Venezuela designated as a state sponsor of terrorism? ¶ Otherwise, <u><mark>how many more years will the U.S. chide Venezuela for failing to cooperate on antiterrorism</u> </mark>efforts? Perhaps it is waiting for some cataclysmic event, like a deadly attack by terrorists trained in Venezuela, to rationalize such a bold move. ¶ There’s also the thinking that if the U.S. waits long enough, an ill <u><mark>Chávez</u></mark>—whose disease remains shrouded in secrecy—may perish, and that his <u><mark>death may usher in friendly relations again between Venezuela and the U.S</mark>.</u> But this approach relies too heavily on a naïve hope that the U.S. can just bide its time for the Chávez regime’s inevitable collapse. Because what would happen next?</p> </s>

Spare capacity’s hit a new low

OPEC's spare crude oil production capacity is at the lowest level since 2008 according to figures from the Energy Information Administration Excess capacity has been declining steadily since the last quarter Low spare capacity is usually associated with high prices and vice versa low capacity does mean prices become inelastic as countries are unable to respond to supply squeezes, increased demand or unanticipated world events by ramping up production What the current moderately low spare capacity indicates is that the world is on a tightrope with the uncertainty over the Iranian boycott Prices are now high and there is not much spare capacity available to bring them down

OPEC's spare capacity is at the lowest level according to figures capacity has been declining steadily Low capacity is associated with high prices and vice versa the low capacity indicates that the world is on a tightrope with uncertainty over the Iranian boycott Prices are high and there is not much capacity to bring them down

OPEC's spare crude oil production capacity is at the lowest level since 2008, according to figures from the Energy Information Administration. Excess capacity has been declining steadily since the last quarter of 2009 but is still nowhere near as low as it was from 2003 to the end of 2008. The blue bars on the graph indicate OPEC spare capacity, with the scale in millions of barrels on the left. Capacity is now 2.4 million barrels, down from 4.5 million in the last quarter of 2009 but well above the low point of less than 1 million barrels in 2004. The red line indicates the WTI crude oil price with the scale on the right, running from zero to $140 a barrel in 2010 prices. The price is now near $100 a barrel, the highest since 2009 but well below the peak of $123 in 2008. Low spare capacity is usually associated with high prices and vice versa, although there is no clear cause and effect. What low capacity does mean is that prices become inelastic as countries are unable to respond to supply squeezes, increased demand or unanticipated world events by ramping up production. Nearly all the world's spare capacity is in OPEC countries and most of that is in Saudi Arabia. EIA defines spare crude oil production capacity as potential oil production that could be brought online within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days, consistent with sound business practices. This does not include oil production increases that could not be sustained without degrading the future production capacity of a field. What the current moderately low spare capacity indicates is that the world is on a tightrope with the uncertainty over the Iranian boycott. Prices are now high and there is not too much spare capacity available to bring them down. But the situation is not as bad as it was in 2008, when tight supplies sent oil over $120 a barrel.

<h4>Spare capacity’s hit a new low</h4><p><strong><mark>RCE ’12</strong></mark> (Real Clear Energy Editors, “OPEC's Spare Capacity Is at Lowest Since 2008”. May 29. http://www.realclearenergy.org/charticles/2012/05/29/opec_spare_capacity_lowest_since_2008_106572.html)</p><p><u><mark>OPEC's spare</mark> crude oil production <mark>capacity is at the lowest level</mark> since 2008</u>, <u><mark>according to figures</mark> from the Energy Information Administration</u>. <u>Excess <mark>capacity has been declining steadily</mark> since the last quarter </u>of 2009 but is still nowhere near as low as it was from 2003 to the end of 2008. The blue bars on the graph indicate OPEC spare capacity, with the scale in millions of barrels on the left. Capacity is now 2.4 million barrels, down from 4.5 million in the last quarter of 2009 but well above the low point of less than 1 million barrels in 2004. The red line indicates the WTI crude oil price with the scale on the right, running from zero to $140 a barrel in 2010 prices. The price is now near $100 a barrel, the highest since 2009 but well below the peak of $123 in 2008. <u><mark>Low</mark> spare <mark>capacity is</mark> usually <mark>associated with high prices and vice versa</u></mark>, although there is no clear cause and effect. What <u>low capacity does mean </u>is that <u>prices become inelastic as countries are unable to respond to supply squeezes, increased demand or unanticipated world events by ramping up production</u>. Nearly all the world's spare capacity is in OPEC countries and most of that is in Saudi Arabia. EIA defines spare crude oil production capacity as potential oil production that could be brought online within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days, consistent with sound business practices. This does not include oil production increases that could not be sustained without degrading the future production capacity of a field. <u>What<strong> <mark>the</mark> </strong>current moderately<strong> <mark>low</mark> </strong>spare<strong> <mark>capacity indicates</mark> </strong>is<strong> <mark>that the world is on a tightrope with</mark> </strong>the<strong> <mark>uncertainty over the Iranian boycott</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Prices are</mark> now <mark>high and there is not</mark> </u>too<u> <mark>much</mark> spare <mark>capacity</mark> available <mark>to bring them down</u></mark>. But the situation is not as bad as it was in 2008, when tight supplies sent oil over $120 a barrel.</p>

RCE ’12 (Real Clear Energy Editors, “OPEC's Spare Capacity Is at Lowest Since 2008”. May 29. http://www.realclearenergy.org/charticles/2012/05/29/opec_spare_capacity_lowest_since_2008_106572.html)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: RCE ’12 (Real Clear Energy Editors, “OPEC's Spare Capacity Is at Lowest Since 2008”. May 29. http://www.realclearenergy.org/charticles/2012/05/29/opec_spare_capacity_lowest_since_2008_106572.html) fulltext: OPEC's spare crude oil production capacity is at the lowest level since 2008, according to figures from the Energy Information Administration. Excess capacity has been declining steadily since the last quarter of 2009 but is still nowhere near as low as it was from 2003 to the end of 2008. The blue bars on the graph indicate OPEC spare capacity, with the scale in millions of barrels on the left. Capacity is now 2.4 million barrels, down from 4.5 million in the last quarter of 2009 but well above the low point of less than 1 million barrels in 2004. The red line indicates the WTI crude oil price with the scale on the right, running from zero to $140 a barrel in 2010 prices. The price is now near $100 a barrel, the highest since 2009 but well below the peak of $123 in 2008. Low spare capacity is usually associated with high prices and vice versa, although there is no clear cause and effect. What low capacity does mean is that prices become inelastic as countries are unable to respond to supply squeezes, increased demand or unanticipated world events by ramping up production. Nearly all the world's spare capacity is in OPEC countries and most of that is in Saudi Arabia. EIA defines spare crude oil production capacity as potential oil production that could be brought online within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days, consistent with sound business practices. This does not include oil production increases that could not be sustained without degrading the future production capacity of a field. What the current moderately low spare capacity indicates is that the world is on a tightrope with the uncertainty over the Iranian boycott. Prices are now high and there is not too much spare capacity available to bring them down. But the situation is not as bad as it was in 2008, when tight supplies sent oil over $120 a barrel. [/INST] <h4>Spare capacity’s hit a new low</h4><p><strong><mark>RCE ’12</strong></mark> (Real Clear Energy Editors, “OPEC's Spare Capacity Is at Lowest Since 2008”. May 29. http://www.realclearenergy.org/charticles/2012/05/29/opec_spare_capacity_lowest_since_2008_106572.html)</p><p><u><mark>OPEC's spare</mark> crude oil production <mark>capacity is at the lowest level</mark> since 2008</u>, <u><mark>according to figures</mark> from the Energy Information Administration</u>. <u>Excess <mark>capacity has been declining steadily</mark> since the last quarter </u>of 2009 but is still nowhere near as low as it was from 2003 to the end of 2008. The blue bars on the graph indicate OPEC spare capacity, with the scale in millions of barrels on the left. Capacity is now 2.4 million barrels, down from 4.5 million in the last quarter of 2009 but well above the low point of less than 1 million barrels in 2004. The red line indicates the WTI crude oil price with the scale on the right, running from zero to $140 a barrel in 2010 prices. The price is now near $100 a barrel, the highest since 2009 but well below the peak of $123 in 2008. <u><mark>Low</mark> spare <mark>capacity is</mark> usually <mark>associated with high prices and vice versa</u></mark>, although there is no clear cause and effect. What <u>low capacity does mean </u>is that <u>prices become inelastic as countries are unable to respond to supply squeezes, increased demand or unanticipated world events by ramping up production</u>. Nearly all the world's spare capacity is in OPEC countries and most of that is in Saudi Arabia. EIA defines spare crude oil production capacity as potential oil production that could be brought online within 30 days and sustained for at least 90 days, consistent with sound business practices. This does not include oil production increases that could not be sustained without degrading the future production capacity of a field. <u>What<strong> <mark>the</mark> </strong>current moderately<strong> <mark>low</mark> </strong>spare<strong> <mark>capacity indicates</mark> </strong>is<strong> <mark>that the world is on a tightrope with</mark> </strong>the<strong> <mark>uncertainty over the Iranian boycott</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Prices are</mark> now <mark>high and there is not</mark> </u>too<u> <mark>much</mark> spare <mark>capacity</mark> available <mark>to bring them down</u></mark>. But the situation is not as bad as it was in 2008, when tight supplies sent oil over $120 a barrel.</p> </s>

Technological growth and cheaper services signal economic growth in the U.S.

A prominent convert is Cowen who has gone from doomsayer to a decidedly more optimistic perspective new technologies like artificial intelligence and online education, increased domestic energy production and slowing growth in the cost of health care have prompted Mr. Cowen to reappraise the country’s prospects It’s better than it looked,” Technological progress comes in batches and it’s just a little more rapid than it looked two years ago.”

[Nelson, has covered the economy and economics for the business section of The New York Times since August 2012, Even Pessimists Feel Optimistic About the American Economy, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/business/economy/even-pessimists-feel-optimistic-over-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0] /Wyo-MB A prominent convert to this emerging belief is Tyler Cowen, an economics professor at George Mason University near Washington and author of “The Great Stagnation,” a 2011 best seller, who has gone from doomsayer to a decidedly more optimistic perspective.¶ He is not predicting an imminent resurgence. Like most academic economists, Mr. Cowen focuses on the next quarter-century rather than the next quarter. But new technologies like artificial intelligence and online education, increased domestic energy production and slowing growth in the cost of health care have prompted Mr. Cowen to reappraise the country’s prospects.¶ “It’s better than it looked,” Mr. Cowen said. “Technological progress comes in batches and it’s just a little more rapid than it looked two years ago.” His next book, “Average Is Over: Powering America Beyond the Age of the Great Stagnation,” is due out in September.

<h4><strong>Technological growth and cheaper services signal economic growth in the U.S.</h4><p>Schwartz, 6-15-13</p><p></strong>[Nelson, has covered the economy and economics for the business section of The New York Times since August 2012, Even Pessimists Feel Optimistic About the American Economy, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/business/economy/even-pessimists-feel-optimistic-over-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0] /Wyo-MB</p><p><u><strong>A prominent convert</u></strong> to this emerging belief <u><strong>is</u></strong> Tyler <u><strong>Cowen</u></strong>, an economics professor at George Mason University near Washington and author of “The Great Stagnation,” a 2011 best seller, <u><strong>who has gone from doomsayer to a decidedly more optimistic perspective</u></strong>.¶ He is not predicting an imminent resurgence. Like most academic economists, Mr. Cowen focuses on the next quarter-century rather than the next quarter. But <u><strong>new technologies like artificial intelligence and online education, increased domestic energy production and slowing growth in the cost of health care have prompted Mr. Cowen to reappraise the country’s prospects</u></strong>.¶ “<u><strong>It’s better than it looked,” </u></strong>Mr. Cowen said. “<u><strong>Technological progress comes in batches and it’s just a little more rapid than it looked two years ago.” </u></strong>His next book, “Average Is Over: Powering America Beyond the Age of the Great Stagnation,” is due out in September.</p>

Schwartz, 6-15-13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Schwartz, 6-15-13 fulltext: [Nelson, has covered the economy and economics for the business section of The New York Times since August 2012, Even Pessimists Feel Optimistic About the American Economy, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/business/economy/even-pessimists-feel-optimistic-over-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0] /Wyo-MB A prominent convert to this emerging belief is Tyler Cowen, an economics professor at George Mason University near Washington and author of “The Great Stagnation,” a 2011 best seller, who has gone from doomsayer to a decidedly more optimistic perspective.¶ He is not predicting an imminent resurgence. Like most academic economists, Mr. Cowen focuses on the next quarter-century rather than the next quarter. But new technologies like artificial intelligence and online education, increased domestic energy production and slowing growth in the cost of health care have prompted Mr. Cowen to reappraise the country’s prospects.¶ “It’s better than it looked,” Mr. Cowen said. “Technological progress comes in batches and it’s just a little more rapid than it looked two years ago.” His next book, “Average Is Over: Powering America Beyond the Age of the Great Stagnation,” is due out in September. [/INST] <h4><strong>Technological growth and cheaper services signal economic growth in the U.S.</h4><p>Schwartz, 6-15-13</p><p></strong>[Nelson, has covered the economy and economics for the business section of The New York Times since August 2012, Even Pessimists Feel Optimistic About the American Economy, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/business/economy/even-pessimists-feel-optimistic-over-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0] /Wyo-MB</p><p><u><strong>A prominent convert</u></strong> to this emerging belief <u><strong>is</u></strong> Tyler <u><strong>Cowen</u></strong>, an economics professor at George Mason University near Washington and author of “The Great Stagnation,” a 2011 best seller, <u><strong>who has gone from doomsayer to a decidedly more optimistic perspective</u></strong>.¶ He is not predicting an imminent resurgence. Like most academic economists, Mr. Cowen focuses on the next quarter-century rather than the next quarter. But <u><strong>new technologies like artificial intelligence and online education, increased domestic energy production and slowing growth in the cost of health care have prompted Mr. Cowen to reappraise the country’s prospects</u></strong>.¶ “<u><strong>It’s better than it looked,” </u></strong>Mr. Cowen said. “<u><strong>Technological progress comes in batches and it’s just a little more rapid than it looked two years ago.” </u></strong>His next book, “Average Is Over: Powering America Beyond the Age of the Great Stagnation,” is due out in September.</p> </s>

Yes CIR – efforts to block the deal will fall short

The truce won't last, but it will allow to pass immigration reform. There's a spring thaw in Congress, clearing the path for big bills to pass Both parties, driven by goodwill are in the mood for progress on other fronts The biggest immigration A sizable package will pass by the end of the year It'll include beefed-up border patrols, more work visas for skilled and unskilled individuals and a path for legal residency Both parties stand to benefit Democrats get to claim another big win Republicans gain a vital truce It won't be easy Many tea partyers remain firmly opposed But they'll come up short of votes to block Democrats who see immigration reform as helping businesses to fill skilled positions that Americans aren't qualified for and unskilled jobs that Americans don't want

The truce will allow to pass immigration reform.¶ There's a thaw clearing the path for bills to pass Both parties, driven by goodwill are in the mood for immigration A sizable package will pass It'll include border patrols work visas for skilled and unskilled and a path for legal residency Both stand to benefit Democrats get to claim another big win f Republicans gain a vital truce It won't be easy tea partyers remain firmly opposed But they'll come up short of votes to block Democrats who see immigration reform as businesses to fill skilled positions that Americans aren't qualified for and jobs that Americans don't want.

The truce won't last, but it will allow some major bills to pass, including immigration reform.¶ There's a spring thaw of sorts under way in Congress, clearing the path for some big bills to pass before the fall, when the focus will shift to the 2014 elections for House and Senate seats.¶ Both parties, driven by the goodwill that remains from their recent agreement to fund the government through the Sept. 30 end of the fiscal year, are in the mood for progress on other fronts.¶ The biggest surprise on tap: immigration reform. A sizable package will pass by the end of the year. It'll include beefed-up border patrols, more work visas for skilled and unskilled individuals and a path for legal residency for many millions of people who are in the U.S. illegally. That last provision was a long shot as recently as a few months ago.¶ Both parties stand to benefit over time. Democrats get to claim another big win for President Obama, allowing immigration to join health care as a cornerstone of his legislative legacy. Republicans gain a vital truce with Hispanic voters that may help them in future elections.¶ It won't be easy. Many tea partyers remain firmly opposed, especially to provisions that would lead to citizenship or legal residency for illegal immigrants. But they'll come up short of votes to block Democrats and mainstream Republicans, who see immigration reform as helping businesses to fill skilled positions that Americans aren't qualified for and unskilled jobs that Americans don't want.

<h4>Yes CIR – efforts to block the deal will fall short </h4><p>Kaenneth <strong>Bazinger</strong>, Political Editor for the NY Daily News and Kiplinger. “For Obama, Republicans, a Pause in Partisanship” 4/8/<strong>13</p><p><u><mark>The truce</mark> won't last, but it <mark>will allow</mark> </u></strong>some major bills <u><strong><mark>to pass</u></strong></mark>, including <u><strong><mark>immigration reform.</u></strong>¶</mark> <u><strong><mark>There's a</mark> spring <mark>thaw</u></strong></mark> of sorts under way <u><strong>in Congress, <mark>clearing the path for</u></strong></mark> some <u><strong>big <mark>bills to pass</u></strong></mark> before the fall, when the focus will shift to the 2014 elections for House and Senate seats.¶ <u><strong><mark>Both parties, driven by</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>goodwill</u></strong></mark> that remains from their recent agreement to fund the government through the Sept. 30 end of the fiscal year, <u><strong><mark>are in the mood for</mark> progress on other fronts</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong>The biggest</u></strong> surprise on tap: <u><strong><mark>immigration</u></strong></mark> reform. <u><strong><mark>A sizable package will pass</mark> by the end of the year</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>It'll include</mark> beefed-up <mark>border patrols</mark>, more <mark>work visas for skilled and unskilled</mark> individuals <mark>and a path for legal residency</u></strong></mark> for many millions of people who are in the U.S. illegally. That last provision was a long shot as recently as a few months ago.¶ <u><strong><mark>Both</mark> parties <mark>stand to benefit</u></strong></mark> over time. <u><strong><mark>Democrats get to claim another big win</u></strong> f</mark>or President Obama, allowing immigration to join health care as a cornerstone of his legislative legacy. <u><strong><mark>Republicans gain a vital truce</u></strong></mark> with Hispanic voters that may help them in future elections.¶ <u><strong><mark>It won't be easy</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Many <mark>tea partyers remain firmly opposed</u></strong></mark>, especially to provisions that would lead to citizenship or legal residency for illegal immigrants. <u><strong><mark>But they'll come up short of votes to block Democrats</u></strong></mark> and mainstream Republicans, <u><strong><mark>who see immigration reform as</mark> helping <mark>businesses to fill skilled positions that Americans aren't qualified for and</mark> unskilled <mark>jobs that Americans don't want</u></strong>.</p></mark>

Kaenneth Bazinger, Political Editor for the NY Daily News and Kiplinger. “For Obama, Republicans, a Pause in Partisanship” 4/8/13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Kaenneth Bazinger, Political Editor for the NY Daily News and Kiplinger. “For Obama, Republicans, a Pause in Partisanship” 4/8/13 fulltext: The truce won't last, but it will allow some major bills to pass, including immigration reform.¶ There's a spring thaw of sorts under way in Congress, clearing the path for some big bills to pass before the fall, when the focus will shift to the 2014 elections for House and Senate seats.¶ Both parties, driven by the goodwill that remains from their recent agreement to fund the government through the Sept. 30 end of the fiscal year, are in the mood for progress on other fronts.¶ The biggest surprise on tap: immigration reform. A sizable package will pass by the end of the year. It'll include beefed-up border patrols, more work visas for skilled and unskilled individuals and a path for legal residency for many millions of people who are in the U.S. illegally. That last provision was a long shot as recently as a few months ago.¶ Both parties stand to benefit over time. Democrats get to claim another big win for President Obama, allowing immigration to join health care as a cornerstone of his legislative legacy. Republicans gain a vital truce with Hispanic voters that may help them in future elections.¶ It won't be easy. Many tea partyers remain firmly opposed, especially to provisions that would lead to citizenship or legal residency for illegal immigrants. But they'll come up short of votes to block Democrats and mainstream Republicans, who see immigration reform as helping businesses to fill skilled positions that Americans aren't qualified for and unskilled jobs that Americans don't want. [/INST] <h4>Yes CIR – efforts to block the deal will fall short </h4><p>Kaenneth <strong>Bazinger</strong>, Political Editor for the NY Daily News and Kiplinger. “For Obama, Republicans, a Pause in Partisanship” 4/8/<strong>13</p><p><u><mark>The truce</mark> won't last, but it <mark>will allow</mark> </u></strong>some major bills <u><strong><mark>to pass</u></strong></mark>, including <u><strong><mark>immigration reform.</u></strong>¶</mark> <u><strong><mark>There's a</mark> spring <mark>thaw</u></strong></mark> of sorts under way <u><strong>in Congress, <mark>clearing the path for</u></strong></mark> some <u><strong>big <mark>bills to pass</u></strong></mark> before the fall, when the focus will shift to the 2014 elections for House and Senate seats.¶ <u><strong><mark>Both parties, driven by</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>goodwill</u></strong></mark> that remains from their recent agreement to fund the government through the Sept. 30 end of the fiscal year, <u><strong><mark>are in the mood for</mark> progress on other fronts</u></strong>.¶ <u><strong>The biggest</u></strong> surprise on tap: <u><strong><mark>immigration</u></strong></mark> reform. <u><strong><mark>A sizable package will pass</mark> by the end of the year</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>It'll include</mark> beefed-up <mark>border patrols</mark>, more <mark>work visas for skilled and unskilled</mark> individuals <mark>and a path for legal residency</u></strong></mark> for many millions of people who are in the U.S. illegally. That last provision was a long shot as recently as a few months ago.¶ <u><strong><mark>Both</mark> parties <mark>stand to benefit</u></strong></mark> over time. <u><strong><mark>Democrats get to claim another big win</u></strong> f</mark>or President Obama, allowing immigration to join health care as a cornerstone of his legislative legacy. <u><strong><mark>Republicans gain a vital truce</u></strong></mark> with Hispanic voters that may help them in future elections.¶ <u><strong><mark>It won't be easy</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Many <mark>tea partyers remain firmly opposed</u></strong></mark>, especially to provisions that would lead to citizenship or legal residency for illegal immigrants. <u><strong><mark>But they'll come up short of votes to block Democrats</u></strong></mark> and mainstream Republicans, <u><strong><mark>who see immigration reform as</mark> helping <mark>businesses to fill skilled positions that Americans aren't qualified for and</mark> unskilled <mark>jobs that Americans don't want</u></strong>.</p></mark> </s>

Disruption of oil supply causes energy insecurity that destabilizes Chinese econ-

Conflating economic risk and risk to the regime in China stems from the fact that the modern CCP largely stakes its legitimacy on the capacity to continually deliver rapid economic growth disruption of China’s supply of oil could lead to twin forces of mass discontent: a stagnating economy and inflation caused by spikes in domestic energy prices The link between energy security and maintaining rapid growth has deepened due to the evolving drivers of China’s growth in place since the mid-1990s

(John, The Washington Quarterly, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” Summer 2012, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerLee.pdf) /wyo-mm Conflating economic risk and risk to the regime in China stems from the fact that the modern CCP largely stakes its legitimacy on the capacity to continually deliver rapid economic growth. A disruption of China’s supply of oil could lead to twin forces of mass discontent: a stagnating economy and inflation caused by spikes in domestic energy prices. As Premier Wen Jiabao explained to colleagues during the National People’s Congress in March 2011, ensuring GDP growth of around 8 percent each year and keeping inflation below 4—5 percent is linked to social stability imperatives required for regime security.7 At a minimum, such rapid growth is required to generate sufficient jobs to keep unemployment (and therefore discontent) under control; it is not lost on modern Chinese authorities that double-digit inflation was one of the major reasons behind countrywide protests in 1989 leading up to Tiananmen Square. The link between energy security and maintaining rapid growth has deepened due to the evolving drivers of China’s growth in place since the mid-1990s. In the first decade of economic reform (1979—1989), growth was largely driven by land reforms, which led to dramatic productivity increases in rural China. It was not until the mid-1990s that mass, large-scale industrialization took place. From the late 1990s onwards, fixed-asset investment (and exports) replaced domestic consumption as the driver of economic growth.

<h4><strong>Disruption of oil supply causes energy insecurity that destabilizes Chinese econ-</h4><p>Lee 12</p><p></strong>(John, The Washington Quarterly, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” Summer 2012, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerLee.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p><u><strong>Conflating economic risk and risk to the regime in China stems from the fact that the modern CCP largely stakes its legitimacy on the capacity to continually deliver rapid economic growth</u></strong>. A <u><strong>disruption of China’s supply of oil could lead to twin forces of mass discontent: a stagnating economy and inflation caused by spikes in domestic energy prices</u></strong>. As Premier Wen Jiabao explained to colleagues during the National People’s Congress in March 2011, ensuring GDP growth of around 8 percent each year and keeping inflation below 4—5 percent is linked to social stability imperatives required for regime security.7 At a minimum, such rapid growth is required to generate sufficient jobs to keep unemployment (and therefore discontent) under control; it is not lost on modern Chinese authorities that double-digit inflation was one of the major reasons behind countrywide protests in 1989 leading up to Tiananmen Square. <u><strong>The link between energy security and maintaining rapid growth has deepened due to the evolving drivers of China’s growth in place since the mid-1990s</u></strong>. In the first decade of economic reform (1979—1989), growth was largely driven by land reforms, which led to dramatic productivity increases in rural China. It was not until the mid-1990s that mass, large-scale industrialization took place. From the late 1990s onwards, fixed-asset investment (and exports) replaced domestic consumption as the driver of economic growth.</p>

Lee 12

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Lee 12 fulltext: (John, The Washington Quarterly, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” Summer 2012, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerLee.pdf) /wyo-mm Conflating economic risk and risk to the regime in China stems from the fact that the modern CCP largely stakes its legitimacy on the capacity to continually deliver rapid economic growth. A disruption of China’s supply of oil could lead to twin forces of mass discontent: a stagnating economy and inflation caused by spikes in domestic energy prices. As Premier Wen Jiabao explained to colleagues during the National People’s Congress in March 2011, ensuring GDP growth of around 8 percent each year and keeping inflation below 4—5 percent is linked to social stability imperatives required for regime security.7 At a minimum, such rapid growth is required to generate sufficient jobs to keep unemployment (and therefore discontent) under control; it is not lost on modern Chinese authorities that double-digit inflation was one of the major reasons behind countrywide protests in 1989 leading up to Tiananmen Square. The link between energy security and maintaining rapid growth has deepened due to the evolving drivers of China’s growth in place since the mid-1990s. In the first decade of economic reform (1979—1989), growth was largely driven by land reforms, which led to dramatic productivity increases in rural China. It was not until the mid-1990s that mass, large-scale industrialization took place. From the late 1990s onwards, fixed-asset investment (and exports) replaced domestic consumption as the driver of economic growth. [/INST] <h4><strong>Disruption of oil supply causes energy insecurity that destabilizes Chinese econ-</h4><p>Lee 12</p><p></strong>(John, The Washington Quarterly, “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil,” Summer 2012, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerLee.pdf) /wyo-mm</p><p><u><strong>Conflating economic risk and risk to the regime in China stems from the fact that the modern CCP largely stakes its legitimacy on the capacity to continually deliver rapid economic growth</u></strong>. A <u><strong>disruption of China’s supply of oil could lead to twin forces of mass discontent: a stagnating economy and inflation caused by spikes in domestic energy prices</u></strong>. As Premier Wen Jiabao explained to colleagues during the National People’s Congress in March 2011, ensuring GDP growth of around 8 percent each year and keeping inflation below 4—5 percent is linked to social stability imperatives required for regime security.7 At a minimum, such rapid growth is required to generate sufficient jobs to keep unemployment (and therefore discontent) under control; it is not lost on modern Chinese authorities that double-digit inflation was one of the major reasons behind countrywide protests in 1989 leading up to Tiananmen Square. <u><strong>The link between energy security and maintaining rapid growth has deepened due to the evolving drivers of China’s growth in place since the mid-1990s</u></strong>. In the first decade of economic reform (1979—1989), growth was largely driven by land reforms, which led to dramatic productivity increases in rural China. It was not until the mid-1990s that mass, large-scale industrialization took place. From the late 1990s onwards, fixed-asset investment (and exports) replaced domestic consumption as the driver of economic growth.</p> </s>

[C.] Lifting the embargo is key to the credibility of United States democracy promotion and hemispheric relations

U.S. policy toward Cuba should advance the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people and strengthen U.S. credibility throughout the hemisphere Our nearly 50-year-old policy toward Cuba has failed on both counts: it has resulted in a downward spiral of U.S. influence on the island and has left the United States isolated in the hemisphere and beyond. Our Cuba policy has become a bellwether, indicating the extent to which the United States will act in partnership with the region or unilaterally— and ineffectually. Inevitably, strategic contact and dialogue with the Cuban government will be necessary a new goal for U.S. policy toward Cuba: to support the emergence of a Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. A great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within. Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country. This policy will advance the interests of the United States in seeking stable relationships based on common hemispheric values that promote e growth of civil society. To engage the Cuban government and Cuban people effectively, U.S. policy toward Cuba would reflect the hemisphere’s and our own desire to encourage the Cuban government to adopt international standards of democracy, human rights, and transparency.

U.S. policy toward Cuba should advance the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people and strengthen U.S. credibility throughout the hemisphere. Our nearly 50-year-old policy toward Cuba has failed on both counts: it has resulted in a downward spiral of U.S. influence on the island and has left the United States isolated in the hemisphere and beyond. Our Cuba policy has become a bellwether, indicating the extent to which the United States will act in partnership with the region or unilaterally— and ineffectually. Inevitably, strategic contact and dialogue with the Cuban government will be necessary if the United States seeks to engage the Cuban people. This book proposes a new goal for U.S. policy toward Cuba: to support the emergence of a Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. A great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within. The type of government at the helm of the island’s future will depend on Cubans. Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country. This policy will advance the interests of the United States in seeking stable relationships based on common hemispheric values that promote the well-being of each individual and the growth of civil society. To engage the Cuban government and Cuban people effectively, the United States will need to engage with other governments, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In so doing, U.S. policy toward Cuba would reflect the hemisphere’s and our own desire to encourage the Cuban government to adopt international standards of democracy, human rights, and transparency.

<h4>[C.] <strong>Lifting the embargo is key to the credibility of United States democracy promotion and hemispheric relations</h4><p>Huddleston and Pascual, 2010</p><p><u>[Vicki and Carlos, Leaders of Advisory group for policy recommendations on Cuba, Vicki is deputy assistant secretary for Africa at the Department of Defense and Carlos is ambassador to Mexico, Learning to Salsa: New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations, Brookings Institutions Press 2010] /Wyo-MB </p><p>U.S. policy toward Cuba should advance the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people and strengthen U.S. credibility throughout the hemisphere</u></strong>.<u><strong> Our nearly 50-year-old policy toward Cuba has failed on both counts: it has resulted in a downward spiral of U.S. influence on the island and has left the United States isolated in the hemisphere and beyond. Our Cuba policy has become a bellwether, indicating the extent to which the United States will act in partnership with the region or unilaterally— and ineffectually. Inevitably, strategic contact and dialogue with the Cuban government will be necessary</u></strong> if the United States seeks to engage the Cuban people. This book proposes <u><strong>a new goal for U.S. policy toward Cuba: to support the emergence of a Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. A great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within.</u></strong> The type of government at the helm of the island’s future will depend on Cubans. <u><strong>Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country. This policy will advance the interests of the United States in seeking stable relationships based on common hemispheric values that promote</u></strong> the well-being of each individual and th<u><strong>e growth of civil society. To engage the Cuban government and Cuban people effectively, </u></strong>the United States will need to engage with other governments, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In so doing, <u><strong>U.S. policy toward Cuba would reflect the hemisphere’s and our own desire to encourage the Cuban government to adopt international standards of democracy, human rights, and transparency. </p></u></strong>

Huddleston and Pascual, 2010 [Vicki and Carlos, Leaders of Advisory group for policy recommendations on Cuba, Vicki is deputy assistant secretary for Africa at the Department of Defense and Carlos is ambassador to Mexico, Learning to Salsa: New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations, Brookings Institutions Press 2010] /Wyo-MB

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Huddleston and Pascual, 2010 [Vicki and Carlos, Leaders of Advisory group for policy recommendations on Cuba, Vicki is deputy assistant secretary for Africa at the Department of Defense and Carlos is ambassador to Mexico, Learning to Salsa: New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations, Brookings Institutions Press 2010] /Wyo-MB fulltext: U.S. policy toward Cuba should advance the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people and strengthen U.S. credibility throughout the hemisphere. Our nearly 50-year-old policy toward Cuba has failed on both counts: it has resulted in a downward spiral of U.S. influence on the island and has left the United States isolated in the hemisphere and beyond. Our Cuba policy has become a bellwether, indicating the extent to which the United States will act in partnership with the region or unilaterally— and ineffectually. Inevitably, strategic contact and dialogue with the Cuban government will be necessary if the United States seeks to engage the Cuban people. This book proposes a new goal for U.S. policy toward Cuba: to support the emergence of a Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. A great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within. The type of government at the helm of the island’s future will depend on Cubans. Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country. This policy will advance the interests of the United States in seeking stable relationships based on common hemispheric values that promote the well-being of each individual and the growth of civil society. To engage the Cuban government and Cuban people effectively, the United States will need to engage with other governments, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In so doing, U.S. policy toward Cuba would reflect the hemisphere’s and our own desire to encourage the Cuban government to adopt international standards of democracy, human rights, and transparency. [/INST] <h4>[C.] <strong>Lifting the embargo is key to the credibility of United States democracy promotion and hemispheric relations</h4><p>Huddleston and Pascual, 2010</p><p><u>[Vicki and Carlos, Leaders of Advisory group for policy recommendations on Cuba, Vicki is deputy assistant secretary for Africa at the Department of Defense and Carlos is ambassador to Mexico, Learning to Salsa: New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations, Brookings Institutions Press 2010] /Wyo-MB </p><p>U.S. policy toward Cuba should advance the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people and strengthen U.S. credibility throughout the hemisphere</u></strong>.<u><strong> Our nearly 50-year-old policy toward Cuba has failed on both counts: it has resulted in a downward spiral of U.S. influence on the island and has left the United States isolated in the hemisphere and beyond. Our Cuba policy has become a bellwether, indicating the extent to which the United States will act in partnership with the region or unilaterally— and ineffectually. Inevitably, strategic contact and dialogue with the Cuban government will be necessary</u></strong> if the United States seeks to engage the Cuban people. This book proposes <u><strong>a new goal for U.S. policy toward Cuba: to support the emergence of a Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the political and economic future of their country through democratic means. A great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within.</u></strong> The type of government at the helm of the island’s future will depend on Cubans. <u><strong>Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country. This policy will advance the interests of the United States in seeking stable relationships based on common hemispheric values that promote</u></strong> the well-being of each individual and th<u><strong>e growth of civil society. To engage the Cuban government and Cuban people effectively, </u></strong>the United States will need to engage with other governments, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In so doing, <u><strong>U.S. policy toward Cuba would reflect the hemisphere’s and our own desire to encourage the Cuban government to adopt international standards of democracy, human rights, and transparency. </p></u></strong> </s>

Terrorism causes nuclear war

some sort of terrorist attack especially nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more states raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties at what stage would Russia and China be ruled out , if the act occurred against a backdrop of existing tension with Russia and/or China would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst Washington’s early response might raise the possibility of an unwanted confrontation the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert it is possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force temptations to preempt grow

nuclear terrorism, could precipitate catalytic nuclear war between superpowers if the act occurred against a backdrop of existing tension with Russia or China would political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst the president place the country’s nuclear arsenal, on a higher alert Moscow or China might mistakenly read this temptations to preempt grow

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability

<h4>Terrorism causes nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Ayson ‘10</strong> [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” July, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7, InformaWorld]</p><p>But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that <u>some sort of terrorist attack</u>, and <u>especially</u> an act of <u><mark>nuclear terrorism, could precipitate</mark> a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more</u> of the <u>states</u> that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as <u>raising the risks of a <strong><mark>catalytic nuclear war</strong></mark> <mark>between</mark> the <mark>superpowers</mark> started by third parties</u>. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But <u>at what stage would Russia and China be</u> definitely <u>ruled out</u> in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular<u>, <mark>if the act </u></mark>of nuclear terrorism<u> <mark>occurred against a backdrop of existing tension</mark> </u>in Washington’s relations<u> <mark>with Russia</mark> and/<mark>or China</u></mark>, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, <u><mark>would </mark>officials and <mark>political leaders not be tempted to <strong>assume the worst</u></strong></mark>? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? <u>Washington’s early response</u> to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil <u>might</u> also <u>raise the possibility of an unwanted</u> (and nuclear aided) <u>confrontation</u> with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, <u><mark>the</mark> U.S. <mark>president</mark> might be expected to <mark>place the country’s</u></mark> armed forces, including its <u><mark>nuclear arsenal, on a higher</mark> stage of <mark>alert</u></mark>. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, <u>it is </u>just <u>possible that <mark>Moscow</mark> and/<mark>or China might mistakenly read this </mark>as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force</u> (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the <u><mark>temptations to preempt</mark> </u>such actions might<u> <mark>grow</u></mark>, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability</p>

Ayson ‘10 [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” July, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7, InformaWorld]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Ayson ‘10 [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” July, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7, InformaWorld] fulltext: But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability [/INST] <h4>Terrorism causes nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Ayson ‘10</strong> [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” July, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Issue 7, InformaWorld]</p><p>But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that <u>some sort of terrorist attack</u>, and <u>especially</u> an act of <u><mark>nuclear terrorism, could precipitate</mark> a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more</u> of the <u>states</u> that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as <u>raising the risks of a <strong><mark>catalytic nuclear war</strong></mark> <mark>between</mark> the <mark>superpowers</mark> started by third parties</u>. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But <u>at what stage would Russia and China be</u> definitely <u>ruled out</u> in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular<u>, <mark>if the act </u></mark>of nuclear terrorism<u> <mark>occurred against a backdrop of existing tension</mark> </u>in Washington’s relations<u> <mark>with Russia</mark> and/<mark>or China</u></mark>, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, <u><mark>would </mark>officials and <mark>political leaders not be tempted to <strong>assume the worst</u></strong></mark>? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? <u>Washington’s early response</u> to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil <u>might</u> also <u>raise the possibility of an unwanted</u> (and nuclear aided) <u>confrontation</u> with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, <u><mark>the</mark> U.S. <mark>president</mark> might be expected to <mark>place the country’s</u></mark> armed forces, including its <u><mark>nuclear arsenal, on a higher</mark> stage of <mark>alert</u></mark>. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, <u>it is </u>just <u>possible that <mark>Moscow</mark> and/<mark>or China might mistakenly read this </mark>as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force</u> (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the <u><mark>temptations to preempt</mark> </u>such actions might<u> <mark>grow</u></mark>, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, bothRussia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability</p> </s>

No Saudi spare capacity – current production levels and domestic use

there are doubts over Saudi Arabia's ability to cover for Iran under any scenario The data from Jodi, a research group in Riyadh, is at odds with the assessments of the IEA The IEA has cast doubt over the levels of spare capacity in Saudi Arabia, putting the total capacity at 11.88 million bpd, leaving less than 2 million bpd as spare capacity at current pumping levels Apart from crude production, Saudi Arabia also increased the amount of diesel it uses domestically to generate electricity and desalinated water

there are doubts over Saudi to cover for Iran The IEA cast doubt over spare capacity in Saudi leaving less than 2 million bpd as spare capacity at current levels Saudi also increased the amount it uses domestically to generate electricity and desalinated water

The outcome of renewed negotiations remains uncertain, however, and there are doubts over Saudi Arabia's ability to cover for Iran under any scenario. The data from Jodi, a research group that works under the auspices of the International Energy Forum in Riyadh, is at odds with the assessments of the International Energy Agency (IEA), an organisation representing the biggest consumer of oil. IEA estimates put Saudi production at 10 million bpd since February, as Opec pumps a collective 31.85 million bpd, well above its self-imposed ceiling of 30 million bpd. Russia, which is not part of Opec, disputes the Jodi figures, putting its own March production at 10.36 million bpd. With producers operating near maximum capacity, a failure of talks with Iran and the continued enforcement of sanctions would create strong pressures on prices to go up. An expected seasonal increase in demand later in the year would add to this pressure. The IEA has cast doubt over the levels of spare capacity in Saudi Arabia, putting the total capacity at 11.88 million bpd, leaving less than 2 million bpd as spare capacity at current pumping levels. "Whenever you operate an industry at 98 per cent of its capacity, then it becomes vulnerable to any disturbance," said Mr Al Husseini, who is also a former vice president of Saudi Aramco. Apart from crude production, Saudi Arabia also increased the amount of diesel it uses domestically to generate electricity and desalinated water.

<h4>No Saudi spare capacity – current production levels and domestic use</h4><p><strong><mark>NEUHOF ’12</strong></mark> – Staff Writer, National (Neuhof, Florian. “Saudi Arabia knocks off Russia as world's biggest oil producer”. May 21, 2012. http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry-insights/energy/saudi-arabia-knocks-off-russia-as-worlds-biggest-oil-producer)</p><p>The outcome of renewed negotiations remains uncertain, however, and <u><mark>there are doubts over Saudi</mark> Arabia's ability <mark>to cover for</mark> <mark>Iran</mark> under any scenario</u>. <u>The data from Jodi, a research group </u>that works under the auspices of the International Energy Forum <u>in Riyadh, is at odds with the assessments of the</u> International Energy Agency (<u>IEA</u>), an organisation representing the biggest consumer of oil. IEA estimates put Saudi production at 10 million bpd since February, as Opec pumps a collective 31.85 million bpd, well above its self-imposed ceiling of 30 million bpd. Russia, which is not part of Opec, disputes the Jodi figures, putting its own March production at 10.36 million bpd. With producers operating near maximum capacity, a failure of talks with Iran and the continued enforcement of sanctions would create strong pressures on prices to go up. An expected seasonal increase in demand later in the year would add to this pressure. <u><mark>The IEA</mark> has <mark>cast doubt over</mark> the levels of <mark>spare capacity in Saudi</mark> Arabia, putting the total capacity at 11.88 million bpd, <mark>leaving less than 2 million bpd as spare capacity at current</mark> pumping <mark>levels</u></mark>. "Whenever you operate an industry at 98 per cent of its capacity, then it becomes vulnerable to any disturbance," said Mr Al Husseini, who is also a former vice president of Saudi Aramco. <u>Apart from crude production, <mark>Saudi</mark> Arabia <mark>also increased the amount</mark> of diesel <strong><mark>it uses</strong> <strong>domestically to generate electricity and desalinated water</u></strong></mark>.</p>

NEUHOF ’12 – Staff Writer, National (Neuhof, Florian. “Saudi Arabia knocks off Russia as world's biggest oil producer”. May 21, 2012. http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry-insights/energy/saudi-arabia-knocks-off-russia-as-worlds-biggest-oil-producer)

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: NEUHOF ’12 – Staff Writer, National (Neuhof, Florian. “Saudi Arabia knocks off Russia as world's biggest oil producer”. May 21, 2012. http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry-insights/energy/saudi-arabia-knocks-off-russia-as-worlds-biggest-oil-producer) fulltext: The outcome of renewed negotiations remains uncertain, however, and there are doubts over Saudi Arabia's ability to cover for Iran under any scenario. The data from Jodi, a research group that works under the auspices of the International Energy Forum in Riyadh, is at odds with the assessments of the International Energy Agency (IEA), an organisation representing the biggest consumer of oil. IEA estimates put Saudi production at 10 million bpd since February, as Opec pumps a collective 31.85 million bpd, well above its self-imposed ceiling of 30 million bpd. Russia, which is not part of Opec, disputes the Jodi figures, putting its own March production at 10.36 million bpd. With producers operating near maximum capacity, a failure of talks with Iran and the continued enforcement of sanctions would create strong pressures on prices to go up. An expected seasonal increase in demand later in the year would add to this pressure. The IEA has cast doubt over the levels of spare capacity in Saudi Arabia, putting the total capacity at 11.88 million bpd, leaving less than 2 million bpd as spare capacity at current pumping levels. "Whenever you operate an industry at 98 per cent of its capacity, then it becomes vulnerable to any disturbance," said Mr Al Husseini, who is also a former vice president of Saudi Aramco. Apart from crude production, Saudi Arabia also increased the amount of diesel it uses domestically to generate electricity and desalinated water. [/INST] <h4>No Saudi spare capacity – current production levels and domestic use</h4><p><strong><mark>NEUHOF ’12</strong></mark> – Staff Writer, National (Neuhof, Florian. “Saudi Arabia knocks off Russia as world's biggest oil producer”. May 21, 2012. http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry-insights/energy/saudi-arabia-knocks-off-russia-as-worlds-biggest-oil-producer)</p><p>The outcome of renewed negotiations remains uncertain, however, and <u><mark>there are doubts over Saudi</mark> Arabia's ability <mark>to cover for</mark> <mark>Iran</mark> under any scenario</u>. <u>The data from Jodi, a research group </u>that works under the auspices of the International Energy Forum <u>in Riyadh, is at odds with the assessments of the</u> International Energy Agency (<u>IEA</u>), an organisation representing the biggest consumer of oil. IEA estimates put Saudi production at 10 million bpd since February, as Opec pumps a collective 31.85 million bpd, well above its self-imposed ceiling of 30 million bpd. Russia, which is not part of Opec, disputes the Jodi figures, putting its own March production at 10.36 million bpd. With producers operating near maximum capacity, a failure of talks with Iran and the continued enforcement of sanctions would create strong pressures on prices to go up. An expected seasonal increase in demand later in the year would add to this pressure. <u><mark>The IEA</mark> has <mark>cast doubt over</mark> the levels of <mark>spare capacity in Saudi</mark> Arabia, putting the total capacity at 11.88 million bpd, <mark>leaving less than 2 million bpd as spare capacity at current</mark> pumping <mark>levels</u></mark>. "Whenever you operate an industry at 98 per cent of its capacity, then it becomes vulnerable to any disturbance," said Mr Al Husseini, who is also a former vice president of Saudi Aramco. <u>Apart from crude production, <mark>Saudi</mark> Arabia <mark>also increased the amount</mark> of diesel <strong><mark>it uses</strong> <strong>domestically to generate electricity and desalinated water</u></strong></mark>.</p> </s>

Multiple experts predict largest economic growth in years

many analysts insist the more upbeat view is justified this time Behravesh and other economists said, the economy has shown greater resilience than expected the overall growth rate should pick up it would mark the fastest annual growth since 2005, when the economy expanded by 3.1 percent. It is also well above the 2 percent rise in output the economy has averaged over the last three years. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office also sees relatively fast growth of 3.4 percent next year, and 3.6 percent between 2015 and 2018 private economists are even more bullish Glassman senior economist at JP Morgan estimates the economy could expand by 4 percent in both 2014 and 2015. If that were to come to pass, it would be the strongest back-to-back annual growth since the late 1990s 2014 will be the real deal

[Nelson, has covered the economy and economics for the business section of The New York Times since August 2012, Even Pessimists Feel Optimistic About the American Economy, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/business/economy/even-pessimists-feel-optimistic-over-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0] /Wyo-MB Whatever the Fed’s conclusion, many analysts insist the more upbeat view is justified this time.¶ In particular, Mr. Behravesh and other economists said, the economy has shown greater resilience than expected in the face of tax increases and spending cuts in Washington. As the impact from this fiscal tightening eases, the overall growth rate should pick up.¶ Mr. Behravesh now expects the annual growth rate to rise to 2.9 percent in 2014 and 3.5 percent in 2015. If he’s right, it would mark the fastest annual growth since 2005, when the economy expanded by 3.1 percent. It is also well above the 2 percent rise in output the economy has averaged over the last three years.¶ The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office also sees relatively fast growth of 3.4 percent next year, and 3.6 percent between 2015 and 2018.¶ A few other private economists are even more bullish. Jim Glassman, senior economist at JP Morgan Chase’s commercial bank, estimates the economy could expand by 4 percent in both 2014 and 2015. If that were to come to pass, it would be the strongest back-to-back annual growth since the late 1990s.¶ “I think 2014 will be the real deal,” Mr. Glassman said. “If we get to that level, which I feel pretty confident about, economists will say it’s about time.”

<h4><strong>Multiple experts predict largest economic growth in years</h4><p>Schwartz, 6-15-13</p><p></strong>[Nelson, has covered the economy and economics for the business section of The New York Times since August 2012, Even Pessimists Feel Optimistic About the American Economy, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/business/economy/even-pessimists-feel-optimistic-over-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0] /Wyo-MB</p><p>Whatever the Fed’s conclusion, <u><strong>many analysts insist the more upbeat view is justified this time</u></strong>.¶ In particular, Mr. <u><strong>Behravesh and other economists said, the economy has shown greater resilience than expected</u></strong> in the face of tax increases and spending cuts in Washington. As the impact from this fiscal tightening eases, <u><strong>the overall growth rate should pick</u></strong> <u><strong>up</u></strong>.¶ Mr. Behravesh now expects the annual growth rate to rise to 2.9 percent in 2014 and 3.5 percent in 2015. If he’s right, <u><strong>it would mark the fastest annual growth since 2005, when the economy expanded by 3.1 percent. It is also well above the 2 percent rise in output the economy has averaged over the last three years.</u></strong>¶ <u><strong>The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office also sees relatively fast growth of 3.4 percent next year, and 3.6 percent between 2015 and 2018</u></strong>.¶ A few other <u><strong>private economists are even more bullish</u></strong>. Jim <u><strong>Glassman</u></strong>, <u><strong>senior economist at JP Morgan</u></strong> Chase’s commercial bank, <u><strong>estimates the economy could expand by 4 percent in both 2014 and 2015. If that were to come to pass, it would be the strongest back-to-back annual growth since the late 1990s</u></strong>.¶ “I think <u><strong>2014 will be the real deal</u></strong>,” Mr. Glassman said. “If we get to that level, which I feel pretty confident about, economists will say it’s about time.”</p>

Schwartz, 6-15-13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Schwartz, 6-15-13 fulltext: [Nelson, has covered the economy and economics for the business section of The New York Times since August 2012, Even Pessimists Feel Optimistic About the American Economy, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/business/economy/even-pessimists-feel-optimistic-over-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0] /Wyo-MB Whatever the Fed’s conclusion, many analysts insist the more upbeat view is justified this time.¶ In particular, Mr. Behravesh and other economists said, the economy has shown greater resilience than expected in the face of tax increases and spending cuts in Washington. As the impact from this fiscal tightening eases, the overall growth rate should pick up.¶ Mr. Behravesh now expects the annual growth rate to rise to 2.9 percent in 2014 and 3.5 percent in 2015. If he’s right, it would mark the fastest annual growth since 2005, when the economy expanded by 3.1 percent. It is also well above the 2 percent rise in output the economy has averaged over the last three years.¶ The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office also sees relatively fast growth of 3.4 percent next year, and 3.6 percent between 2015 and 2018.¶ A few other private economists are even more bullish. Jim Glassman, senior economist at JP Morgan Chase’s commercial bank, estimates the economy could expand by 4 percent in both 2014 and 2015. If that were to come to pass, it would be the strongest back-to-back annual growth since the late 1990s.¶ “I think 2014 will be the real deal,” Mr. Glassman said. “If we get to that level, which I feel pretty confident about, economists will say it’s about time.” [/INST] <h4><strong>Multiple experts predict largest economic growth in years</h4><p>Schwartz, 6-15-13</p><p></strong>[Nelson, has covered the economy and economics for the business section of The New York Times since August 2012, Even Pessimists Feel Optimistic About the American Economy, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/business/economy/even-pessimists-feel-optimistic-over-economy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0] /Wyo-MB</p><p>Whatever the Fed’s conclusion, <u><strong>many analysts insist the more upbeat view is justified this time</u></strong>.¶ In particular, Mr. <u><strong>Behravesh and other economists said, the economy has shown greater resilience than expected</u></strong> in the face of tax increases and spending cuts in Washington. As the impact from this fiscal tightening eases, <u><strong>the overall growth rate should pick</u></strong> <u><strong>up</u></strong>.¶ Mr. Behravesh now expects the annual growth rate to rise to 2.9 percent in 2014 and 3.5 percent in 2015. If he’s right, <u><strong>it would mark the fastest annual growth since 2005, when the economy expanded by 3.1 percent. It is also well above the 2 percent rise in output the economy has averaged over the last three years.</u></strong>¶ <u><strong>The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office also sees relatively fast growth of 3.4 percent next year, and 3.6 percent between 2015 and 2018</u></strong>.¶ A few other <u><strong>private economists are even more bullish</u></strong>. Jim <u><strong>Glassman</u></strong>, <u><strong>senior economist at JP Morgan</u></strong> Chase’s commercial bank, <u><strong>estimates the economy could expand by 4 percent in both 2014 and 2015. If that were to come to pass, it would be the strongest back-to-back annual growth since the late 1990s</u></strong>.¶ “I think <u><strong>2014 will be the real deal</u></strong>,” Mr. Glassman said. “If we get to that level, which I feel pretty confident about, economists will say it’s about time.”</p> </s>

Yes CIR – GOP’s on board

While some Republicans and conservatives remain skeptical that support for immigration reform Republicans mulling a White House bid "are eager to pass something Republicans may end up agreeing to the emerging framework — which would be a real breakthrough for the chances of passing real immigration reform

While some conservatives remain skeptical Republicans mulling a White House bid "are eager to pass something Republicans may end up agreeing which would be a real breakthrough for reform,

While some Republicans and conservatives remain skeptical that support for immigration reform will result in more votes from the Latino community, other Republicans mulling a White House bid "are eager to pass something," Bouie said.¶ "So Republicans may end up agreeing to the emerging framework — which would be a real breakthrough for the chances of passing real immigration reform, albeit less ambitious than liberal supporters might like."

<h4>Yes CIR – GOP’s on board</h4><p>John <strong>Mariani</strong>, Politics for the Times. 3/11/<strong>13</strong> </p><p><u><strong><mark>While some</mark> Republicans and <mark>conservatives remain skeptical</mark> that support for immigration reform</u></strong> will result in more votes from the Latino community, other <u><strong><mark>Republicans mulling a White House bid "are eager to pass something</u></strong></mark>," Bouie said.¶ "So <u><strong><mark>Republicans may end up agreeing</mark> to the emerging framework — <mark>which would be a real breakthrough</mark> <mark>for</mark> the chances of passing real immigration <mark>reform</u></strong>,</mark> albeit less ambitious than liberal supporters might like."</p>

John Mariani, Politics for the Times. 3/11/13

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: John Mariani, Politics for the Times. 3/11/13 fulltext: While some Republicans and conservatives remain skeptical that support for immigration reform will result in more votes from the Latino community, other Republicans mulling a White House bid "are eager to pass something," Bouie said.¶ "So Republicans may end up agreeing to the emerging framework — which would be a real breakthrough for the chances of passing real immigration reform, albeit less ambitious than liberal supporters might like." [/INST] <h4>Yes CIR – GOP’s on board</h4><p>John <strong>Mariani</strong>, Politics for the Times. 3/11/<strong>13</strong> </p><p><u><strong><mark>While some</mark> Republicans and <mark>conservatives remain skeptical</mark> that support for immigration reform</u></strong> will result in more votes from the Latino community, other <u><strong><mark>Republicans mulling a White House bid "are eager to pass something</u></strong></mark>," Bouie said.¶ "So <u><strong><mark>Republicans may end up agreeing</mark> to the emerging framework — <mark>which would be a real breakthrough</mark> <mark>for</mark> the chances of passing real immigration <mark>reform</u></strong>,</mark> albeit less ambitious than liberal supporters might like."</p> </s>

Econ collapse in China causes extinction

political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum A fragmented China could also result in - nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

economic collapse resulting in civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on stability. A fragmented China could result in nuclear weapons falling into the hands of warlords a disintegrating China would pose a threat to the world

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario- nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords. From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.

<h4>Econ collapse in China causes extinction</h4><p><strong>Yee and Storey 2</strong> Herbert is a Professor of Politics and IR @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian is a Lecturer in Defence Studies @ Deakin University. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p. 5 </p><p>The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of <u>political and <mark>economic collapse </mark>in the PRC, <mark>resulting in</mark> territorial fragmentation, <mark>civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries</mark>. </u>Naturally, any or all of <u><mark>these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on </mark>regional <mark>stability.</mark> </u>Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These <u>problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum </u>in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. <u><mark>A fragmented China could</mark> also <mark>result in</mark> </u>another nightmare scenario<u>- <strong><mark>nuclear weapons falling into the hands of</mark> irresponsible</strong> local provincial leaders or <strong><mark>warlords</u></strong></mark>. From this perspective, <u><mark>a disintegrating China would</mark> also <mark>pose a threat to </mark>its neighbours and <strong><mark>the world</mark>.</p></u></strong>

Yee and Storey 2 Herbert is a Professor of Politics and IR @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian is a Lecturer in Defence Studies @ Deakin University. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p. 5

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Yee and Storey 2 Herbert is a Professor of Politics and IR @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian is a Lecturer in Defence Studies @ Deakin University. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p. 5 fulltext: The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario- nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords. From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world. [/INST] <h4>Econ collapse in China causes extinction</h4><p><strong>Yee and Storey 2</strong> Herbert is a Professor of Politics and IR @ Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian is a Lecturer in Defence Studies @ Deakin University. “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality,” p. 5 </p><p>The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of <u>political and <mark>economic collapse </mark>in the PRC, <mark>resulting in</mark> territorial fragmentation, <mark>civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries</mark>. </u>Naturally, any or all of <u><mark>these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on </mark>regional <mark>stability.</mark> </u>Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and pollution. These <u>problems are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum </u>in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. <u><mark>A fragmented China could</mark> also <mark>result in</mark> </u>another nightmare scenario<u>- <strong><mark>nuclear weapons falling into the hands of</mark> irresponsible</strong> local provincial leaders or <strong><mark>warlords</u></strong></mark>. From this perspective, <u><mark>a disintegrating China would</mark> also <mark>pose a threat to </mark>its neighbours and <strong><mark>the world</mark>.</p></u></strong> </s>

[D.] Effective democracy promotion is key to solve global conflict

] /Wyo-MB Yet there are tangible stakes for the United States and indeed the world in the spread of democracy—namely, greater peace, prosperity, and pluralism Democracies often have conflicting priorities, and democracy promotion is not a panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is that established democracies never go to war with one another , durable stability flows from a domestic politics built on consensus and peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes similar international conduct for governments.

[Mark, adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights Council of Foreign Relations, February 2011, Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International Community, http://www.cfr.org/democracy-promotion/promoting-democracy-whys-hows-united-states-international-community/p24090] /Wyo-MB Furthering democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or mere lip service to build support for strategic policies. Yet there are tangible stakes for the United States and indeed the world in the spread of democracy—namely, greater peace, prosperity, and pluralism. Controversial means for promoting democracy and frequent mismatches between deeds and words have clouded appreciation of this truth.¶ ¶ Democracies often have conflicting priorities, and democracy promotion is not a panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is that established democracies never go to war with one another. Foreign policy “realists” advocate working with other governments on the basis of interests, irrespective of character, and suggest that this approach best preserves stability in the world. However, durable stability flows from a domestic politics built on consensus and peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes similar international conduct for governments.

<h4>[D.] <strong>Effective democracy promotion is key to solve global conflict</h4><p>Lagon, 2011</p><p></strong>[Mark, adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights Council of Foreign Relations, February 2011, Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International Community, http://www.cfr.org/democracy-promotion/promoting-democracy-whys-hows-united-states-international-community/p24090<u><strong>] /Wyo-MB</p><p></u></strong>Furthering democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or mere lip service to build support for strategic policies. <u><strong>Yet there are tangible stakes for the United States and indeed the world in the spread of democracy—namely, greater peace, prosperity, and pluralism</u></strong>. Controversial means for promoting democracy and frequent mismatches between deeds and words have clouded appreciation of this truth.¶ ¶ <u><strong>Democracies often have conflicting priorities, and democracy promotion is not a panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is that established democracies never go to war with one another</u></strong>. Foreign policy “realists” advocate working with other governments on the basis of interests, irrespective of character, and suggest that this approach best preserves stability in the world. However<u><strong>, durable stability flows from a domestic politics built on consensus and peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes similar international conduct for governments.</p></u></strong>

Lagon, 2011

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Lagon, 2011 fulltext: [Mark, adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights Council of Foreign Relations, February 2011, Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International Community, http://www.cfr.org/democracy-promotion/promoting-democracy-whys-hows-united-states-international-community/p24090] /Wyo-MB Furthering democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or mere lip service to build support for strategic policies. Yet there are tangible stakes for the United States and indeed the world in the spread of democracy—namely, greater peace, prosperity, and pluralism. Controversial means for promoting democracy and frequent mismatches between deeds and words have clouded appreciation of this truth.¶ ¶ Democracies often have conflicting priorities, and democracy promotion is not a panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is that established democracies never go to war with one another. Foreign policy “realists” advocate working with other governments on the basis of interests, irrespective of character, and suggest that this approach best preserves stability in the world. However, durable stability flows from a domestic politics built on consensus and peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes similar international conduct for governments. [/INST] <h4>[D.] <strong>Effective democracy promotion is key to solve global conflict</h4><p>Lagon, 2011</p><p></strong>[Mark, adjunct Senior Fellow for Human Rights Council of Foreign Relations, February 2011, Promoting Democracy: The Whys and Hows for the United States and the International Community, http://www.cfr.org/democracy-promotion/promoting-democracy-whys-hows-united-states-international-community/p24090<u><strong>] /Wyo-MB</p><p></u></strong>Furthering democracy is often dismissed as moralism distinct from U.S. interests or mere lip service to build support for strategic policies. <u><strong>Yet there are tangible stakes for the United States and indeed the world in the spread of democracy—namely, greater peace, prosperity, and pluralism</u></strong>. Controversial means for promoting democracy and frequent mismatches between deeds and words have clouded appreciation of this truth.¶ ¶ <u><strong>Democracies often have conflicting priorities, and democracy promotion is not a panacea. Yet one of the few truly robust findings in international relations is that established democracies never go to war with one another</u></strong>. Foreign policy “realists” advocate working with other governments on the basis of interests, irrespective of character, and suggest that this approach best preserves stability in the world. However<u><strong>, durable stability flows from a domestic politics built on consensus and peaceful competition, which more often than not promotes similar international conduct for governments.</p></u></strong> </s>

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US energy investment in the region is key to competitiveness

A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success the United States is not the only partner to choose from– with China’s influence growing radical populism fueled by Venezuela’s petrodollars and allied with dangerous extra-regional forces pose a daunting set of challenges. Alongside a positive economic engagement is an indispensable obligation to US security and regional leadership An aggressive foreign investment strategy in today’s hypercompetitive globalized economy are imperatives the Western Hemisphere supplies one-quarter of the world’s crude oil Three of the United States’ top four foreign sources of energy are in the Americas. The US administration must recognize this reality and act to take full advantage of the opportunities

A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success the United States is not the only partner to choose from– with China’s influence growing radical populism fueled by Venezuela’s petrodollars and allied with dangerous extra-regional forces pose a daunting set of challenges. Alongside a positive economic engagement is an indispensable obligation to US security and regional leadership An aggressive foreign investment strategy in today’s hypercompetitive globalized economy are imperatives the Western Hemisphere supplies one-quarter of the world’s crude oil Three of the United States’ top four foreign sources of energy are in the Americas.¶ The US administration must recognize this reality and act to take full advantage of the opportunities

A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success and security. However, the US economic and fiscal crises and preoccupation with two controversial wars distracted policy makers in Washington and undermined US leadership in the region. Although access to the US market, investment, technology, and other economic benefits is valued in most countries in the region, the United States is not the only partner to choose from– with China’s influence growing.¶ The United States must recover its own credibility by making bold decisions to restore fiscal responsibility, aggressive trade promotion, energy interdependence, and economic growth.¶ The security challenges in the Americas are very real and growing more complicated every day. Illegal narcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime, and radical populism fueled by Venezuela’s petrodollars and allied with dangerous extra-regional forces pose a daunting set of challenges. Alongside a positive economic engagement, assessing and addressing threats is an indispensable obligation to US security and regional leadership.¶ Expanding Regional Economic Cooperation and Trade Integration¶ An aggressive trade promotion and foreign investment strategy in today’s hypercompetitive globalized economy are imperatives.¶ Mexico, Chile, Peru, Brazil, and Colombia have been at the forefront in modernizing their economies, liberalizing trade, opening their economies to investment, and becoming more competitive overall. Since 2003, an estimated 73 million Latin Americans have risen out of poverty. Moreover, between then and 2010, the average Latin American income increased by more than 30 percent, meaning that today nearly one-third of the region’s one-billion population is considered middle class. And in just the next five years, regional economies are projected to expand by one-third. That macroeconomic stability generates even greater opportunities for US business.¶ Already the Western Hemisphere supplies one-quarter of the world’s crude oil, one-third of the world’s natural gas, nearly one-fourth of its coal, and more than a third of global electricity, while offering tremendous potential for the development of renewable energy technologies. Three of the United States’ top four foreign sources of energy are in the Americas.¶ The US administration must recognize this reality and act to take full advantage of the opportunities.

<h4>US energy investment in the region is key to competitiveness</h4><p><strong>Noriega ’12</strong> [Roger, visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has served as a U.S. diplomat and policy maker, specializing in Western Hemisphere Affairs “Latin America is crucial to US competitiveness,” http://www.aei-ideas.org/2012/10/latin-america-is-crucial-to-us-competitiveness/]</p><p><u><mark>A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success</u></mark> and security. However, the US economic and fiscal crises and preoccupation with two controversial wars distracted policy makers in Washington and undermined US leadership in the region. Although access to the US market, investment, technology, and other economic benefits is valued in most countries in the region, <u><mark>the United States is not the only partner to choose from– with China’s influence growing</u></mark>.¶ The United States must recover its own credibility by making bold decisions to restore fiscal responsibility, aggressive trade promotion, energy interdependence, and economic growth.¶ The security challenges in the Americas are very real and growing more complicated every day. Illegal narcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime, and <u><mark>radical populism fueled by Venezuela’s petrodollars and allied with dangerous extra-regional forces pose a daunting set of challenges. Alongside a positive economic engagement</u></mark>, assessing and addressing threats <u><mark>is an indispensable obligation to US security and regional leadership</u></mark>.¶ Expanding Regional Economic Cooperation and Trade Integration¶ <u><mark>An aggressive</u> </mark>trade promotion and <u><mark>foreign investment strategy in today’s hypercompetitive globalized economy are imperatives</u></mark>.¶ Mexico, Chile, Peru, Brazil, and Colombia have been at the forefront in modernizing their economies, liberalizing trade, opening their economies to investment, and becoming more competitive overall. Since 2003, an estimated 73 million Latin Americans have risen out of poverty. Moreover, between then and 2010, the average Latin American income increased by more than 30 percent, meaning that today nearly one-third of the region’s one-billion population is considered middle class. And in just the next five years, regional economies are projected to expand by one-third. That macroeconomic stability generates even greater opportunities for US business.¶ Already <u><mark>the Western Hemisphere supplies one-quarter of the world’s crude oil</u></mark>, one-third of the world’s natural gas, nearly one-fourth of its coal, and more than a third of global electricity, while offering tremendous potential for the development of renewable energy technologies. <u><mark>Three of the United States’ top four foreign sources of energy are in the Americas.</u>¶<u> The US administration must recognize this reality and act to take full advantage of the opportunities</u></mark>.</p>

Noriega ’12 [Roger, visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has served as a U.S. diplomat and policy maker, specializing in Western Hemisphere Affairs “Latin America is crucial to US competitiveness,” http://www.aei-ideas.org/2012/10/latin-america-is-crucial-to-us-competitiveness/]

<s> [INST] Convert the following into an HTML formatted debate card with tag, citation, and formatted underlined/highlighted text: citation: Noriega ’12 [Roger, visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has served as a U.S. diplomat and policy maker, specializing in Western Hemisphere Affairs “Latin America is crucial to US competitiveness,” http://www.aei-ideas.org/2012/10/latin-america-is-crucial-to-us-competitiveness/] fulltext: A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success and security. However, the US economic and fiscal crises and preoccupation with two controversial wars distracted policy makers in Washington and undermined US leadership in the region. Although access to the US market, investment, technology, and other economic benefits is valued in most countries in the region, the United States is not the only partner to choose from– with China’s influence growing.¶ The United States must recover its own credibility by making bold decisions to restore fiscal responsibility, aggressive trade promotion, energy interdependence, and economic growth.¶ The security challenges in the Americas are very real and growing more complicated every day. Illegal narcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime, and radical populism fueled by Venezuela’s petrodollars and allied with dangerous extra-regional forces pose a daunting set of challenges. Alongside a positive economic engagement, assessing and addressing threats is an indispensable obligation to US security and regional leadership.¶ Expanding Regional Economic Cooperation and Trade Integration¶ An aggressive trade promotion and foreign investment strategy in today’s hypercompetitive globalized economy are imperatives.¶ Mexico, Chile, Peru, Brazil, and Colombia have been at the forefront in modernizing their economies, liberalizing trade, opening their economies to investment, and becoming more competitive overall. Since 2003, an estimated 73 million Latin Americans have risen out of poverty. Moreover, between then and 2010, the average Latin American income increased by more than 30 percent, meaning that today nearly one-third of the region’s one-billion population is considered middle class. And in just the next five years, regional economies are projected to expand by one-third. That macroeconomic stability generates even greater opportunities for US business.¶ Already the Western Hemisphere supplies one-quarter of the world’s crude oil, one-third of the world’s natural gas, nearly one-fourth of its coal, and more than a third of global electricity, while offering tremendous potential for the development of renewable energy technologies. Three of the United States’ top four foreign sources of energy are in the Americas.¶ The US administration must recognize this reality and act to take full advantage of the opportunities. [/INST] <h4>US energy investment in the region is key to competitiveness</h4><p><strong>Noriega ’12</strong> [Roger, visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has served as a U.S. diplomat and policy maker, specializing in Western Hemisphere Affairs “Latin America is crucial to US competitiveness,” http://www.aei-ideas.org/2012/10/latin-america-is-crucial-to-us-competitiveness/]</p><p><u><mark>A stable and prosperous Americas is indispensable to US economic success</u></mark> and security. However, the US economic and fiscal crises and preoccupation with two controversial wars distracted policy makers in Washington and undermined US leadership in the region. Although access to the US market, investment, technology, and other economic benefits is valued in most countries in the region, <u><mark>the United States is not the only partner to choose from– with China’s influence growing</u></mark>.¶ The United States must recover its own credibility by making bold decisions to restore fiscal responsibility, aggressive trade promotion, energy interdependence, and economic growth.¶ The security challenges in the Americas are very real and growing more complicated every day. Illegal narcotics trafficking, transnational organized crime, and <u><mark>radical populism fueled by Venezuela’s petrodollars and allied with dangerous extra-regional forces pose a daunting set of challenges. Alongside a positive economic engagement</u></mark>, assessing and addressing threats <u><mark>is an indispensable obligation to US security and regional leadership</u></mark>.¶ Expanding Regional Economic Cooperation and Trade Integration¶ <u><mark>An aggressive</u> </mark>trade promotion and <u><mark>foreign investment strategy in today’s hypercompetitive globalized economy are imperatives</u></mark>.¶ Mexico, Chile, Peru, Brazil, and Colombia have been at the forefront in modernizing their economies, liberalizing trade, opening their economies to investment, and becoming more competitive overall. Since 2003, an estimated 73 million Latin Americans have risen out of poverty. Moreover, between then and 2010, the average Latin American income increased by more than 30 percent, meaning that today nearly one-third of the region’s one-billion population is considered middle class. And in just the next five years, regional economies are projected to expand by one-third. That macroeconomic stability generates even greater opportunities for US business.¶ Already <u><mark>the Western Hemisphere supplies one-quarter of the world’s crude oil</u></mark>, one-third of the world’s natural gas, nearly one-fourth of its coal, and more than a third of global electricity, while offering tremendous potential for the development of renewable energy technologies. <u><mark>Three of the United States’ top four foreign sources of energy are in the Americas.</u>¶<u> The US administration must recognize this reality and act to take full advantage of the opportunities</u></mark>.</p> </s>